:: SUMMARY

The situation in Chiapas - and at the national level -hasn’t changed much in recent months, either in regard to the constitutional reform on indigenous rights or in regard to the human rights situation. And to be certain, there has been no improvement regarding the agrarian question and the social conflicts linked to it.

With regard to the indigenous reform, the Supreme Court ruling is still being awaited in the over 300 constitutional complaints filed against the reform approved a year ago. Individual hearings will conclude on June 15. The outcome of this process has generated an atmosphere of great expectation among indigenous and social organizations.

In February, 168 deputies again presented the COCOPA law into the federal Congress, but there are few possibilities that it will be passed given the current composition of the legislature (elections 2003). Also pending is the pronouncement of the International Labor Organization in the case brought against the Mexican government for violation of Convention 169 on Indigenous and Tribal Peoples. In March the ILO admitted the complaints and a resolution condemning the indigenous reform is expected to mean a moral sanction of the Mexican state, as well as further questioning the legitimacy of the law.

Despite the changes of governments more than a year ago, at both the national and state level, the human rights situation has not significantly improved.

The Special UN Rapporteur for the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, R. Stavenhagen, affirmed that Mexico systematically violates the rights of indigenous peoples. In addition, the Special UN Rapporteur on the Independence of Judges and Lawyers, P. Cumaraswamy, maintained in his report on Mexico that corruption affects between 50% and 70% of federal judges, and that impunity persists.

In its 2001 annual report, the Miguel Agustin Pro Human Rights Center reported that torture and police violence are recurrent in the Fox government. The first National Torture Diagnostic, presented in April by the official National Human Rights Commission, reached a similar conclusion.

A half year after the murder of the defender Digna Ochoa, the investigation has not registered significant progress, and the hypotheses range “from the possibility of suicide to that of a crime of the State,” according to the Attorney General of Mexico City.

In an encouraging act in this somber panorama, Mexico signed an agreement with the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights to initiate the second phase of the Program of Technical Cooperation, that will include the opening of a permanent office of that UN body in Mexico and the carrying out of a diagnostic evaluation of the situation of human rights in the country.

In Chiapas, human rights organizations have denounced the responsibility of state authorities in human rights violations. Governor Pablo Salazar criticized the work of these organizations.

Many social organizations denounce the tension that exists in the Montes Azules Integral Biosphere, because of persistent rumors of an imminent expulsion of indigenous communities located in that protected zone. Governor Salazar accused the Federal Attorney for Environmental Protection of promoting the eviction of the communities, and announced that his government will not allow this. In any case, it is undoubtedly problematic to have strict environmental preservation laws in a region of incessant demand for land.

And surely demands for land will not stop as long as underlying structural solutions for all the aspects of the agrarian problem are not provided: rapid population increase, limited natural resources, expansion of livestock production, obstacles to more efficient land use, and lack of training and employment for the indigenous population in other sectors.

For President Fox, the solution to these problems will be the Puebla-Panama Plan, the main development proposal for southern Mexico and Central America. Nevertheless, popular organizations and NGOs criticize this plan because they consider it to serve North American strategic interests and the dominant neoliberal economic model. Also, in spite of the strong social and environmental impacts that it will have, the peoples have not been consulted during its formulation.

In Chiapas, after eight years of conflict and six of a stalled peace process, a logic of confrontation and social, political and religious intolerance predominate. The state government acknowledges the existence of intercommunity conflicts in at least 40 villages in the municipalities of Ocosingo, Altamirano and Las Margaritas.

The causes of these conflicts — that even occur between previously allied organizations — are many: relations with both governments and the acceptance or not of their programs and subsidies; different forms of building autonomy; disputes over land or for political control in a given territory; ideological and religious differences, etc. The growing antagonism often leads to violent resolution of differences at a high cost in displaced people, injuries, kidnappings and even deaths.

The federal government appears to be counting on making up for the absence of accords with the Zapatistas through economic programs and secondary laws. On the other hand, the EZLN maintains its obstinate silence and its resistance to any partial solution, relying on the construction of autonomy through direct action in their communities. Among other things, this means not accepting “charity from the government” and strongly criticizing those who do accept government programs.

