:: SUMMARY

On April 27 the Mexican Congress approved constitutional reforms on indigenous rights and culture. These reforms differed significantly from the 1996 San Andres Accords and the accompanying COCOPA (Commission for Agreement and Pacification) initiative, the passage of which was one of the three conditions set forth by the EZLN (Zapatista Army of National Liberation) for its return to peace negotiations. Criticism of the new reforms centered on the fact that the law fails to recognize indigenous communities as subjects with legal rights; does not recognize the right of indigenous people to their territories nor to control of the natural resources within their territories; limits the exercise of their rights to the county level; and relegates the definition of fundamental aspects of indigenous rights to the state level.

The EZLN broke off relations with the government and rejected the reform, saying that "it betrays hopes for a negotiated solution to the war in Chiapas." Numerous indigenous groups and non-governmental organizations, both within Mexico and internationally, criticized the reform. Voices in favor came from the PRI (Institutional Revolutionary Party) and the PAN (National Action Party) who contended that the changes to the COCOPA initiative were necessary to avoid "balkanization."

The text of the constitutional reform was sent to the 31 state congresses for ratification. Indigenous and civil society organizations mounted an unprecedented lobbying effort encouraging the state lawmakers to reject the reform. The law was, in fact, voted down in the four states in Mexico with the largest indigenous populations (Chiapas, Oaxaca, Hidalgo and Guerrero). Having been widely rejected by its supposed beneficiaries, the legitimacy of the law is left in question.

By mid-July, although nine states had rejected the law, 17 states had approved it. The majority required for ratification had been reached. Despite the fact that some states had yet to vote, the Permanent Commission of the Congress of the Union "fast tracked" the reform, approved the vote of the state congresses, and sent the law to President Fox to be formally published.

In response, various county and state authorities as well as members of the PRD (Party of the Democratic Revolution) began presenting appeals to the Mexican Supreme Court, challenging the constitutionality of the law. Without waiting for the Court to pass judgement on these cases, President Fox published the law on August 14. Since then, there have been further protests and challenges. Another arena of legal action is the International Labor Organization. The new law has been denounced as inconsistent with Convention 169 on Indigenous and Tribal Peoples, a convention ratified by Mexico.

Some analysts suggest that economic considerations played an important role in the approval of the constitutional reform. Laws giving indigenous citizens control over the lands on which they live and the valuable resources contained in these lands could pose obstacles to projects of transnational corporations in Chiapas and other parts of Mexico.

Regarding Chiapas, President Fox seems to have no long range plan for peace. Administration representatives maintain they have done all that is possible to achieve peace in Chiapas. The president apparently believes that the underlying causes of the conflict can be handled by the promotion of development projects, even though this strategy has not proven successful in the past. Furthermore, a response that focuses solely on Chiapas loses sight of the fact that the issue of indigenous rights is not just local but national. Fox has stated that the concerns of Chiapas are not necessarily those of the country. According to the president, what is "a thousand times more than the Zapatista movement or an indigenous community in Chiapas" is his Puebla Panama Plan, a massive economic development project that includes southern Mexico and all of Central America. However, this plan has been strongly criticized by hundreds of Mexican and Central American indigenous, civil society and non-governmental organizations.

Despite Fox's assertion that there is "blessed peace" in Chiapas, tensions have escalated since the approval of the reforms. There has been a substantial increase in reports of military patrols and overflights. Still unresolved is the situation of the thousands of displaced persons in Chiapas who have fled their communities as a result of paramilitary violence. Despite the fact that the paramilitary threat still exists, 61 families of Las Abejas (the Bees) returned to their communities on August 28 to face an uncertain future.

Given the upcoming county and state elections in October, a further increase in tensions is foreseeable. At the same time, both in Chiapas and in other parts of the country, there are continued voices of protest and further calls for civil resistance to the recently approved law on indigenous rights.

