:: SUMMARY

During the first five months of President Vicente Fox's term, important progress was made toward reinvigorating the stalled peace process in Chiapas. However the hopes raised were seriously challenged when the Mexican Congress approved a bill of constitutional reforms on indigenous rights and culture that was promptly and vehemently rejected by the Zapatista Army of National Liberation (EZLN).

The law differs significantly from the bill drafted by the congressional Commission on Agreement and Pacification (COCOPA) and backed by the EZLN. The COCOPA bill sought to implement the San Andres Accords, signed in 1996 by the federal government and the EZLN. That was the bill President Fox submitted to Congress shortly after assuming office.
The bill that was finally approved includes positive elements prohibiting discrimination of any kind and recognizing the autonomy of indigenous peoples in certain respects. However, as indigenous leaders, academic experts and others pointed out, it fails to grant a variety of legal rights to indigenous peoples without which, they argue, it would be difficult to make autonomy meaningful in practice.

In the end, it seems to reflect the historic gap between the reality of the indigenous peoples and that of the political class in Mexico. The bill was passed by a large majority in Congress, and legislators from the PRI and PAN parties have defended it as an important, albeit limited, step forward. However, the long-awaited passage of this bill was greeted as much by criticism from those it is supposed to benefit and their supporters as it was by praise from other quarters. Moreover, as the limitations of the bill became known, the criticism from key indigenous groups took the form of cries of outrage and betrayal. Some pledged to oppose ratification of the reforms by the state legislatures. Even President Fox, responding to the mounting criticism, was moved to state, "Clearly more thorough work is required on central aspects, such as autonomy and self-determination…"

The sense of disappointment and betrayal was perhaps greater as a result of the hopes raised by the remarkable events of the preceding months. In late February, 24 EZLN leaders undertook a two-week caravan through twelve states that culminated with a rally of approximately 200,000 people in Mexico City's main square. The central objective of the march was to lobby Congress on behalf of the COCOPA bill. While the Zapatistas delegates encountered some hostility, they were generally received enthusiastically along their route. Moreover, the caravan propelled the Chiapas conflict back to the center of public attention. En route, they participated in the third National Indigenous Congress (CNI). The five thousand representatives of 42 indigenous peoples accepted the COCOPA bill as their own and recognized the EZLN as fully representative of the CNI. Given the broad representation of the CNI, its action undermines efforts to cast the EZLN as an isolated group and the Chiapas conflict as a local matter.

The Fox administration contributed to the positive climate by welcoming the Zapatista caravan, pledging to secure peace and prosperity in Chiapas, and partially addressing the three conditions set by the EZLN for the renewal of talks: closure of seven Mexican Army camps, release of EZLN prisoners, and approval of the COCOPA bill on indigenous rights and culture.
A lengthy polemic over whether the EZLN would be allowed to address legislators from the floor of Congress led to an EZLN threat to return to Chiapas. At that point, President Fox intervened to take further steps to fulfill the EZLN's conditions and to lean on Congress, where opposition had already been weakened by the growing momentum created by the Zapatista caravan. Finally the Chamber of Deputies voted to open its doors to the Zapatistas.

On March 28, in an historic event, EZLN and CNI leaders spoke in Congress. The EZLN leaders seemed to mark the opening of a new stage when they affirmed the Zapatistas option for political struggle and stated, "Now is no longer the time for arms." Once back in Chiapas, Subcommander Marcos summed up their hopeful assessment: "Today dialogue is closer and confrontation is more distant."

Meanwhile, events in Chiapas underscored the urgent need for progress in the peace process. Social and political killings continued. In one unresolved case, eight indigenous peasants were ambushed and killed. There were multiple incidents of violent confrontation between groups with rival land claims. Ranchers and others marched in opposition to the Zapatistas and the COCOPA bill and demanded a role in peace talks. And the new governor, Pablo Salazar, continued to face a power struggle with the state legislature and judiciary while he was simultaneously besieged by sometimes competing demands from a wide variety of social groups.

Hopes that progress in the peace process would alleviate tensions in Chiapas and establish the basis for dealing with their underlying causes were dashed by the negative reactions to the indigenous rights bill, which included a decision by the EZLN to suspend contact between its intermediary and the federal government.

In this deteriorating environment, Chiapas governor Pablo Salazar called upon President Fox and the EZLN to maintain their commitment to peace and to rise above the interests and visions of those who place obstacles in the path of the measures needed to get the peace process back on track.

Recommended Actions:

1. Write President Fox, COCOPA, the Subcommittee for Analysis of Indigenous Initiatives, and the EZLN, expressing:
   • concern about this new obstacle to renewed peace talks whose prospects until recently had seemed to be improving; and
   • the hope of the international community that the key participants will find the vision and the courage to meet this challenge that has put the entire peace process at risk.
2. Write to President Fox: Note that the bill approved by Congress dramatically limits the exercise of the right of self-determination of the indigenous peoples and its expression, indigenous autonomy, and that he himself stated "Clearly more thorough work is required on central aspects, such as autonomy and self-determination…" Appeal to him to find the appropriate manner to use his executive power to ensure that, as soon as possible, Congress reconsiders the issue of indigenous rights and culture and approves the remaining elements of the COCOPA bill that he presented to Congress in December.
3. Circulate information, such as the contents of this Report, on the situation in Chiapas.

