:: SUMMARY

In Mexico, as elsewhere in the world, the September 11 attacks on the US commanded enormous attention. One result was reduced focus on other unresolved conflicts, including Chiapas.

Even before September 11, the peace process seemed once again at a stalemate. The indigenous rights constitutional reform passed by Congress in April had been denounced by the EZLN (Zapatista Army of National Liberation) and other major indigenous organizations as a "betrayal." Several of the states with the largest Indian population voted against ratification. Yet the Fox administration had heralded it as an important step forward and even as proof that the Chiapas conflict effectively had been resolved. That view was welcomed during President Fox's trip to Europe, which is anxious to expand trade relations with Mexico.

At the same time, the government has repeatedly manifested its willingness to renew peace talks. However, the EZLN has maintained silence since April, and other indigenous organizations have scoffed at the idea of new talks as long as, in their view, the government has not implemented past agreements. On the ground in Chiapas, the level of polarization and conflict remains high, denunciations continue of military and paramilitary harassment, at least 10,000 internal refugees do not feel safe to return home, and peace talks have netted few concrete gains for the indigenous communities. The EZLN is currently "in resistance," rejecting any government assistance and apparently focusing its attention on continuing, despite the tensions provoked, to develop autonomous structures that parallel official local government.

Indigenous, human rights and other organizations continue both to denounce the illegitimacy of the indigenous rights law and also to challenge its legality. Literally hundreds of state and local government appeals have been filed before the Supreme Court. Complaints have also been filed with the International Labor Organization (ILO) on the basis that the law does not fulfill Mexico's international obligations regarding indigenous rights. Additional efforts in Congress focus on improving the law, either by revising it in Congress or through the necessary implementation legislation at the state level.

The issue is likely to be determined on the basis of politics rather than strict legality, and conservative forces continue to oppose any broadening of the legislation. While the debate has demonstrated a new independence among the three branches of government, the law itself has become a de facto obstacle to the resolution of the Chiapas conflict.

The October 19 assassination of leading human rights lawyer Digna Ochoa provoked a national and international outcry. Nonetheless it was followed by a wave of threats against other prominent human rights activists.

After Ochoa's murder, President Fox ordered the release of two peasant environmental activists from Guerrero whom Ochoa had defended against what many view as trumped up charges. That move increased focus on a Guerrero connection. Ochoa had had run-ins with the military in the course of her work there. Recently, human rights groups have complained about the lack of progress in the investigation of her murder.

To further cloud the government's human rights image, in November the OAS Inter-american Human Rights Commission issued an ultimatum calling for the immediate release of General Jose Francisco Gallardo, imprisoned eight years ago after he proposed the creation of a human rights ombudsman for the Army.

October county and state elections in Chiapas gave the PRI (Institutional Revolutionary Party) a comfortable majority in the state congress. Turnout was around 50%. Once again the EZLN boycotted the vote. Governor Pablo Salazar, who was elected in 2000 by a coalition united against the PRI, will continue to have to govern with an opposition-controlled Congress.

Conflicts have increased in Chiapas among formally allied indigenous-peasant organizations. Issues include land tenure, struggles for political hegemony, and differences about political strategy, especially toward official bodies. Of course the context is the unresolved conflict with the federal government, and the cost is familiar in that strife-torn region: injuries, deaths, kidnappings, displacement, burned houses, and growing threats.

At the same time, there are some indications of reduced tensions, including ecumenical dialogue in Chenalho (Chiapas highlands) and agreements that have permitted the re-opening of Catholic churches in El Limar and Sabanilla (northern region).

Despite unresolved claims regarding reparations and the continued danger of paramilitary attack, several groups of the civil society organization Las Abejas (The Bees), totaling 1336, returned to their homes between August and October. Their decision to return was prompted by decreasing access to potable water, fuel, and food. Their "forced returns" were accompanied by national and international observers. To date, they have been without serious incident, although security concerns remain high. In any case, they are the exception to the rule, and the fate of over 10,000 displaced remains unresolved.