Recommended Actions:

1. Write to President Fox and to COCOPA to express:
   1. your concern regarding this new obstacle to the reopening of the peace process as well as
   2. the hope of the international community that the Mexican government, through both the executive and legislative branches, will work to revise the approved legislation to make it congruent with the commitments of the San Andres Accords and Convention 169 of the International Labor Organization.
2. Urge the International Labor Organization to demand that the Mexican government make its laws congruent with Convention 169 which Mexico ratified in1990.
3. Write to Dr. Rudolph Stavenhagen, UN Special Rapporteur on indigenous peoples, to express your concern about the lack of recognition of indigenous rights in Mexico.
4. Circulate information, such as the contents of this Report, on the situation in Chiapas.

Please write:

Lic. Vicente Fox, Presidente de la República
Residencial Oficial de los Pinos
Colonia M. Chapultepec, Delegación M. Hidalgo
11850 México, D.F., México
Fax: (+52)(5)515 1794
Internet site for comments

Comisión de Concordia y Pacificación (COCOPA)
Reforma No.10, Torre Caballitos, Piso 18
06030 México, D.F., México
Fax: (+52)(5)345 3288

Juan Somavía
Director General de la OIT
4, route de Morrillons
CH-1211, Geneva 22
Switzerland
Fax (41 22) 799 85 33

Rodolfo Stavenhagen
Special Rapporteur on Human Rights
and the Fundamental Liberties
of Indigenous Peoples .
OHCHR
Palais des Nations
1211 Geneva 10
Switzerland
Fax: (41 22) 917 9010
jwoo.hchr@unog.ch
cc. staven@colmex.mx

:: UPDATE

Indigenous Rights Law: A new obstacle to the peace process in Chiapas

After months of renewed hope, peace efforts in Chiapas entered a new crisis at the end of April when the federal Congress approved an indigenous rights law which key indigenous and popular movement organizations denounced as a betrayal.

To review the history a bit, in November 1996 the congressional Commission for Agreement and Pacification (COCOPA), in an effort to move the stalled peace process forward, agreed to prepare a legislative proposal on indigenous rights and culture. The purpose was to integrate into the federal constitution the San Andres Accords, which had been signed in February of that same year. The COCOPA proposal was accepted by the EZLN (Zapatista Army of National Liberation) in December 1996, but the government rejected it and made a different proposal. Neither of the proposals came to a vote in Congress during the term of President Zedillo. Since then, the Zapatistas have insisted that the fulfillment of the San Andres Accords is a necessary condition for the renewal of peace talks.

On December 5, 2000, several days after assuming office, President Vicente Fox sent the COCOPA proposal to Congress. Later the Zapatistas staged a highly-visible, two-week caravan from Chiapas to Mexico City. Then on March 28, a delegation of Zapatista commanders and representatives of the National Indigenous Congress (CNI), was given the opportunity to advocate for the COCOPA initiative from the floor of the Congress.

However, on April 25 the Senate unanimously approved a significantly different proposal. On April 28, the Chamber of Deputies approved the same proposal, with the PRI (Institutional Revolutionary Party) and the PAN (National Action Party) voting in favor and the PRD (Party of the Democratic Revolution) voting against. As a constitutional amendment, subsequent approval by the state congresses was also required.

Voices in favor

The PAN defended the new law, arguing that the Congress "concerned itself with attending to the details that the COCOPA proposal had not considered" and that it had avoided a situation "in which national unity might be broken and the country might become balkanized." The PAN actively lobbied state-level PAN leaders to insure ratification of the reform.

Enrique Jackson, leader of the PRI senators, stated that it was an error of President Fox "to suppose that the National Congress is here to please him or an armed group." He added that the issue "is now closed."

The Mexican Bishops Conference (CEM) declared that this law is better than nothing. It underscored the importance of the recognition of the authority of the Congress and that the indigenous rights reform be accepted as a basis for building peace. The CEM also acknowledged that the new law is generating political tensions and that the peace process is at risk.

Position of the Fox administration and reactions to it

Initially President Fox recognized the work of the Senate, then later he spoke about the limitations of the new law. On May 20, he addressed the issue of Chiapas: "This issue is finished. A law has been approved and there is interest on our part in renewing peace talks. There are no other comments about the issue other than that we have to return to dialogue."