In spite of this adverse political and social climate, the state government persists in its efforts to ease tensions and bring about reconciliation. In some highly conflictive regions it has managed to initiate negotiations for the signing of peace accords, in which antagonistic social organizations, various churches and local authorities have participated. Nonetheless, these accords have been criticized by those who maintain that they are temporary situational arrangements and do not offer long term structural solutions. And for this, profound reforms such as those set down in the unfulfilled San Andres Accords would be required.

RECOMMENDED ACTIONS:

1. Write to President Fox expresing concern:
   1. because the constitutional reform on indigenous rights has become an obstacle to resumption of the peace process and advancement towards a solution to the Chiapas conflict;
   2. concerning the lack of progress in the investigation of Digna Ochoa’s murder; urge him to take effective measures so that the Army and the involved federal and state governmental bodies collaborate with the Attorney General of the Federal District, in order to bring the responsible people to justice and to end threats against the human rights defenders.
2. Write to the National Supreme Court of Justice respectfully expressing your hope that it will resolve the constitutional compaints to the indigenous reform taking into account the demands raised by the indigenous peoples, the commitments undertaken by the federal government in the San Andrés Accords of February 1996, and the obligations contracted by the Mexican State upon ratifying Convention 169 of the ILO.
3. Spread information -such as that contained in this report- about the situation in Chiapas and Mexico.

Please write to:

Lic. Vicente Fox, Presidente de la República
Residencia Oficial de los Pinos
11850 México, D.F., México
Fax: (+52) 55 55 15 17 94
Website for opinions

Suprema Corte de Justicia de la Nación
Calle Pino Suárez #2
Col. Centro, Delegación Cuauhtemoc
México D.F., México
Fax: (+52) 55 55 22 44 45

:: UPDATE

CHIAPAS: In order to dialog, you must know how to listen

Six years after their signing, the San Andres Accords have yet to be implemented, and as a result the possibility of resuming the peace process between the EZLN and the federal government remains on hold. For over a year, the EZLN has remained silent in protest against approval of the constitutional reform on indigenous rights. The law was also rejected by the congresses of those states with the largest indigenous population in the country and by the main indigenous organizations as well.

“It’s not a sin to be indigenous”
(Words in a poster displayed by indigenous demonstrators in front of the Supreme Court building)

When Vicente Fox assumed the presidency, the EZLN demanded three conditions for returning to the negotiating table: withdrawal of the Army from seven military positions, liberation of all zapatista prisoners, and fulfillment of the San Andres Accords through approval of the law proposed by the COCOPA(1). With the closing of the seven military bases in the first months of 2001, the first condition is considered to have been fulfilled, although militarization persists in Chiapas.

As for the zapatista prisoners, in March and April the COCOPA implemented proceedings with the federal executive branch as well as the state governments of Queretaro and Tabasco in order to obtain the freedom of the eight zapatistas who remain in prison (2), and it announced their imminent release. Three of them were released in Chiapas in May 23. Nevertheless, Miguel Angel de los Santos, lawyer for the zapatista prisoners, has reported the existence of 17 new zapatista prisoners who have been incarcerated during the current administration.

Regarding the most controversial point, i.e., the indigenous reform, three processes still pending could possibly alter the political scenario. First, the ruling of the National Supreme Court of Justice (SCJN) is being awaited with regard to the more than 300 constitutional complaintsfiled against the indigenous law. Hearings of the cases have already begun and it is anticipated that they will all take place between May 6 and June 15. Expectations concerning the outcome are running high inasmuch as the highest judicial body now faces the decision to legitimate the approved reform or listen to the indigenous people and reject it. The expected ruling will be decisive with regard to the redefining of strategies by those involved in the conflict, since for many it could signify the failure of legal and peaceful avenues.
Secondly, in the middle of February, 168 members of Parliament presented the COCOPA law in the federal congress again, “in order to correct the mistake of having approved … a reform that does not respond to the demands of the indigenous people.” Nevertheless, it is virtually impossible for the initiative to be successful given the current composition of the legislature, which cannot change until 2003.

Finally, the International Labor Organization (ILO) has yet to make its pronouncement concerning the claims presented by labor unions and social organizations against the Mexican state arguying that the indigenous reform violates Convention 169 on Indigenous Peoples and Tribes. In March, the ILO admitted the claims, and although a resolution against the reform would not have any coercive power, it would mean a moral sanction and would question its legitimacy even further.