After the September 11 attacks, military presence in Chiapas was strengthened, especially on the border with Guatemala. The claim of a US government agency that the EZLN is a terrorist organization was disputed both by Chiapas governor Pablo Salazar and by the federal Chiapas Peace Commissioner, Luis H. Alvarez. Nonetheless, as elsewhere, concern is growing that heightened fear may lead to intolerance of minorities. The biggest impact of the attacks was economic, significantly aggravating the effects of the existing slowdown in the global economy. In some parts of Chiapas, coffee was left unpicked after prices fell to 50% of last year's already low price. Traditionally migration to the US has been a relief valve for Mexico in hard times. However, with the US economy also in decline, migration is down 50% since September 11.

Recommended Actions

It is important that the international community continue to express its concern about the absence of a just and lasting peace in Chiapas.

1. Write to President Fox to express:
   1. concern that the indigenous rights constitutional reform has become an obstacle to the reopening of the peace process;
   2. the hope of the international community that the Mexican government, through both the executive and legislative branches, will work to revise the legislation to make it congruent with the commitments of the San Andres Accords and Convention 169 of the International Labor Organization;
   3. profound concern about the murder of Digna Ochoa and continuing threats to human rights defenders and the need for an exhaustive investigation to bring those responsible to justice.
2. Urge the International Labor Organization to demand that the Mexican government make its laws on indigenous rights congruent with Convention 169 which Mexico ratified in1990.
3. Circulate information, such as the contents of this Report, on the situation in Chiapas.

Please write:

Lic. Vicente Fox, Presidente de la República
Residencial Oficial de los Pinos
Colonia M. Chapultepec, Delegación M. Hidalgo
11850 México, D.F., México
Fax: (+52)(5)515 1794
Internet site for comments

Comisión de Concordia y Pacificación (COCOPA)
Reforma No.10, Torre Caballitos, Piso 18
06030 México, D.F., México
Fax: (+52)(5)345 3288

Juan Somavía
Director General de la OIT
4, route de Morrillons
CH-1211, Geneva 22
Switzerland
cabinet@ilo.org
Fax (41 22) 799 85 33

Rodolfo Stavenhagen
Special Rapporteur on Human Rights
and the Fundamental Liberties
of Indigenous Peoples .
OHCHR
Palais des Nations
1211 Geneva 10
Switzerland
Fax: (41 22) 917 9010
jwoo.hchr@unog.ch
cc. staven@colmex.mx

:: UPDATE

Chiapas Conflict Relegated to Secondary Level

In Mexico, as in the rest of the world, the terrible events of September 11 were deeply shocking. One result was reduced attention for other unresolved conflicts, such as the stalled peace process in Chiapas and the problems of the indigenous people in Mexico.

Indigenous rights law: apple of discord

Peace efforts stalled again last April when the EZLN (Zapatista Army of National Liberation), along with other indigenous and popular organizations, denounced as a "betrayal" the constitutional reform on indigenous rights and culture that was approved by the federal Congress. The reform was subsequently ratified by a majority of state legislatures and in mid-August it was put into effect by President Fox.

On September 4, the Commissioner for Peace in Chiapas, Luis H. Alvarez, reiterated the government’s openness to resuming peace talks, "but in no way are we going to remain paralyzed if the EZLN doesn’t want to do so. We will promote social programs and deepen the institutional changes arising from the reform." Although "the EZLN has every right to disagree with what was approved by the Congress, this does not justify its refusal to open conversations with a government that, no matter how you look at it, has offered concrete evidence of its commitment to peace."

Although the EZLN did not respond to these comments (its communiqué of April 29 presented a clear position on the matter), other indigenous organizations questioned what the Commissioner said. The National Indigenous Multi-ethnic Assembly for Autonomy (ANIPA) emphasized: "It is not possible to build bridges of dialogue and national conciliation when one of the two parties, in this case the federal government, has not fulfilled its word to bring about the constitutional recognition of our rights as peoples, and instead applauds the pretense, lies and mockery approved in the Congress of the Union."

