SUMARY: Recommended Actions

The national elections on July 2 marked an historic shift in Mexico. After 71 years of uninterrupted rule, the PRI (Institutional Revolutionary Party) lost the presidency to center-right opposition leader Vicente Fox. The former governor of the state of Guanajuato garnered 43% of the vote to 37% for PRI candidate and former Interior Minister Francisco Labastida. Cuauhtemoc Cardenas, leader of the center-left PRD (Party of the Democratic Revolution), was third with 17%. Fox’s opposition coalition, which included the National Action Party (PAN) and the Green Ecology Party (PVEM), won a plurality of seats in the Chamber of Deputies. The PRI won a plurality in the Senate, leaving no party with a majority in either house of Congress.

Turnout was strong (64%). The elections were well-run, and complaints about logistical problems or fraud were not widespread. Ten civic organizations and 860 international visitors observed the balloting . They praised the professionalism and impartiality of the Federal Electoral Institute (IFE), which was responsible for oversight of the entire electoral process. The organizations criticized practices, mostly by the PRI, of vote buying and other forms of electoral pressure, especially in rural areas, in the period leading up to the vote.

President Zedillo and PRI candidate Labastida recognized Fox’s victory a few hours after the polls closed. That simple gesture curtailed uncertainty about how the regime would respond to an electoral defeat and marked an important step in the consolidation of democracy in Mexico.

In Chiapas, there was substantial concern prior to the elections about how the high level of militarization might inhibit voting in rural areas. The Army did withdraw its checkpoints on election day. Nevertheless, it is likely that turnout was reduced as a result of the climate of intimidation that exists in some areas.

For its part, the EZLN (Zapatista Army of National Liberation) issued a communiqué stating that it would not impede the voting process and that Zapatista supporters were free to vote. The EZLN’s position is likely to be a significant factor in the August 20 governor’s election in Chiapas in which an opposition coalition led by Pablo Salazar is presenting a strong challenge to the PRI candidate, Sami David. On the other hand, the PRI demonstrated its strength by carrying the presidential election in Chiapas and all but one of the congressional seats.

A couple of factors were prominent in Fox’s victory. His well-run campaign took full advantage of his personality and charisma. Perhaps even more important was the degree to which Mexicans were fed up with the PRI. Fox even pulled thousands of voters who normally support the left but who voted for him as the best bet to actually defeat the PRI.

The president-elect will face serious problems when he assumes office in December, including daunting levels of poverty and inequality, widespread human rights violations, and severe inadequacies in the judicial system. His effectiveness will depend on his ability to build a working coalition. He has emphasized his commitment to inclusivity in his government and his intention to include the PRI in his cabinet. He has also distanced himself somewhat from the PAN, his original electoral base. For its part, the center-left PRD has staked out a position as the “responsible opposition” rather than a collaborator with the new government. Hence it is possible that Fox may end up depending significantly on the backing of the PRI in the shaping of his policies.

In addition to the applause of many foreign governments for Mexico’s democratic transition, the market responded positively to Fox’s victory. He is expected to continue economic policy along the same lines as his predecessor.

Regarding the Chiapas conflict, a statement by Fox early in the campaign asserting that if he were elected, he could “work out the problem in 15 minutes” was not reassuring to those involved in the peace process. However later he declared his intention to present to Congress the COCOPA (congressional Commission for Agreement and Pacification) legislative proposal for implementation of the 1996 San Andres Accords (signed but never implemented by the government.) He also indicated his support for renewed dialogue on the outstanding issues in the stalled peace talks, and he said he would consider a pullback of Army troops in order to reduce tensions. The fact that neither the PRI nor the PAN supported the COCOPA proposal in the past suggests that it may not have smooth sailing in the Congress.

Meanwhile, in Chiapas there were a number of violent ambushes in recent months. The victims were of various political affiliations. In one case, seven police were killed. The perpetrators of the attacks have not been identified. However, the attacks did result in increased pressure by the military on nearby villages.

Another factor that has contributed to tensions in recent months is the expanded deployment throughout the conflict areas of the Federal Preventive Police (PFP). The deployment of the PFP in Montes Azules, an area of strong Zapatista influence, and threats to remove indigenous communities there for “ecological crimes” illustrate how the PFP is being used by the federal government as another control mechanism.

President-elect Fox will not assume office until December. The hotly contested governor’s election in Chiapas on August 20 and the unprecedented transfer of power at the national level introduce elements of uncertainty and potential instability during the interregnum, especially in Chiapas where the PRI old guard remains strong. The relentless military pressure used to pen in Zapatista supporters only seems to exacerbate tensions.

Acciones Recomendadas

• Congratulate President Zedillo for his role in assuring free elections on July 2 and for his statesmanship in recognizing the results and pledging to cooperate with President-elect Fox to ensure a smooth transfer of power. Urge him to use his leadership to ensure a democratic process in the Chiapas governor’s election on August 20.
• Urge President Zedillo to minimize the possibility of violence in Chiapas during the remaining months of his tenure by withdrawing Army troops currently stationed in and around indigenous communities.
• Circulate information, such as this Report, on the situation in Chiapas.

Please write:

Lic. Ernesto Zedillo Ponce de León
Presidente de la República
Palacio Nacional
06067 México, DF – México
Fax: (int-52) 271 1764 / 515 4783