:: SUMMARY

December marked the inauguration of a new president in Mexico (Vicente Fox) and of a new governor in Chiapas (Pablo Salazar). In both cases they are the first to hold their respective offices in the post-Revolution era who are not members of the long-time ruling Party of the Institutional Revolution (PRI).

As such their terms hold out the promise of change, and the handling of the Chiapas conflict is a case in point. Signaling the importance he attaches to the unresolved conflict, President Fox ordered the dismantling of 53 military checkpoints in the conflict area on the very day of his inauguration (December 1).

In another promising development, the Zapatista Army of National Liberation (EZLN) broke a five-month silence with a press conference on December 2. Indicating that the new administration represents an opportunity for a new era in peace efforts, the EZLN listed three conditions for resuming peace talks: fulfillment of the 1996 San Andres Accords (signed but never implemented by the Zedillo administration); release of Zapatista political prisoners; closing of seven specific military bases in the area of greatest Zapatista influence.

In most cases, the dismantling of checkpoints ordered by Fox meant that the soldiers simply retreated to their camps at the side of the road. Nor, apparently, were all the checkpoints definitively removed. However, Fox's action did result in a significant change in the lives of many Indians who no longer had to face interrogation and harassment on a daily basis. In addition, Fox named the highly respected Luis H. Alvarez to be Chiapas Peace Commissioner, ordered the withdrawal of four of the seven bases identified by the EZLN, and sent the San Andres Accords to Congress in the form of the legislative proposal drafted by COCOPA (the congressional Commission for Agreement and Pacification). A few Zapatista prisoners have been released while the cases of others are under review. At the close of this issue, Fox had ruled out further troop withdrawals pending "a signal from the other side in order to restart the dialogue."

Meanwhile, the EZLN leadership is making plans for a potentially controversial February-March visit to Mexico City to lobby Congress regarding the San Andres Accords. Approval of the COCOPA proposal that Fox introduced is uncertain in the pluralistic new Congress where it faces the possibility of competing proposals, including one from Fox's own National Action Party (PAN). It will require a solid and energetic effort on his part. Yet anything other than the COCOPA proposal is likely to be viewed as a breech of confidence by the EZLN.

In Chiapas, the period leading up to the inauguration of Pablo Salazar as governor saw renewed tensions. In October, eleven members of an alleged paramilitary group were arrested, and in November, the federal Office of the Attorney General (PGR) botched an operation aimed at suppressing paramilitary groups in Chenalho in the Chiapas highlands. In the latter case, the army stood by passively in the face of attacks by local residents against the federal police agents. While these actions lend themselves to a variety of interpretations, the fact remains that the paramilitary groups continue to be a factor of instability in the region.

Upon taking office, Salazar promised that he would match the withdrawal of military bases in Chiapas with the withdrawal of state police forces from those places. He also abolished a redistricting commission whose work had been viewed as a direct attack by the Zapatistas, and he instituted a review of the cases of Zapatista prisoners being held on state charges.

Salazar came to power backed by an eight-party alliance opposed to the PRI. He pledged to defend the rule of law and to fight corruption. And immediately he was faced with a power struggle with the legislative and judicial branches of the state government, both dominated by the PRI. Even before Salazar took office, the legislature had gone on the offensive, acting to prohibit future multi-party electoral alliances and arrogating to itself sole authority to audit county governments (traditionally a key channel for distributing political largess.) The struggle continued with a budget deadlock and a fight over Salazar's political appointments. This lack of cohesion in the state government makes even more complicated the already difficult task of promoting reconciliation and reweaving the tattered social fabric.

Meanwhile the unprecedented annulment by a federal electoral court of the October governor's election in the state of Tabasco marked another milestone in Mexico's democratization process. The court threw out the victory by the PRI candidate because of widespread irregularities and ruled that a new election must be held.

In conclusion, the actions of the Fox administration have created new momentum in peace efforts. Yet it is too early to gauge the strength of the administration's commitment to a just and lasting peace. While it may perceive a resolution of the conflict to be in its interests, clearly it is facing conflicting pressures. Reinitiating the peace talks is but the first of many challenges ahead.

