:: SUMMARY

Pablo Salazar Mendiguchia, representing the opposition Alliance for Chiapas, was elected governor on August 20. Salazar took 51.5% of the vote compared to 45.7% for Sami David, candidate of the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI). The defeat was a stunning setback for the PRI, which has dominated Chiapas politics for decades.

Like many opposition leaders in Mexico, Salazar was a lifelong member of the PRI, holding both state-level and federal positions, until he left the party in 1999 to lead an opposition campaign for governor. One of the main issues that led to his departure was the PRI's handling of the Chiapas conflict. As a PRI Senator, Salazar was a member of COCOPA (the congressional Commission for Agreement and Pacification, charged with assisting the peace process in Chiapas). He played a key role in the drafting of legislation to implement the 1996 San Andres Accords between the federal government and the Zapatista Army of National Liberation (EZLN). President Zedillo rejected the COCOPA proposal and substituted one of his own. Neither have been voted on, and peace talks remain suspended.

Remarkably, Salazar put together an opposition campaign including virtually all political parties in Chiapas. (For its part, the EZLN maintained its silence about the campaign, and turnout was especially light in Zapatista areas.) Campaigning on a platform of change, he managed to convince a skeptical public that it was possible to break the PRI's hammerlock on Chiapas politics. While polls consistently showed him well ahead, there was considerable concern that the PRI, known in Chiapas for its strong-arm tactics and recourse to fraud, simply would not accept defeat. An increase in agrarian disputes and paramilitary activity in the period leading up to the vote only increased such fears.

In the end, while there were numerous cases of pressure, intimidation, and various kinds of irregularities, the vote was largely peaceful, the vote count was transparent, and the PRI conceded the popular verdict. (For more information, see "Report on Electoral Observation" on the SIPAZ website: www.sipaz.org)

Although he received a strong electoral mandate, Salazar will govern with little support from the PRI-controlled state congress or from local governments that remain largely in PRI hands. He faces enormous challenges: overcoming poverty and marginalization, controlling political violence, rebuilding the social fabric in an extremely polarized region, etc. It will be difficult to maintain cohesion among the diverse political forces that united behind him. At the same time, his commitment to inclusivity, including of indigenous and peasant groups, holds out the hope for a new kind of politics in Chiapas.

The opposition victory in Chiapas benefited from the election of Vicente Fox in July. When he takes office on December 1, Fox will be the first non-PRI president in 71 years. No party will have a majority in either house of Congress. In the new Chamber of Deputies, the PAN (National Action Party) has 213 seats, the PRI 210, and the PRD (Party of the Democratic Revolution) 44. In the Senate, the PRI has 59, the PAN 46, and the PRD 15.

One of the big challenges facing both Fox and Salazar is the unresolved conflict in Chiapas. Fox has indicated that one of his first acts as president will be to send the COCOPA proposal to Congress for approval. He has also expressed his intention to renew peace talks with the EZLN and to reduce the massive military presence in Chiapas (currently as many as 70,000 - about one-third - of all federal troops.) However, the COCOPA proposal will not face smooth sailing in the new Congress, and Fox has not made it clear that he is prepared to make the effort necessary to achieve a successful outcome. Regarding the military presence in Chiapas, it remains a highly charged issue. Fox would like to use it to nudge the EZLN back to the table (pullback troops if the EZLN agrees to dialogue). For its part, the EZLN has made no response to overtures from the Fox transition team, but in the past it has stated pre-conditions for reinitiating talks that focus on its lack of confidence in the peace process (unfulfilled agreements) and the urgent need to end the siege of indigenous communities (military presence.)

While as state governor, Salazar can neither order the withdrawal of federal troops nor resolve the conflict with the EZLN, he can contribute to building the confidence and improving the conditions that are necessary for real dialogue.

The October 28 arrest of eleven alleged paramilitary members on federal charges in the northern region of Chiapas may signal new limits on the impunity that these groups have enjoyed. However, the fact that top state government officials (from the outgoing PRI administration) are rallying to their defense only underscores the continued limits on the rule of law.

