:: SUMMARY

The national elections on July 2 marked an historic shift in Mexico. After 71 years of uninterrupted rule, the PRI (Institutional Revolutionary Party) lost the presidency to center-right opposition leader Vicente Fox. The former governor of the state of Guanajuato garnered 43% of the vote to 37% for PRI candidate and former Interior Minister Francisco Labastida. Cuauhtemoc Cardenas, leader of the center-left PRD (Party of the Democratic Revolution), was third with 17%. Fox's opposition coalition, which included the National Action Party (PAN) and the Green Ecology Party (PVEM), won a plurality of seats in the Chamber of Deputies. The PRI won a plurality in the Senate, leaving no party with a majority in either house of Congress.

Turnout was strong (64%). The elections were well-run, and complaints about logistical problems or fraud were not widespread. Ten civic organizations and 860 international visitors observed the balloting . They praised the professionalism and impartiality of the Federal Electoral Institute (IFE), which was responsible for oversight of the entire electoral process. The organizations criticized practices, mostly by the PRI, of vote buying and other forms of electoral pressure, especially in rural areas, in the period leading up to the vote.

President Zedillo and PRI candidate Labastida recognized Fox's victory a few hours after the polls closed. That simple gesture curtailed uncertainty about how the regime would respond to an electoral defeat and marked an important step in the consolidation of democracy in Mexico.

In Chiapas, there was substantial concern prior to the elections about how the high level of militarization might inhibit voting in rural areas. The Army did withdraw its checkpoints on election day. Nevertheless, it is likely that turnout was reduced as a result of the climate of intimidation that exists in some areas.

For its part, the EZLN (Zapatista Army of National Liberation) issued a communiqué stating that it would not impede the voting process and that Zapatista supporters were free to vote. The EZLN's position is likely to be a significant factor in the August 20 governor's election in Chiapas in which an opposition coalition led by Pablo Salazar is presenting a strong challenge to the PRI candidate, Sami David. On the other hand, the PRI demonstrated its strength by carrying the presidential election in Chiapas and all but one of the congressional seats.

A couple of factors were prominent in Fox's victory. His well-run campaign took full advantage of his personality and charisma. Perhaps even more important was the degree to which Mexicans were fed up with the PRI. Fox even pulled thousands of voters who normally support the left but who voted for him as the best bet to actually defeat the PRI.

The president-elect will face serious problems when he assumes office in December, including daunting levels of poverty and inequality, widespread human rights violations, and severe inadequacies in the judicial system. His effectiveness will depend on his ability to build a working coalition. He has emphasized his commitment to inclusivity in his government and his intention to include the PRI in his cabinet. He has also distanced himself somewhat from the PAN, his original electoral base. For its part, the center-left PRD has staked out a position as the "responsible opposition" rather than a collaborator with the new government. Hence it is possible that Fox may end up depending significantly on the backing of the PRI in the shaping of his policies.

In addition to the applause of many foreign governments for Mexico's democratic transition, the market responded positively to Fox's victory. He is expected to continue economic policy along the same lines as his predecessor.

Regarding the Chiapas conflict, a statement by Fox early in the campaign asserting that if he were elected, he could "work out the problem in 15 minutes" was not reassuring to those involved in the peace process. However later he declared his intention to present to Congress the COCOPA (congressional Commission for Agreement and Pacification) legislative proposal for implementation of the 1996 San Andres Accords (signed but never implemented by the government.) He also indicated his support for renewed dialogue on the outstanding issues in the stalled peace talks, and he said he would consider a pullback of Army troops in order to reduce tensions. The fact that neither the PRI nor the PAN supported the COCOPA proposal in the past suggests that it may not have smooth sailing in the Congress.

Meanwhile, in Chiapas there were a number of violent ambushes in recent months. The victims were of various political affiliations. In one case, seven police were killed. The perpetrators of the attacks have not been identified. However, the attacks did result in increased pressure by the military on nearby villages.

Another factor that has contributed to tensions in recent months is the expanded deployment throughout the conflict areas of the Federal Preventive Police (PFP). The deployment of the PFP in Montes Azules, an area of strong Zapatista influence, and threats to remove indigenous communities there for "ecological crimes" illustrate how the PFP is being used by the federal government as another control mechanism.

President-elect Fox will not assume office until December. The hotly contested governor's election in Chiapas on August 20 and the unprecedented transfer of power at the national level introduce elements of uncertainty and potential instability during the interregnum, especially in Chiapas where the PRI old guard remains strong. The relentless military pressure used to pen in Zapatista supporters only seems to exacerbate tensions.

