On September 6^th (at the time of this writing) the National Supreme Court of Justice (SCJN) rejected the complaints filed by indigenous municipalities against the constitutional reform on indigenous matters. Thus, the reform remained valid.

Background

In February 1996, initial negotiations between the federal government and the Zapatista Army of National Liberation (EZLN) culminated with the signing of the San Andres Accords on Indigenous Culture and Rights. At the end of that year, the legislative Commission for Agreement and Pacification (COCOPA) drafted a proposal for constitutional reform based on those accords.

After many vicissitudes, the draft was presented to Congress in December 2000 by the new president, Vicente Fox. In April 2001, Congress approved a reform package quite different from the original proposal. The package was rejected by the EZLN, along with the legislatures of the Mexican states with the highest concentrations of indigenous population, as well as their main organizations, considering it is a reduction of the San Andres Accords. Nevertheless, the process continued on course, and by gaining a majority of votes in the state legislatures, the reform finally was passed in August of 2001.

Since then, more than 300 complaints (called controversias constitucionales) were filed before the SCJN, an unusual and historic event, since a constitutional reform bill had never been the subject of such comprehensive debate.

In August, the Court was analyzing whether or not it had the right to judge constitutional reforms. In recent months, many civil and social organizations had emphasized the responsibility and opportunity the SCJN had for demanding respect to the San Andres Accords, as a means of contributing to the peace process in Chiapas. Essentially, fulfillment of the Accords is among the conditions put forth by the EZLN for resuming peace talks. Other analysts believed the SCJN ruling -on this so politically sensitive issue- would reflect the efective division of powers in the Mexican democracy.

The SCJN judgment means a pivotal event in the history of the conflict. Since the reform bill has been declared valid, adaptation of secondary laws to the reform text should now begin. As the reform forwards the definition of autonomy to the state legislatures, it will be difficult for the different indigenous peoples in the country to articulate a coordinated strategy to face the reform. It is unlikely that the debate over the content of the law will be reopened, despite the will of a minority in Congress.

What is certain is that all actors in the conflict will need to redefine their strategies. It is still possible to turn to international organizations such as the International Labor Organization (ILO), the Interamerican Commission for Human Rights (CIDH) or the United Nations (UN) to weigh in. However, resolutions made by international organizations have no power of coercion at the internal level.

On the other hand, as we have highlighted in previous reports, the danger of such a ruling could be the perception that all legal and peaceful means to resolve the conflict have been exhausted. Anyway, the possibility of resuming peace talks in Chiapas remains distant. While the EZLN continues to demand for compliance with the three conditions stated in 2000, the release of five Zapatista prisoners held in Tabasco and Queretaro has not been achieved yet, in spite of COCOPA’s efforts.

A difficult relationship

While the SCJN resolution was expected, other facts illustrated the gap between the State and the indigenous peoples, reflecting the lack of trust and communication difficulties between the parties.

The federal government wants to transform the National Indigenous Institute (INI), so that the design, direction, and supervision of all policies relative to the indigenous peoples remain their own responsibility. In this regard, during July the INI intended to consult with the 62 indigenous peoples of Mexico about what kind of relationship they wanted with the State, through the INI.

The consultation, titled “Indigenous Peoples, Public Policy and Institutional Reform”, was rejected by the main indigenous organizations. In the declaration of Waut, the National Indigenous Congress (that unites many of them) confirmed: “We will not accept a single legal and institutional reform while the three conditions for resuming the dialogue remain unfulfilled.”

Even the canonization of the Indian Juan Diego -during the Pope’s visit to Mexico in August- was a matter of debate. Several indigenous organizations refused the invitation to attend the canonization ceremony, arguing: “Those who push the canonization of Juan Diego are not indigenous. They are the same people who have systematically been opposed to the movement and the struggle for legitimate rights for the [indigenous] communities.”