Meanwhile, the latest in a series of high-level UN investigations of Mexico's human rights situation in recent years underscored the remarkable degree of continued international concern in this regard. In August, Erica Irene Daes, President of the UN Working Group on Indigenous Populations, reported to the UN Sub-commission for Human Rights on her April 2000 visit to Mexico. She observed that the militarization of indigenous communities and the increasing use of the Army in police operations contribute to an atmosphere of fear and violation of human rights, including the rights to life, physical integrity and protection from arbitrary arrest.

Recommended Actions

1. Congratulate President-elect Vicente Fox on his election and on his announced intention to introduce to the Mexican Congress the COCOPA proposal for implementing the San Andres Accords and to renew peace talks with the EZLN.
2. Noting the lack of consensus in Congress on the COCOPA proposal, encourage him to make the effort necessary to ensure approval of implementing legislation that is consistent with both the letter and the spirit of the San Andres Accords.
3. In view of the massive presence of the Mexican Army in Chiapas and the explosive tension that often results in indigenous communities, urge President-elect Fox, when he assumes power, to order an immediate withdrawal of a significant number of military camps in areas where their presence is provoking particular tension. Note that such action would not only reduce tensions but would also serve as a confidence building measure that would improve the conditions for renewed peace talks.
4. Circulate information, such as this Report, on the situation in Chiapas.

Please write:

(before December 1)
Lic. Vicente Fox
Reforma 525, Colonia Lomas de Chapultepec
Código postal 11000 México DF, México
Fax: (int-52)(5)520 7125

(after December 1)
Lic. Vicente Fox
Presidente de la República
Palacio Nacional
06067 México, DF, México
Fax (int-52)(5)515 4783

:: UPDATE

Elections in Chiapas: the opposition's historic triumph

On August 20, Chiapas elected a new governor. Pablo Salazar Mendiguchia, representing the Alliance for Chiapas, won with 535,860 votes (51.5%) while Sami David, of the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) received 475,267 votes (45.7%). In the 24 districts where elections were held, the opposition candidate won in fifteen and the candidate of the former ruling party in nine.

According to the Federal Electoral Institute (IFE), there were 2,090,545 eligible registered voters, of whom less than 50 percent voted. Voter turnout was 10% lower than in the July presidential elections.

The Alliance for Chiapas, which was formed to back Salazar and which for the first time united eight parties from all political tendencies, won the most important cities: Tuxtla Gutierrez (the state capital), Tapachula and San Cristobal de las Casas. These were the most heavily observed elections in the history of Mexico. More than 4,000 national observers and almost a hundred internationals, accredited by the State Electoral Council (CEE), fanned out across all of Chiapas.

Election Day

Although violent incidents, threats, rumors, and strong verbal attacks between the opposition and pro-government groups characterized the pre-electoral atmosphere, the state elections were unusually calm. There were neither the usual Army nor Immigration checkpoints, and soldiers in the area were confined to their camps.

The Zapatistas did not take a position on the election, nor did they carry out actions to impede or block the vote in their area of influence, as they did in 1997. High levels of abstentionism were noted in their principal area of influence, the Lacandon Jungle, where in the midst of general calm, considerably less than half the electorate voted. The PRI won by a slim margin of 1,305 votes in the Ocosingo electoral district.

In the northern region and in the Chiapas highlands, there was greater and more evident tension. The Alliance for Chiapas won handily in the former (a traditional stronghold of the alleged paramilitary group Development, Peace and Justice), despite the climate of tension and threats and the overall control of the electoral process by PRI loyalists.

In these regions, around five thousand displaced people had to travel to their places of origin or to the district capitals in order to vote, since special polling booths were not installed in the refugee camps.

Irregularities and advances in the electoral process

In spite of overwhelming administrative difficulties, the CEE acted with an independence and impartiality that Mexican electoral organizations did not have, especially in Chiapas, before the reforms that began in 1996.

Despite the advances noted in the CEE, there were formal complaints about votes being bought, coerced or induced; the use of government social programs as campaign propaganda; and violation of the secret vote, especially in the rural areas which comprise most of the state. (For more information, see "Report on Electoral Observation" on the SIPAZ website: www.sipaz.org).