Acciones Recomendadas

1. Congratulate President Zedillo for his role in assuring free elections on July 2 and for his statesmanship in recognizing the results and pledging to cooperate with President-elect Fox to ensure a smooth transfer of power. Urge him to use his leadership to ensure a democratic process in the Chiapas governor's election on August 20.
2. Urge President Zedillo to minimize the possibility of violence in Chiapas during the remaining months of his tenure by withdrawing Army troops currently stationed in and around indigenous communities.
3. Circulate information, such as this Report, on the situation in Chiapas.
   

Please write:

Lic. Ernesto Zedillo Ponce de León
Presidente de la República
Palacio Nacional
06067 México, DF - México
Fax: (int-52) 271 1764 / 515 4783

:: UPDATE

Mexico: A New Political Map

Mexico's New President: Vicente Fox

On July 2, Vicente Fox, representing the National Action Party (PAN) and the Green Ecology Party of Mexico (PVEM) won the presidential elections with 43.4% of the total votes. Following him was Francisco Labastida of the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) with 36.9%. In third place was Cuauhtemoc Cardenas of the Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD), Labor Party (PT) and other leftist political forces with 17% of the votes. After 71 years in power, the PRI is relinquishing the presidency. In the evening of the same day, President Zedillo and the other candidates recognized Fox's victory. The Alliance for Change which Fox led, also obtained a plurality in the lower house of the Congress, while the PRI won a plurality in the Senate. See details in the accompanying table:

Results of July 2 elections:

President
Vicente Fox (Alliance for Change) 43.4%
Francisco Labastida (PRI) 36.9%
Cuauhtemoc Cardenas
(Alliance for Mexico) 17%


Chamber of Deputies
Alliance for Change: 223 seats
PRI: 209 seats
Alliance for Mexico: 68 seats

Senate
Alliance for Change: 51 seats
PRI: 60 seats
Alliance for Mexico: 17 seats

Voter turnout was high: 64% of 58,789,209 eligible voters. This civic celebration was not overshadowed by the relatively small number of problems that were reported in various voting stations. Nonetheless, there were numerous cases of voters whose names did not appear on the appropriate registration list and who complained that they were not able to vote at the special polling places established for such cases because of a shortage of ballots.

Civic Organizations endorse the elections

Ten civic organizations and 860 international observers made a positive assessment of the July 2 balloting. According to them, the 350 complaints which they received (mostly from rural areas) did not invalidate the final results. The organizations praised the work of the Federal Electoral Institute (IFE) while also calling for improvements in election legislation to reduce irregularities and to place more rigorous sanctions on election crimes.

Prior to the elections, international observers and European parliamentary representatives and leftist politicians had commented (Proceso Magazine No. 1234) that alternation in power was necessary in order to speak of democratization of the country.

Post-Election Reactions

Within the PRI, reactions came quickly. In an historic development, prominent members of the party (including former government ministers) openly criticized President Zedillo, blaming him for the defeat.

For his part, while Fox expressed his intention to form a government that is inclusive and pluralistic, some of his statements seemed to signal that the parties that nominated him may not have much weight in the formation of his cabinet.

Chiapas: Irregularities in the Federal Elections

Before the elections, the Federal Electoral Institute (IFE) indicated that it was going to investigate the effects of excessive militarization on reducing voter turnout in Chiapas. (Troop strength in Chiapas is estimated to be 30-50,000.) At the end of May, a group of US and Canadian observers visited Chiapas to observe the election campaign. In their report they underscored this risk. Subsequently, the IFE called upon the Army to return the troops to their bases and to withdraw the approximately 50 roadblocks on election day. The Army complied with that request.

On June 23, the EZLN (Zapatista Army of National Liberation) released a communiqué in which it declared that it would not obstruct the elections nor the placement of election booths in the areas of Zapatista influence. It also stated that Zapatistas were free to vote.

Three booths were not installed in District III of Ocosingo, considered a zone of Zapatista influence. According to a survey taken in the district, military personnel in civilian dress were on the streets for much of the day. Also there were complaints that two days before the elections, checks dated May 26 from PROCAMPO (Program for the Countryside, a government assistance program) were being distributed. The communities where this took place protested what they viewed as a clear attempt to buy votes.

Similarly, various irregularities were reported by the Chiapas IFE office regarding the delay in installation of election booths and problems caused by the presence of PRI political propaganda in voting areas.