Please write:

Lic. Vicente Fox, Presidente de la República
Residencial Oficial de los Pinos
Colonia M. Chapultepec, Delegación M. Hidalgo
11850 México, D.F., México
Fax: (+52)(5)515 1794
Internet site for comments

Comisión de Concordia y Pacificación (COCOPA)
Reforma No.10, Torre Caballitos, Piso 18
06030 México, D.F., México
Fax: (+52)(5)345 3288

Subcomisión de Análisis de las Iniciativas de Ley de Derechos y Cultura Indígena
A través de C. Senador Manuel Bartlett Díaz
Reforma No.10, Torre Caballitos, Piso 16
06030 México, D.F., México
Fax: (+52)(5)345 3296 ext. 5329
Correo-e: mbartlett.spri@senado.gob.mx

Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacional
A través del Centro de Información Zapatista
Avenida Ignacio Allende No. 22-A
Barrio San Antonio
29250 San Cristóbal de las Casas,
Chiapas, México
Fax: (+52)(9)678 1013

:: LATE NEWS

Indigenous law approved by Congress unleashes a national debate

Action in Congress on the indigenous rights bill took place after this report was largely prepared. Here we provide a brief update, acknowledging it is limited by our deadline and because the complex terms of the bill require fuller explanation than space allows.

On April 25, the Senate approved a bill on indigenous rights that had been drafted and presented by the Senate Subcommittee for Analysis of Indigenous Initiatives. Then on April 27, the Chamber of Deputies ratified the bill approved by the Senate, with the PAN, the PRI, and the PVEM voting in favor and the PRD and the PT against. (See Glossary.)

Among positive aspects, the bill expressly prohibits all forms of discrimination; guarantees women's rights, including participation in local government; and recognizes indigenous autonomy in the areas of culture, education, language and local government. Nonetheless, it differs significantly from the proposal prepared by COCOPA (the congressional Commission for Agreement and Pacification) and presented by President Fox in December 2000.

In a public statement the same day as the lower house vote, the National Indigenous Congress (CNI) expressed its rejection of the new law, saying that it is not consistent with the San Andres Accords signed by the federal government and the EZLN in February 1996 and synthesized in COCOPA's November 1996 legislative proposal.

The CNI stated, "The law…eliminates substantial parts of the COCOPA initiative, such as: recognition of the communities as entities with legal rights; recognition of indigenous territories; the collective use and benefit of the natural resources found in said territories; and the possibility of the association of indigenous communities and counties."

A group of researchers and academics from the UNAM (National Autonomous University of Mexico), the College of Mexico, and the National Institute of Anthropology and History concluded that, due to those omissions, there are no territories nor other geographic spaces nor legal entities within the structure of the Mexican State in which the collective exercise of autonomy is guaranteed. They argue that, while indigenous autonomy is recognized in theory, the bill does not assure the concrete means to put it into practice.

While President Fox expressed his "recognition" of the Senate's work, insisting that the passage of this law "marks the end of what was the armed conflict," the president of COCOPA, PRD Congressman Felix Castellanos, asserted that the indigenous law approved by Congress "is stillborn" because it does not consider the needs of the indigenous peoples nor does it respond to their demands. In contrast, PAN Senator Felipe de Jesus Vicencio, also a member of COCOPA, stated that the EZLN should appreciate the conditions in which this constitutional reform was brought to fruition. He added, "While it may not represent the end of the struggle to redress the injustice, it is a step forward toward the recognition of the rights of indigenous peoples."

On April 29, the EZLN issued a communiqué in which it declared that the constitutional reform does not respond to the demands of the indigenous peoples of the country, nor to those of the EZLN, the CNI or civil society. It asserted that the reform betrays the San Andres Accords and the COCOPA legislative proposal. Saying that the federal government and the legislators "closed the door on dialogue and peace," the EZLN ordered Fernando Yañez to suspend his work as its official intermediary with the government.

Chiapas Governor Pablo Salazar commented that the passage of the indigenous rights law promoted by the PRI and the PAN signifies a setback to the peace actions that the federal and state governments and the EZLN had undertaken. Salazar, who was a member of COCOPA when the original COCOPA proposal was drafted, called upon President Fox and the EZLN to sustain their commitment to peace and to rise above the interests and visions of conservative groups who place obstacles in the path of the measures needed to get the peace process back on track.

Perhaps in reaction to the flood of criticism, President Fox modified his public position, stating, "Clearly more thorough work is required on central aspects, such as autonomy and self-determination of indigenous peoples and communities as entities with legal standing and legal rights. We all have a responsibility to work with dedication to achieve the modifications that are necessary in order to deepen the reforms within the parameters of the democratic institutions." (News from the Presidency, 4/30/01)

The constitutional reforms still must be ratified by a majority of the states before they become law, and it appears that they will face significant opposition from indigenous groups and others who feel that they do not go far enough.