In June, during a visit to El Salvador, he stated: "The issue of Chiapas is not by a long shot the issue of Mexico. It needs to be placed in its proper perspective. At the same time, there is a very firm effort to deactivate the conflict. In fact, there is no conflict. We are in holy peace." He added, "The Puebla Panama Plan [see glossary] is a thousand times more than the Zapatista movement or an indigenous community in Chiapas." In response to these statements, members of COCOPA asserted that there is a conflict in Chiapas and that it requires a solution. They added that while the conflict is not primarily in a military phase, neither can it be said that there is "holy peace."

During his July 5 visit to Chiapas, President Fox focused his public talks on the necessity to promote development programs so that "harmony might return to the communities."

The government peace commissioner, Luis H. Alvarez, recognized the need to extend the new law in several important areas. On May 11, he announced that the administration would prepare regulatory laws aimed at implementing the constitutional reform. He also said that the government would focus its efforts on the causes of the conflict. On June 28, he called on the EZLN to "respect the decisions of the indigenous communities, whether or not they sympathize with your movement, and refrain from blocking the implementation of social programs."

Rodolfo Elizondo, the administration's coordinator for the Citizen's Alliance and an advisor on Chiapas, defended the government's position saying, "that the law does not fulfill the expectations of the EZLN and the CNI and has not been accepted by them is not a matter that the administration can resolve." Alluding to the absence of the EZLN during the discussion of the law in congress in April, he asked, "Where was the EZLN during the process of approval of the law?"

Xochitl Galvez, head of the President's Office for the Development of the Indian Peoples, was critical of the law from the beginning: "The constitutional reform that was approved includes some of the concepts of the president's proposal. However it leaves out others which require further efforts to find political solutions that will permit the respective advances."

Rejection by indigenous organizations and civil society

On April 27 the CNI emitted a statement denouncing the new law because it differed from the COCOPA proposal on the following key points: autonomy and self-determination, recognition of indigenous communities as legal entities, rights to lands and territories, use and enjoyment of natural resources, election of authorities, and the right to regional association.

On April 29, the EZLN stated that it "…formally refuses to recognize this constitutional reform on indigenous rights and culture. It is not in the spirit of the San Andres Accords, it does not respect the COCOPA legislative proposal, it completely ignores the national and international demand for recognition of indigenous rights and culture, it sabotages the incipient process of rapprochement between the government and the EZLN, it betrays hopes for a negotiated solution to the war in Chiapas, and it reveals the total separation of the political class from popular demands." As a result, the EZLN broke off the contacts it had recently re-established with the federal government.

The National Indigenous Multi-ethnic Assembly for Autonomy (ANIPA) also criticized the law for not complying with the San Andres Accords: "It is a simulation, a doorway to war."

In May, both the ERPI (Revolutionary Army of the Insurgent People) and the EPR (Popular Revolutionary Army) expressed their support for the EZLN in its decision to suspend contacts with the federal government.

Governors Pablo Salazar (Chiapas) and Jose Murat (Oaxaca) also strongly criticized the law. Salazar stated that the law was similar to the proposal of former president Zedillo and added that the legislation "was not at the level of the needs and the demands of the indigenous and of Mexican society. In the Congress, political and ideological considerations prevailed and not an objective evaluation of an initiative based on an agreement made by the government." On July 11 Salazar and Murat signed a joint statement ("Call from the South") exhorting the state congresses that had not yet voted to reject the new law.

An intense lobbying campaign was waged with the state congresses, and in each state there were demonstrations organized by indigenous groups and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). On July 3, 1400 writers, intellectuals, religious leaders and representatives of Mexican and international NGOs released a public statement calling on the local congresses to reject the constitutional reform.

In the state congresses

In several states, the law was voted on amidst popular protests. In Chiapas, in the consultative forums organized by the state Congress, the mayors from the highlands (all of them from the PRI), representatives of several ethnic groups, and dozens of social, indigenous, peasant, and non-governmental organizations spoke out against the law. In the end, the constitutional reform was defeated in Chiapas by a vote of 30 to 5, with deputies from all the parties joining together to oppose the law.