Violence in the Highlands of Chiapas

In an ambush on May 6 in Chenalho, close to the community of Tzanembolom, three people were killed and two wounded. Two of them were PRI supporters and one was a young member of the civil society group Las Abejas (the Bees). Members of the Army and the state police surrounded the displaced persons camp in Polho (an autonomous Zapatista county) to "look for the murderers." The Interior Ministry declared that that was not a matter within the competence of the Federal Preventive Police (PFP) (see article elsewhere in this issue.) Nevertheless, several days later the Interior Ministry announced the sending of hundreds of federal police to the area.

PRD senators of the congressional Commission for Agreement and Pacification (COCOPA) described the entrance of the PFP in the highlands as a repressive alternative and some civic bodies demonstrated their opposition to this measure.

Emilio Rabasa, Coordinator for Dialogue in Chiapas, insisted that these operations did not in any way indicate an impending attack on the EZLN. Instead their purpose was to monitor the roads and by-ways and to confiscate arms. In the same context, the leader of the National Brotherhood of Christian Evangelical Churches (CONFRATERNICE), Arturo Farela, said that those responsible for the ambush were "declared Zapatistas." For his part, the Bishop of San Cristobal, Felipe Arizmendi, declared that it was a regrettable but isolated event.

Also in May, three people implicated in the 1997 Acteal massacre (a retired general working with the state police and two other state police officials) received eight-year prison terms for failing to stop the massacre, even though they were close enough to hear the shooting.

On June 13, seven police were killed in an ambush in Las Limas in the county of El Bosque. Following this event, the military presence was increased in the county seat and nearby communities, especially in Union Progreso, where troops searched for three Zapatista peasants suspected of the murders. The military also surrounded the communities of Las Limas and Los Angeles. In the context of these events, the PFP declared that in these areas it would employ the services of military intelligence to determine the identity of the aggressors. The EZLN disavowed responsibility for the ambush.

Subsequently, Alberto Pathistan, a teacher with PRI affiliation, was detained as a suspect in the killings. Local PRI members then took over the county government office and demanded his release.

The PFP presence was also denounced in the Zapatista communities of Ojo de Agua, Amador Hernandez and Flor de Cacao after it had installed a camp in each community. In addition, the PFP is known to be operating checkpoints on the roads in the county of Tila (northern region), where it is engaged in checking documents.

Bishop Arizmendi: First Steps

After taking over the position on May l, Bishop Felipe Arizmendi visited some communities of the diocese. He ratified the majority of the leadership positions in the various vicariates of the diocese, thus demonstrating continuity with his predecessors. On several occasions, the bishop stated that the Army presence in Chiapas was excessive. Before the elections, he called upon the people to vote. Later, he urged acceptance of the people's vote and saluted the Zapatista's attitude as hopeful for the nation.

August: Elections in Chiapas

In the midst of so many events shaking the country, in Chiapas the campaign for the election of the state governor (set for August 20) gained momentum, particularly that of the ex-PRI senator, now opposition candidate, Pablo Salazar. While Salazar's campaign appears broad-based, it is important to keep in mind the triumph of the PRI in Chiapas in the July elections (the PRI candidates won for President of the Republic, two senators, and eleven of twelve federal representatives).

Trade Agreements

On July 1, the Free Trade Treaty with the European Union went into effect. This event took a back seat in the pre-election atmosphere of the country. In line with the economic model that has been pursued in recent years, agreements of this nature continue to be signed. Hence President Zedillo met recently with the presidents of El Salvador and Guatemala in an effort to liberalize trade relations with these countries.

:: ANALYSIS

Mexico: A Step Forward in Building Democracy

July 2 of the year 2000 is a date that will permanently remain in Mexico's history. After 71 years of dominance by the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), an opposition candidate, Vicente Fox, won.

Fox's victory was principally due to the combination of two factors: the exploitation of his charisma and personality through skillful management of the media, and perhaps most importantly, the fact that the majority of Mexicans had had their fill of the PRI. The votes of the undecided contributed to this overwhelming triumph. Paradoxically, given that Fox is from the center-right, so too did the votes of thousands of people who generally vote for the left. A controversy erupted during the last weeks of the campaigns about the "useful vote" concept. For those who defended it, the idea was to "get the PRI out of los Pinos" [the presidential residence], so that a change could take place.

Democratic Advances

Previous elections had been stained by suspicions of fraud. Those of July took place in a general context of calm. There were relatively few complaints of irregularities during the voting. Actual co-optation of the vote took place before the elections through a variety of abuses of incumbency, including the use of federal assistance programs (like PROGRESA and PROCAMPO) for propaganda goals, irregularities in the selection of election officials, inequality among the candidates in access to the media, etc. This may be one of the reasons why the PRI continued to carry the state of Chiapas.