In spite of the advances achieved through President Fox's measures with regard to Zapatista prisoners and the seven military bases, to the extent that the law that was passed is not faithful to the text of the COCOPA proposal, it would not be complying with one of the three conditions set out by the EZLN in December for renewing peace talks with the federal government. In view of the EZLN's rejection of the new law, this indicates that the perspectives for renewing the peace process, which had grown increasingly positive in the first months of the year (as described elsewhere in this SIPAZ Report), are now cast into doubt, and the situation once again looks complex and difficult.

:: UPDATE

MEXICO: NEW OPPORTUNITY FOR PEACE

On February 24, 23 commanders of the Clandestine Revolutionary Indigenous Committee of the Zapatista Army of National Liberation (EZLN) and Subcommander Marcos embarked on a peaceful march to Mexico City. Their objective was constitutional recognition of indigenous rights and culture as agreed to in the San Andres Accords and later presented to Congress in the legislative proposal of the Commission for Agreement and Pacification (COCOPA). For a detailed account, see "SIPAZ Report on the Zapatista Caravan to Mexico City," at www.sipaz.org.)

On their caravan through twelve different states, the Zapatista representatives met with most of the 56 ethnic groups in the country, and participated in the third National Indigenous Congress (CNI). Numerous representatives of the indigenous peoples represented in the CNI as well as members of civil society accompanied the Zapatistas in their march. The Zapatista caravan received many expressions of support at the national and international levels, but it was also met with hostility by some social, business and political groups.

Diverse positions before the march

A few days before the departure of the caravan, President Fox called upon the Mexican people to support it. In response, the two largest television networks initiated the "United for Peace" campaign. In January, in the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland, Fox said he was not frightened by the Zapatista march, and he made a promise to the European investors to achieve peace and prosperity for Chiapas.

According to the Minister of Foreign Relations, Jorge Castañeda, "The logical corollary for bringing peace to this area is the Puebla Panama Plan", a transnational economic development and trade project that will include southern Mexico and Central America. (See Glossary.) On February 19, Castañeda affirmed in the European Parliament that there are real hopes that the objectives and the results of the Zapatista march are the renewal of peace talks, the signing of a peace accord and the passage of the law of indigenous rights and culture. The European Union welcomed Fox’s initiative to reinitiate dialogue.

The leaders of the PRI (Institutional Revolutionary Party) and the PAN (National Action Party) were reluctant to permit the EZLN representatives to speak on the floor of the National Congress. The leader of the PAN, Diego Fernandez de Cevallos, even rejected the intention of President Fox to go to the Senate to speak in support of the COCOPA legislative proposal that he had presented to Congress, arguing that the discussion should occur solely with the appropriate congressional committees.

The Mexican Bishops Conference called upon Congress to listen closely to the EZLN and in turn asked the Zapatistas, after being heard by the legislators, to "accept the resulting law without imposing criteria."

Continuation of the caravan and others developments

At the same time as the Zapatista march, the World Economic Forum took place in Cancun, Mexico. There President Fox praised the Zapatistas: "Thanks to the mobilization that [the EZLN] initiated seven years ago in Chiapas, it was possible to create an awareness concerning the rights of the indigenous people." He demanded, "No more excuses or conditions that only delay the resolution of the conflict." Later, when dozens of demonstrators against the Forum were getting ready to disperse, they were badly beaten by the PFP (Federal Preventive Police). State and PFP agents charged each other with responsibility for this action.

On March 2 the caravan arrived at Nurio, Michoacan, to participate in the third National Indigenous Congress that brought together representatives of 42 indigenous peoples. The approximately five thousand delegates agreed to undertake a peaceful national uprising to demand the approval of the COCOPA legislative proposal; to recognize the EZLN as fully representative of the CNI and to send a delegation on the march to Mexico City; to reject the Puebla Panama Plan (because, among other reasons, it veils the interests of transnational corporations that seek to exploit the natural resources and geographic advantages of the region); and to demand a moratorium on all international projects that seek to develop new drugs based on native knowledge until the Indian peoples have discussed matters concerning the control of their own resources.

On March 11, the caravan arrived in Mexico City, where it was met by a crowd of approximately 200,000 people. There Marcos announced that he would not accept President Fox’s invitation to engage in a dialogue in Los Pinos (the Presidential Mansion) because the three conditions that the EZLN had set for renewing peace talks with the government had not been fulfilled.

Political chess

Inside of Congress, the Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD) unconditionally endorsed peace talks and the approval of the COCOPA legislative proposal. The Mexican Green Ecology Party (PVEM) and the Labor Party (PT) maintained similar positions. The PRI asserted that it agreed with the demands of the EZLN in spite of some differences. Within the PAN, the differences were irreconcilable.