Recommended Actions:

1. Write President Fox:
   • Express appreciation to President Fox for his initial steps on the San Andres Accords, the release of prisoners and troop withdrawals.
   • Noting the lack of consensus in Congress on the COCOPA proposal, encourage him to make the effort necessary to ensure approval of implementing legislation that is consistent with both the letter and the spirit of the San Andres Accords.
   • Recalling that he has pledged to make the needs of the poor his top priority, call on him to act boldly and courageously to establish the conditions necessary for renewing peace talks in Chiapas, including additional troop withdrawals and release of prisoners. Dialogue is the only viable means of establishing a just and lasting peace.
2. Write the members of COCOPA, encouraging them to redouble their efforts in order to secure the approval of their legislative proposal on Indigenous Rights and Culture and, with it, the reopening of peace talks.
3. Circulate information, such as this Report, on the situation in Chiapas.

Please write:

Lic. Vicente Fox, Presidente de la República
Residencia Oficial de los Pinos, Puerta #1
Colonia M. Chapultepec, Delegación M.Hidalgo
CP 11850
México, D. F.- México
Fax: (+52) (5) 515 1794

Comisión de Concordia y Pacificación
(COCOPA)
Reforma No.10, Torre Caballitos
Piso 18, Colonia Tabacalera
Delegación Cuahtémoc
CP 06030
México DF, México
Fax: (+52) (5) 345 3288

:: UPDATE

Mexico: A New Regime

On December 1, President-elect Vicente Fox Quesada was sworn in before the Mexican Congress, becoming the first president of the post-revolutionary era to come from a party other than the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI). In his first speech he announced that he would fight against corruption and impunity. He committed to promoting seven core reforms that would guarantee an "effective democracy and a democratic efficacy" and to achieving a reform of the State that will assure an increasingly balanced exercise of power. With respect to Chiapas, on the day of his inauguration he ordered the dismantling of 53 military checkpoints in the three most conflicted areas: the highlands, the northern region, and the cañadas of the Lacandon Jungle.

A Cabinet of "order and respect"

President Fox defined his cabinet as one of "order and respect." The naming of Luis H. Alvarez as Chiapas Peace Commissioner was generally viewed as a good choice, since he is felt to have the moral authority necessary to participate in the peace talks. The nomination received a positive response from the Zapatista Army of National Liberation (EZLN). Luis H. Alvarez was a founding member of the congressional Commission for Agreement and Pacification (COCOPA). He participated in the negotiations that led to the signing of the San Andres Accords. In his view, "The COCOPA proposal [the legislative initiative on Indigenous Rights and Culture drafted in November 1996 as the basis for implementing the San Andres Accords] is consistent with the principles of national unity. The free determination and autonomy of the indigenous peoples is proposed without compromising national sovereignty, and within the constitutional framework of the Mexican State."

The naming of General Rafael Macedo de la Concha to the office of Attorney General of the Republic (PGR) raised eyebrows. After almost a century of civilian tradition, for the first time a military leader assumed this post. When he was Attorney General for Military Justice, Macedo de la Concha neglected to deal with a series of accusations against the military regarding human rights violations.

The EZLN breaks its silence

In a press conference held on December 2 in the Zapatista community of La Realidad, the EZLN asked the new government for three signs of its good will as a basis for renewing peace talks: fulfillment of the San Andres Accords, freedom for all Zapatista political prisoners, and the withdrawal and closure of seven army positions out of what the EZLN referred to as "the 259 that it presently maintains in the conflict zone." It announced that in February 2001, 23 members of the Clandestine Revolutionary Indigenous Committee – High Command of the EZLN will travel to Mexico City to convince Congress of the "benefits" of the COCOPA proposal.

Although the EZLN did not explicitly take it up as one of its demands, in a communiqué it accused the new government of not doing anything in regard to the paramilitary groups. It also charged that on December 20, nine Zapatista families from the community of Santa Fe el Duraznal (county of Chilon) were displaced by a paramilitary group.

Government responses

Almost immediately, Fox responded saying that he will seek to fulfill the EZLN's conditions. On December 5, he sent the COCOPA proposal to Congress. Afterwards, Senator Manuel Bartlett (PRI), as president of the Commission on Constitutional Issues, warned that Congress would not legislate "in a vacuum." He argued that before any legislation is approved, there should be a national consultation because it affects not only with Chiapas but all parts of the country where there are indigenous groups.