Another intense confrontation occurred this summer between the federal government and the communal landholders (“ejidatarios”) of San Salvador Atenco, who rejected the expropriation of their lands for the construction of a new international airport in the State of Mexico. The campesino’s struggle –supported by 12 neighboring communities and other sectors of civil society- finally persuaded the government to give up the project.

For some analysts, this conflict can be seen as a foreshadowing about what could happen with the Puebla-Panama Plan (PPP) ⁽¹⁾. In recent months, popular opposition has grown faster than the Plan itself. In Veracruz, Chiapas, Guatemala, and Nicaragua, social and indigenous organizations based in the mesoamerican region have united to voice their categorical rejection of the megaproject because it is considered functional to the strategic interests of the USA; and because the affected peoples have not been consulted, in spite of the strong social and environmental impacts it will have on them.

Various religious and academic people have joined the critics, to the point that President Fox and the outcoming coordinator of PPP, Florencio Salazar, have said that nothing will be done without the consent of the region’s inhabitants. Perhaps these statements contain, more than a sincere respect for popular will, a dose of realism: Atenco showed that imposing projects without the consent of the affected people can have steep social and political costs.

The National Encounter for Peace that took place in July in Chiapas (see Feature article); the Pope’s exhortation to recognize the rights of the Mexican indigenous peoples, and the victory at Atenco have lifted spirits: organized civil society is increasingly confident in its capacity to defend the people’s demands.

A grave escalation of violence in Chiapas

In Chiapas, meanwhile, denounces by the autonomous Zapatista municipalities have multiplied about increasingly visible military activities in the conflict zone, including army flyovers, patrols and harassment of the communities.

At the same time, Zapatista communities, the Network of Human Rights Community Defenders and the civil organization The Bees, denounced the persistence of paramilitary presence, including the possible formation of new groups. The autonomous municipality of Ricardo Flores Magon, for example, allege that a newly armed group has been organized in Ocosingo. The group, known as the Organization for the Defense of Indigenous and Campesino Rights (OPDIC), is led by the local PRI- congressman, Pedro Chulin, who also has been appointed leader of another organization accused of being a paramilitary band, known as Revolutionary Indigenous Anti-Zapatista Movement.

In July and August, a worrying escalation of violence in autonomous municipalities of the Jungle zone reached a climax. On July 31, authorities from the autonomous municipality of Ricardo Flores Magon denounced an aggression by OPDIC in the ejido La Culebra, resulting in seven wounded. On August 7, the Zapatista Jose Lopez Santiz was assassinated in the autonomous municipality of 17th of November (Altamirano). On August 19, in Crucero Quexil (autonomous municipality of San Manuel), where the Zapatistas maintain a check point to avoid traffic of alcohol, stolen cars and woods, a confrontation resulted in nine more wounded. On August 25, at Amaytik village (Ocosingo), two Zapatistas who served as autonomous authorities of Ricardo Flores Magon, were also assassinated. That same day, another Zapatista was killed in the autonomous municipality of Olga Isabel (Chilon). This assassination was attributed to an armed band known as “Los Aguilares”. In almost all the cases, the Zapatistas blame armed groups close to the PRI.

As this report went to print, civil observation brigades were investigating those incidents. Several state NGOs denounced that these and other violent attacks against Zapatista Autonomous municipalities have similar patterns.

Another concern is the evident deterioration of social relations between the Zapatistas and other indigenous organizations, particularly in Las Caniadas (in the Jungle region). A frequent exchange of accusations occurs between autonomous authorities and the leaders of ORCAO ⁽²⁾, ARIC-Independiente ⁽³⁾, FOS ⁽⁴⁾, et al. Versions over who is responsible for violent acts consistently contradict each other.

Even before this recent escalation of violence, many organizations criticized the state government for not acting more forcefully. For his part, Governor Salazar, in comments made to the International Civil Commission for Human Rights Observation (CCIODH), argued that his strategy has had two stages: first, to push for reconciliation policies between communities; secondly, to fight impunity.