There followed a long public argument about whether to permit the EZLN to speak from the floor of Congress. The legislators of the PAN and some from the PRI hardened their positions against the EZLN's request, and the EZLN threatened to simply return to Chiapas. President Fox called upon Congress to find the appropriate forum and means to receive and to listen to the EZLN. In this context he announced the closure of the three remaining military camps (the last of the seven whose removal the EZLN had demanded as a precondition for renewing talks) and the release of Zapatista prisoners.

On March 22 approval to speak in the Chamber of Deputies was finally granted to the EZLN for a meeting with Chamber members, the Senate's Subcommittee for Analysis of Indigenous Initiatives, and the members of COCOPA.

Beginning March 21, the Army began to pull out of the three remaining military posts: Rio Euseba, Guadalupe Tepeyac and La Garrucha. According to the President, in place of the three vacated military posts, community development centers will be set up. They will be run by the Ministry of Social Development. On April 20, in the presence of Fernando Yañez (the EZLN’s liaison to the government) and Luis H. Alvarez (Peace Commissioner for Chiapas), the facilities of Guadalupe Tepeyac and Rio Euseba, were officially vacated.

Concerning the Zapatista prisoners, 84 were released by the governor of Chiapas, Pablo Salazar. On April 18 it was announced that Luis H. Alvarez, Interior Minister Santiago Creel and the members of COCOPA agreed that eleven prisoners with ties to the EZLN remained to be released: five in Chiapas, four in Tabasco and two in Queretaro.

The EZLN speaks in Congress

On March 28, members of Congress listened and spoke with the Zapatista commanders and representatives of the CNI. Subcommander Marcos was not present. Whereas the PAN deputies followed the order of the national leadership not to attend, two PAN senators did come to hear the EZLN.

Speaking for the EZLN, Commander Esther defended the COCOPA legislative proposal, acknowledged that the president had made gestures of peace with the military closures, and stated that the EZLN will not advance on the seven positions vacated by the Army. She called on Congress to provide a space for an initial meeting between the Zapatista liaison and the Peace Commissioner, Luis H. Alvarez, so that along with the COCOPA, the Army’s withdrawal from the seven positions, and with it, the fulfillment of one of the three conditions set by the EZLN, could be verified.

Several of the legislators who spoke promised to produce legislation on the COCOPA initiative within the regular session set to end on April 30. However, the PAN and the PRI insisted that it was necessary to make changes to the initiative.

Upon returning to their communities, the commanders expressed their elation about the results they obtained. "Today dialogue is closer and confrontation is more distant," said Marcos, although "the EZLN maintains the declaration of war, as a safeguard of its survival."

The political tension escalates in Chiapas

On February 6, the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic (PGR) found the remains of three indigenous who had been tortured and murdered in the county of Tila. The Network of Community Human Rights Defenders accused the suspected paramilitary group Peace and Justice of responsibility for the three murders and claimed that Peace and Justice intended to seek revenge against the witnesses in this case.

Meanwhile, the head of the PGR's Special Unit on Crimes Committed by Suspected Armed Civil Groups, Armando del Rio, affirmed that in Chiapas there is a high degree of violence. He indicated that the PRI-affiliated organization Peace and Justice is a large group and that a number of its members have been accused of a variety of criminal acts. In the beginning of March, the official observed that 1065 people related to some armed group in Chiapas have been called to testify before the Special Unit. He said that 776 had appeared to make statements, some of them as defendants and others as witnesses.

Prior to the departure of the Zapatista caravan, ranchers in Chiapas announced that they intended to prevent the passage of the march if they were not compensated for the land from which they had been displaced as a result of the Zapatista uprising. They also requested that they be included in the peace talks, a call echoed by the leaders of Peace and Justice.

Social conflict

At the beginning of April, after several weeks of work, the indigenous organization Las Abejas (The Bees) announced its withdrawal from negotiations with the Chiapas state government and the county authorities of Chenalho, claiming that conditions were not right for making progress. The meetings were held to find a solution to the problem of the displaced members of Las Abejas and to other conflicts in the county. Las Abejas demanded that the federal government solve the problem of the paramilitaries in the region and that it guarantee a fair legal solution concerning the 1997 Acteal massacre.

In his first months in office, numerous demands were made of Governor Pablo Salazar by different groups and sectors of society: release of imprisoned union leaders and peasants, security guarantees for the return of the thousands of displaced, relocation of some of the victims of religious persecution, fulfillment of promises of land made by the previous government, etc.

In March, there was a confrontation over land between Indian peasants of the Regional Organization of Coffee Growers of Ocosingo (ORCAO) and Zapatista supporters from the community of San Salvador (county of Ocosingo). Three people were injured. In the third week of April, approximately 300 hooded and armed people, suspected members of the PRD, invaded a landholding in the county of Chilon. They were demanding a solution to the problem created by the fact that the previous governor had given title to the land to two different groups.

On April 18, ranchers, small land owners, and displaced ejido (communal landholding) members that do not belong to the EZLN marched through San Cristobal de las Casas to demand that Congress not approve the COCOPA proposal because it would cause more division in Chiapas. Jorge Constantino Kanter, leader of the ranchers, insisted that the president and the governor allow the mestizos (people of mixed European/Indian descent) and other groups to be heard. He announced a march to the country’s capital to demand the right to voice their opinions in the Congress.