Nationally, the reform was finally approved, with 17 state congresses voting in favor and nine voting against. Significantly, those voting against the law included the states with the highest concentration of indigenous (Chiapas, Oaxaca, Guerrero and Hidalgo.)

Governor Salazar observed, "Here we have a conflict between representative democracy and participatory democracy…Those for whom the law was created are largely rejecting it."

"Fast track" approval

On July 16, the votes of the state congresses were officially tabulated in the federal Congress. This was despite the fact that the law had not yet been voted on in some states and the issue had not been placed on the agenda of the Permanent Commission of the Congress.

That same day, the administration expressed its full respect for the Congress. On the other hand, Luisa Maria Calderon (PAN), who occupied the rotating presidency of COCOPA, criticized the accelerated tabulation process: "It was not appropriate. There was a lack of prudence. There was no need to not respect the normal legislative schedule."

Initial reactions

On July 25, the CNI and a variety of civil society organizations organized a demonstration in front of the Senate, repudiating the reform. On July 30 thousands of Indians blocked the main highways in Chiapas in protest of the indigenous rights law and of the Puebla Panama Plan. They also demanded the release of Zapatista prisoners, the cancellation of arrest warrants against popular movement leaders, the punishment and disarming of paramilitary groups, and the withdrawal of the Mexican army from Chiapas.

Others sought legal remedies. The county of Molcaxac (state of Puebla) was the first to present an appeal to the Supreme Court challenging the law's constitutionality. Several days later the high court agreed to hear the case. The county authorities opposed the constitutional reform as a violation of the rights of the counties, because the indigenous peoples had not been consulted, and because it does not respect the International Labor Organization's Convention 169 on Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries, which was ratified by Mexico.

In August two other counties, Texpatepec (Veracruz) and Copalillo (Guerrero), appealed to the Supreme Court for a stay. The stay was denied on the basis that the legislative process had not yet concluded and that a stay could not be issued against a law that has not been formally published.

The PRD presented another constitutional complaint against the federal Congress and eight state legislatures "for not having complied fully with statutory requirements regarding constitutional reforms." The cases in question were ones in which the reform had been approved by a simple majority, whereas, although it does not appear explicitly in all the state constitutions, the PRD argued that a two-thirds majority is required in the state congresses, just as it is in the federal Congress.

Oaxaca was the first state to file a constitutional appeal. Governor Jose Murat criticized the indigenous law as "an agreement that is capricious, factional and partial." He said that the state appeal is backed by the 16 indigenous ethnic groups in Oaxaca and by the 418 counties that are governed by traditional practices and customs.

On August 10, around 100 national and international NGOs and 120 civil society representatives sent a request to the International Labor Organization and to the UN Special Rapporteur on Human Rights and the Fundamental Liberties of Indigenous Peoples (Rodolfo Stavenhagen, who is Mexican), calling on them to recommend to the Mexican government the fulfillment of its international commitments in the area of indigenous rights.

On August 14 President Fox published the constitutional reform on indigenous rights in the Official Daily of the Federation, at which point it went into effect. Additional protests and legal appeals are expected in the coming weeks. The explosion of small homemade bombs at branch offices of the Banamex bank in Mexico City on August 8, for which a group called the FARP (Revolutionary Armed Forces of the People) took credit, did nothing to diminish fears that more groups may opt for violent means of struggle.

Tensions in Chiapas

Meanwhile in Chiapas the tension has increased since the approval of the law. In addition to the new stalemate in peace efforts, there are other problems on the southern border (illegal trafficking in drugs, weapons and undocumented migrants). On June 4, after a six month lapse, the Defense Ministry, the Federal Office of the Attorney General, and the state government reactivated the patrols of the BOM (Mixed Operation Bases), inter-agency military/police initiatives.

A short while later, contradictory accounts were given regarding the reinforcement of the presence of military, police and immigration agents on the southern border. Chiapas Governor Pablo Salazar denied that there was a buildup and asserted, "The number of military troops is the same as before Congress resolved the issue of indigenous reform, but I have been informed that there is no increase in the patrols of the army nor other maneuvers that have not been undertaken on a routine basis."