Two opposite approaches

Meanwhile, the conflict continues to be caught between two approaches that seem to be increasingly polarized: the “pragmatism” of the federal government, which appears to be counting on making up for the absence of accords with economic programs and secondary laws; and the “principles” of the EZLN which continues its radical resistance to any partial solution.

On the Executive level, at the beginning of March, Xochitl Galvez, head of the President’s Office for Attention to Indigenous Peoples, announced that Fox will press for approval of indigenous legislation more in line with the COCOPA law. Nevertheless, shortly afterwards the Official Plan for Indigenous People’s Development was presented, which seems to leave aside key aspects of that law.

In February, the federal Peace Commissioner for Chiapas, Luis H. Alvarez, announced that government programs “will be the key to resolving the conflict”. However, implementing this is seen as problematic in Chiapas. In April, Porfirio Encino, state Secretary for Indigenous Peoples, asked the EZLN to permit social organizations in their zone of influence to take advantage of government programs: “We guarantee that there is no counterinsurgency policy behind this effort, it is simply that we cannot deny assistance to those who need it and ask for it.”

The zapatistas continue to turn their backs on these initiatives, relying on the building of autonomy through direct action from the bases of the communities, and harshly criticizing those who choose to accept “charity from the government”.

In recent months a particularly critical zone has been the Integral Biosphere of Montes Azules (in the Jungle region), where there have been increasing rumors of the imminent expulsion of the indigenous communities settled in the protected region. In this case the contradictory approaches appear to be between the federal government and the government of Chiapas. In May, Chiapas governor Pablo Salazar accused Jose Campillo, Federal Attorney for the Protection of the Environment, of promoting the violent eviction of the communities and warned that his government would neither carry out nor permit this action.

Another source of confrontation and distrust between the government and popular organizations continues to be the Plan Puebla-Panama, presented by President Fox as the main proposal for the development of southern Mexico and Central America. In spite of the fact that this plan will have serious social, labor and environmental impacts on the peasants and indigenous people who inhabit the region, they were not consulted regarding its formulation. Consequently, the popular organizations of the mesoamerican region have repeatedly expressed their rejection of the project.

Our daily intolerance

The increasing weakness of the logic of dialogue continues to strengthen the logic of confrontation, and the government of Chiapas, beyond its attempts to counteract such logic, cannot escape it. The state lives in a climate of social and political as well as religious intolerance (3).

At the end of April, Porfirio Encino recognized the existence of inter-community conflicts in at least 40 villages in the counties of Ocosingo, Altamirano and Las Margaritas. Members of the PRI clash with members of the PRD or zapatistas, but also zapatista supporters clash with organizations allied in the past with the EZLN, but which are now closer to the state government. There are various causes for these conflicts (see also SIPAZ Report, February 2002): relations with both federal and state governments, their programs and subsidies; disputes over land or for political control; ideological and religious differences. These conflicts continue to exact ever higher costs in displaced people, injuries, kidnappings and even deaths.

In the Northern region, tension increased in February after the arrest of Diego Vasquez, leader of the alleged paramilitary organization, Development, Peace and Justice. The Network of Community Human Rights Defenders has repeatedly denounced attacks and threats against its members, and the State Human Rights Commission (CEDH) issued recommendations granting security measures to the threatened leaders.

Conflicts over land and political hegemony occur particularly in the Jungle region. There, the counties of Ocosingo and Altamirano have been the scene of ongoing confrontations between zapatistas and PRI supporters, between zapatistas and ORCAO (4), or between official county authorities and authorities of the autonomous zapatista counties. In some of the Highlands counties (Zinacantan, Oxchuc), confrontations have occurred inside the county councils when the majority party has not allowed the minority into the council.

On the other hand, a theme that continues to unite diverse organizations beyond their ideological differences is the organized civil resistance against the Federal Electricity Commission (CFE), particularly in the Mountain, Coast, Northern and Highlands regions. Civil organizations are protesting against the high cost of service and demand a preferential rate given that Chiapas is the main producer of electrical energy for the country and is the state with the highest index of poverty.