The Federal Electoral Institute (IFE) played a key exemplary role in the process before and during the elections. It was able to maintain autonomy in its actions, demonstrating efficiency, independence, impartiality and professionalism.

The democratic advances were seen most clearly in two aspects: citizen participation (in the process of preparing for and during the elections themselves, with a particularly low abstention rate compared with previous elections), and the public recognition of the preliminary results by all political figures.

Nevertheless, there are still five long months of uncertainty left, from forming the new cabinet to the inauguration of the new President of the Republic on the first of December.

The defeat of the PRI and its possible risks

To a certain extent, we can see an anti-PRI tendency in many of the July 2 votes. The crushing defeat has not signified, however, immobility within the party. Readjustment of forces and internal paybacks for such a crashing fall, as well as resistance to assuming the role of opposition have begun to generate accusations, finger pointing and struggles for control of this ship which seems in danger of going under.

Consequent re-composition of blocs

The simple fact that the opposition (Fox) won, constitutes a step forward in the transition to democracy. It is also important to recognize the previous steps that have been taken to get to this point, including the '88 and '94 elections, the electoral reforms of '96, and the elections of '97, which gave the Chamber of Deputies a new configuration in which the PRI no longer held an absolute majority.

Today the triumph of an opposition candidate is an important advance in the process of democratization, but it is only one, since democracy will have to continue to be built among the three powers, in each of the houses of Congress, in the different parties, and with the participation of civil society. Surely those members of civil society unaffiliated with a political party will express themselves more actively during this six-year term, particularly those groups that publicly supported Fox. They will be in a position to demand the fulfillment of campaign promises.

Without doubt there are many pending issues that must still be resolved: the challenge to develop a political economy that overcomes the profound inequalities that exist in Mexican society, promoting and including the 30 million people who are below the poverty line; Chiapas and the resumption of the peace process; the cleanup of FOBAPROA (financial scandal that occurred in 1998 around the operations of the Savings Protection Bank Fund); social and educational aspects; the human rights situation, and flaws within the system of administration of justice.

The president-elect speaks a lot about inclusion, of putting together a plural government. Nevertheless, after the elections he set himself apart from the PAN, in order to let it be seen between the lines that in this new stage, the patterns of the past wouldn't be repeated. On the other hand, the PRD already announced its firm decision not to collaborate with the Fox government and to assume the posture of the "responsible opposition." If Fox relies on the PRI, it is possible that Mexican politics would return to the point of departure. On the contrary, if he succeeds in gathering the support of others, the government will be able, with greater security, to go forward with the country towards democracy. It is one of the first challenges that Fox will have to confront.

Fox's Proposal for Chiapas

At the beginning of the campaign, a comment by Fox about "being able to fix the problem of Chiapas in 15 minutes" caught the attention of sectors linked to the conflict. However, later he proposed to present the COCOPA bill regarding Indigenous Rights and Culture to the next session of Congress. It should be remembered that the impasse in the Chiapas peace process has to do, in large part, with the reluctance of President Zedillo to take on this bill as a way of implementing the San Andres Accords which were signed by the government and the EZLN in 1996. The president-elect also proposed to pick up the dialogue on the outstanding issues that were previously identified. An important factor of the legislative proposal is that it will be presented in a Congress dominated by the PAN and the PRI, parties which to date have opposed the COCOPA text, each proposing alternatives. Therefore, there is no guarantee that the proposal will prosper.

Fox's Chiapas policy contemplates the majority of the conditions raised by the Zapatistas for resumption of talks. Some analysts think that this proposal, which arrived quite late in the electoral campaign and which closely resembles that of Cardenas, was a ploy to gain the vote of some sectors of the left for whom the conflict in Chiapas was a particularly important electoral theme.

The EZLN and the electoral process

By announcing that it would not block the electoral process in Chiapas and by giving its supporters the freedom to vote, the EZLN was able to situate itself in a sufficiently neutral position so it would not be marginalized from the democratic process. This could be a factor that strengthens the August electoral process in Chiapas.

Local elections in Chiapas; an opportunity for peace

The PRI candidate for governor, Sami David, had based a large part of his campaign strategy on the victory of Francisco Labastida in the presidential elections. The opposition victory at the national level as well as the EZLN's position with respect to the participation of its supporters in the election could allow the opposition candidate, Pablo Salazar, to win the elections in Chiapas scheduled for August 20.