Nonetheless, the number of denunciations has been increasing from communities in the conflict areas (the highlands and the Lacandon Jungle) regarding an increase in land and air military patrols as well as in the number of troops in the military camps. At the same time, intra-community conflicts, especially regarding land issues, continue to increase.

On August 28, 61 families of the civil society group Las Abejas (the Bees), returned to their home communities after several years living in displaced persons camps. They did so in spite of the fact that they don't believe that conditions for their safe return exist (in particular because of the continued impunity enjoyed by some of the paramilitary groups in the area). Governor Salazar had offered security guarantees to permit their return. While their well-publicized return was without incident, the prospects for their longer-term security are less clear.

Economic and international aspects

On May 11 in Panama, the Millennial Conference of Indigenous Peoples rejected the indigenous rights and culture reform approved by the Mexican Congress, saying that it is discriminatory and does not respond to the demands of the indigenous peoples.

Also during May, the UN Special Rapporteur on the independence of judges and lawyers arrived in Mexico. He made strong criticisms regarding the way in which justice is delivered.

One hundred and nine organizations from southeastern Mexico and Central America rejected the Puebla Panama Plan (PPP) at a meeting in Tapachula (Chiapas). The PPP was approved by the governments of Mexico, El Salvador, Costa Rica, Honduras, Guatemala, Panama, Belize and Nicaragua on July 12. Florencio Salazar Adame, general coordinator of PPP, stated that the future of the plan is not dependent on the pacification of Chiapas and that the fact that the dialogue between the EZLN and the Mexican government is broken off "does not worry" European investors. However, he added that it would not be implemented in the communities that did not wish it.

In a report released in June, the organization Public Citizen (USA) reported that at least 15 million Mexican peasants abandoned their traditional forms of subsistence in the face of the 46.2% fall (between 1993 and 1999) in the price for corn paid to Mexican producers. The report identified the main factors as the North America Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), which resulted in the importation of cheap corn from the US, and the reduction by 90% (over seven years) in federal investment in agricultural projects.

In August, the Third Congress of the Latin American Coordination of Farm Organizations, meeting in Mexico, included in its final declaration a rejection of the indigenous law approved by the Mexican Congress and reiterated its support for the COCOPA proposal. A similar declaration was made by the International Conference of Social Movements, which also took place in August in Mexico City.

:: ANALYSIS

Chiapas Peace Process: Optimism Cancelled

The optimism that prevailed since the beginning of the year was shattered by the approval of a constitutional reform on indigenous rights and culture that was quickly rejected by the EZLN and other indigenous organizations. The approval of the legislative proposal drafted by COCOPA in 1996 was one of the conditions listed by the Zapatistas last December for a renewal of peace talks. Hence the peace process has entered into a new crisis: stalemate, uncertainty and the risk that groups who opt for violent struggle may be the new order of the day.

The time of hope

From the time President Fox assumed office last December, a significant change was apparent with regard to the federal government's treatment of the Chiapas conflict. During the previous administration of Ernesto Zedillo, a continual attempt was made to minimize the conflict, whereas initially Fox put the issue at the top of the national agenda.

While the process of rapprochement proceeded with ups and downs, the EZLN was able to carry out its caravan to Mexico City (February-March) in order to lobby for the COCOPA legislative proposal without major problems. Along the way the caravan received the support of thousands of indigenous and others as it traveled through twelve states. The caravan culminated with the speeches of the Zapatistas and other indigenous leaders from the floor of Congress.

That event was historic, and the speeches of the Zapatista commanders were themselves hopeful, confirming their decision to pursue their struggle through dialogue and political means. They recognized that the Fox administration had offered signs of peace by withdrawing from specific military bases named by the EZLN and by freeing nearly all of the Zapatista prisoners. A first meeting took place between the designated Zapatista contact person and the federal peace commissioner, thus marking the incipient renewal of the peace process. It was the first direct contact between the EZLN and the Executive in nearly five years.