A total of 329 constitutional objections to the indigenous law were presented to the Supreme Court of Justice of the Nation (SCJN). Indigenous and other civil society organizations continued to express their rejection of the new law. Several lodged complaints against the reform with the International Labor Organization (ILO). The ILO will examine them, as well as the report presented by the Mexican government, and will publish its findings in May of 2002.

Faced with this situation, the Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD) proposed to reopen the discussion about the indigenous reform before the end of December. The PRD doesn’t believe it necessary to await the Supreme Court’s decision (expected by February) in order to begin "the reform of the reform." At the beginning of October, more than 100 deputies of six political parties signed the Manifesto of San Lazaro, which also proposes reopening the discussion of the indigenous reform. In his tour of Europe, some days later, even President Fox expressed a willingness to reopen the subject.

However, the National Action Party (PAN) expressed its disagreement. In addition, Manuel Bartlett, a leader of the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) and chairman of the congressional Commission on Constitutional Points, said that "Quite apart from the crazy ideas of President Fox, whom even his own party does not support," the constitutional reform on indigenous matters "is firm, and there is no possibility whatsoever of reopening the discussion." He added that related reforms to 40 secondary laws will be ready for approval before December.

The congressional Commission for Agreement and Pacification (COCOPA), created to support the peace process, was divided over the subject, reflecting the existing differences among the member parties. At the beginning of December, COCOPA even reached the point of considering the possibility of declaring itself in permanent recess.

Fox’s speeches about the situation in Chiapas

In Madrid, during his October tour of Europe, President Fox said that the Zapatistas "have been quiet and at peace after all that we did to seek pacification in Chiapas." He also mentioned that "the displaced...have returned to their communities, to their homes, and all is in peace and tranquility." Finally, he added, in regard to the rest of the "very small guerrilla groups that appear from time to time in Mexico, we want to surround and capture them."

Later, in Italy, Fox affirmed that in Mexico, "There is a new law of indigenous rights and culture that compared with other countries, with any other, is among the most advanced and avant-garde that exists." At the end of his tour, he concluded, "Europe is clear; today there is a democratic government in Mexico, that respects human rights, that cares for, loves and respects its indigenous brothers."

Concern about the human rights situation in Mexico increases

In contrast to Fox’s declarations, on October 19, lawyer and leading human rights defender Digna Ochoa was murdered in Mexico City. On the following day, more than 80 NGOs (non-governmental organizations) demanded an expedited investigation of this murder. Governments, international and multi-lateral organizations, civil society, and churches of the world also expressed their repudiation of the assassination. The government of Fox as well as that of the Federal District of Mexico (whose Attorney General is in charge of the investigation) committed themselves to finding and punishing the guilty.

Shortly afterwards, President Fox freed two peasant-environmentalists from Guerrero, Teodoro Cabrera and Rodolfo Montiel, detained and tortured by the Army in 1999 on trumped up charges. Digna Ochoa had defended both. In fact, leads in the murder investigation point towards the state of Guerrero. Ochoa had been subjected to heavy military surveillance on a visit to Guerrero shortly before her death.

At the end of November, the Miguel Agustin Pro Human Rights Center carried out an evaluation of the Ochoa murder investigation. The report criticized the slow progress, lack of clarity in methodology, "information leaks," and other irregularities and limitations that threatened the effectiveness of the investigation.

Meanwhile, threats against human rights defenders continued, including one on October 27 that targeted Miguel Sarre, Sergio Aguayo, Edgar Cortez, Juan Antonio Vega and Fernando Ruiz, all members of recognized human rights institutions in Mexico.

On November 15, the Inter-american Human Rights Commission presented an ultimatum to the Fox government, calling for the immediate liberation of General Jose Francisco Gallardo, who was imprisoned eight years ago after he proposed the creation of a human rights ombudsman for the Army.