In the aftermath of the elections, on October 16 the state Congress approved a series of electoral reforms that were criticized as a step backwards in the democratization process. The reforms passed on the basis of the PRI's majority and despite the opposition of the other political parties. The reforms include prohibiting alliances among political parties in local mayor and state congressional races; replacing the figure of citizen counselor with that of electoral counselor; and changing the structure of the State Electoral Tribunal. In response, the President of the State Electoral Council, Eduardo Pineda, resigned in protest, and opposition political parties announced that they would ask the Supreme Court to declare the reforms unconstitutional.

Agrarian conflicts

The pre-electoral campaign took place in an atmosphere of great tension due to various conflicts linked to land.

Only two weeks before election day, the tone of violence was increasing. On lands in Progreso and Paraiso, in the county of Yajalon, a uniformed paramilitary group violently displaced approximately 60 Zapatista families from their homes. In Ocosingo, latent friction due to agrarian disputes among PRI supporters, Zapatistas and independents was on the rise. It should be noted that in this region there had previously been confrontations between Zapatista supporters and independent peasant organizations in several places.

Last June, the Fray Bartolome de las Casas Human Rights Center (CDHFBC) filed a complaint against the Mexican Army on behalf of the residents of the Amador Hernandez ejido (communal landholding) in the county of Ocosingo. It was accepted by the National Commission for Human Rights (CNDH). The basis of the complaint is the dispossession of ejido residents and the ecological damage caused by the Army when it entered the village on August 9, 1999. According to ejido members, after originally occupying five hectares (about 12.5 acres), the Army expanded to occupy eight. In addition to the CNDH case, CDHFBC also filed suit in federal court.

In an executive decree published October 18, President Zedillo expropriated 3.5 hectares of the Amador Hernandez ejido. According to the decree, the expropriated land is to be used for the construction of military facilities. In response, CDHFBC observed that the expropriation demonstrates that the entry of the Army in that place was for counter-insurgency purposes. CDHFBC also expressed its confidence that the courts would not allow themselves to be used to uphold such a violation of social rights.

Final results July 2 elections

Final results July 2 elections:

San Andres Accords

President-elect Vicente Fox declared several times that he would withdraw the Army from Chiapas, but only upon the re-establishment of the dialogue with the Zapatista Army of National Liberation (EZLN). In one of his speeches, he declared that the problem of Chiapas is regional (and not national), but it needed to be resolved. According to Fox, this is a propitious time to resume talks and to find a peaceful solution to the problems facing the state. He stated that one of his first priorities when he assumes power on December 1 will be to send to Congress the legislation proposed by the congressional Commission for Agreement and Pacification (COCOPA). Drafted in order to implement the San Andres Accords, the proposal requires congressional approval. Some PRI deputies have said that they will support the proposal. However it is likely to face competing proposals, and its future is uncertain.

In this context, the ex-commissioner for peace in Chiapas, Marco Antonio Bernal, stated that the conditions for dialogue do not currently exist, and that in order for it to happen, it is first necessary to work on implementing the San Andres Accords.

Congress is currently in the process of determining the new makeup of COCOPA, the congressional commission created to assist with the peace process in Chiapas. It remains to be seen what posture it will adopt vis a vis the conflict.

On August 11, the President of the United Nations Working Group on Indigenous Populations, Erica Irene Daes, presented a report to the UN Sub-commission for Human Rights, based on her visit to Mexico last April at the invitation of President Zedillo. The report recommends that the federal government implement the San Andres Accords, and that the government and the EZLN reinitiate dialogue. It points out that the militarization in indigenous communities and the increasing use of the Army for police functions create situations of violence, an atmosphere of fear, and violation of human rights, including the right to life, to physical integrity and to freedom from arbitrary arrest and detention.

Fox and the NGOs

Signaling a clear difference from his predecessors, President-elect Vicente Fox made contacts with various non-governmental organizations (NGOs) from Mexican society. A first meeting took place in August in Mexico City (in which SIPAZ participated). Following that, Fox met with NGOs in Canada and the United states. In September, Fox's transition team announced a proposed legislative reform that would permit Mexican NGOs to participate in the planning, execution and evaluation of public policies.

Unusual Events

Paralleling the PRI's electoral defeats, in August in Chimalhuacan (state of Mexico), a bloody brawl took place between two PRI mobs that resulted in ten deaths, 42 wounded and 245 arrests. Guadalupe Buendia (known as "The Wolf"), who had exercised absolute power there since 1996, was charged with responsibility for the clash.