At the same time, the success of the Zapatista march raised hopes that a political opening had been achieved that would facilitate the approval of the COCOPA bill. Perhaps this optimism explains the decision of the EZLN – which has been criticized by many – to retreat to the silence of the jungle in Chiapas during the process of discussion of the law in Congress.

Frustrated expectations

The approval of an indigenous rights law different from the COCOPA proposal marked the end of the possibility for rapprochement. Its rejection by the EZLN and the CNI was immediate. Other indigenous and non-governmental organizations were quick to do the same. Their criticisms were both of form and of content. (See Indigenous reform: What is at stake?)

While groups close to the government affirmed that the new law constitutes an advance (albeit limited), groups close to the indigenous movement see it as a potentially fatal blow to the peace process. For the Zapatistas, the reform violates the San Andres Accords which they signed with the previous government, and that closes off the possibility of renewing peace talks. From their viewpoint, why talk with the government if it will not abide by the agreements it has already made?

It is worth noting that the new law was widely rejected by its supposed beneficiaries: the indigenous organizations and communities. Even the government agencies that attend to indigenous issues criticized the new law.

Polemic in the states

Once approved by the federal Congress, the constitutional reform had to be ratified by the state congresses. Historically this legal procedure has been conducted almost automatically with little debate or fanfare. In the case of the indigenous law, the voting in the state congresses generated unprecedented interest and polemics. For the first time, there was intense lobbying of the legislators by civil society, and the votes were not always along predictable lines. In a number of cases, the political parties did not vote as a block.

The states with the largest concentration of indigenous population that rejected the reform are also the most explosive ones with the largest guerrilla presence (Oaxaca, Chiapas and Guerrero). Some analysts suggest that their rejection of the law undermines its legitimacy, since it does not resolve the issue of indigenous rights nor does it open the way to a peaceful solution of the conflict in Chiapas. Hence the discussion about the possible disconnect between legality and legitimacy. On an issue like this, it is difficult for a system of representative government to respond to the demands of the indigenous peoples when they constitute a minority with little representation in the structures of power (something which the COCOPA proposal attempted to change.)

Future prospects

The Congress frustrated the expectations of the indigenous peoples, voting for a law that they do not desire. The Executive officially published the law despite the fact that it was very different from the proposal the President had submitted. In this final stage, the judicial branch appears to be the new actor that could play a key role, since the Supreme Court is expected to rule on the appeals that have been filed against the law by the PRD, county authorities, and state congresses.

Apart from the drama of the situation, it is interesting to observe the dynamic give and take that for the first time is unfolding among the three branches of government and which has succeeded in maintaining the issue of indigenous rights at the center of the national political agenda.

Equally interesting is to gauge the capacity of civil society, through national and international mobilization, to question the legitimacy of the new law. In this regard, a key tool is Convention 169 on Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries, which Mexico ratified, and which the constitutional reform is in conflict with on fundamental aspects related to self-determination. However, the diplomatic weight of the Mexican government in international organizations is well known, and the challenge is great.

The Fox administration's policy with regard to Chiapas has been ambiguous, and it appears that there is no long-term peace strategy. Some critics argue that President Fox only sent the COCOPA proposal to Congress because of the pressure to resolve the conflict in Chiapas and to give positive signals at the beginning of his term. But, they say, he did not lobby for his proposal on Chiapas like he did on other issues that were of greater importance to him, such as fiscal reform and approval of his budget.

With regard to his Chiapas policy, while it is true that he has not back-tracked on the withdrawal of the military bases, since the law was approved, the indigenous communities have begun to denounce a new increase in military presence and harassment. Nor has there been any further advance in the process of freeing Zapatista prisoners.

Fulfillment of the Zapatista conditions now looks like history, not like a current issue in the efforts to renew the dialogue. In fact, administration representatives argue that they have already done everything within their reach for peace in Chiapas and that the decision about whether to talk is in the hands of the Zapatistas. In view of the increasing tensions in Chiapas, some of the comments of President Fox are worrisome (for example, " There is no conflict. We are in holy peace.").

