:: SUMMARY

On September 7, federal Interior Minister Diodoro Carrasco issued a new dialogue proposal for Chiapas and stated that he himself would lead the negotiations team if talks are re-established. The government initiative also included proposals for an expanded debate in the Senate on indigenous rights and culture, the freeing of some Zapatista prisoners, review of complaints regarding harassment of indigenous communities in Chiapas, and the creation of a new mediation body.

The new proposal stands in contrast to the government's hard-line strategy over the last three years. It seems to suggests a renewed willingness to dialogue and some modifications in the government's position. It may contribute to a reduction in tensions in Chiapas, especially if it results in reining in the increasingly belligerent state government of Governor Roberto Albores.

At the same time, the proposal addresses inadequately or not at all certain key points of dispute, including army presence in indigenous communities, paramilitary groups, and the 1996 legislative proposal of COCOPA (the congressional Commission for Agreement and Pacification). These issues are among those that the EZLN (Zapatista Army of National Liberation) has insisted must be satisfactorily addressed as a pre-condition to future talks. Hence it seems unlikely that the Zapatistas, who thus far have withheld any substantive response, will accept the government's proposal.

Only time will tell whether the proposal represents a fresh and concerted effort on the part of the government to break the stalemate or if instead it is mainly designed to buy political space in the run up to next July's national and local elections or in anticipation of the visit of UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Mary Robinson which is scheduled for November 23-27.

Meanwhile, military pressure on the Zapatistas and their supporters has increased in some areas. For example, in August approximately 500 soldiers arrived in the tiny community of Amador Hernandez, located a few kilometers from the presumed base of the EZLN command. Their stated purpose was to protect a surveying crew that was mapping out a new road that would connect the community to the major army base at San Quintin. Community opposition to the road was strong, and the community's protests were joined by university students from Mexico City and others. Community members fear the consequences of easier army access and a stronger army presence. The state government reacted harshly, accusing the students of manipulating the Indians and threatening their arrest. Chiapas Governor Albores stated that he would no longer allow the presence of national or international observers. In a subsequent press release he added, "We in Chiapas are losing patience...Enough of blackmail and manipulation...[by]...agitators [who] are taking advantage of the political conflicts and are polluting the state."

In late August, in the face of national and international pressure, the federal Interior Ministry announced that work on the road was being suspended. However, as this report went to press, the military remained in force in Amador Hernandez, against the will of local residents.

In July the state congress, dominated by the ruling PRI (Institutional Revolutionary Party), approved a law on indigenous rights and culture. Governor Albores observed, "If peace is truly desired in Chiapas, there are no longer any excuses, because, with this law, liberty and respect for ethnic autonomy are guaranteed, and so the dispute between the EZLN and the federal government no longer has any substantive basis." Opposition parties criticized the law as unhelpful to the peace process because it is unilateral and inconsistent with the 1996 San Andres Accords, which were signed but not implemented by the federal government.

In the Acteal massacre case, at separate hearings in July and September a total of 45 individuals, all of them indigenous, were sentenced to between 32 and 35 years in prison for their involvement in the killing of 45 people on December 22, 1997. Among those sentenced was the former mayor of Chenalho. A total of 55 persons have now received prison terms. Other cases remain pending. While this represents an unusually energetic prosecution by the government, critics continue to complain that higher-up government officials who may have responsibility for the massacre or for its cover-up have not been charged.

In the international arena, what has become a steady stream of criticism of Mexico's human rights record continued unabated. At the end of her July visit to Mexico, UN Special Rapporteur for Extra-Judicial Executions, Asma Jahangir, expressed her concern regarding the problem of impunity in cases of massacres and other political killings and the consequent likelihood that they will continue to occur: "Injustice owing to selective impunity is a political question in Mexico...It is the result of politics and a legal system that fails." Federal Attorney General Jorge Madrazo acknowledged the problem in September when he observed, "In this country a true culture of legality does not exist," adding that impunity is a reflection of the lack of respect for the rule of law.