In response to the Zapatista demands for military withdrawal, the first position to be abandoned was Amador Hernandez. The army entered this community on August 9, 1999. On October 18, 2000, then-President Ernesto Zedillo expropriated 3.5 hectares (approximately 9 acres) from the ejido (communal landholding). On December 22, President Fox returned the property to the community. The move was welcomed by the EZLN, and it was seen as contributing to prospects for renewed dialogue. On December 31, in the face of a protest by local Zapatista supporters, the military sped up its departure from the Jolnachoj (San Andres Larrainzar) army base. By presidential order, on January 9 Cuxuljá became the third base to be withdrawn. And, on the January 17, the military abandoned its base in Roberto Barrios.

After the closing of the fourth military base, President Fox said that there would be no more redeployments by the army pending "a signal from the other side in order to restart the dialogue."

Chiapas before the change of governor

Following the October 28 detention of eleven leaders of the alleged paramilitary group UCIAF (Farming and Forestry Indigenous Peasant Union, a splinter group of Development, Peace and Justice), and only a few weeks before the inauguration of Pablo Salazar as the new governor of Chiapas, the atmosphere grew more tense. Continued threats by paramilitary groups were denounced by several communities, especially in the northern region and the highlands. Among them were the refugees of Tierra y Libertad (county of Yajalon) who had been displaced on August 3.

In this agitated climate, early on the morning of November 13, 150 federal police and 20 agents from the state Public Ministry carried out an operation in Los Chorros (county of Chenalho) in search of guns in the hands of alleged paramilitary members. With the army's passivity in the face of the aggressive posture of the community toward the federal agents, the townspeople were able to block the operation in a confrontation that left 20 people injured. The federal PGR acknowledged the failure but said that it would continue such operations.

Pablo Salazar takes office

On December 8, in the presence of President Vicente Fox, Pablo Salazar Mendiguchia became the first post-revolutionary, non-PRI governor in the history of Chiapas. In his first speech he called for President Fox to audit all federal resources sent to Chiapas in the past few years. He signaled that he would uphold the rule of law so that there would be no more spilled blood. He asserted the necessity of knowing the truth about the Acteal and El Bosque massacres and what he termed "the paramilitary bands."

His new cabinet includes prominent representatives of both the business and the civil society sectors. Emilio Zebadua, a member of the Federal Electoral Institute (IFE), was nominated as Secretary of Government. Porifirio Encino, of the Rural Association of Collective Interest – Independent and Democratic (ARIC-I), an historic indigenous organization, will occupy the position of Secretary of Indigenous Peoples.

The new governor's actions

The new governor promised that he would undertake a withdrawal of state police parallel to that of the Mexican army from the seven points listed by the EZLN. He also abolished the State Redistricting Commission created by the previous government, a highly conflictive initiative that had resulted in the creation of seven new counties, principally in the regions where the autonomous councils of the EZLN were found.

Secretary of Government Emilio Zebadua asserted that the redistricting agencies undermined prospects for a peaceful resolution of the conflict. He also said that they compromised the independence of the State Supreme Court (STJE) because they were under the authority of that body's president, Noe Castanon. He added that the fate of the Zapatista autonomous counties should be considered in the framework of the revision that will be made of the San Andres Accords.

In another development witnessed by Chiapas Peace Commissioner Luis H. Alvarez, 22 Zapatistas were released from the Cerro Hueco prison. That leaves 81 out of a total of 103 individuals identified as Zapatista political prisoners who have been arrested and tried since the beginning of 1994 (some with sentences of up to 25 years.) The state Attorney General said that two mechanisms would be utilized in the review of the case of the alleged Zapatistas: the Law of Suspended Sentence for those who have been sentenced and adjournment for those whose cases are still in process.

Power struggle

Days before the new state government took power, the PRI parliamentary faction approved a series of reforms to the Public Treasury Code. According to Salazar, its intent was "to remove faculties from the Executive for reviewing the accounts of the county councils through the Comptroller General of the State and to make the legislature the only body with the authority to audit the county governments."

The PRI faction in the state Congress filed a political suit against Salazar and Zebadua, claiming that the naming of Emilio Zebadua as Secretary of Government was unconstitutional "because he is not from Chiapas." While this conflict remains unresolved, the state Congress is declining to discuss several of the governor's proposals (such as a legislative reform proposal and the proposal to repeal a law passed in October 2000 that prohibits alliances by political parties in state legislative and county elections). Furthermore, although Salazar abolished the Redistricting Commission, the state Congress indicated that it would continue its discussion of the second stage of the redistricting project.