The actual proposals of the government to respond to the situation may be inadequate. The idea of resorting to secondary implementation laws as a means of improving the constitutional reform is not likely to be enough to rebuild the confidence of the EZLN. Another strategy of the administration seems to be to attempt to directly address the causes of the conflict, that is, to promote economic and social development projects in the indigenous communities of Chiapas. However this approach loses sight of the fact that the indigenous issue is national and not just regional. Moreover this strategy was tried by the previous administration without positive results. The economic situation of the indigenous is worse than at the beginning of the conflict. And in the majority of cases, the government assistance has fomented intra-communal divisions, especially when it was used as part of a counterinsurgency strategy or as a form of political patronage. Currently there is a great deal of polarization between those who accept the aid and the Zapatistas, who refuse it as part of their strategy of resistance.

On another front, the Fox administration is confronting the consequences of the economic policies associated with the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). Farming production has been seriously effected and today is in a deep crisis in a number of sectors, especially coffee, corn, sugarcane, and fishing. If the crisis and the increasing protests of peasants and other farm laborers should continue, the Chiapas conflict could become a secondary concern on the complicated national stage.

For its part, the EZLN appears to have opted to return to a posture of "resistance." This decision generates tensions, including within Zapatista communities, because of weariness and the grave economic situation in the conflict areas. Another possibility that has been mentioned – and which would be even more worrisome – is that the EZLN might seek to ally itself with other guerrilla groups, which have already expressed their support for the Zapatistas decision to refuse to renew peace talks. Some analysts have been inclined to read the EZLN's last communiqué in this sense: "[The legislators and the government] reinforce the logic of the different armed groups in Mexico by invalidating a process of dialogue and negotiation." (EZLN communiqué, April 29, 2001)

In any case, even if this is not an actual choice of the Zapatista leadership, in the increasing tension of the conflict, some dynamics may escape the control of the key actors and unleash a process that later would be difficult to reverse.

The unseen war

Meanwhile in Chiapas, the consequences of the approval of the law weigh on the level of community harmony and make the challenge of governing even more difficult for the administration of Governor Pablo Salazar.

After the Zapatista caravan, and during the brief process of discussion of the proposed law, there was a period of noticeably reduced social, political and military tension in Chiapas. But with the new crisis, the tendency is once again toward greater polarization.

SERAPAZ (Peace Services and Consulting) has denounced the "explosiveness" of the situation which continues to deteriorate with land conflicts, the generally unchecked presence of the paramilitary groups, the unresolved situation of the thousands of displaced, manifestations of social discontent, etc. The situation is further aggravated by the tense pre-electoral climate (county and state congress elections are scheduled for October.)

Previously the axis of tension among the organizations was the division between those affiliated with the PRI (the former ruling party) and opposition or independent groups. Today the confrontation is also between those who support the independent government of Pablo Salazar and those who refuse any sort of contact with the state government.

The Salazar government has been clear in its rejection of the indigenous law that was approved. Since he assumed office, Salazar also has insisted consistently that, in contrast to its predecessor, his government will not contribute to the divisions among the communities and the promotion of violence.

However some feel that up till now, Salazar has not taken clear positions with respect to highly sensitive issues related to the conflict, such as the paramilitary groups and the impunity they enjoy, which directly effects the situation of the internal refugees and their prospects for returning home. It is possible that not confronting these issues with greater clarity has to do both with his intention to maintain dialogue with all the different sectors as well as with the necessity of assuring a certain degree of governability in extremely difficult conditions.

Conflict of interests

After seven and a half years of conflict in Chiapas, Mexico has a new indigenous rights law that was not consulted with the indigenous peoples and that has been rejected by the majority of them.

A number of experts and organizations have stated that it is not happenstance that the constitutional reform differs from the San Andres Accords and the COCOPA proposal in fundamental aspects such as recognition of the indigenous peoples as subjects with legal rights and concrete guarantees regarding the means to exercise the autonomy that is theoretically recognized: land, territories, and the natural resources that exist on them. They point out that such rights are in potential conflict with the investment and economic exploitation projects of transnational companies in Chiapas and other parts of Mexico.

