The optimism that prevailed since the beginning of the year was shattered by the approval of a constitutional reform on indigenous rights and culture that was quickly rejected by the EZLN and other indigenous organizations. The approval of the legislative proposal drafted by COCOPA in 1996 was one of the conditions listed by the Zapatistas last December for a renewal of peace talks. Hence the peace process has entered into a new crisis: stalemate, uncertainty and the risk that groups who opt for violent struggle may be the new order of the day.

The time of hope

From the time President Fox assumed office last December, a significant change was apparent with regard to the federal government’s treatment of the Chiapas conflict. During the previous administration of Ernesto Zedillo, a continual attempt was made to minimize the conflict, whereas initially Fox put the issue at the top of the national agenda.

While the process of rapprochement proceeded with ups and downs, the EZLN was able to carry out its caravan to Mexico City (February-March) in order to lobby for the COCOPA legislative proposal without major problems. Along the way the caravan received the support of thousands of indigenous and others as it traveled through twelve states. The caravan culminated with the speeches of the Zapatistas and other indigenous leaders from the floor of Congress.

That event was historic, and the speeches of the Zapatista commanders were themselves hopeful, confirming their decision to pursue their struggle through dialogue and political means. They recognized that the Fox administration had offered signs of peace by withdrawing from specific military bases named by the EZLN and by freeing nearly all of the Zapatista prisoners. A first meeting took place between the designated Zapatista contact person and the federal peace commissioner, thus marking the incipient renewal of the peace process. It was the first direct contact between the EZLN and the Executive in nearly five years.

At the same time, the success of the Zapatista march raised hopes that a political opening had been achieved that would facilitate the approval of the COCOPA bill. Perhaps this optimism explains the decision of the EZLN – which has been criticized by many – to retreat to the silence of the jungle in Chiapas during the process of discussion of the law in Congress.

Frustrated expectations

The approval of an indigenous rights law different from the COCOPA proposal marked the end of the possibility for rapprochement. Its rejection by the EZLN and the CNI was immediate. Other indigenous and non-governmental organizations were quick to do the same. Their criticisms were both of form and of content. (See Indigenous reform: What is at stake?)

While groups close to the government affirmed that the new law constitutes an advance (albeit limited), groups close to the indigenous movement see it as a potentially fatal blow to the peace process. For the Zapatistas, the reform violates the San Andres Accords which they signed with the previous government, and that closes off the possibility of renewing peace talks. From their viewpoint, why talk with the government if it will not abide by the agreements it has already made?

It is worth noting that the new law was widely rejected by its supposed beneficiaries: the indigenous organizations and communities. Even the government agencies that attend to indigenous issues criticized the new law.

Polemic in the states

Once approved by the federal Congress, the constitutional reform had to be ratified by the state congresses. Historically this legal procedure has been conducted almost automatically with little debate or fanfare. In the case of the indigenous law, the voting in the state congresses generated unprecedented interest and polemics. For the first time, there was intense lobbying of the legislators by civil society, and the votes were not always along predictable lines. In a number of cases, the political parties did not vote as a block.

The states with the largest concentration of indigenous population that rejected the reform are also the most explosive ones with the largest guerrilla presence (Oaxaca, Chiapas and Guerrero). Some analysts suggest that their rejection of the law undermines its legitimacy, since it does not resolve the issue of indigenous rights nor does it open the way to a peaceful solution of the conflict in Chiapas. Hence the discussion about the possible disconnect between legality and legitimacy. On an issue like this, it is difficult for a system of representative government to respond to the demands of the indigenous peoples when they constitute a minority with little representation in the structures of power (something which the COCOPA proposal attempted to change.)

Future prospects

The Congress frustrated the expectations of the indigenous peoples, voting for a law that they do not desire. The Executive officially published the law despite the fact that it was very different from the proposal the President had submitted. In this final stage, the judicial branch appears to be the new actor that could play a key role, since the Supreme Court is expected to rule on the appeals that have been filed against the law by the PRD, county authorities, and state congresses.

Apart from the drama of the situation, it is interesting to observe the dynamic give and take that for the first time is unfolding among the three branches of government and which has succeeded in maintaining the issue of indigenous rights at the center of the national political agenda.

Equally interesting is to gauge the capacity of civil society, through national and international mobilization, to question the legitimacy of the new law. In this regard, a key tool is Convention 169 on Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries, which Mexico ratified, and which the constitutional reform is in conflict with on fundamental aspects related to self-determination. However, the diplomatic weight of the Mexican government in international organizations is well known, and the challenge is great.

The Fox administration’s policy with regard to Chiapas has been ambiguous, and it appears that there is no long-term peace strategy. Some critics argue that President Fox only sent the COCOPA proposal to Congress because of the pressure to resolve the conflict in Chiapas and to give positive signals at the beginning of his term. But, they say, he did not lobby for his proposal on Chiapas like he did on other issues that were of greater importance to him, such as fiscal reform and approval of his budget.