In this adverse social and political climate, Pablo Salazar’s government persists in its efforts to ease tensions. In recent months, it has succeeded in initiating negotiations in some of the highly conflictive regions (the counties of Tila and Sabanilla). It has also achieved the signing of peace accords in which high state government officials, diverse social organizations (from The Bees to Development, Peace and Justice), different churches and even zapatista supporters have participated.

Nonetheless, these accords have been criticized by those who maintain that they are merely temporary situational arrangements, and thus the conflicts will reappear because they do not offer long term structural solutions. And for this, profound reforms such as those set down in the unfulfilled San Andres Accords would be required.

Rodolfo Stavenhagen, Special UN Rapporteur for the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, concurred with this analysis after a visit to Chiapas. Despite diverse efforts to achieve reconciliation at the local level, he stated that if the problems raised by the rejection of the approved constitutional reform by the EZLN and the majority of the indigenous movement are not resolved, “there will be no definitive social peace” in the communities.

On the other hand, the polarization that is experienced in Chiapas has strained the relationships between the governor and social organizations, particularly human rights organizations. From the CEDH (whose president holds the governor responsible for the attacks he has suffered), to the Fray Bartolome de las Casas Human Rights Center, the Network of Community Human Rights Defenders and the North American organization Global Exchange, all have denounced the responsibility of state authorities in human rights violations in Chiapas.

The poorest among the poors

At the end of April, the catholic Latin American Episcopal Conference (CELAM) held a meeting in the neighboring state of Oaxaca, entitled “Indigenous Emergency”. In this meeting, the Mexican Episcopal Conference presented a report in which the figures show that the challenges go far beyond legislation: 96% of indigenous Mexican people inhabit counties of high and very high marginalization and they suffer an increasing deterioration in their living conditions.

In May, Rodolfo Stavenhagen asserted that Mexico systematically violates the rights of indigenous people and declared that the living conditions indicators of indigenous peoples show a grave lack of economic, cultural and social rights. Referring to the Declaration of Indigenous Rights being discussed at the UN, he maintained that many governments resist this edict because they consider it very dangerous to recognize indigenous’ right to self determination, because it could lead indigenous peoples to make their own decisions regarding their lands and the exploitation of their resources.

The fact is that all of Latin America is currently in a critical situation. Adjustment programs imposed by the multilateral institutions lead to more recession and economic exclusion of ever wider sectors of the population. An atmosphere of social discontent and dissatisfaction predominates, harboring situations of latent violence.

The Summit of Monterrey that took place in March revived the polemic concerning the predominant neoliberalism and alternative development models. The catholic Episcopal Commission of Social Pastoral described the free market as a “blind machine” that institutionalizes inequality and exclusion. Similar opinions were expressed by protestant organizations such as the Latin American Council of Churches (CLAI) and the World Council of Churches.

The problems of the President

The search for balance among the three branches of power continues to be marked by conflicts between the Fox team and the legislature. The Executive agenda has no support in Congress. The opposition parties have severely criticized Fox for his foreign policy which they consider subordinate to the United States. Fox has so far been unable to create alliances that would permit him to make progress on his principal initiatives, such as fiscal reform and private investment in the petroleum and electricity sectors. Also the SCJN has issued rulings unfavorable to the President’s interests, such as the recent one against private investment in the electricity industry.

Regarding human rights issues, the Fox administration has also been unable to temper domestic criticism concerning human rights, in spite of intense diplomatic efforts to improve its international image. In April, the Special UN Rapporteur for the Independence of Judges and Lawyers, Param Cumaraswamy, maintained in his report that corruption affects between 50% and 70% of the federal judges in Mexico. According to Cumaraswamy, “Impunity and corruption do not seem to have lost any strength in Mexico”, and most judicial civil servants at the local level continue to be subordinated to state executive powers. The main Mexican judiciary bodies have disavowed this report.

In its 2001 annual report, the Miguel Agustin Pro Human Rights Center reported that torture and police violence are recurrent in the Fox government and that 48% of the cases of repression occurred in the marginalized regions of Oaxaca, Chiapas and Guerrero. Coincidentally, on April 5, the official National Human Rights Commission (CNDH) presented the first National Diagnostic on Torture in which it maintained that torture continues to be a daily practice during the process of detention.