But at the same time, the most hard-line PRI groups could generate instability in the region during the time that remains before the elections. One can't forget that elections in Chiapas have a long history of violence, fraud, coercion and other arbitrary acts that have not simply disappeared with the federal elections. In fact, that could explain in large measure the triumph of the PRI in Chiapas on July 2. The same happened in the neighboring state of Tabasco. Southeast Mexico continues to be a bastion of the PRI.

Difficult electoral context in Chiapas: between ambushes and militarization

Before the presidential elections, complaints from the indigenous communities painted a picture of a hardening of the posture of the Army at its checkpoints (although they were taken down on the day of the elections.) This military presence surely inhibited the opposition vote in more than one part of the state, even after the communiqué from the EZLN.

In recent months, two types of situations were used to justify that presence: the new ecological concern of the government about the areas under Zapatista influence (Montes Azules) and the increase in the number of unresolved ambushes, with their mounting toll (Chalchihuitan, Chenalho, El Bosque). Doubtless the presence of the state police, the military and recently the Federal Preventive Police contributed to the strained political atmosphere before the elections.

International Approval

Vicente Fox's economic policy guarantees continuity with that of Ernesto Zedillo government. This explains to a large extent the favorable reaction of the Stock Market and the fact that the currency has maintained its value. In fact this continuity was already secured in large part by the Free Trade Treaty with the European Union, which went into effect one day before the July 2 elections. In this sense, the international community's approval is explained. The democratic advances in Mexico are taking place in a context that doesn't threaten economic interests.

:: FEATURE

Children of the Low-Intensity War

"God protect us, so that we are not scared anymore"

After six years of excessive military presence in Chiapas, little is known of some of its impacts on the indigenous communities. While there has been reporting on divisions, confrontations, massacres, displacements, and the increase in disease, some aspects have received little attention. One of these is the impact of this war on children who continue to suffer in a variety of ways. Because of their natural vulnerability, they are among the hardest hit by the violence.

The Impact of Militarization

In the northern region of Chiapas, a 13-year-old girl is in search of some kind of income to help feed her family. Trembling, she enters a military compound and offers her body in exchange for a few pesos.

Estimates of the number of federal troops in Chiapas vary from 30,000 to 50,000. While the government does not provide figures for troop strength, it has been possible to document the growth of army installations. Since 1995, their number has quadrupled (from 74 to 296, according to the research group CIEPAC), and new installations continue to be established. The pervasive presence of the military in the conflict areas is apparent to even a casual visitor.

Military presence in and around indigenous communities in Chiapas is having profound effects on the population on many different levels. In some cases, the basis for interactions with local people is a militarization of public services. The military has "social work" stations that offer a variety of services: medical check-ups, medicine, hair cuts, etc. The military also gives out water and food, builds roads, and gives free rides to government supporters. In many communities, the soldiers play on town basketball courts and soccer fields, so that young people from the town must interact with soldiers if they want to play ball. Soldiers and state police have also been known to hand out candy to the children, play violent videos on the only available television in the town, and bring pornographic magazines to show to the teenagers and the children in some communities. All of these interactions give the soldiers the chance to not only influence the children but also to gather information.

The army and police represent power and wealth, and that is attractive to the young people. Many teenage boys have begun dressing in clothes that look like army and police uniforms. Similarly, as a peace camp observer in the northern region explains, "Many of the 14 and 15-year-old girls have begun to want to marry soldiers and police officers because, with their guns and money, they seem powerful."

Many communities have reported that the soldiers have prostitutes and use drugs in front of the children. In fact, prostitution and drug use in the indigenous communities near military camps have become much more widespread whereas they were extremely rare before 1994. Many of the prostitutes that come to the military camps are still children themselves. For these girls, it has meant an increase in sexually transmitted diseases and pregnancies that bear unwanted and stigmatized children. Prostitution continues though, because these young girls or their families feel that they have no other choice in light of their desperate economic situation, which is greatly exacerbated by the war.

The influence of the military is especially powerful in the children of government supporters who, because of their political position, have more contact with the military. There is concern by parents and civil society groups that the very nature of the military and the activities of paramilitary groups in the area are teaching the children that violence is the appropriate and preferred way to solve problems.

Violent Attacks

"I am 12 years old and I lost my whole family. Only I stayed here by myself, . . .with no one of my blood, and I am only here because the people that came here helped me so that I wasn't abandoned."
Acteal massacre survivor

Despite the cease-fire, since 1994 at least several hundred people, children among them, have been killed in the fighting in Chiapas, and many more have been wounded or beaten. Over 20,000 have been displaced from their homes. Children have witnessed terrible acts of violence. Some have seen a parent killed before their eyes. Others have watched their houses burned, their animals killed, and their parents beaten, before being forced from their homes at gun-point by paramilitary groups.