A day later, eleven members of the Farming and Forestry Indigenous Peasant Union (a splinter group of Peace and Justice) were exonerated of serious crimes for lack of evidence. The eleven had been jailed since last October. Still facing charges of property damage and plunder, each one paid 22,000 pesos (about $2300) in order to be released on bail.

On April 19, eight members of the San Bartolome de los Llanos Alliance, a PRI-affiliated peasant organization, were ambushed and killed on a farm in the county of Venustiano Carranza, about 70 kilometers from the conflict region. The governor expressed his surprise and added, "What happened when I was a member of COCOPA is happening again. Whenever there was good news in the peace process, inevitably something very bad occurred."

Meanwhile, on April 3 the Secretariat of Accounting and Administrative Development (SECODAM) confirmed that the audits made of the administration of Albores Guillen, the previous governor of Chiapas, show serious irregularities, especially in the handling of the special federal funds intended for the regions with EZLN presence. It announced that the result of the audits will be ready at the end of April.

:: ANALYSIS

CHIAPAS: NEW IMPULSE IN THE PEACE PROCESS

"Today war is a little further away and peace with justice and dignity a little closer. Today dialogue is closer and confrontation is more distant."
(Subcommander Marcos, upon returning to Chiapas after the "March for Indigenous Dignity", April 1, 2001)

Recently, after several years of stalemated negotiations, there have been a number of steps that have been taken toward the possible resumption of the peace process in Chiapas. The panorama improved, at least for a few weeks, although various unknowns continue to cast a shadow over the long-term possibilities. In April, several outbreaks of violence in Chiapas contributed to straining the political atmosphere, creating doubts about the solidity of progress toward renewed peace talks.

Words and Deeds of Peace

Starting last December, the EZLN began to move its political pieces with good results. Its initiative in proposing to hold a march to Mexico City with the purpose of persuading the Mexican Congress to approve the COCOPA legislative proposal had a positive impact and increased its political capital with a view toward a renewal of the dialogue.

Since then, the issues of the conflict in Chiapas and indigenous rights have received unprecedented coverage in the national and international media. A prime victory for the Zapatistas and indigenous peoples as a whole was to be able to attract attention, increase awareness, and maintain their demands at the center of national attention for a several weeks running.

One contributing factor was that President Vicente Fox referred to the issue of Chiapas in many of his speeches, while at the same time he was working to send the three "signals" requested by the Zapatistas for renewing talks.

The March for Indigenous Dignity

A few days before the caravan began, a polemic surrounding the frustrated participation of the International Red Cross distorted the environment. To the EZLN's invitation to accompany the march as a security measure, the Red Cross had initially indicated its willingness but later refused to participate, creating suspicions about the role of the federal government in its decision. The result was to create distance between the positions of Fox and the Zapatista leadership. The public debate became heated, creating the fear that the march would fall apart. To many it seemed that what was at stake in the march was the choice each side would have to make between the paths of negotiation or of force, between dialogue or radicalization.

In spite of some of the tough talk along the way, the clear objective of the Zapatista caravan was to speak to legislators, which can be seen as a recognition of and a minimum trust in the new democratic reality made possible after the July 2000 elections.

In the third national meeting of the National Indigenous Congress (CNI) in Nurio, representatives from 42 ethnic groups accepted as their own the COCOPA bill as well as the three conditions put forth by the Zapatistas for renewing peace talks. This decision makes it impossible to continue to view the EZLN as an isolated group and the conflict in Chiapas as a local matter. The meeting in Nurio also signifies the growth and maturing of the CNI as an important actor on the national level, given the broad representation of the country's indigenous groups that was evident there and their unprecedented capacity for coordinated action.

In spite of some voices raised in opposition to the march, including the PAN (National Action Party), sectors of the PRI (Institutional Revolutionary Party), some Catholic bishops and evangelical groups, businessmen, ranchers from Chiapas, etc., recognition and support of the fairness of the indigenous demands was what prevailed.

The EZLN on the floor of Congress

The support that the march achieved throughout the country and its international resonance played a role when it came time to define the format for the meeting between the Zapatista delegation and the legislators. The difficulty in Congress in agreeing on how the meeting would take place generated rising tension among the legislators themselves as well as within the Fox administration and among the EZLN representatives. The announcement by the Zapatistas that they would return to Chiapas - before having been received by Congress - was another able move that pushed the other players to make a last effort to arrive at an agreement.

In the end, the presence of the EZLN in the lower house of Congress and especially the tone of the speeches defined the opening of a new stage in the conflict. The Zapatistas confirmed their option for political rather than military struggle and signaled this by indicating they would not advance militarily upon the positions from which the Mexican army had pulled back.

The commanders explained the notable absence of Subcommander Marcos, recognizing him as a military commander but reaffirming that "this is no longer the time for arms." At the same time, they responded indirectly to a common critique of the role played by Marcos in the EZLN, indicating that they are the commanders who give the orders.