The legislature proposed a 90 percent increase in the its own budget and a 17 percent reduction in the state Social Development Ministry. The governor vetoed this budget, claiming that it contravened provisions of the Chiapas state constitution. While the standoff continues, the budget from 2000 remains in effect.

The president of the State Supreme Court (STJE), Noe Castanon, charged Governor Salazar with responsibility for the death threats against him and against 16 PRI judges. Castanon, who had presided over the STJE for six years, was re-elected for another term with the vote of the PRI majority of the magistrates.

More changes

A presidential press release announced that the immigration regulation requiring a special visa for human rights observation in Mexico had been eliminated. Such activities will continue to be subject to relevant laws regarding the activities of foreigners in Mexico.

For the first time in Mexican electoral history, the Federal Electoral Tribunal annulled a state-level election. In this case, the October election of a PRI candidate for governor of Tabasco (adjacent to Chiapas) was annulled because of widespread irregularities. Weeks of political uncertainty followed during part of which there were two interim governors. Finally a political agreement was reached between the federal Interior Ministry, the national directorates of the political parties involved, and the local Congress. An interim governor from the PRI was named and new elections were scheduled for November 2001.

In the state of Yucatan another electoral conflict arose around accusations of political partisanship in the naming of members of the State Electoral Council. The same federal tribunal intervened to demand that the PRI-majority state Congress develop a new, longer list of electoral councilors, to be elected randomly this time. The PRI bench declined to do so and announced that the previous Council would remain in place.

At the end of December, an Amnesty Law was approved in Oaxaca to benefit all persons allegedly affiliated with guerrilla groups. As a result, 32 people were released from prison, and 129 who are fugitives and who supposedly have links to the Popular Revolutionary Army (EPR) will also benefit.

:: ANALYSIS

After Seven Years of Conflict, Some Encouraging Signs

The conflict in Chiapas is now seven years old. The third president since its beginning, Vicente Fox, inherits a particularly complex situation. Nevertheless, for the first time in years, signs point towards the renewal of the dialogue between the Mexican government and the EZLN. These signs of good faith were given by the new state and federal governments, as well as by the EZLN.

Unrest before the Inaugurations

Between the election (July) and his inauguration (December), President Fox occupied the front pages of the national press, reiterating his campaign promises, particularly in regard to Chiapas. It was a time of latent tension and transition; of expectations, debates, and definitions.

In Chiapas, tensions rose on more than one occasion. For example, in October eleven people from the alleged paramilitary group Farming and Forestry Indigenous Peasant Union (UCIAF, a group that broke off from Development, Peace and Justice) were arrested in the northern region. In November the federal Office of the Attorney General (PGR) botched an operation aimed at paramilitary groups in Chenalho in the Chiapas highlands. The power of the alleged paramilitary groups raised fears of a reaction and greater mobilization on the part of their supporters.

Since very little has been done to date against the paramilitary groups, several analysts applauded the government's intentions in both actions. Others saw them as a "goodbye present from the outgoing government" to prepare for the entry of the next. Others suggested it was an attempt to create instability before the inauguration of Pablo Salazar as governor of Chiapas (also in December). No doubt there were other interests at play as well, in particular, that of the PGR which may have wanted to demonstrate its good work prior to a possible reform by the new government. Some analysts spoke of a possible accord between the alleged paramilitary groups and the local Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) in the case of the October arrests: they would turn themselves in voluntarily in order to avoid a political crisis in the region; the PRI would defend them in exchange for their votes. Whatever the real explanation, the result remains the same: at the beginning of December, in more than one region, several groups found themselves on the defensive, hostile to the new local government.

The EZLN Shows its Cards

After four years in which the peace process has been at a standstill, steps towards its possible resumption have occurred with surprising speed. The EZLN calculated its "entry" well: After five months of silence, it spoke on November 30 to invite journalists to a press conference, as if to give Fox the opportunity to adjust his inaugural speech the next day.

In its press conference on December 2, the EZLN appeared to perceive a panorama more favorable to its cause. Since 1996, it had proposed five conditions for the resumption of dialogue. These are now reduced to three. In fact, two of the five have already been fulfilled: the naming of Luis H. Alvarez as Peace Commissioner (he has been described by the EZLN as a "valid interlocutor"), and the formation of the Commission for Monitoring and Verification (COSEVER) in 1997, although it has never functioned because the San Andres Accords were not implemented. The EZLN did not take up the subject of the paramilitaries, perhaps because it realized that the solution to this problem would take longer to resolve or because the state government has already declared it a priority for its attention.