Sometimes the children themselves have been a target. On December 22, 1997, a paramilitary group massacred 45 unarmed members of the pacifist group Las Abejas (The Bees) in the community of Acteal. The victims, who were praying and fasting for peace in the church, included 15 children, 21 women (one of them seven months pregnant) and nine men. A number of children were wounded, and some of the survivors were left orphans.

The constant stream of rumors and the free movement of paramilitary groups keep the people, especially the children, in a state of fear and anticipation. As a result the people in Acteal do not feel safe hunting for firewood or returning to their cornfields. Women dare not walk alone, and children stay close to the house when they are playing.

The struggle for survival amid the ongoing threat of violence makes it difficult for the people to work on healing from the loss and trauma they have suffered. This expression of unresolved trauma has manifested itself medically in Acteal. Many children have had a skin sickness called neurodermatitis that is caused by intense trauma. A health promoter noted, "As a result of the general situation, including the trauma, the children get sick more frequently and with more intensity. You see this most in the survivors of the massacre. And the children cannot express what is happening inside very well. Because of this the majority of the children remain in silence. They live in constant fear without a way for these emotions to be released."

There has also been a rise in sexual assault and domestic violence among Chiapas indigenous since 1994. COLEM, a women's group in San Cristobal, reports that the number of rape cases it has seen increased almost 50% in 1994 and more than 300% in 1995. Between 1993 and 1997, the victims in 37% of the sexual assault cases seen by COLEM were girls under the age of 18. The aggressors in 45% of the sexual assault cases were in a position of authority, i.e. police, military, doctors, teachers, etc. In addition, according to COLEM, since 1994 domestic violence has risen 20-30%. This rise in sexual assault and domestic abuse may be attributed, at least in part, to the increased level of tension and stress (and a subsequent rise in alcoholism) and to the close proximity of the military to the civilian population. So even though many children are not directly experiencing the violence of the war, they are much more likely now to have to face violence within their own homes.

The Drama of the Displaced

In Chenalho, two brothers, ages 6 and 9, and a sister, age 11, carry a full load of firewood on their backs with a strap that goes around their foreheads. Bent over, sweating, these internal refugees carry this load over mountains and hills behind their father until, after an hour and a half, they reach their plastic and tin house where they have lived for three years since being displaced from their community.

As a result of the continuing violence, 15-20,000 people have been displaced from their homes in Chiapas, more than half of them children. A victim from the northern region of Chiapas recounts a typical story: "On July 18, 1996, they carried out an operation, the Army and the police, along with Development, Peace and Justice [a paramilitary group]. They shot up the church, they broke the images, they looted houses and stole our animals. We went to the mountains to hide. Many people died. One of my little boys died. He got sick, and we couldn't take him to the doctor out of fear of ambushes by Peace and Justice."

As long as the conflict continues to fester, it can be expected that more and more men, women, and children will finally give in to the pressure of living in divided, oppressive communities and move to a place where at least they know that their next-door neighbor will not threaten their lives.

In some communities in the Lacandon Jungle, the government is pressuring the communities directly. It has accused some communities in the Montes Azules biosphere of damaging the environment and it has attempted to relocate them with a combination of promises and threats. Here we cite the words of the children of these communities: "We have a right to live in this place where we were born , just like other children who were born in other parts of the world. Wise sirs, scholars of animals and plants, do not ask the authorities to kill us or to displace us. Have a little conscience, governors and scholars. You too have children. The children of Montes Azules are not the enemies of our mother, who is the paradise of nature. We have lived here for years with the birds, the animals and the plants. We too are concerned about the life of Mother Nature. We invite you to join with us in conserving her."

Each displaced family has its own story, but they all left in the midst of fear, walking for many miles, often at night and in the rain, to reach safety. And they have all experienced a profound loss. One of the children who had to flee his community talks about all that he left behind: "The dog got lost and the priistas ( supporters of the ruling party) took him. The school is in my town and I want to study. The flowers, the dogs, the chickens were lost. The paramilitaries took them. Cats, cooking pots, corn grinders have been lost. We were scared because they threatened us with their rifles, and they also shot their rifles."

The children understand that they are still in danger. They hear the constant rumors that the paramilitaries are coming to kill the refugees. In the community of X'oyep, the children participate in weekly community prayers, where the people pray "that the people return [to their communities], that the soldiers leave, and that God protect us, so that we are not scared anymore."