The UN Human Rights Commission and Human Rights Watch also issued critical statements. In addition, a coalition of Mexican non-governmental organizations issued an alternative report in conjunction with the Mexican government's five-year report on progress in fulfillment of economic, social and cultural rights under the terms of the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights. In their report, the NGOs cited poverty statistics to argue that the government's free market economic policy has been a determinant factor in the deterioration of living standards throughout Mexico.

Nonetheless, during his September visit to Chiapas, European Union ambassador to Mexico, Manuel Lopez, asserted that human rights violations in Chiapas or elsewhere in Mexico would not impede the implementation of the EU/Mexico trade agreement.

Recommended Actions

1. Urge the Zedillo administration to: - order a substantial reduction of the Army presence in the conflict areas in Chiapas and insure that the Army respects the rights and freedoms of citizens as an authentic and concrete sign of a will to dialogue; - recognize and respect the efforts of human rights workers and international observers whose work offers substantial support to the peace process.
2. Urge Chiapas Governor Roberto Albores Guillén to: - cease operations in already highly conflictive areas that harass indigenous communities and opposition organizations.
3. Urge the Mexican Senate to: - approve the COCOPA legislative proposal on Indigenous Rights and Culture, placing the interests of peace above partisan politics.
4. Circulate information, such as this Report, on the situation in Chiapas.

Please write:

Lic. Ernesto Zedillo Ponce de León
Presidente de la República
Palacio Nacional
06067 México, DF - México
Fax: (int-52) (5) 271 1764 / 515 4783

Roberto Albores Guillén
Gobernador de Chiapas
Palacio de Gobierno
29009 Tuxtla Gutiérrez, Chiapas - México
Fax: (int-52) (961) 20917

El Senado de la República
Paseo de la Reforma # 10
06030 México, DF - México
Fax. (int-52) (5) 130 2292

Please send copies of letters to the Senate to:

Comisión de Concordia y Pacificación
Paseo de la Reforma # 10, piso 17
06030 México, DF - México
Fax: (int-52) (5) 140 3288

:: UPDATE

Chiapas: Unresolved Peace Issues

Incursion into the Jungle

Three months following the last military advance into the Lacandon Jungle (see SIPAZ Report, Vol. IV, No. 3), the Mexican Army increased its presence once again in that region in August. The most important events took place in Amador Hernandez, county of Ocosingo. Approximately 500 Army troops arrived via land and parachute in this community, which is 19 kilometers from where the Zapatista command is supposedly located. At the same time, students and professors from the School of Anthropology and History and from the National Autonomous University of Mexico (UNAM) were participating in a national meeting in defense of the cultural heritage convened by the Zapatista Army of National Liberation (EZLN) in the nearby community of La Realidad. Upon learning of the incursion, some of them went there in order to observe the situation.

State authorities reacted by threatening to issue arrest warrants against the students for the crimes of inciting violence, obstruction of roads, kidnapping, and attacking the Army. They also carried out a fierce campaign of disparagement and defamation against them, utilizing a broad array of regional and national mass media, accusing them, among other things, of "manipulating" the indigenous. Chiapas Governor Roberto Albores Guillen, warned that he would no longer accept the presence of national and international observers, and acts of "destabilization" would no longer be allowed. In a subsequent state government communiqué, he added that "we in Chiapas are losing patience...Enough of blackmail and manipulation...[by]...agitators [who] are taking advantage of the political conflicts and are polluting the state."

Government and military sources argued that the military presence in Amador Hernandez sought to protect the topographers who were taking measurements for the stretch of highway from San Quintin (where one of the most important military barracks in the state is found) to Amador Hernandez and onward. This community, however, does not want that highway, since it will facilitate the Army's entrance into the region.

At the same time, some 6000 military troops moved into the Lacandon Jungle in order to carry out a reforestation program, allowing them to establish new camps, checkpoints and other military works in the conflict zone.

Government officials, under national and international pressure, later softened their statements, and the Interior Ministry attempted to pacify the situation. However, military forces remain in Amador Hernandez.