In an unusual admission, during an interview with reporters on September 29, Army General Enrique Canovas Buenrostro, who commands approximately ten military camps in an area of Zapatista influence in the Chiapas highlands, acknowledged the existence of paramilitary groups in the state. He indicated that they operate in the northern region and the Lacandon Jungle, while the highlands region is "peaceful."

In September, the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic (PGR) issued orders for members of alleged paramilitary groups that operate in the counties of Yajalon and Venustiano Carranza to turn themselves in. According to reports from that department, there are twelve arrest orders against one group and ten against another. However, and despite testimony and other evidence that indicate that they function as paramilitary groups, the PGR stated that it was only a case of violent thieves.

Nonetheless, in an impressive police operation on October 28, elements of the PGR's Special Unit for Attention to Crimes Committed by Probable Armed Civilian Groups detained eleven members of the alleged paramilitary group Development, Peace and Justice and the Farming and Forestry Indigenous Peasant Union (UCIAF, a group formed after a split within Development, Peace and Justice ). Among them were two of the key leaders, Samuel Sanchez, ex-PRI state congress member, and Marcos Albino Torres, an ex-Army captain. Also among those arrested was Mario Cruz Perez, leader of the group that invaded the Paraiso property in the county of Yajalon (see above).

Reportedly they are accused of the federal crimes of terrorism, possession of illegal firearms, criminal association, rioting, organized crime, assault, property damage, and dispossession of property. The PGR indicated that the investigations it had been conducting intensified after the violent displacement of 60 families in Yajalon in August. Those arrested attributed their detention to political pressure exerted on the government by national and international NGOs. Top state government officials (of the outgoing PRI administration) reportedly offered economic and political support, including top-flight legal assistance, to the detainees.

Zedillo's Report

On the first of September, President Zedillo released his last Annual Report, which was criticized by the opposition for omitting the conflict in Chiapas. Among other observations, President-elect Fox commented that it did not deal with critical issues of the last five years, including the conflict in Chiapas and the massacres at Acteal and Aguas Blancas.

Political Scandal

One day before the presentation of Zedillo's Report, generals Francisco Quiroz Hermosillo and Mario Arturo Acosta Caparro, were arrested and accused of having links to drug trafficking. General Rafael Macedo de la Concha, Attorney General of Military Justice, said that they could be sentenced to 50 years in prison if found guilty.

Fox's Tours

Between August and October, President-elect Vicente Fox traveled to Central America (Costa Rica, San Salvador and Nicaragua); South America (Chile, Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay); North America (Canada and United States); Europe (Spain, France, Germany, Belgium and England); and Colombia to talk with government and business people, to introduce the new face of Mexico, and to discuss trade agreements.

Election in Tabasco

In a controversial election on October 22, PRI candidate Manuel Andrade was declared the new governor of Tabasco, a state bordering Chiapas. In that contest, his strongest opponent was PRD candidate Cesar Raul Ojeda. According to the State Electoral Institute of Tabasco, the PRI obtained 298,969 votes against 290,968 for the PRD. The PRD claimed widespread fraud and refused to recognize the outcome, pledging instead to appeal in federal court. It also called for a statement by President-elect Fox, who had not taken a public position on the controversy.

:: ANALYSYS

MEXICO: CHALLENGES OF THE DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION

The democratic transition advanced by the victory of the opposition in July's federal elections and those in August in Chiapas opens new possibilities. The electoral results do not immediately guarantee the resolution of multiple pending problems: increasing poverty, impunity and political violence, the unresolved conflict in Chiapas, to name some of the most urgent. But they could lay the foundations that would permit those problems to be processed in a new relation between government and society in Mexico. Both at the federal and state levels, the challenge is similar: to prioritize the needs of the population as a whole over partisan interests, and to learn to work like a mature democracy on the basis of ongoing negotiations and give-and-take between political forces.

