The National Encounter for Peace with Justice and Dignity convened July 5-7 in San Cristobal de las Casas, Chiapas. More than 1,000 people, including indigenous and non-indigenous, and representing 285 organizations, 23 states of the Republic and 13 countries, participated in the three-day event.

As its main objective, the Encounter sought to revive the articulation of civil society’s initiatives regarding the conflict in Chiapas, with emphasis on defending the San Andres Accords on indigenous rights and culture.

Toward this goal, work focused on three major themes:

1. the course of the armed conflict in Mexico, its consequences, and the peace process;
2. democracy and indigenous peoples’ rights; and
3. alternative economic development for indigenous communities, municipalities and peoples. The three were aimed at the building of alternatives for national and international civil participation toward peace with justice and dignity.

Time and reasons for the meeting

The initiative arose from a series of meetings held in Mexico City to create a new effort for peace. The call for the Encounter came from Samuel Ruiz, bishop emeritus of San Cristobal de las Casas. Other important personalities followed, including members of the ex-National Mediation Commission (CONAI), intellectuals, and representatives of various civil organizations and diverse social sectors.

One reason for convening the Encounter was because, according to Miguel Alvarez -from Services and Consulting for Peace (SERAPAZ)-, “in the short term, chances for the resumption of the dialogue are not clear. (…) the possibility of renewing national attention about the situation in Chiapas ought to come from civil society, due to [the fact that] the vision of the current situation is reduced to disputes between communities”. (Hoy, 7/4/02).

Felipe Toussaint, from the Commission of Support for Unity and Community Reconciliation (CORECO), considered that after the grand initiatives of 1994-96, the popular mobilization in favor of a peaceful solution to the conflict in Chiapas was significantly reduced. The massacre at Acteal generated an important reaction, but it declined after the attacks to several autonomous municipalities in 1998. The elections of 2000 contributed to the dispersion and division of a civil society that, nevertheless, demonstrated a great capacity for mobilization during the Zapatista march to Mexico City at the beginning of 2001.

However, the retreat and prolonged silence of the Zapatista commanders, after the approval of an indigenous reform substantially different from the San Andres Accords, led the situation to an impasse; and it continues even after the resolution of the Supreme Court (SCJN) concerning the complaints filed against the indigenous law (see Update). On this crucial conjuncture, Toussaint said, “it was important that civil society said: We are here, present, and we want to continue working for a peaceful solution, as an actor that must be taken into account in the peace process”.

Gonzalo Ituarte, former member of CONAI, noted that “Vicente Fox’s Administration at this time has no clarity about the conflict, the peace process, the indigenous problem or their long-standing causes… Today the availability of a new effort-willingness is not visible in Chiapas, and there is only polarization and destruction of the social fabric. The peace that Fox speaks of in his trips abroad seems to be only the silence of arms, and he has not understood that the conflict is still in force: the army continues its maneuvers, the EZLN continues to be armed, the declaration of war is valid and the problem of the paramilitaries remains. Meanwhile, as long as those who are responsible politically, economically or militarily for this are not punished, it will be difficult to be confident that minimal conditions for a peaceful dialogue exist.” (La Jornada, 7/11/02).

Absences, silences and disputes

Organizers of the Encounter sent a letter to the EZLN, informing its leaders about the event and requesting their support, so that their civil bases would participate. The letter explained the organizers’ will not to pressure the EZLN to modify its current strategy. In any case, the EZLN did not spoke in favor or against the Encounter, although participation of its sympathizers and Zapatista support bases at the meeting was evident.

As Toussaint suggested, “Perhaps it is important to the EZLN to see the results of the Encounter, [to see] how many people will succeed in coming together and to see if civil society will continue moving or not. Because since the beginning, when they stopped ‘sounding the rifles,’ as they say, and searched for a political, dialogical solution, their desire has been to rely on civil society.”