With regard to his Chiapas policy, while it is true that he has not back-tracked on the withdrawal of the military bases, since the law was approved, the indigenous communities have begun to denounce a new increase in military presence and harassment. Nor has there been any further advance in the process of freeing Zapatista prisoners.

Fulfillment of the Zapatista conditions now looks like history, not like a current issue in the efforts to renew the dialogue. In fact, administration representatives argue that they have already done everything within their reach for peace in Chiapas and that the decision about whether to talk is in the hands of the Zapatistas. In view of the increasing tensions in Chiapas, some of the comments of President Fox are worrisome (for example, ” There is no conflict. We are in holy peace.”).

The actual proposals of the government to respond to the situation may be inadequate. The idea of resorting to secondary implementation laws as a means of improving the constitutional reform is not likely to be enough to rebuild the confidence of the EZLN. Another strategy of the administration seems to be to attempt to directly address the causes of the conflict, that is, to promote economic and social development projects in the indigenous communities of Chiapas. However this approach loses sight of the fact that the indigenous issue is national and not just regional. Moreover this strategy was tried by the previous administration without positive results. The economic situation of the indigenous is worse than at the beginning of the conflict. And in the majority of cases, the government assistance has fomented intra-communal divisions, especially when it was used as part of a counterinsurgency strategy or as a form of political patronage. Currently there is a great deal of polarization between those who accept the aid and the Zapatistas, who refuse it as part of their strategy of resistance.

On another front, the Fox administration is confronting the consequences of the economic policies associated with the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). Farming production has been seriously effected and today is in a deep crisis in a number of sectors, especially coffee, corn, sugarcane, and fishing. If the crisis and the increasing protests of peasants and other farm laborers should continue, the Chiapas conflict could become a secondary concern on the complicated national stage.

For its part, the EZLN appears to have opted to return to a posture of “resistance.” This decision generates tensions, including within Zapatista communities, because of weariness and the grave economic situation in the conflict areas. Another possibility that has been mentioned – and which would be even more worrisome – is that the EZLN might seek to ally itself with other guerrilla groups, which have already expressed their support for the Zapatistas decision to refuse to renew peace talks. Some analysts have been inclined to read the EZLN’s last communiqué in this sense: “[The legislators and the government] reinforce the logic of the different armed groups in Mexico by invalidating a process of dialogue and negotiation.” (EZLN communiqué, April 29, 2001)

In any case, even if this is not an actual choice of the Zapatista leadership, in the increasing tension of the conflict, some dynamics may escape the control of the key actors and unleash a process that later would be difficult to reverse.

The unseen war

Meanwhile in Chiapas, the consequences of the approval of the law weigh on the level of community harmony and make the challenge of governing even more difficult for the administration of Governor Pablo Salazar.

After the Zapatista caravan, and during the brief process of discussion of the proposed law, there was a period of noticeably reduced social, political and military tension in Chiapas. But with the new crisis, the tendency is once again toward greater polarization.

SERAPAZ (Peace Services and Consulting) has denounced the “explosiveness” of the situation which continues to deteriorate with land conflicts, the generally unchecked presence of the paramilitary groups, the unresolved situation of the thousands of displaced, manifestations of social discontent, etc. The situation is further aggravated by the tense pre-electoral climate (county and state congress elections are scheduled for October.)

Previously the axis of tension among the organizations was the division between those affiliated with the PRI (the former ruling party) and opposition or independent groups. Today the confrontation is also between those who support the independent government of Pablo Salazar and those who refuse any sort of contact with the state government.

The Salazar government has been clear in its rejection of the indigenous law that was approved. Since he assumed office, Salazar also has insisted consistently that, in contrast to its predecessor, his government will not contribute to the divisions among the communities and the promotion of violence.

However some feel that up till now, Salazar has not taken clear positions with respect to highly sensitive issues related to the conflict, such as the paramilitary groups and the impunity they enjoy, which directly effects the situation of the internal refugees and their prospects for returning home. It is possible that not confronting these issues with greater clarity has to do both with his intention to maintain dialogue with all the different sectors as well as with the necessity of assuring a certain degree of governability in extremely difficult conditions.

Conflict of interests

After seven and a half years of conflict in Chiapas, Mexico has a new indigenous rights law that was not consulted with the indigenous peoples and that has been rejected by the majority of them.

A number of experts and organizations have stated that it is not happenstance that the constitutional reform differs from the San Andres Accords and the COCOPA proposal in fundamental aspects such as recognition of the indigenous peoples as subjects with legal rights and concrete guarantees regarding the means to exercise the autonomy that is theoretically recognized: land, territories, and the natural resources that exist on them. They point out that such rights are in potential conflict with the investment and economic exploitation projects of transnational companies in Chiapas and other parts of Mexico.

The dilemma is as clear as it is difficult, and it transcends the Chiapas conflict, although it also includes it: What national project is to be pursued in a Mexico that wishes to move toward greater democratization?