Correlation of forces

The federal elections of July have given rise to a new and more complex political map. Shortly after the victory, Fox declared that he does not intend to govern for the PAN (National Action Party), the center-right party that was the main force that carried him to the presidency. For its part, the PAN declared that it would not be taking orders from the new president. In addition, the president no longer will be able to rely on an absolute and unconditional majority in the Congress. No party will be able to impose itself on the others. The necessity of negotiation represents a democratic advance. It will also complicate the negotiations to achieve the necessary reforms. The government of Vicente Fox will not be able to fortify itself except on the basis of his capacity to convince the other political groups of the legitimacy and pertinence of his proposals for change.

In this new context, all the political parties have entered into a phase of realignment and the alliances among them remain to be defined. The results of July and those of August in Chiapas represent a significant weakening of the PRI (Institutional Revolutionary Party), which lost the presidency after more than 70 years in power. The big question is what role will the PRI choose to play, having lost the presidency but still holding power in many state and local governments as well as solid ties with local political bosses and powerful economic groups. The challenge for the PRI is to rebuild the unity of the party now that the defeat has created internal fissures and struggles in the search for new leadership. It will have to worry about the possible unforeseen consequences of all the maneuvering. The violent confrontations between PRI factions in Chimalhuacan (in the state of Mexico), which left ten people dead, are an indication of this risk.

The PRD (Party of the Democratic Revolution), in spite of having recaptured the governorship of Mexico City in the July elections, has been shaken by its federal defeat. Mexico's principal left-wing party is also going through a difficult period of structural and ideological redefinition.

Times of change

The shock waves even seem to have shaken the Armed Forces, an institution that has seemed monolithic. In these times of transition, internal fights between the different fractions are happening. Some advocate the need to clean house while others support the maintenance of the "old order."

The detention of Acosta Chaparro and Quiros Hermosillo, two hard-line generals accused of ties with drug trafficking, seems to indicate a new correlation of forces, since both belonged to an elite group of officers previously considered untouchable.

Other developments point toward change and an eagerness to arrive at a more consolidated and transparent democracy. Examples include the Supreme Court decree that President Zedillo is required to provide an accounting of the financing of his successful 1994 campaign for the presidency and the handling of several scandals implicating high-level staff within Zedillo's government.

It is also worth noting the openness shown by Fox towards non-governmental organizations (NGOs). His announced intention to include them in the process of formulating and implementing public policies and his meetings with those groups may indicate a new attitude within the political elite towards civil society. Fox indicated that the meetings are just a first step, but it remains to be seen to what extent they represent an interest in a truly substantive relationship.

EZLN: the option of non-intervention

Before the presidential elections, the EZLN (Zapatista Army of National Liberation) limited itself to saying that it would respect the electoral process and its results. After the victory of the opposition in July, a change of attitude might have been expected. Nevertheless, the EZLN maintained absolute silence with respect to the governor's election in Chiapas, even though the opposition for the first time had a definite possibility of prevailing. In the end, some increase in Zapatista participation was noted, but overall few Zapatistas voted, thus favoring the prospect that the PRI would win in areas of strong EZLN influence.

Challenges for the new state government

The great political diversity of the groups that promoted Pablo Salazar's campaign constitutes the first challenge for the new government. In addition, his proposals for change will have to face a state Congress and most county governments that will remain under the control of the PRI at least until the next elections in November 2001. It remains to be seen how the forces with past ties to the PRI government (peasant organizations, labor and teacher unions, communications media, big money groups) will reposition themselves.

Some tasks may seem titanic for the new governor: reversing poverty and social alienation, promoting development, reconstructing the social fabric, solving explosive agrarian disputes, controlling armed groups, etc. At the same time, his triumph has created a new political space in which social forces have been invited to participate - including indigenous and peasant groups - that historically have been marginalized. It might be argued that the fortunes of the democratic transition in the state and the country will largely depend upon the ability of the different sectors of civil society in Chiapas to articulate creatively their demands for the construction of a new political project for Chiapas. The question is if Salazar will be able to maintain the citizen movement that he was able to coalesce around his candidacy. How will he be able to respond to the demands and expectations of such diverse social and political sectors who have historically been at odds?

The conflict in Chiapas after the elections

The resolution of the conflict in Chiapas will surely be on the agenda of both governments. Certainly the victory of the opposition at federal and state levels opens new perspectives in this sense. The fact that the issue continues to lose visibility in the media should not obscure the fact that its causes remain unresolved and the situation is still explosive. In many cases, the living conditions of the indigenous have even gotten worse. In addition, the accelerated deterioration of the social fabric results in many additional conflicts in Chiapas today, on top of that between the EZLN and the federal government. The situation is increasingly complicated and the solutions will have to be pursued at both the federal and state levels.