Six months after the assassination of the human rights defender Digna Ochoa, the investigation has made no significant advances and the hypotheses range “from the possibility of suicide toward that of a crime of the State,” according to the Attorney General of Justice of Mexico City. Meanwhile, another human rights lawyer, Barbara Zamora, received threats in March, and in April the policemen assigned to protect her colleague, Leonel Rivero, were assaulted by unknown persons.

In March, the International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH) and the World Organization against Torture (OMCT), declared that the situation of human rights defenders in Mexico is “extremely difficult” and that repression against them is manifested in “a manner much more subtle than in other countries.”

In this somber overall state, at the end of April Mexico signed an agreement with the Office of the High Commission for Human Rights to initiate the second phase of the Program of Technical Cooperation. This stage includes the opening of a permanent office of this UN body in Mexico and the realization of a diagnostic evaluation of the human rights situation in the country that will provide the basis for the formulation of a national human rights program.

Footnotes:

(1) The Commission for Agreement and Pacification (COCOPA) was created in 1995 to assist with the peace process and is made up of legislators of the four parties represented in Congress. In 1996 COCOPA drafted a legal initiative which would integrate the San Andres Accords into the Constitution. (Return)

(2) Those prisoners in violation of Chiapas law were freed in 2001 at the request of the governor and the State Attorney General. (Return)

(3) In the counties of San Juan Chamula and Las Margaritas assaults by traditional Catholics against Evangelicals have recently been recorded. (Return)

(4) Ocosingo’s Regional Coffee Growers Organization, which groups various peasant organizations.(Return)

:: FEATURE

Myths and realities of the agrarian question in Chiapas

“They take away our land and, with them as bosses, we build airports on it when we will never travel by plane. We build highways and will never have a car. (...) We build shopping malls and will never have money to shop in them. We build urban areas with all the services and will only ever see them from afar. (...) In short, we build a world that excludes us, a world that will never accept us but which could not exist without us.”
(Words of the EZLN in the Polytechnic Institute, Mexico City, 3/16/01)

More than eight years after the Zapatista uprising, the agrarian question in Chiapas is still a central issue in most of the conflicts and divisions which have worsened over time. In this state which leads the country in poverty, more than two thirds of the population still makes their living from agricultural activities. This reaffirms the fundamental character of the agrarian disputes. The challenges, however, are much greater and have to do with an economic system that leaves farmers, mainly indigenous people, with few alternatives.

Impact of the 1994 uprising

Although in 1992 the federal government declared the end of land redistribution, the armed uprising of 1994 acted as a catalyst in the fight for land in Chiapas, and provided an excellent opportunity for the social movement to reaffirm and intensify its demands. Land invasion accelerated, not only by Zapatista groups but also by other organizations. “The creation at the end of January 1994 of the State Council of Indigenous and Peasant Organizations (CEOIC) opened up a period of rural mobilization that involved at least eight thousand claimants from eleven organizations demanding land. In the first six months of 1994, 340 private estates covering more than 50,000 hectares were invaded” (Harvey).

In 1996, Agrarian Agreements were signed with 62 peasant organizations and 85 independent groups. The government committed itself to providing solutions to the demands for land. On the other hand, the peasant organizations promised not to carry out more invasions, to vacate land not available for acquisition, and to consider agrarian claims settled. However, the magnitude of the problem becomes evident when the number of hectares invaded (more than 50,000) is compared to the amount of land that owners were willing to sell (11,910 hectares). The government hoped for a quick solution to the agrarian problem; however, land invasions have continued, and probably will continue as long as underlying structural solutions are not provided (Reyes).

Nevertheless, these negotiations did have an impact. Until 1995, many peasant organizations supported the EZLN in their fight, but these relations were broken when some organizations decided to negotiate partial agreements with the government.

Other factors in the equation

It would be impossible to discuss the Chiapas land problem in all of its complexity in an article of this length. Therefore we will briefly enumerate some of its components.

First of all, the agrarian conflict is intensely politicized. Many of the demands for land have been accompanied by demands for democracy, justice and respect for human rights. These demands have been quite justified because evictions are usually accompanied by abuses, arbitrary arrests, and even murders which remain unpunished.

Second, contrary to what many people believe, the problem of large estates is no longer relevant in the conflict zone. “By 1990, social property and small private holdings of less than five hectares represented more than 77% of the total amount of land, a figure which reaches over 90% in many counties in the Highlands region“ (Viqueira).