In the end, the EZLN is offering a more easily negotiable package in order to have a direct dialogue with the new government.

Governmental Responses

President Fox demonstrated his good will by partially fulfilling the Zapatista demands, presenting the proposal of the Commission for Agreement and Pacification (COCOPA) to Congress on December 5 and closing several military positions. He also rescinded restrictive regulations on international human rights observers. A corresponding effort was made by the state when Governor Pablo Salazar freed several Zapatista prisoners and abolished the Redistricting Commission (another source of tension in the conflict area during recent years).

The repositioning of the military ordered on December 1 generated much confusion both inside and outside Mexico because of the gap between President Fox's message and the reality on the ground. Despite the withdrawal of dozens of checkpoints and four military bases from indigenous communities and the positive impact this has had on local residents, the overall military presence itself has not yet diminished significantly. There is no evidence that the soldiers previously stationed at those checkpoints and bases have left Chiapas.

Although the federal and state executives have shown signs of their good will, the definitive solution of many of the pending problems is up to other branches: judicial (for the prisoners) and legislative (for the San Andres Accords).

Certainly Fox presented the COCOPA proposal to Congress, but it still faces a long legislative battle with an uncertain end. Paradoxically, the National Action Party (PAN), the main party that carried him to power, could be one of the principal sources of resistance. In fact, that party already presented its own proposal on Indigenous Rights and Culture during the past administration, and the fact that Fox has presented a different text generated frictions (adding to those that already existed).

For the first time, the president finds himself confronted with a multi-party Congress in which none of the parties has a simple majority in either house and any initiative will have to rest on alliances that have not yet been defined. The PRI also has its own proposal on Indigenous Rights and Culture. Certainly, there is a latent risk of this party's "Balkanization," which could further complicate the political prospects of the COCOPA legislative proposal. The PRD (Party of the Democratic Revolution) is also threatened with divisions, but it has been in favor of the COCOPA text since it was drafted.

If in the end, the text were not accepted (and the process could take up to two years), Fox would have some political cover, since the decision is in the hands of Congress. However, since his economic project rests on greater globalization of the economy, it is in his interest to rid himself of the international critics of the Chiapas situation that he inherited from previous administrations.

One must also take into account that Chiapas has particular importance for his economic project because of its resources and because a resumption of peace negotiations would enhance his political credibility. Fox has made many promises in his campaign. He will have to carry out measures much less popular (for example in the fiscal sphere) or of even greater complexity (like the Reform of the State) and in this sense, Chiapas could be a reserve of political credit.

The electoral crises in the states of Tabasco and Yucatan raise the question of what level of involvement the federal government is willing to assume in these southeastern states where the PRI, defying the political order, refuses to let go of part of the power that it has left.

Governability in Chiapas?

The situation of Pablo Salazar, the new governor of Chiapas, is problematic. A few days after he took office, a struggle arose among the branches of government in response to his executive actions. The legislature and the judiciary (both with a PRI majority) began criticizing and blocking several of his proposals and even refusing to deal with some of them.

In a document submitted to the state legislature, the governor accused the PRI legislators of drawing up a political and economic strategy for electoral purposes and of seeking to increase their control over the county governments in the run-up to the legislative and county elections in October 2001. On the other hand, the legislature and judiciary accuse the governor of unconstitutional actions, describing them as acts of political revenge. They even speak of death threats against members of the judiciary.

It must be emphasized that any negotiation initiative will require intricate planning and extremely sensitive execution in order to restore cohesion to the political and social life of the state and to be able to resolve both older and more recent community and regional problems.

In Conclusion

In recent months, in Chiapas as well as in Mexico, crucial and necessary processes have begun which have not yet run their course. The problems faced by both governments are not easy to solve. It is important to guarantee greater governability, and above all, to proceed with actions in order to rebuild a minimum confidence in the indigenous communities.