Although Salazar cannot order the withdrawal of the Army - which answers to the federal government - nor is the solution to the conflict with the EZLN in his hands, the governor could become a facilitator who helps to create conditions to resume the dialogue.

Controversial silence of the EZLN

The silence of the EZLN towards the proposals of the president-elect (including the possibility of a direct dialogue) has been criticized as a lack of will to negotiate. Other explanations exist. It could be that the EZLN is waiting until the president-elect takes power. Another possibility is that it thinks that conditions for dialogue do not exist as long as the massive presence of the Mexican Army remains unchanged.

The defeat of the PRI at the ballot box and not by means of force has been seen by some as calling into question the way that the EZLN has chosen, while others stress that the defeat would not have been possible without the democratic consciousness raising done by the EZLN. In any case, the Zapatista movement still must stake out its role in the new democratic context.

Pending dialogue

In fact, the EZLN has already "spoken." At the time that it suspended peace talks in September 1996, it identified conditions for resuming talks that, no doubt, it continues to feel are necessary. Given this state of affairs, the prospects are not so encouraging. Both parties (EZLN and the Fox transition team) appear to be awaiting some demonstration of the will of the other as a condition for taking next steps.

The problem is clear when considering the first condition of the Zapatistas: withdrawal of the Army and the dismantling of the paramilitary groups in the region. For his part, the president-elect conditions the withdrawal of troops on an agreement with the Zapatistas to resume the dialogue. In fact, a "total withdrawal" of the Army appears unlikely. In many divided communities, a part of the inhabitants requests its protection. Moreover it can seem like the only viable means to control the paramilitary forces, given that local political and legal institutions continue to be dominated by the PRI. Nevertheless, a way to build confidence at a minimal strategic cost to the government would be to immediately withdraw some of the military camps that are generating the most tension (for example, Amador Hernandez).

Another key point is the San Andres Accords, which were signed by the federal government and the EZLN in 1996. In order to implement the Accords, the congressional Commission for Agreement and Pacification (COCOPA) drew up a legislative proposal for constitutional reform in the area of indigenous rights and culture on the condition that the parties (federal government and EZLN) consider it on a yes-or-no basis. While the EZLN approved it, the Zedillo administration did not. Subsequently other political parties presented their own proposed texts, including one from the PRI that was backed by President Zedillo. (None of them were actually voted on). Although Fox said that he will present the initiative of COCOPA to the Congress, it seems clear that without obtaining previous agreements, the proposal has little chance of being approved. In addition, the PAN already declared that it will not withdraw its proposal. Therefore, in addition to the will already expressed, a clear commitment and a strong job of lobbying will be required of the new government.

In the end, much remains to be invented in the new political relations that Mexico requires in order to face the challenges of the transition in a constructive manner. The international community can play an important role in insuring that the new federal government faces up to its responsibility in the Chiapas conflict and other pressing national issues in a way that guarantees a real advance in the process of democratization.

:: FEATURE

"We Live Displaced...":

A suffering people cries out for an answer

During his visit to the X'oyep refugee camp on August 11, Chiapas gubernatorial candidate Pablo Salazar said, "In nine days there will be an election and we will win. There will be a new government of reconciliation and peace, and the first thing it will do is establish contact with the displaced communities in order to achieve reconciliation."

The internally displaced persons in Chiapas represent one of the most complicated situations that Salazar, now governor-elect, will have to face upon his inauguration on December 8, 2000. In the conflict zones (highlands, Lacandon Jungle and northern region), there are currently groups of displaced persons from diverse sectors of the population (members of civil organizations, PRD supporters, Zapatista supporters, PRI supporters, Catholics, and Evangelicals. The phenomenon of the displaced persons has accelerated in the state since the armed uprising in 1994. According to CIEPAC ("Displaced Population in Chiapas, in 1999"), there are 21,059 displaced persons in Chiapas. In the county of Chenalho alone there are 9,125 (ibid.).