On the other hand, the constantly increasing population re sults in an ever decreasing amount of land available to the peasants. This encourages use of the land for personal consumption, which in turn also affects land productivity. In fact, in the regions where small holdings predominate (where the cultivated land covers less area), more than 75% of the population usually earns less than minimum wage (Viqueira).

Third, even if the government distributed all the available land (in fact, it claims to have done so already), as long as the rate of population growth remains constant (2.12% per year), more land will always be needed. Today, 51% of the population in Chiapas is less than 20 years old. Therefore, the demand for land can never be satisfied if alternative forms of economic development and employment are not found for the active population. The increase in migration to the cities and to the United States in recent years is not unfounded.

Fourth, few employment opportunities exist outside the agricultural sector. Also, the indigenous population has little probability of gaining access to any that do exist due to educational limitations.

Fifth, the lands that were distributed were only marginally fertile. Irrigation systems are scarce, and livestock has accelerated the process of deterioration in the arable regions. On the other hand, it is difficult to have strict environmental preservation laws in a region of incessant demand for land. The best known case in this regard is the Montes Azules Integral Biosphere (Jungle region), where the threat of eviction continues for more than 40 indigenous communities.

Legality versus Legitimacy

Land disputes among farmers are as old as the PRI government policy of granting the same piece of land to more than one group of applicants, in order to divide and weaken organizing possibilities in the sector. Moreover, after 1994 land distribution was part of a counterinsurgency policy designed to isolate and cut off the Zapatistas. Several cases exist in which peasant organizations connected to the government were granted land in estates which had been invaded by Zapatistas.

Currently, other difficulties are arising because of divisions between previously allied organizations. Are the ‘recovered‘ lands, i.e., those invaded by Zapatistas beginning in 1994, communal property? In more than one instance, another organization, allied with the EZLN, negotiated the ownership of these lands with the government to the benefit of everybody (including the Zapatistas). Today, in the context of increasing division among these organizations, the conflict arises between legality (property rights) and legitimacy. A phrase that can be heard in the Jungle region by the Zapatistas is: “We shed our blood”.

One concern of the EZLN is that the organizations with which they are currently in conflict could sell land parcels to a third party according to the constitutional reform of 1992 that allows the sale of communal land. The banners in Cuxuljá (scene of a recent harsh dispute of this kind) illustrate this point: “the land is our mother, it may not be bought nor sold,” and “land is not merchandise, to sell it would be treason.”

Often, behind the land disputes, what we find is rather a fight for political control or hegemony over a certain territory and its inhabitants. On the other hand, an additional source of tension is that, in order to benefit from certain government programs, farmers must present individual title to the land. This clashes with the communal property system that is still prevalent in indigenous regions.

Problem without a solution?

Although the agrarian struggle in Chiapas is no longer against the large estates, since they are now scarce, the inequality is still tremendous. Undoubtedly, agrarian demands will not stop because of the issues mentioned above: population increase, scarce natural resources, expansion of livestock holdings, obstacles to more efficient land use and the lack of training and employment in other sectors. All of this can be translated as the nonexistence of alternatives to the rural problem within the current system.

At the end of April, the Chiapas state Secretary for Indigenous People, Porfirio Encino, acknowledged that intercommunity problems had been detected in at least 40 localities in the counties of Ocosingo, Altamirano and Las Margaritas. He also affirmed that beyond the agrarian issues, “the root of these problems has to do with the dialogue [suspended between the federal government and the EZLN ] and the non-fulfillment of the San Andres Accords.”

In this sense, it is worth remembering some of the criticisms which have been leveled at the indigenous reform approved by the federal congress last year and at the Puebla-Panama Plan: Indigenous people no longer want to be the objects of welfare policies, but to be subjects and part of the discussion, not only with regard to agrarian policies but to everything involving their economic and social development. The times call for a comprehensive change, not for partial or short-term solutions.

The Agrarian Question: Many Historical Gaps

There can be no doubt that the current issues are heavily weighted by past policies, which have been characterized to a great degree by repression and agrarian reforms intended to be a “discretionary fix between local landowners and the federal government.” This policy was developed to suit “the needs of the system at any given moment and was aimed at protecting the great agrarian properties, in this way securing the rural vote for the official party” (Garcia de Leon).