The federal and state governments seemed to view the Encounter in good faith, in principle. Santiago Creel, secretary of the Government (minister of Interior), declared “I hope that the reflections in San Cristobal de las Casas will be something that contributes to enrich the reflection and debate on an issue that requires to be studied, that demands a permanent consideration.” (Diario de Chiapas, 7/5/02). For his part, the secretary of the Government of Chiapas, Emilio Zebadua, said that the Encounter “surely will shed light on what [the participants] consider necessary for the EZLN to break the silence and give a small sign that permits a glimpse of an opportunity to return to the negotiation table.” (Expreso, 11/7/02).

Nevertheless, the tension increased in the days preceding the opening. In a press conference, event organizers feared that the state government would try “to capitalize on the efforts of civil society as if it were carrying out a joint project with them or as if the event would support their initiatives about the Chiapas question”. Taking steps, the organizers made it clear that they would not allow the state government to press them with the intention to put pressure on the Zapatistas through the Encounter.

Although some government officials participated actively or as observers, a few days after the Encounter, Governor Salazar questioned: “Are they so gullible, so naive, so foolish that they believe it is possible to build a process of reconciliation in Chiapas aside or against the government, or isolating the government?” (…) “There were proposals of peace with the language of war, proposals of reconciliation but excluding the government.” (Expreso, 7/11/02).

Toussaint reasoned: “Pablo Salazar forgets that these organizations -that in some way helped him become governor- have decided to act with a healthy autonomy regarding the government, in order to maintain an ability to come together and dialogue with those actors who are in opposition to the government. (…) The peace process is everyone’s responsibility, and each one has his or her function in it. As civil society we have our role, and we do not need to wait for the government to tell us what to do.”

Achievements, challenges and questions

In countable terms, the Encounter was an undisputed success. Historian Andres Aubry described the Encounter as a brick for the construction of peace: the attendance of more than 1000 people from everywhere demonstrated that civil society is not passive. “The people responded to this event,” he said. “They came from everywhere and in good numbers … [The Encounter] shows that called upon, civil society will respond when there is an emergency.” (Expreso, 7/10/02).

According to Toussaint, while the defense of the San Andres Accords was reaffirmed, the Encounter sparked a great interest and effort at moving toward a major articulation with other themes, such as economics (i.e. the struggle against the Puebla-Panama Plan and the Free Trade Area of the Americas) and other sectorial initiatives.

The participants agreed to deliver the conclusions of the Encounter to the ministers of the SCJN on July 14, and to hold a second Encounter in six months, possibly in the state of Guerrero, to reaffirm the national character of the process.

Far beyond the immediate enthusiasm and evident success of the gathering, questions remain over the future of the initiative, mostly concerning its possible impact on the political actors and the follow up on the approved motions. Much will depend on the ability of the organizations to articulate joint strategies for implementing their committments, especially now that the SCJN has already made its ruling.

Main agreements

Results of the three major areas of work focused in 11 points:

• To orient all civil struggles so as to create conditions for peace, respect for human rights and the building of democracy.
• To defend the San Andres Accords, calling for the fulfillment of the three remaining conditions of the EZLN.
• To strengthen civil observation and participation in the struggle against militarization and paramilitarization, and for the release of political prisoners, and for decent conditions for the return of those displaced by the conflict.
• To involve women and men equally in all processes and projects in the struggle for the construction of peace.
• To broadcast the grave situation of war and conflicts at a national level, as well as the need for a true and lasting peace.
• To support the indigenous peoples’ processes of autonomy and resistance.
• To stimulate the unity and participation of civil society for the construction of peace and democracy.
• To promote political practices based on “to govern obeying” [a zapatista definition of democratic government] and respectful of cultural diversity.
• To encourage Mexican civil society’s participation in the processes of continental and international struggle against neoliberal globalization projects, such as the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the Puebla-Panama Plan (PPP) and the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA).
• To reinforce the struggle against privatization, to defend the labor rights contained in Article 123 of the Constitution and to recover the original spirit of Article 27.
• To develop economic alternatives that favor autonomy, and biological and cultural diversity.