Some of the displaced live in communities that have lent them land to work (northern region). Others have formed encampments where a great number of families inhabit a small parcel of land. They don't have access to their cornfields. Instead they receive humanitarian help from institutions such as the International Red Cross and Caritas of the Catholic Church. In the case of those displaced members of Las Abejas, they have spent more than three years in the X'oyep, Tzajalchen and Acteal camps in the county of Chenalho.

At the beginning of 1997 there was an increase in violence in that county in which several PRI and Zapatistas supporters were killed. In September of that year, hundreds of members of Las Abejas (the Bees) began to leave their home communities where, according to their testimony, groups affiliated with the PRI demanded that they contribute to finance the purchase of weapons. Not wanting to do so, they were threatened. So they left their places of origin to come together in the refugee camps. Their representatives recall, "When we arrived in the X'oyep camp, it was the rainy season. We cooked and lived outdoors, in the rain." After the Acteal massacre, in December of the same year, the number of displaced grew and so did the presence of the army, with 21 military camps in the county (id.)

Those from Yibeljoj, another community in Chenalho, described their life in the X'oyep camp. "The houses are no good. We are suffering greatly. We sleep on the ground." "We sleep in houses with plastic roofs; before there were planks of wood." "Before there was firewood but now it is all gone. The women and children grow sick worrying about their needs...We are the ones who are feeling the suffering, and we can no longer stand it."
" We Live Displaced..."

The displaced of Las Abejas have participated in several demonstrations to bring their needs to light and to demand the creation of the conditions necessary for their return. On August 10 of this year, hundreds of indigenous staged a march to ask the government to take action against the paramilitary groups and to fulfill its commitment to pay indemnification to the displaced.

Now many of them are taking part in the Jubilee 2000 Pilgrimage to plead, together with other indigenous from Chiapas, that the conditions necessary for return to their homes be created. The 250 Tzotzil, Ch'ol, Tzeltal and Tojolabal pilgrims, representing the principle ethnic groups in Chiapas, are marching under this theme: "We were born walking...We are pilgrims...We live displaced...The road belongs to us...To it we offer our steps."

The participants were brought together by Las Abejas and the organization Xi'Nich' (see glossary) for a mobilization that has as its objective the improvement of living conditions and the strengthening of spirit to "continue fighting for a just and dignified peace for the Indian peoples." They began the march on October 14 from Acteal and plan to arrive at the Basilica of Guadalupe in Mexico City on December 12, traveling a distance of almost 1,300 kilometers (about 800 miles).

However, in X'oyep, 96 families originally from the village of Yibeljoj decided that they could not wait for a return negotiated with the authorities and with minimal guarantees of security. No longer able to bear the difficulties they have faced in the camp, they decided to relocate on their own, creating another camp with better access to water and wood. On October 17, they carried their belongings some ten kilometers along a path muddied by the seasonal rain. They headed to a place near their original community. They didn't dare return to the community itself "because the paramilitaries are there. Also we are afraid of the soldiers on the roads." So, they say, "We continue to be displaced persons."

Lack of security

Security is a high priority in movements such as this relocation or a possible return. The International Red Cross (IRC) did not participate in accompanying the families of Yibeljoj because, in its view, there were neither the necessary conditions nor the security nor the materials that would permit this group of families to improve their situation. Pierre Ferrand, head of the sub-delegation of the IRC, observed, "We respect the decision of the displaced, but we did not accompany the relocation of the displaced persons from X'oyep, because this was not the result of any negotiation between the parties or with the government. Likewise there was no dialogue with the inhabitants of Yibeljoj, with whom they might have built a minimum of security."

The displaced themselves confirm this lack of security conditions, but at the same time they note other factors. "We are afraid here, but we left out of necessity. We didn't leave because we wanted to." Several NGOs (non-governmental organizations), although recognizing the risks that persist because of the tension in the region and the presence of paramilitary groups, decided to accompany them. In addition, the National Human Rights Commission (CNDH) sent observers to accompany the relocation.

In an interview in the newspaper Cuarto Poder, the mayor of Chenalho, Antonio Perez Arias, stated that there already exist sufficient guarantees for the return of the displaced persons of Las Abejas. In July of this year, Arias and PRI supporters from several communities of the county signed public declarations that seek to guarantee the physical security of the displaced who come back to work on their land or who return to live in their houses. Nevertheless, representatives from Las Abejas considered them insufficient. "We don't trust these statements because ...when we entered our community to harvest corn, you could hear shots."