:: FEATURE

The Mexican Army: A Key Factor in the Conflict in Chiapas

The large presence of the Mexican army in Chiapas since the Zapatista uprising in 1994 has been the object of criticism from the EZLN (Zapatista Army of National Liberation), indigenous and social organizations, national and international human rights organizations, and opposition political parties. On the other hand, its presence has been explicitly requested by various groups affiliated with the PRI (Institutional Revolutionary Party), and the government has defended its deployment there. In the current political situation, the army continues to play a key role in the possibilities for renewed peace talks in Chiapas.

Historical Pact

In order to understand military plans and doctrine in Mexico, it is necessary to look back a bit in history. According to the authors of a recent study (Always Near, Always Far: The Armed Forces in Mexico): "There is a civilian-military pact in Mexico in place since the 40s, based on two unwritten laws that resulted from one historical event. In 1947, when Miguel Aleman, the first civilian president of the revolution, took the office offered to him by the generals of the revolution, he accepted it in exchange for one commitment: Absolute respect for the institution of the military. Concomitantly, the second norm was derived ...: The military would respect civil authority 'by cape and by sword.' ... In that respect, the Mexican army was never autonomous in relation to the political system, ... and because of that, it was not a factor of instability." (1)

War Plans

The war plans and doctrine that determine the deployment of the Armed Forces are derived from the Constitution and from the laws that regulate its activity: Preparation for external defense (described in the plan known as DN-I); guarantee of internal security and social peace (DN-II plan); and, since the 70s, intervention in the case of natural disasters (DN-III).

Many of the criticisms of the Armed Forces are related to the DN-II plan, whose mission is quite broad. "It ranges from preparation and training for the war against drugs, fighting it constitutionally in support of the federal Office of the Attorney General (Procuraduria General de la República/PGR); to counterinsurgency; to supporting inefficient public security forces; to carrying out so-called civic action which includes vaccination and dental services for the population in marginalized rural areas, protection of natural resources, and other actions... The army is directly responsible for controlling insurgent groups that have declared war on the state, such as the EZLN, the EPR (People's Revolutionary Army) and the ERPI (Revolutionary Army of the Insurgent People), and its actions are carried out in close coordination with the Interior Ministry. With regard to drug trafficking or public security where the military substitutes for inefficient county, state, and federal public security forces, its coordination is with the federal Office of the Attorney General." (2).The criticism with regard to this sort of civic action is that, according to the Mexican Constitution and its laws, it is the responsibility of other federal and even county and state agencies.

Chiapas: The Reality

Since the Zapatista uprising in 1994, the exact number of soldiers in Chiapas has been the focus of much unresolved debate. "While the government and the Ministry of National Defense (SEDENA) have reported from 17,000 to 25,000 soldiers at different times, indigenous, peasant, and human and civil rights organizations have reached a public consensus of approximately 70,000 troops." (3). At the same time, it is recognized that "... the exact number of troops in Chiapas will never be truthfully or accurately known ...However, there are other criteria to measure militarization in quantitative terms and to make a calculation not only of the number of troops, but also of their positions, actions, and consequences to society ..." Regarding their positions, in February 2000 the authors of Always Near, Always Far counted "259 geographic points: 175 fixed positions, 24 permanent checkpoints, 60 intermittent checkpoints" spread out over 58 counties (more than half of the 110 counties in Chiapas).(4)

The official reasons given for the presence of the Mexican army in Chiapas are national security; combating drugs, terrorism and the absence of the rule of law; and so-called civic action or social work. Some examples of the latter are road construction, reforestation, and military camps that offer food, medical attention, information about family planning, haircuts, and building repair or building materials to local residents.

While military sources emphasize the legality and the necessity of the military presence, during the past seven years there have been hundreds of accusations against the military by the indigenous population. These include interrogations, harassment at checkpoints and through low flying planes and helicopters, the occupation of community buildings such as schools, the introduction of prostitution and venereal diseases in communities, the rape of girls and women, the forced displacement of the population through military/police operations, support or protection of paramilitary groups, theft of hardwoods, obstruction of freedom of movement, profanation of sacred sites, attaching political conditions to the delivery of humanitarian aid, distribution or control of public resources based on political affiliation, environmental pollution, planting marijuana, creating division in the communities, and contributing to the de facto impunity that characterizes the region. Because of these accusations, a large number of indigenous Zapatista supporters and displaced persons have rejected the social services of the army.