High tension in Chiapas

In the October 7 elections in Chiapas, despite its strong internal divisions, the PRI maintained a comfortable majority in the state congress, winning 21 of 24 districts (the PRD won two and the PAN one). The PRI also won 72 of 118 mayoral races (the PRD won 19 and PAN 11). Turnout was around 50%. A prohibition established last year against forming party coalitions (like that which led to the 2000 victory of Governor Pablo Salazar) limited the prospects for the PRI's opponents. The lack of training of the voting booth functionaries and the role of the State Electoral Institute were widely criticized. In fourteen counties, one or another of the political parties filed challenges to the election results, and there have been incidents and demonstrations in several parts of the state.

Conflicts between social and indigenous organizations have multiplied and sharpened, even between those which up until now shared an ideological affinity. For example, the Regional Organization of Coffee Growers of Ocosingo (ORCAO) became involved in a conflict with the EZLN regarding the distribution of 800 hectares of land. Despite efforts to open a dialogue between the organizations without government intervention, the issue still has not been resolved. Throughout Chiapas these conflicts have resulted in injuries, deaths, kidnappings, displacement, burned houses, and growing threats. The causes of these confrontations are complex and have to do with unresolved problems of land tenure, struggles for political hegemony, and strategic differences about relations with the government, particularly regarding the electoral processes.

Another relevant event was the detention on November 6 of Eduardo Montoya Lievano, Chiapas attorney general during the former government. He was charged with criminal association, graft and giving protection to death squads.

Amidst such instability, the return of the displaced families from the civil society organization, Las Abejas (The Bees) took place (See Dilemma of the Displaced in Chiapas: Return without Justice?, in this issue).

There have also been positive signs that point towards a reduction of tensions at some points of conflict. There have been ecumenical prayer services in Chenalho, and in the northern region, adversaries reached agreements—with the presence of the state government—that allowed the reopening of the Catholic churches in El Limar and in Sabanilla.

As a consequence of the attacks in the United States…

A few days after the attacks, which were strongly condemned by the Fox government, the presence of military forces was strengthened in Chiapas, especially on the Guatemala border. The Organization of American States (OAS), of which Mexico is a party, declared that the attacks were an attack against the whole continent and offered its military support in the framework of the Interamerican Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance.

What occurred in the United States generated a polemic regarding the armed groups in Mexico. The Governor of Chiapas, Pablo Salazar, rejected the idea that the EZLN is a terrorist group, as was indicated in a report of the US Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA). He elaborated, "On the contrary, they are social fighters who are searching for a solution to their problems of marginalization, poverty and exclusion." The Chiapas Peace Commissioner, Luis H. Alvarez, also rejected the characterization of the EZLN as a terrorist group, but said that he did not have enough information to express an opinion about other armed groups.

In a more general way, the federal government's National Indigenist Institute (INI)expressed its concern that minority groups, including the indigenous, may be "observed" and their rights may be challenged under the pretext of "national security."

Finally, the global economic slowdown, aggravated by what occurred in the United States, is being strongly felt in Mexico. In some parts of Chiapas, with coffee prices 50% less than last year, the producers simply decided to suspend the harvest. When at the same time possibilities for migration to the United States are shrinking (migration from Mexico is down 50% since September 11), the economic situation is particularly critical for poor peasants and workers.

:: ANALYSIS

Chiapas: A Puzzle Ever More Difficult to Solve

The international consequences of the September 11 attacks on the United States have shifted other regional conflicts to a secondary level of public attention. This includes the stymied peace process in Chiapas and with it the poverty and marginalization of Mexico's ten million Indians that the conflict had brought to light.

During his October tour of Europe, President Fox minimized the Chiapas conflict, presenting it as already resolved. This view was well received in the European Union countries that see Mexico as a promising trade partner, transitioning toward democracy, with increasingly credible institutions. However, several aspects of the situation in Mexico and Chiapas would appear to contradict the optimistic declarations of President Fox.