The Zapatistas recognized Fox's efforts. In a significant gesture just a few hours after the meeting in Congress, Fernando Yañez, designated as official go-between for the Zapatistas, met with Luis H. Alvarez, the governmental Peace Commissioner, thus re-establishing direct formal contacts between the two sides.

Congress, key actor in restarting the peace process

The Zapatista appeal to Congress made apparent the new power configurations in Congress. The PRD (Party of the Democratic Revolution), PT (Labor Party) and PVEM (Mexican Green Ecology Party) endorsed the text. For the PRI, the debate revealed the divisions that exist within the party. The PAN hardened its public posture, including opting not to attend the meeting. The hard-liners called the shots, making evident the differences between Fox and his party. This indicated that Fox designed his strategy for Chiapas without benefit of any firm agreements with his party.

With regard to the democratization of power in Mexico, the relative strength of the parties is becoming balanced. The same is true of the relations between the executive and the legislative branches. Freedom of expression (exemplified in having allowed the Zapatista and CNI delegation to speak on the floor of Congress) is another significant democratic advance that could not have been imagined a year ago.

The first 100 days of the Fox administration

It is worth noting that many of the steps taken could not have been possible without a conciliatory and tolerant attitude on the part of the Fox administration. Some (including those of his own party) strongly criticize Fox for having conceded too much to the EZLN. They think that it was a mistake to make Chiapas a priority issue when it was clear during the July 2000 campaign that it was not a top concern for most Mexicans.

Two hypotheses have been given to explain this choice on the part of Fox. According to one, he is acting on moral conviction and according to another, on political calculation. Most likely it is a combination of the two. His management of the conflict in Chiapas and its possible solution also could be a form of projecting within and outside of Mexico the image that change has truly arrived in the country, an image that is very helpful in his efforts to advance his economic plans.

What next?

Most likely the Zapatista strategy now will be focused on two axes. The first is constitutional and institutional reform related to the approval of a new indigenous rights law. This is likely to require substantial work and further debate.

The other axis would be the negotiations regarding the sizeable unfinished agenda set out in 1995. Despite what the media may project in a given moment, that agenda makes it clear that peace is not "around the corner." The steps agreed upon between the EZLN and the previous administration include three more rounds of talks on the themes of Democracy and Justice, Welfare and Development, and Women's Rights.

This process is likely to take a good deal of time. Attempting to hurry it up could have a counterproductive effect and undermine the possibility of arriving at a lasting peace.

Meanwhile, there is another pressure that makes progress in the peace process in Chiapas an urgent necessity. It might have been hoped that the recent events at the national level would serve to reduce the violence and tension in the state. However, those advances are not yet reflected in the situation on the ground in Chiapas. Instead what prevails is a multitude of simultaneous conflicts: the growing social discontent around land tenure and related issues; the demands of some social sectors in the face of unfulfilled commitments of the new state government; the regrettable recent acts of violence in which more than a dozen peasants have perished (including the case of Venustiano Carranza), etc. These realities, added to the ongoing power struggle among the executive, legislative and judicial branches of state government, have raised doubts in some minds about the capacity of the new governor to resolve adverse situations and to provide a minimum level of governability in the conflicted state of Chiapas.

:: FEATURE

Indigenous Rights and Culture: Legal Debate or Political Battle?

The San Andres Accords, signed February 16, 1996 by the Zapatista Army of National Liberation (EZLN) and the federal government of Ernesto Zedillo, contain the results of the negotiations between both parties on the theme of Indigenous Rights and Culture. In November of the same year, the parties agreed that the Commission for Agreement and Pacification (COCOPA)(1) would prepare a legislative proposal in order to integrate the Accords into the Constitution. The understanding was that the parties would either accept the initiative without changes or reject it.

In December 1996 the EZLN accepted this initiative which included proposals to amend constitutional articles 4, 18, 26, 53, 73, 115 and 116. The government, on the other hand, proposed modifications which substantially altered the COCOPA proposal. In January 1997 the EZLN accused the government of having violated the process by presenting a counterproposal and of not fulfilling the conditions set forth by the Zapatistas when in September, 1996 they withdrew from peace talks.(2) (These included demilitarization, disarming the paramilitary groups, freeing the Zapatista political prisoners, and fulfilling the San Andres Accords.)

It was not until President Vicente Fox of the National Action Party (PAN) was inaugurated in December 2000 that conditions began to improve for a possible renewal of peace talks.

A new president

On December 5, 2000, only days after assuming office, President Fox presented the COCOPA proposal to the Senate. Nevertheless, it was not until the "March for Indigenous Dignity"(3) in February-March 2001 in which 24 representatives of the EZLN traveled through a large part of the country that the proposal before Congress commanded broad public attention.