In the interview, the governor also indicated his actions to dismantle repressive state apparatus -with a former justice attorney and 25 police commissioners in prison-, as well as ongoing prosecutions of ex-mayors, the imprisonment of former high-ranking civil servants, and arrest warrants issued against more than 20 percent of the former governor’s cabinet for acts of corruption. On September 13, the state police arrested 22 members and leaders of the major paramilitary organization, Desarrollo Paz y Justicia, in the Northern region.

Land continues to be the cause of permanent tension. Pablo Salazar estimates that 80 percent of the social and political problems in Chiapas are linked to agrarian disputes. “Hot spots” exist in various regions of the state, mainly in the Jungle; many of them resulting in death, injury and abductions. Add to this the eviction threats against communities settled within the Biosphere of Montes Azules and latent violence in the Chimalapas area (on the border with Oaxaca).

For its part, federal authorities admit that some 5000 agrarian conflicts exist in Mexico. They estimate that 362 of them carry the risk of exploding, and that they primarily involve indigenous peoples. The massacre in Agua Fria (Oaxaca) in June (resulting in 26 deaths and 42 injured) was one more cry for attention. It resulted in a joint effort among the Government secretary and the secretaries of National Defense, Environment and Natural Resources, Agrarian Reform and Social Development, to define -in collaboration with state governments- an inter-institutional prevention and solution strategy to face potential conflicts rooted in the possession of land.

Despite its efforts, Mexico criticized on human rights

In mid-June, the first application of the recently approved law of “informative transparency” provided public access to documents of the “Dirty War in Mexico”. (70’s and 80’s). At the archives opening ceremony, Fox assured that the Government is on a search for truth and a way to apply the law appropriately, but there won’t be place for revenge or offense. Meanwhile, human rights NGOs have criticized the special prosecutor office created to investigate this period, since it can neither try institutions nor determine if their actions were part of a state policy.

A positive sign from the federal government was the creation of two new agencies to look after human rights affairs, in the Government Secretariat (ministry of Interior) and in the Federal Attorney General’s Office –perhaps as a result of the ongoing dialogue between the federal government and human rights NGOs, which demand a State policy on this field.

Despite these advances, the federal government continues to receive criticism from both national and international organizations. In August the Miguel Agustin Pro Human Rights Centre issued a report on torture during the first semester of 2002, which documents the torture of 35 people by police and military agents, including three minors and two indigenous women raped by the military.

Mexico also continues to be a focus of concern for international human rights organizations. The outgoing UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Mary Robinson, the Representative of the UN Secretary General for the Internally Displaced, Francis Deng, and the President of the Interamerican Commission for Human Rights (from the OAS), Juan Mendez, each visited Mexico during the last trimester. The last two also visited Chiapas.

In June, Amnesty International presented its 2001 annual report, in which it pointed out abuses and injustices in Mexico. Its chief representative for Mexico also visited Chiapas.

or its part, the International Federation for Human Rights issued its report about the observation mission on indigenous peoples, realized at the end of 2001. The report considers the constitutional reform insufficient “in relation to the content and spirit of the San Andres Accords and the layouts of the ILO Convention 169”, and therefore it “does not contribute to the pacification objective”. Also the CCIODH visited Mexico and traveled to Chiapas to report on its mission realized at the beginning of 2002. The report confirms that little has changed with the new governments regarding the plight of the indigenous peoples as the principal victims of human rights violations.

• (1) An intersectorial and transnational megaproject for economic development that will cover the south-southeast of Mexico and all of Central America. (Return)
• (2) Regional Coffeegrowers Organization of Ocosingo, which gathers various campesino organizations. (Return)
• (3) Association of Collective Rural Interest, an indigenous organization of Las Caniadas of the Lacondon Jungle. (Return)
• (4) Jungle Organizations Front, close to the PRI party. (Return)