Optimistic speeches for a not so encouraging reality

In his speeches in Europe, President Fox spoke of "tranquility and peace" in Chiapas. However the silence of the EZLN since its last statement on April 29, rejecting the indigenous rights law, does not signify acceptance of the situation. As on other occasions during these eight years of conflict, the prolonged silence is a form of categorical rejection of the government's position. In this case, the Zapatista communities have again entered a phase of "resistance." This includes putting autonomy into practice on their own terms as well as the rejection of any kind of government assistance.

Moreover, it is difficult to speak of peace when many communities continue to denounce military and paramilitary harassment and when there are renewed flare ups of community conflict among organizations that were formerly friendly. After a period of renewed optimism at the beginning of 2001, the prolonged stalemate in the peace process, exacerbated by congressional approval of an indigenous rights law that does not do justice to the San Andres Accords, led to increased divisions and polarization.

As we explain in more detail in an accompanying article (Dilemma of the Displaced in Chiapas: Return without Justice?), and in contrast with the statements of President Fox, the return of some groups of internal refugees cannot be seen as a resolution of the problem of displaced people in Chiapas.

Another alarm bell has been the murder of Digna Ochoa, a leading human rights lawyer, and the wave of threats against human rights defenders that followed. These events reveal serious institutional problems, in particular since one of the lines of investigation is directed toward the Army.

It is also true, however, that progress has been made in the construction of a democratic culture in Mexico. The national debate generated by the indigenous rights law, and the independent positions of the executive, legislative and judicial branches of government regarding the law are an indication of that progress. But the persistence of power structures from the old regime within the new, a phenomenon found at the local, state and national levels, is one of the largest challenges facing the transition process in Mexico.

Stalemate on indigenous rights

The polemic around the indigenous rights constitutional reform approved earlier this year continues. While its defenders insist that it reflects an advance in relation to previous legislation, it is indisputable that it will not serve as a step toward the renewal of peace talks in Chiapas but rather an obstacle and a new source of conflict, since it has been rejected by its supposed beneficiaries.

Efforts to improve the law are grouped in two camps: those who propose the possibility of a "reform of the reform" (i.e., revising the law that was approved) and those who propose improving the law through the implementing legislation that will be required. While the latter position appears more pragmatic, critics argue that it would represent a shirking of the responsibility of the national government to guarantee adequately the recognition of indigenous rights within the Constitution. In addition, the historical experience of the Indians leaves them with little confidence in the state governments, which are subject to political interests and shifting power politics.

Appeals to the Supreme Court and to the International Labor Organization (ILO) will not necessarily permit the issue to be reopened, since their decisions are limited by the nature of those institutions. If in the end the law is not modified, those who have rejected it completely will have to redefine their strategy with regard to the secondary legislation and policies related to implementation of the law.

This latest stalemate in the peace process may be the most difficult to overcome. The administration is claiming that it has done everything possible, while the EZLN dismisses the new law as a "betrayal," and in the indigenous communities, one begins to hear commentaries about how Fox "is the same as [former President] Zedillo." This growing distance between the government and the Zapatistas is a far cry from the renewed hope that emerged during the first months of the Fox administration, and is increasingly reminiscent of the polarization that prevailed during the preceding regime.

The absence of a mediation body further complicates the possibility of finding channels for dialogue. COCOPA, the congressional peace commission, has not been able to overcome its internal divisions, and, in fact, has become an apt reflection of the disagreements among the political parties of its members.

Readjustments after the Chiapas elections

The political power map continues to be reorganized in the aftermath of the county government elections in October. Notable factors in the process were the low credibility of the State Electoral Institute and the low voter turnout.

Analysts had expected a more balanced outcome among the political parties, especially in view of the internal conflicts within the state PRI in recent months. The PRI's victory may be explained in large part by the prohibition on coalitions of political parties together with a particularly wide variety of political parties from which to choose. While old practices continue (vote buying, domination by political bosses), the political landscape in Chiapas is increasingly blurred.