In an analysis of 1160 complaints from communities and indigenous organizations found in the Historical Archive of the National Mediation Commission (CONAI) for the period 1994-98, the police and the army were the most frequently identified aggressor (36%) (5). For the year 1999, the Fray Bartolome de las Casas Human Rights Center concluded that "of the totality of cases of alleged violations of human rights received by the Center, 39% were carried out by the Mexican army, making it the main aggressor. The majority of cases referred to violations of physical integrity and guarantees of due process." (6).

International Criticism

In February 2000, the Commissioner for Human Rights and Indigenous Affairs of the United Nations (UN), Erika Irene Daes, appealed for the federal army to return to its barracks. That same month the report of the UN Special Rapporteur for Extrajudicial, Arbitrary, or Summary Executions, Ashma Jahangir, recommended that the Mexican government "achieve the demilitarization of society and avoid delegating the maintenance of public order or the fight against crime to the Armed Forces." (7).

A few months later, the UN Committee for Human Rights declared that "the Committee is ... concerned by the growing intervention of the military in civil society, especially in the states of Chiapas, Guerrero, and Oaxaca where it is responsible for activities that are more appropriate for police forces." It also observed that, "The Committee is deeply concerned with the nonexistence of institutionalized processes to investigate allegations of violations of human rights alleged to be committed by military and security forces and which, as a consequence, frequently are not investigated." It recommended that "the maintenance of public order within the country's territory must be carried out by civilian security forces" and that "the State must establish adequate procedures to carry out independent investigations of accusations of violations of human rights attributed to the military and the security forces to ensure that those accused of such violations be brought to justice..." (8).

The Organization of American States (OAS) recommended in 1998 that the Mexican government "revise the content of the National System of Public Security Law in order to assure that the Armed Forces remain in the role originally intended for them, according to what has been established in international legislation on the matter, especially by article 27 of the American Convention." (9).

Proposals for Change

Recently there was a proposal from the state and federal governments and from the army for a modernization of the Armed Forces and a readjustment of their activities specifically in Chiapas.

Shortly before the last annual report of outgoing President Zedillo in September 2000, in an unprecedented act that responded to national and international criticism, General Cervantes Aguirre, then Minister of National Defense, stated that the federal army's presence in Chiapas is a painful subject for the conscience of military personnel.

In preparation for the incoming Fox administration, and at his invitation, the State Reform Studies Commission, in a document delivered to President-elect Fox on November 22, 2000, identified as an "urgent measure" for the peace process in Chiapas the retreat of the army from the immediate surroundings of the rural communities in Chiapas. Additionally, it recommended: "prohibition of Armed Forces' participation in any tasks foreign to their constitutional mission, such as public security and combating drugs; ... reform of Article 93 of the Constitution to ensure that chiefs of staff of the Armed Forces may be required to testify before Congress to provide information when a law is being debated or a matter pertinent to them is being studied; and ... strengthening of the powers of legislative commissions in matters of national defense, with the objective of granting them competence to revise and audit the budgets administered by military authorities and institutions." (10). President Fox will decide which of these proposals will be sent to the Congress for further discussion.

Commitments and Facts

During December 2000 and January 2001, there were various changes at a military level in Chiapas. In the first weeks after taking office, Fox ordered the dismantling of dozens of checkpoints and, in response to the conditions demanded by the EZLN for the renewal of peace talks, he ordered the withdrawal of several military bases.

These initiatives require continuous monitoring, since several indigenous organizations charged that soldiers, dressed as civilians, continue to carry out their jobs by the side of the road at dismantled checkpoints; that some checkpoints that had been dismantled have been re-established; and that some military camps have been reinforced.

Community Divisions

The steps taken by the president have caused some relief in many indigenous communities, and disagreement in others. In recent years, the withdrawal of the army from indigenous communities has been a constant demand of a number of indigenous organizations and groups from the communities. On the other hand, some PRI-affiliated groups call for the army to stay, arguing that it is needed in order to restore normal order to the public and institutional life of Chiapas and to solve the problems that lead to the Zapatista uprising. They also say that the withdrawal of the military would be a violation of community reconciliation agreements.

This divergence of understanding presents a real challenge. Reconciliation among the people of Chiapas is one of the most important priorities for the state government, given the damage sustained to the social fabric since the 1994 uprising, and even before.