On August 26, there was a confrontation between the Army and Zapatista supporters in the community of San Jose La Esperanza (county of Las Margaritas). Three indigenous were arbitrarily detained. The Ministry of National Defense announced that seven members of the Army were wounded by machete blows.

In Morelia (county of Altamirano) and in Roberto Barrios (county of Palenque) - two Zapatista Aguascalientes - tension has risen to worrisome levels. In Morelia, today a divided community, the PRI supporters took six Zapatista sympathizers prisoners, destroyed houses and dislocated the Civil Peace Camp there.

In July, the state Congress, dominated by the PRI, approved the creation of seven new counties, as well as the proposal for a state law on Indigenous Rights and Culture. The governor stated, "If peace is truly desired in Chiapas, there are no longer any excuses, because, with this law, liberty and respect for ethnic autonomy are guaranteed, and so the dispute between the EZLN and the federal government no longer has any substantive basis." The political opposition and numerous local social organizations strongly criticized these proposals, arguing that neither their content, nor their unilateral nature, would help to facilitate the peace process.

New Peace Proposal

On September 7, the federal government released a new proposal for dialogue in Chiapas. The Interior Minister, Diodoro Carrasco Altamirano, stated that he would be willing to head a negotiating commission, anytime and any place (see the Open Letter). The proposal was well received in many political and social quarters, some of whom suggested some improvements. Among the points of contention are: the repositioning of the Army, the issue of the alleged paramilitary groups (investigation and punishment), and the fact that the government continues to promote its Indigenous Rights and Culture proposal instead of implementing the 1996 legislative proposal of the congressional Commission for Agreement and Pacification (COCOPA), already accepted by the EZLN. Regarding the strong military presence in Chiapas, Carrasco stated that the issue of its repositioning would be dealt with when negotiations with the EZLN resumed. He also reported that 37 accused Zapatistas had been released, in order to demonstrate the government's good will.

Concerning the prisoners, representatives of the Mexican Bishops Conference (CEM), during their visit to Chiapas (August 11-13) and following a visit to the Cerro Hueco Jail, stated that several prisoners had apparently been unjustly incarcerated. EZLN Subcommander Marcos stated that the EZLN was not going to respond quickly to the Open Letter, as long as the government "was adding statements, corrections and postscripts to it."

Two weeks later, Jorge Madrazo Cuellar, the Attorney General of the Republic, stated that "a true culture of legality does not exist in this country," and that impunity of government officials was a consequence of the fact that there was a lack of respect for the law. While avoiding stating that they carried weapons, he recognized the existence of armed groups (15 in total) in Chiapas, saying that "it is highly probable" that they were "a consequence of religious conflicts, and in order to defend their property and interests."

International Visits and Commentaries

At the end of her visit to Mexico (July 23), the United Nations' Special Rapporteur for Extrajudicial Executions, Asma Jahangir, expressed her concern for the impunity of those responsible for massacres and executions. She also expressed her concern that such violent acts may be repeated, despite the government's desire and the measures taken to improve the situation: "Injustice owing to selective impunity is a political question in Mexico...It is the result of politics and a legal system that fails. It would appear that policies are changing in favor of justice, but the legal system changes at a slower pace than does the political will of those in the government who want to see the promotion of the rule of law." From the time the Rapporteur arrived, strong criticisms were heard from the Ministry of Foreign Relations, from the Coordinator for Dialogue (Emilio Rabasa) and from the National Human Rights Commission, accusing the Rapporteur of involving herself in affairs that did not correspond to her mandate and violating Mexican sovereignty. The concerns regarding partial, but not definitive, progress in the legal system were shared by Joel Solomon, Director of Investigations for Human Rights Watch, during his stay in Mexico.

In addition, the UN Human Rights Committee, upon examining in July the fourth report on Mexico, insisted once again that the issues of Chiapas, the administration of justice, violence against women, the growing militarization and impunity are all still a cause for "worry" and "profound concern." The Committee stated that the official delegation had not convinced the examiners, adding that the willingness to respond and the ample documentation offered by Mexico had not managed to dispel doubts nor instill confidence. The Committee recognized improvements, such as: the autonomy granted to the National Human Rights Commission (CNDH); the establishment of several programs for women and children; the program on the presumed disappeared; the release of some detained indigenous; the promulgation of the Law for Federal Public Defense and of the law for preventing and punishing torture, as well as some electoral reforms.