Certainly the election results will not make the job of Governor Salazar any easier. He will continue to have to lead with a state congress dominated by the PRI, even though the PRI is more divided than ever. This situation may complicate the resolution of a number of outstanding issues, unless the two powers can achieve a minimal political understanding.

Other consequences of September 11

September 11 exacerbated some tendencies that do not help the advancement of the Chiapas peace process. One of the most immediate consequences was the increased militarization of the state, which augmented tensions given that] the military presence has long been very high.

The discussion about which armed groups in Mexico are terrorist seems to have exculpated the Zapatistas. However there is continuing concern that as a result of fear, intolerance may grow and with it the risk that the rights of dissident and minority groups may be more vulnerable.

The economic factor will also be an important element in the coming months as tensions rise in the indigenous communities between those who continue in resistance and those who accept government assistance. Of course the crisis extends far beyond Chiapas, the reduced possibilities of migration to the U.S. being but one indication

:: FEATURE

Dilemma of the Displaced in Chiapas: Return without Justice?

"Frankly, the issue of Chiapas has completely disappeared from the European agenda; Europe is clear: today there is a democratic government in Mexico which respects human rights, which takes care of, which loves and respects its indigenous brothers."
-- Vicente Fox (La Jornada, October 22, 2001, p.14)

Today, almost eight years after the Zapatista uprising in January of 1994 and almost a year after the electoral unseating of the old PRI regime, the plight of those displaced by the armed conflict in Chiapas has yet to be resolved, despite this statement by President Fox, and despite the election promises of Pablo Salazar, the new governor of Chiapas. While the first displacements occurred during the military portion of the uprising in early January 1994, the majority of those currently living as displaced persons were forced from their homes between 1995 and 1998 as a result of the paramilitary activity which was the most criticized element of the Zedillo government's counterinsurgency program. In its well-documented census of persons forced to leave their homes as a result of the armed struggle in Chiapas, the Fray Bartolome de las Casas Human Rights Center shows well over 12,000 displaced in five different zones and ten counties in Chiapas as of August 2001.

Since fleeing from their homes, they have survived the intervening years in very reduced circumstances. Most were forced to leave their belongings behind with their houses, and many had their houses burned and their animals stolen when they fled. While a few have been able to work their lands with the accompaniment of human rights observers, most have had no access to their lands and livelihood; in some cases their plots have been taken over or stolen outright. Many have lost relationships as a result of leaving their homes and all have been wrenched from their communities. All live without a sense of security, and many continue to be threatened.

The Returns of Las Abejas

By August of this year conditions in the encampments of displaced families belonging to the civil society group Las Abejas (The Bees) in Chenalho had deteriorated to such an extent that they were no longer bearable. Especially in X'oyep the people did not have adequate access to potable water or firewood. While this had been a growing problem for some time, they now learned thatg the International Red Cross was cutting their food allotments as well.

When we asked Ernesto Herrera, head of the Chiapas office of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) about the cutbacks, he emphasized that the mission of the ICRC is to offer emergency humanitarian aid to displaced victims of armed conflict. In the case of Chenalho, they had been giving 100% food support to the displaced families in the region since they entered the area following the massacre in Acteal in December of 1997. In an evaluation of the situation of the displaced families in Chenalho which the ICRC carried out in March and April of this year, they realized that some families receiving aid now had access to their own food crops or income from harvesting their coffee. Based on this assessment, they decided to cut some of the food aid and to replace it with agricultural aid programs which encourage families to regain self-sufficiency.

Whatever the rationale for the cuts, for many of the displaced Abejas this was the final straw. They felt that they had no alternative but to return to their communities, even though appropriate conditions for return did not yet exist; that is, they had not received reparations for the losses they had sustained, nor had the paramilitaries who forced them to flee been disarmed or brought to justice. Especially given the prospect of lack of food, they had to act quickly in order to return in time to plant their crops. So, beginning on August 28, and continuing September 30, October 11, and October 22, 1,336 Abejas returned to several different communities.