For the children from the communities that take in the displaced population, it is difficult to suddenly have hundreds of strange children and their families living in their community. Though they are not displaced themselves, they are faced with having to share their homes, their food, and their land. The consequence of this generosity is that these children now share in the suffering of the displaced. One child from X'oyep describes their situation: "When the displaced people got here, we crowded together with them in our houses, and afterwards they made their own houses out of plastic. .. Before we had enough trees, but we gave permission to the people who fled their community to cut firewood. We felt bad for them because they didn't have anything, and that's how our trees are all gone."

The most severe problem for displaced people is the lack of land. In their own communities, the people could grow vegetables as well as their traditional corn and beans on their own land. In the camps, though, none of that is available. In some refugee camps, 100% of the children are in the first stage of malnutrition, and some are moving into the second and third stages. Their state of malnutrition, along with their very close quarters (in some cases, there are 20 to 30 people living in a house of 8 by 5 meters), make the children more vulnerable to the respiratory infections, skin infections, and diarrhea that constantly run through these communities. Not only do these illnesses affect the physical development of these children, but because of this vulnerability, without prompt medical attention they are at greater risk of death from these curable diseases.

Education is difficult, to say the least, for all of the displaced children. In many communities, there is no school for the children. In some, schools exist, but there are other problems. In Poconichim, because of the influx of displaced persons there are up to 70 students for each teacher. In other communities children don't go to school because they must have a birth certificate to enroll, and they either never had one or it was lost or burned when they fled their communities.

Living in Divided Communities

In 1996 there was a confrontation between government supporters and opposition groups in the community of Jolnixtie, in the highly polarized northern region. The opposition groups fled their communities under threat from the paramilitaries. In their absence, their houses, animals and crops were pillaged and burned. After four months, the displaced returned to live just down the road from the people who robbed them and threatened their lives. Both sides were wary, afraid that the other was going to attack. The children were conscious of their parents' suffering and worry, and the obvious source of it.

In the community of Puebla in the Chiapas highlands, some families finally fled in part because the division was so marked that the children of government supporters were threatening the children of Las Abejas while they were in school. In other communities, the children are separated entirely, with one school for children of government supporters and another for children of opposition supporters.

Meanwhile, the military presence in the region serves to maintain divisions and make a genuine resolution more difficult.

The Exploitation of Child Workers

In San Cristobal de las Casas, a 10-year-old boy is forced to work so that his family can survive. Every day he walks the streets, from early morning to 11:00 or 12:00 at night, burdened with bracelets and Zapatista dolls, begging tourists to buy his goods. Though he walks the streets of a wealthy city with many schools, he will probably never attend one.

Children all over Chiapas spend long days working in the fields, taking care of younger siblings, carrying firewood, and doing countless other things to help their families survive. There is a certain population, though, that works outside of their homes and plots of land, selling gum, bracelets, or whatever is necessary to earn a few pesos. Since 1994, many children have migrated with or without their families to San Cristobal de las Casas, one of the largest cities in Chiapas.

For these children, the prospect of education, even through primary school, is remote. In addition, without the support structure of their community and culture, they are targets of discrimination and abuse, not only because of their poverty and their vulnerability but because of their indigenous race. According to Melel Xojobal (an organization that works with street children), "The situation for the children on the street is very hard. They are mistreated by each other, by the authorities, and by the general population. Some adults use the children's labor to their own benefit and in some of the most serious cases make them sell drugs or prostitute themselves."

Storm Clouds and Rays of Hope

Amid the trauma and suffering, there are also signs of hope and renewal. For example, the community of Acteal is far from immobilized by its situation. A social worker noted, "There is a sense of community, of solidarity, of helping each other. There is a community nucleus to reflect and share in, to celebrate the word of God, or to conmemorate together on the 22nd of every month the anniversary of the Acteal massacre. All of this helps the children to feel that though they left their community and though they have this profound loss, this new space is their space. And they are adapting because of this solidarity amongst the people."

Nonetheless, the lives of the majority of the children in the conflict areas are dominated by poverty and tension.

It is noteworthy that Mexico signed and ratified the UN Convention on the Rights of Children. That document states that children have the right: to live in healthy conditions, appropriate for their development; to be protected from economic exploitation and from work that does them harm; to physical and psychological recuperation if the child has been the victim of maltreatment; to attend school; to play and rest; to live with their family in a secure environment; to express their opinion and have it taken into account; and to freedom of thought and religion.

For thousands of children in Chiapas, all of these rights are being systematically violated every day. They live their lives under threat of injury or death; they bear the influences of the military and paramilitary groups; they sell their wares or their bodies to survive; they have lost their homes, their animals, their loved ones and neighbors; they are shut out from schools and medical attention; they are caught in the middle of a conflict that they never asked for, and whose consequences they will inherit.