The dilemma is as clear as it is difficult, and it transcends the Chiapas conflict, although it also includes it: What national project is to be pursued in a Mexico that wishes to move toward greater democratization?

:: FEATURE

Indigenous reform: What is at stake?

According to the Miguel Agustin Pro Human Rights Center and SERAPAZ (Peace Services and Consulting), the following are basic differences between the COCOPA legislative proposal on indigenous rights (based on the San Andres Accords) and the constitutional reform that was finally approved by the Congress.

1. The COCOPA draft calls for the amendment of Articles 115, 26, 53, 73 and 116. The reform that was approved concentrates all issues related to indigenous rights in a new Article 2. The concern these organizations have expressed in this respect is that it may be left "as an isolated issue that will not permeate the text of the Constitution as a whole to make explicit and to permit the conditions that would make possible the exercise of the collective rights of the indigenous peoples." Specifically, the absence of the reforms to the other articles eliminates constitutional guarantees of key elements for the exercise of self determination, as well as the definition of the spheres of action at the county and regional levels and the representation and political participation of the indigenous peoples.
2. The reform that was approved eliminates the recognition of indigenous communities as entities with legal rights (derecho público) and instead defines them as entities of public interest (interés público). This change re-creates the vision of indigenous people as nothing more than the recipients of public policies and not subjects with rights who participate in the organization of the Mexican State. As a first example, Article 2-B defines the components of the public policies of the State for indigenous peoples.
3. The reform that was approved eliminates any recognition of the right of indigenous peoples to their lands and territories. Instead it refers only to "the places where communities dwell and which they occupy." Consistent with this limitation, the right of access for the collective use and enjoyment of the existing natural resources in their territories is suppressed and instead only the right to the "preferential use" of such resources is recognized.
4. Indigenous rights are limited to the community level or at most to the county level, and the possibility of association of indigenous counties is eliminated. In contrast the San Andres Accords and the COCOPA legislative proposal recognize the possibility of regional association.
5. The determination of indigenous rights and their potential scope is relegated to secondary laws or to the state constitutions. This arrangement carries the risk that some rights will be limited in some states and non-existent in others and that some matters of minority rights that should be guaranteed by the Constitution will be left to the discretion of majority groups. This is even more of a problem for indigenous peoples whose culture and territories extend to two or more states.

:: Activities of the SIPAZ in Mexico

Between - and July 2001

Between May and July 2001, SIPAZ activities included the following:

VISITS AND CONTACTS

• Visits to the northern region of Chiapas to speak with a variety of political and religious leaders.
• Meetings with various delegations from North America to inform them about the present political situation in Chiapas and about SIPAZ work.
• Visits from the embassies of France (the Ambassador and the First Political Secretary), Germany (the Vice-minister for Economic Cooperation), and the US (Human Rights Officer).
• Meeting of the Board of Directors of SIPAZ in Chiapas and, in conjunction with it, meetings with national and local NGOs, COCOPA members, federal Peace Commissioner Luis H. Alvarez, the National Indigenous Congress, and Chiapas Governor Pablo Salazar.

INTER-RELIGIOUS DIALOGUE

• Meetings with religious leaders in the county of Chenalho and with the Pluralistic Ecumenical Group.
• Commencement of the Peacebuilding Exchange Project in the Chiapas highlands, in collaboration with CEPAD (Council of Evangelical Churches) and the Peace Commissions of Nicaragua; workshop with Evangelical and Catholic representatives and visits to several communities in Chenalho.
• Completion of the strategic planning process of the ecumenical Bible School of Holistic Formation.

PEACE EDUCATION

• Participation in the Peace Network, an inclusive space for action and reflection about processes of community reconciliation.
• A series of five workshops on conflict transformation with pupils of the Community Development Centers (CEDECOs).
• Workshop with the Board of Directors of the Women's Research and Support Center (CIAM).
• Workshop on "Reconciliation" with communication promoters at Melel Xojobal.
• Workshop on "Introduction to Conflict Transformation" with a Presbyterian congregation in Tuxtla Gutierrez.