Given the unresolved tension in the communities, Las Abejas were very concerned about their safety as they planned the returns. On August 24, before the first return took place, they successfully negotiated an agreement with county authorities and high level state government officials which they hoped would ensure the rights and security of the returnees as well as defining their community responsibilities following their return. In contrast to the former state government, Pablo Salazar´s government facilitated these negotiations and state government officials were present in each of the returns. Las Abejas also asked national and international human rights organizations in Chiapas to provide accompaniment for each return, and an ongoing observation presence was established in several of the returnee communities.

Reaction to the Returns

As might be expected, response to these returns was greatly varied. The returnees themselves ran the gamut of emotional reactions -- excitement at finally returning to homes and lives they had left behind years before; sorrow at leaving those who had taken them in and supported them throughout the difficult years of their displacement; and, of course, fear of returning to communities where the groups of armed men who had forced them to leave are at liberty and still in possession of their weapons. Perhaps the greatest preoccupation centered around Los Chorros where paramilitary groups remain intact after forcibly rebuffing federal government operatives who entered the town to disarm them late last year. In fact, at least a dozen of the families scheduled to make the return to Los Chorros from X'oyep changed their minds due to rumors of possible paramilitary reprisals. On November 21, in a move which served to heighten tensions, a federal judge decreed that six of the 87 prisoners held in the Acteal massacre were innocent and released them from prison. Of the four freed men who live in Los Chorros, two are identified as paramilitary leaders.

Within the wider circle of displaced communities, other groups were interested in how Las Abejas had organized the returns and what kind of support they received with an eye toward the possibility of utilizing these experiences in future returns to their own communities. Also of interest was whether the returnees would be able to reclaim their lands. For any unable to maintain access to their land, as would be the case for most of the displaced families in the northern region, for example, this is a critical issue.

In addition, there was concern as to how the government might use the returns to its own advantage. Because the government position is that Las Abejas are returning to their communities voluntarily, some displaced communities fear that the government may claim that the problems of the displaced have been resolved and that others can now safely return home as well. For example, the EZLN insists that their displaced will remain in resistance until appropriate conditions for return have been established (i.e., reparations for the displaced and disarming and bringing paramilitaries to justice).

What might this mean for Polho, the Zapatista autonomous community adjacent to Acteal where many of the displaced Abejas have been living? If their neighbors are in fact able to return safely to their communities, the displaced Zapatistas in Polho may fear losing the support of public opinion and international organizations.

Also, since Las Abejas had engaged in negotiations with the government to provide safeguards for the returns, there is concern among all of the displaced that the government will now try to claim a political victory for having "resolved" their problems.

By calling these "forced returns," Las Abejas attempt to underscore the fact that the requisite conditions for a just and safe return still have not been established. Nevertheless, public perception of the plight of the displaced, as indicated by local press coverage, seems to have shifted toward the view that these issues have been resolved. It remains to be seen just how much of an impact this will have in terms of waning support for victims of the conflict in Chiapas from national and international organizations.

Beyond Chenalho

In January of this year, the Fray Bartolome de las Casas Human Rights Center organized a meeting attended by approximately one hundred displaced people from all over Chiapas. Out of this gathering was formed a negotiation commission, consisting of twenty persons representing sixteen communities, which was charged with taking the following four demands to the state government:

1. that those who drove them from their homes be brought to justice;
2. that reparations be paid for the losses they had suffered;
3. that they be given new land or that the legal status of their own lands be regularized; and
4. that the San Andres Accords be officially recognized.

The new commission met in April and again in May with Pablo Salazar and the government agencies involved in the issues to be negotiated. While the governor seems eager to resolve the problems of the displaced, there is an obvious gap between his vision of such a resolution and that of the displaced people themselves. The official position is that there is now neither money nor land available for reparations. What the government has offered is humanitarian aid and the services of the government commission for reconciliation, which would treat the problem as a series of isolated intracommunity incidents in which the slate can be wiped clean and agreements reached between the disputing parties. This approach is unacceptable to people who have been driven from their homes as a direct result of the armed conflict here, because it fails to address a key element of the problem: the continued impunity of the paramilitary groups in their communities.