It remains to be seen what the long-term effects of low intensity warfare will be on these children as they grow up to be adults and have children themselves. Clearly the future of Mexican society depends on the emotional and physical health of its children, and true peace in Chiapas can only be achieved when the needs of these children are met.

The Federal Preventive Police - A New Actor in Chiapas

The Federal Preventive Police (PFP) first rose to public attention last February in Mexico City when it dislodged the students who for months had occupied the National Autonomous University of Mexico (UNAM). In April it was sent to Chiapas, specifically to the Montes Azules ecological reserve, with the stated purpose of "being the guardians of the jungle" in the indigenous communities that had been established there since the 1970s. Later it was sent to the county of Chenalho to search for arms in the communities close to the sites of the ambushes that took place during May. And in Tila the PFP checks documents of citizens at the checkpoints set up by the Army. In all of these cases the PFP acts in conjunction with the Army, whether in joint patrols or at checkpoints. Its presence has increased the climate of tension and fear in the communities. The children and women are frightened and the men are inhibited from undertaking their daily activities.

It is helpful to understand better the origin of this police force and the actual functions it is given, beyond prevention.

The Federal Preventive Police Legislative Proposal was presented to Congress in November 1998. One month later the Federal Preventive Police Legal Decree was approved by Congress. On December 31, President Zedillo and Interior Minister Francisco Labastida approved its official publication and it became law.

The legislative proposal was reviewed and approved in a very short time. It includes an extensive exposition of its basis in the necessity of preventing crime as a response to public insecurity. For that purpose the Federal Preventive Police was proposed, bringing together the police forces of Immigration, Federal Highway Police, and others in order to establish "a police institution with a sphere of competence clearly limited to the function of preventing crime."

However in the law as it was actually approved, a number of functions were included that do not appear to fit properly within the prevention of crime. The PFP was given a national scope and the capacity to act above other police corps, under the direction of the executive branch through the Ministry of the Interior.

Its field of action is very broad. It can conduct arrests, investigate crimes, undertake surveillance, conduct inspections on highways and public transport, and monitor the coming and going of merchandise and individuals in the airports. It can also participate in joint operations with other federal, state or county police, issue tickets, and protect the physical integrity of persons and their belongings.

The indigenous Zapatista communities publicly expressed their opposition to the deployment of the PFP, charging that it represents an act of aggression by the government. The Miguel Agustin Pro Human Rights Center declared that "the entrance of the PFP increases the polarization of the conflict," and the National Human Rights Network "All Rights for Everyone" stated that "the PFP was being used to impose a new fence around the Zapatistas."

Because of the functions authorized by the law, there is a big risk that the PFP may be utilized as another resource in the low intensity war against the indigenous communities. Its presence in the conflict areas increases the tension and impacts the dynamics as well as the possibilities for reactivating peace talks.

:: ACTIVITIES OF THE SIPAZ TEAM IN CHIAPAS

May - July 2000

Between May and July 2000, team activities included the following:

VISITS AND CONTACTS

• Visit to the northern region (communities in the counties of Tila and Sabanilla) to speak with figures from different social sectors in the pre-electoral context and during the voting.
• Interview with the First Political Secretary of the U.S. Embassy during his visit to Chiapas.
• Visit to Mexico City for meetings with NGOs, religious figures and diplomatic representatives (embassies of Germany, Great Britain, France, United States, and a delegation from the European Commission in Mexico).
• Interview with the new Bishop of San Cristobal de las Casas, Felipe Arizmendi, in the context of the ecumenical work of SIPAZ.
• Interviews with religious figures from various denominations in the Chiapas highlands.
• Interviews with various NGOs and churches for research on the Federal Preventive Police
• Assistance in organizing the program for the Civil Mission for Peace in Chiapas, May 18-22.

INFORMATION

• Convoking, organizing and facilitating a meeting with organizations that work with children in Chiapas as part of a research project on children.
• Consultations with two religious delegations from the United States.
• Workshop on accompaniment and international human rights observation for a Mexican NGO.
• Participation as an observer in the civil society conference on democracy and peace in June in Mexico City.

EDUCATION

• Facilitation of workshops on Conflict Transformation with teachers from the House of Science.
• Participation in a series of workshops to promote the methodology on Conflict Resolution of the University of Birmingham, England.
• Facilitation of a workshop on Conflict Analysis and Strategies for Peace with promoters from the Center for Women's Research and Assistance (CIAM).