On March 28, 2001, Congress, through the different commissions involved in consideration of the legislation, received the Zapatista delegation and delegates of the National Indigenous Congress (CNI) and listened to their presentations about the importance of approving the so-called "COCOPA law."(4)

Support for the COCOPA initiative

One of the strongest arguments in favor of the proposal to convert the San Andres Accords into law is that the former Executive (Zedillo) and the present (Fox) committed themselves to it, and they did so with the help and the encouragement of the representatives of the legislature who made up the first COCOPA. In the words of Deputy Batres Guadarrama of the Democratic Revolutionary Party (PRD): "It is the word of some and of others, a pledged word, which ought to be put into action. It would be absurd that we as the Congress approve a law [the 1995 Dialogue Law] where we call the parties to negotiate and then we don't recognize the results of that negotiation." (Congress, March 28, 2001)

Others emphasize that the Accords and the legislative proposal would contribute to the redress of historic injustice suffered by the indigenous peoples; that the Accords seek to establish a new relationship between the Mexican State and the indigenous peoples; that historically speaking there is no evidence that indigenous autonomy would destroy national unity; that in the Constitution collective rights are practically speaking absent, although this is a fundamental concept in the indigenous way of life; and that the San Andres Accords and the COCOPA law are the basic condition for passing from simulation of indigenous rights to their actual recognition.

The Minister of the Interior, Santiago Creel, argued that "we are not talking about making a new Constitution since the one in force has permitted the alternation of political parties and the modernization of the country. But the Constitution must be modernized in order to adapt it to the present reality of Mexico, to overcome contradictions which exist in some of its articles." (La Jornada, March 27, 2001)

Disagreements with the "COCOPA Law"

Those who oppose the proposal declare that it would lead to the "Balkanization" of the country. That "only" 10% of the population is indigenous and that within this group, few are Zapatistas. Some jurists and politicians hold that the rights of the indigenous are sufficiently protected in the Constitution as it presently exists.

One of the criticisms or warnings which are made about the proposal has to do with its recognition of the so-called "traditions and customs" (usos y costumbres) of the indigenous cultures. The critics hold that not all the traditions and customs can be justified or are appropriate for community living since traditionally they included negative elements such as the treatment of women and intolerance of religious diversity or political pluralism. Hence some argue that recognizing indigenous traditions and customs in the Constitution could bring unacceptable consequences. Such recognition could mean legitimization of or even an increase in discrimination against indigenous women or expulsions of evangelical indigenous by the traditionalist Catholics.

The Center of Fiscal and Legislative Studies (CEFYL) of the Business Coordinating Council, a business trade group, advises that the approval as such of the COCOPA proposal would impede investment in the regions inhabited by indigenous groups. In its analysis, autonomy and its "private laws" (traditions and customs) "would bring as a consequence the creation of small independent states" in Mexico and would leave the indigenous exposed to the temptation to implant "some type of socialism, a cooperativism, a disguised tyranny", or to apply "taxes which may not be proportional or equitable." (La Jornada March 28, 2001)

Jose del Val, advisor to the administration's Office for Indigenous Peoples and Director of the Inter-american Indigenist Institute of the Organization of American States, questions the legal basis of the Accords and the COCOPA proposal. He says it was written and agreed to in a moment in which consensus was simulated and discussions "were not free." He emphasizes, "Limiting autonomy to only the native peoples raises the question of what the indigenous people want to do with the nature of autonomy. To break the backbone of Mexican federalism?" (La Jornada, March 28, 2001).

The EZLN responds to the criticisms

In her speech before Congress, EZLN Commander Esther observed that "this proposal [the COCOPA law] is accused of Balkanizing the country while it is forgotten that the country is already divided...This proposal is accused of creating Indian reservations, and it is forgotten that we indigenous already live apart...This proposal is accused of promoting a backward legal system, and it is forgotten that the present system only provokes confrontation., punishes the poor and gives impunity to the rich, condemns our color, and converts our language into a crime. This proposal is accused of creating exceptions to existing political practice, and it is forgotten that the present government does not govern; rather it converts its public responsibility into a source of personal enrichment and is considered unpunishable and untouchable as long as it holds power." (Congress, March 28, 2001)

Responding to the accusation that the COCOPA proposal would result in greater discrimination against indigenous woman, several indigenous groups have recognized that the situation of women is a grave internal problem. Besides emphasizing that this problem is not exclusive to the indigenous, they claim the right to assume the responsibility to combat discrimination of women in their own manner. PRD Deputy Batres Guadarrama pointed out: "The so-called COCOPA law… does not say that all the traditions and customs of the Indian peoples will be recognized. To the contrary, it says that only those which are found to be in harmony with human rights and equality of the genders will be recognized. What they ask to be included in the law is already there." (Congress, March 28, 2001). Moreover some articles of the proposal reinforce the obligation to respect the "dignity and integrity of women" (article 4 II) and "to guarantee the [political] participation of women in conditions of equality" (article 4 III). Although the topic of religion does not come up as such in the proposal, some articles emphasize the obligation of respecting individual protections and human rights. The representatives of the EZLN and those of the National Indigenous Congress have repeated their intention to work hard to keep discrimination in the indigenous communities from happening or from getting worse.

Is this a legal debate or a political battle?