Despite these differences, the meetings produced agreement on three topics of discussion: justice, land and development. Negotiations are scheduled to begin in December, pending the outcome of a government analysis of the situation of the displaced and their communities of origin. So far, the government has offered no concrete proposals, and the negotiation commission for the displaced has expressed some doubt as to whether the government intends to enter into meaningful negotiations. However, at this point, they still hope that they will see some positive results in December. If at that time they feel progress is not being made, they will have to decide whether to continue the negotiation process or whether other forms of action may be more effective.

Moving On

In the meantime, life goes on for those who have returned to their communities. While there are still fears and uneasiness, as of yet there have been no reports of any serious incidents. Las Abejas have created a committee to handle land disputes and other complaints which the returnees may have. For the most part, however, it seems that people are getting down to the business of reestablishing their lives. An important part of this process is rebuilding relationships within the communities which were ruptured with the displacements.

A moving report from one of the observer teams describes an informal meeting between a member of an armed group in the community of Puebla and a leader of Las Abejas in that community. After some general discussion, and after reading and discussing some Bible passages together, the man identified as a paramilitary asked the pardon of the Abeja for his part in the displacements. This is a single incident, and "pardon" on an individual level does not begin to address the unresolved issues of justice. Nevertheless it indicates that much as there exist real possibilities for renewed conflict or even new atrocities in these forced returns, the fact that people are once again living in direct relationship with each other means that there may also be possibilities for rebuilding and renewal within these communities.

Whether the returns were for better or worse is now only an academic debate -- the people could no longer endure the conditions under which they were living, and they had to make a change. What remains clear is that the problems of other displaced persons in the state have not been resolved with these returns. As their negotiation commission is making clear, adequate conditions for return do not yet exist for displaced people in other areas any more than they did for Las Abejas. Until the underlying causes of the displacements are addressed, the problems of those thousands still displaced will remain unresolved.

:: ACTIVITIES OF THE SIPAZ

September – November 2001

VISITS AND CONTACTS

• Urgent Actions regarding the murder of Digna Ochoa and threats against human rights defenders in Mexico.
• Accompaniment of displaced families from the civil society organization Las Abejas (the Bees) on their return to their communities of origin.
• Visit of the Political Secretary of the British Embassy during the Chiapas state/county elections; followup visit accompanied by Great Britain's Assistant Secretary for Latin America.
• Meetings in Mexico City with advisors, NGOs, embassies, and the Under-secretary for Human Rights and Democracy of the Mexican Foreign Ministry.
• Tour by the International Outreach Coordinator through five European countries; interviews and meetings with official organizations (lnternational Labor Organization, Working Group on Indigenous Peoples of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, European Parliament, foreign ministries of France and Germany), solidarity organizations, churches, media, and members of the SIPAZ coalition.
• Tour by a member of the SIPAZ Chiapas team in Germany and Switzerland; participation in the international assemblies of Pax Christi International and Peace Brigades International, both member organizations of the SIPAZ coalition.

INTER-RELIGIOUS DIALOGUE

• Meetings with religious leaders in the county of Chenalho and with the Pluralistic Ecumenical Group. Visits to several communities in the area.
• Second stage of the Peacebuilding Exchange Project in the Chiapas highlands, in collaboration with CEPAD (Council of Evangelical Churches) and the Peace Commissions of Nicaragua; two-week visit to Nicaragua by representatives of Catholic and Presbyterian churches in Chenalho.
• Participation in a television program on religious intolerance in Chiapas.

PEACE EDUCATION

• Workshop on "Reconciliation" with students of the Bible School of Holistic Formation.
• Workshop by Capacitar (US-based member group of SIPAZ) with health promoters in Chenalho and members of organizations and churches from San Cristobal de las Casas.
• Organizing of the "Conference on Communal Experiences of Reconciliation and Peace" (November 16-18 in San Cristobal de las Casas.)