Although one of the achievements of the Mexican Revolution at the beginning of the twentieth century was to initiate the Agrarian Reform to give land to the peasants, in Chiapas landowners successfully organized a counterrevolution to protect their privileges. The agrarian laws of the 1920´s also benefited them.

It was not until the Lazaro Cardenas administration (1934-1940) that significant agrarian distributions were carried out in this state. By 1940 there were fewer than half as many large plantations as those existing in 1900. Nevertheless, the better quality land remained in the hands of the large landowners (Gomez and Kovic). At the same time, agrarian policy was aimed at promoting livestock activity in the region.

Between 1940 and 1965, the national policy of import substitution gave priority to the industrial sector over the agricultural sector. As a result, between 1965 and 1980, national agricultural production declined from 14% to 7% of the GNP. This led to the country becoming dependant on imports for half the national corn consumption.

As of 1970, under president Echeverria, land settlement in the Jungle region of Chiapas was promoted. But soon inequities emerged again, as the population outgrew the amount of available land (Collier).

A key moment in the fight for collective rights was the Indigenous Congress of 1974: peasants realized that they all shared the same problems and decided to organize themselves in their demand for land (Gomez and Kovic). The development of “Zapatismo” would later benefit from this growing organizational process.

In order to protect the interests of large land holders, the government of Chiapas granted some five thousand certificates setting aside land for livestock production in the ‘80’s, thus protecting more than a million hectares against land claims by social organizations.
In addition, during all these years, land grants were given maintaining the “bonds of corruption between the owners involved and the peasant beneficiaries, whose political loyalty and promise not to continue backing land claims and occupations was demanded.” (Garcia de Leon).

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Collier, George A.: Reforms of Mexico’s agrarian code: Impacts on the Peasantry. Background of the rebellion in Chiapas. (1994).
García de León, Antonio: Fronteras interiores. Chiapas: una modernidad particular (2002).
Gómez Cruz P.J. y Kovic C.M: Con un pueblo vivo en tierra negada (1989-1993). (1994).
Harvey, Neil: The Chiapas Rebellion. The struggle for land and democracy. (1998).
Reyes Ramos, María Eugenia: El reparto de tierras y la política agraria en Chiapas. 1914-1988 (1992), y Espacios disputados. Transformaciones Rurales en Chiapas (1998).
Viqueira, Juan Pedro: Los peligros del Chiapas imaginario. (Letras Libres, enero 1999)

:: SIPAZ ACTIVITIES

March - May 2002

Contacts and Information

• Visits to the Jungle and Northern regions to dialogue with diverse social/political and religious actors.
• Receiving various international delegations to introduce them to the current situation in Chiapas and the work of SIPAZ: United Churches of Christ, Pax Christi Italy, a high profile delegation from Norway and the Swiss Peace Program (PROPAZ).
• Coordinated a visit of the German Ambassador to indigenous communities in the Highlands and his meeting with different organizations in Chiapas.
• Meetings in Mexico City with advisors, NGOs, Embassies and the European Commission’s office.
• Interview with Juan Gonzalez Esponda, Commissioner for Reconciliation of the Chiapas government.
• Sojourn of a SIPAZ collaborator in the civil peace camp of Moises Ghandi (Jungle region).

Inter-religious Dialogue

• Meetings with religious leaders from the county of Chenalho and with the Pluralistic Ecumenical Group.
• Continuation of the Peacebuilding Exchange Project between religious leaders from Chenalho and the Nicaraguan Peace Commissions.
• Visits to various communities in the county to make them aware of the project.
• Participation in ecumenical prayers for peace in San Cristobal de las Casas and Los Chorros (county of Chenalho).

Peace Education

• Participation in the Network for Peace, a space for exchanging on action and reflection that seeks to support peace and reconciliation processes at the community and organizational level in Chiapas.
• Participation in the Second Meeting on Experiences of Peace and Community Reconciliation (May 24-26 in San Cristobal de las Casas).
• Series of three workshops on Conflict Transformation with the students of CEDECOs (Centers for Community Development) in San Cristobal de las Casas.

International

• Exchanging workshop on experiences of peacebuilding in the Central American region, in Guatemala (part of the project Reflecting on Peacebuilding Practices)
• Participation in the IV Meeting of Latin American Peacebuilders Network, in Peru.