The war of terminology on the topic of indigenous rights which has been unleashed in recent weeks is a legitimate exercise of debate, although it can also function as a delaying tactic on the part of those who oppose the proposal. In general there is no clarity or consensus among experts of jurisprudence, intellectuals and politicians on the legal understanding of the terminology, much less on the possible practical consequences.

Manuel Camacho Solis, the first Peace Commissioner for peace talks with the EZLN, insists that the fundamental problem is political and not the technical legal terminology. He warns Congress that it will have to decide between an indigenous law with imperfections or a perfect law from the legal point of view, but without popular backing. He underscores the "necessity of thinking about this law with a vision equivalent to those who promoted the great Mexican laws that changed the destiny of the country. They were more the fruit of a political vision and of the backing of a popular political struggle than of the talent of the experts in jurisprudence." (La Jornada, March 28, 2001)

Peace…

Mexico is living in a period of much social and political dynamism. And there is no doubt that more of the same lies ahead. Some important results are visible in the fact that the representatives of the EZLN and the CNI have managed to join together so many distinct voices in favor of approving the COCOPA law. They have united political parties, social organizations, communications media, sectors of civil society, and even the President and broad sectors of the Mexican people.

Meanwhile, there are various views on how to understand the opposition to the initiative. Some say it can be understood in terms of economic interests, fear, racism, disinformation, the manipulation of information. Others simply insist on the merit of the concerns that have been raised, such as Balkanization, individual rights, etc. Others underscore more the importance of discussing the legislative proposal with much precision and permitting the different players to give their opinion on the matter. Whatever it may be, the most conservative voices seem to have been confronted with a counterpart that because of its increasing legitimacy and size, and through its peaceful and persevering struggles, has been converted into a counterpart that can no longer be disregarded.

To recognize indigenous rights and culture according to the COCOPA proposal and no other is to directly promote the peace process and to take a significant step toward confronting centuries of marginalization, poverty and injustice, a sad reality which millions of indigenous Mexicans live each day.

Footnotes

1. Made up of representatives of the political parties represented in the national Congress. Responsible for assisting with the dialogue between the government and the EZLN. Established in 1995. (Return)

2. For more detail regarding the peace process during the period 1997-99, see "Peace process, War process..." (Return)

3. See "SIPAZ Report on the Zapatista Caravan to Mexico City," at www.sipaz.org (Return)

4. Working Meeting of the Joint Committees for Constitutional Issues and Indigenous Affairs, Chamber of Deputies of the H. Congress of the Union, with delegates of the EZLN and the CNI, March 28, 2001. For the complete text of the meeting, see: www.cddhcu.gob.mx/servddd (Return)

5. Definition of indigenous peoples: "…descendents of the inhabitants of the country during the period of the conquest or colonization and the establishment of the actual state borders and which, whatever their juridical status, preserve their own social, economic, cultural and political institutions, in whole or in part." (Return)

6. Synthesis produced on the basis of a document of SERAPAZ (Peace Services and Consulting). (Return)

7. For more detail, see the website of SIPAZ (www.sipaz.org) or CIEPAC (www.ciepac.org/Leyes/index.htm) (Return)

:: SIPAZ's Activities in Mexico

February - April 2001

VISITS AND CONTACTS

• Visits to the northern region of Chiapas to speak with political and religious leaders about the impact of the new political situation on the conflict.
• Meetings with several North American delegations; presentations on the political situation in Chiapas and on the work of SIPAZ.
• Meetings with several European reporters in order to inform them about the conflict in Chiapas; assistance with their trips to the rural areas.
• Visit to Mexico City in order to meet with European Union embassies in the context of the Zapatista caravan.
• Assistance with the visit of the Dutch ambassador to Chiapas.

INFORMATION

• Publication of an article on indigenous youth and low intensity warfare in Fellowship, the magazine of the U.S. Fellowship of Reconciliation.
• Publication of a news bulletin: "The Zapatista March to Mexico City." (See the SIPAZ webpage.)
• Publication of an article on the Zapatista march in Central America and Mexico Report, the publication of the Religious Task Force on Central America and Mexico (USA).

INTER-RELIGIOUS DIALOGUE

• Meetings with religious leaders in the county of Chenalho and with the Pluralistic Ecumenical Group.
• Agreement on the part of Evangelical and Catholic groups in Chenalho and the Board of Directors of SIPAZ for a peace and reconciliation project in the Chiapas highlands, to be conducted in collaboration with the Nicaraguan Peace Commissions.
• Participation in the strategic planning process of the Bible School of Holistic Formation (EFBI).
• Meetings with state government officials in charge of religious affairs.
• Presentation of a speech as part of a seminar on "Religious Tolerance and Diversity" organized by the state government.

PEACE EDUCATION

• Participation in the Peace Network, a state-wide initiative of action and reflection on the theory and practice of community reconciliation.
• Initiation of a series of workshops with the Community Development Centers of the state government
• Facilitation of workshops on conflict transformation for the Latin American Women's Center for Research and Action and RICAA, a network of women artisan cooperatives.