Awaiting the response of the government

Besides security, the displaced persons of Yibeljoj are finding that other needs have arisen in their new spot. "We are in just the same situation as we were in 1997" (when they originally fled), one of the representatives said. "The main things we were lacking were water and wood. Now with the river and trees here (in the new camp), that has been resolved, but only partially." The families in the new camp are sleeping in small houses made of sticks and plastic. Other families don't even have houses. "We're dismantling our houses in X'oyep to bring the materials here. But there are people in X'oyep that have lived in a house with three, four, even five families. Here, each has his own lot. So there isn't enough sheet roofing for everyone. Some are offering others a place to sleep."

For this reason, the displaced persons are demanding that they be paid compensation for the robbery and destruction of their belongings in 1997. "When we left (Yibeljoj in '97), we left corn, chairs, tables, corn mills and all the items from the kitchen." In the case of Yibeljoj, the houses of Las Abejas still exist. But for the displaced persons from other communities whose houses were burned after they were displaced, compensation will represent a way of avoiding, upon their eventual return, the bad living conditions that those displaced from Yibeljoj presently face.

The displaced groups from Chenalho and elsewhere in the state represent a situation of great suffering. It cries out for a response from the new government, whose greatest challenge is to establish security in the region, fulfill existing commitments to pay compensation to the displaced, and help in the reconstruction of the social fabric.
Meanwhile, the displaced continue to wait. "First we will wait to see the government of Pablo Salazar, who said in X'oyep that if he wins, he would disarm the paramilitary groups. That's what he said. If he fulfills his pledge, we will return."

:: ACTIVITIES OF THE SIPAZ TEAM IN CHIAPAS

August - October 2000

Between August and October 2000, team activities included the following:

VISITS AND CONTACTS

• First General Assembly of SIPAZ with member organizations of the coalition from Europe, North America and Latin America in order to evaluate and project the work of SIPAZ.
• Meetings with several delegations from Europe and North America in order to discuss the current political situation and the work of SIPAZ.
• Visit to the northern region of Chiapas in order to speak to the various political and religious actors during the run-up to the August governor's election.
• Observation of the August election by three separate international SIPAZ teams that visited the northern region, the highlands and the Lacandon Jungle respectively.
• Participation along with other NGOs in a meeting with President-elect Vicente Fox in Mexico City.
• Meetings in Mexico City with Senator Luis H. Alvarez, key Chiapas policy advisor within the Fox transition team, and with Samuel Ruiz, ex-Bishop of San Cristobal de las Casas.
• Post-electoral visit to the northern region to interview key actors there in the context of the new political situation.
• Organization of the agenda and coordination of visits of the first political secretary of the British Embassy and of a German government delegation to Chiapas.
• Participation as observers in the South-North Encounter: "The Peoples of America Building Alternatives to Neo-liberalism" in San Cristobal, October 9-12.
• Accompaniment of a group of displaced persons from Las Abejas during their relocation from one refugee camp to another in the county of Chenalho.

INFORMATION

• Tour of a member of the SIPAZ team in the US, October 2-12, in order to participate in a conference on international non-governmental peacebuilding initiatives and to speak with NGOs, churches, international organizations, and the communications media.
• Tour of a member of the SIPAZ team in Germany for four months in order to speak about Chiapas and the work of SIPAZ to NGOs, solidarity groups, and governmental representatives.
• Publication of an article in NACLA Report on the Americas on the results of the state election in Chiapas.
• Publication of a report on SIPAZ' observation of the August governor's election in Chiapas. (See SIPAZ website: www.sipaz.org)

EDUCATION

• Organization of a workshop by Capacitar (SIPAZ coalition member), September 12-14, for NGOs and representatives of indigenous communities on the theme of "Trauma, Healing and Transformation."
• Advisory assistance for a workshop on Conflict Transformation with women leaders in Las Margaritas.
• Facilitation of a workshop with representatives of communities belonging to indigenous and peasant organizations in the Cañadas region on the theme "Analysis of Conflicts and Search for Peaceful Strategies."