Democratization

Sería demasiado fácil creer que la ‘desmilitarización’ de Chiapas se resolvería con sólo un reposicionamiento o repliegue deIt would be very easy to believe that the "demilitarization" of Chiapas will be solved with only a repositioning or withdrawal of the army. However, any withdrawal should be accompanied by a guarantee that the abundant presence of guns and/or the harassment of the population are not simply copied by the police who would take over primary responsibility for public order. In addition, it is essential that paramilitary/armed civilian groups be dismantled since they represent a continual source of great tension in the region. Chiapas Governor Pablo Salazar indicated in mid- December that the retreat of the army will be accompanied by a withdrawal of state police. It remains to be seen whether the federal government will commit to not establishing a strong presence of federal police. Such challenges require greater stability and governability in Chiapas, which are negatively affected by the growing conflicts within the state government. (See Update and Analysis in this issue.)

Even so, a resolution regarding the army presence in Chiapas cannot be separated from a broader resolution that includes the political and social situation in the region and in the rest of the country. While the federal government is responsible to ensure that activities under the broad heading of "civic action" be assumed by federal and state institutions, this requires a process of democratization of the nation's political system. And that, in turn, goes hand in hand with the struggle against corruption and impunity at all levels of government.

At the moment, a number of cards are on the table. To the degree that the Armed Forces respect civilian authorities, and to the extent that the civilian authorities fulfill their promises, the army may become a factor that facilitates the renewal of the peace process.

1 Siempre cerca, siempre lejos: Las Fuerzas Armadas en México, Global Exchange, CIEPAC, CENCOS, 2000, p. 16-17. Published in English as Always Near, Always Far: The Armed Forces in Mexico. Citations in this article refer to the Spanish edition (Return ^...)
2 “Siempre cerca....”, p.24. (Return ^...)
3 “Siempre cerca....”, p.132. (Return ^...)
4 “Siempre cerca....”, p.133. (Return ^...)
5 “Siempre cerca....”, p.124. (Return ^...)
6 La guerra en Chiapas: ¿Incidente en la historia?, Centro de Derechos Humanos Fray Bartolomé de las Casas A.C., April 2000, p. 54.(Return ^...)
7 Recommendation 107.b, February 2000. (Return ^...)
8 Human Rights Committee, 66º Session, UN, July 1999. (Return ^...)
9 "Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Mexico," OAS/IAHRC, September 1998. Recommendation 738, p. 167 (Return ^...)
10 Proceso 1255, November 19, 2000, p. 22-23. (Return ^...)

:: Activities of the SIPAZ team in Chiapas

November 2000 - January 2001

VISITS AND CONTACTS

• Participation in a gathering of base communities in the northern region of Chiapas on the theme of community reconciliation.
• Meetings with a variety of political and religious contacts in the northern region to discuss the implications of the new state and federal governments.
• Meetings with several North American delegations to brief them on the political situation in Chiapas and the work of SIPAZ.
• Organization of a visit to rural areas in Chiapas for the Undersecretary of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office of Great Britain.

INFORMATION

• Continuation of the tour by a SIPAZ team member in Germany, Belgium and Switzerland, with presentations on the situation in Chiapas and the work of SIPAZ to non-governmental organizations, solidarity groups, and government representatives.
• Publication of an article on indigenous women in the conflict area for the "Women's Peacemakers Program 2001" of the International Fellowship of Reconciliation.
• Publication of two articles on the situation in Chiapas in Dutch periodicals.
• Interview with a Spanish radio program regarding the new political situation in Chiapas.
• Meetings with three international academics who are studying the role of SIPAZ and other non-governmental organizations in the peace process in Chiapas.

INTER-RELIGIOUS

• Meetings with a variety of church contacts in Chenalho.
• Participation in a strategic planning process at the Bible School of Holistic Formation (EFBI).
• Initiation of a series of meetings of the Pluralistic Ecumenical Group.

EDUCATION

• Facilitation of workshops on Conflict Transformation for educators of the House of Science and the Center for Research and Support of Women (CIAM).
• Together with other organizations, convening of a reflection process on processes of community reconciliation that resulted in the forming of a statewide Interest Group on the subject. Preparation of an analysis of community conflicts in the northern region as part of the Interest Group process.

OFFICE IN MEXICO CITY

• Opening of an office in Mexico City and naming of an Executive Director.
• Participation in the conference "Human Rights, Civil Society, and Military Practices."
• Meeting with the Undersecretary of the Office of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor of the US State Department.