The Mexican government has kept up its tough talk on national sovereignty regarding human rights matters, resulting in the expulsion of 144 foreigners from Chiapas in 1998, expulsions that are continuing up to the present time. They have also continued to minimize the importance of reports by international human rights bodies. Nonetheless, it was announced at the end of August that Mexico was reviewing the process for its entrance into the Council of Europe, which includes human rights in its purview, as an extra-regional observer country. Mexico would be the fourth country with this special status (the others being the United States, Canada and Japan).

For his part, during his visit to Chiapas, the ambassador from the European Union to Mexico, Manuel Lopez Blanco, stated that human rights violations in Chiapas and in other parts of the country would not prevent the completion of a trade agreement with Mexico.

In contrast, Mexican non-governmental organizations presented an alternative report on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (DESC) arguing that neoliberal economic policies have been a determining factor in the worsening of poverty and social injustices. Every five years the Mexican government prepares a report for the UN on the fulfillment of its obligations in this arena. (To see the alternative report: www.sjsocial.org/PRODH beginning in late November. To see the government report, see the web page for the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights: www.unhcr.ch)

Update: Acteal

On July 20, a state judge sentenced 20 accused members of the group that assassinated 45 indigenous in Acteal to 35 years in prison. In the second week of September, 25 persons implicated in the massacre were also sentenced to from 32 to 35 years for the crimes of homicide, assault, and the carrying of firearms restricted to the use of the Army. Among those sentenced (all indigenous) was the former county president of Chenalho. Those who have been sentenced thus far have been convicted as individuals, not as members of an armed group, which would have increased their sentences.

These sentences bring to 55 the number of persons convicted, and legal processes are yet to be completed for another 47 persons implicated in the case. There are also 90 outstanding arrest warrants, eleven of them for former state government officials and state police.

It remains to be seen how far the investigation will pursue the intellectual authors of the massacre, who could include high government officials.

The Government's Open Letter

The new government proposal for dialogue contains the following six points:

1. It proposes that the Senate of the Republic take up again the issue of constitutional changes on indigenous rights and culture, and that it accept proposals from the EZLN, from the government itself and from other groups involved in the conflict.
2. It asks the EZLN to propose dates for the government to carry out what was agreed to at San Andres on social development in the indigenous communities of Chiapas.
3. It calls on judicial bodies for the release of EZLN members or sympathizers who have not been implicated in murders or rapes.
4. It commits itself to analyzing the denunciations of human rights organizations on the harassment being experienced by indigenous communities in Chiapas.
5. It agrees to create a new civil and nonpartisan mediation body.
6. It commits itself to sending a government negotiating commission with decision making capabilities.

:: ANALYSIS

Chiapas: Words Without Dialogue

Almost six years since the armed Zapatista uprising - and a few days from the end of the millennium - peace in Chiapas still does not appear to be on the horizon. The new federal proposal (see details in Update article elsewhere in this issue) for the renewal of dialogue between the government and the EZLN was a surprise to many, especially because of the hard-line strategy the government has been implementing in dealing with the Chiapas conflict over the last three years. This proposal represents a significant, although not sufficient, advance on the part of the government. It contributes minimally to reducing tensions in some communities and to controlling somewhat the way in which the state government is confronting the conflict. It remains to be seen if the proposal is really an attempt to break the impasse in dialogue, or if it is a maneuver for gaining time within the framework of the fast approaching national and local elections. It could even be seen as an opening by the government to the United Nations High Commissioner, Mary Robinson, in anticipation of her visit to Mexico, scheduled for November 23 to 27 this year.

This initiative, widely disseminated in the media, is a small crack of light in the dialogue process, stalled for three years now. Among the new items it contains is the invitation to the COCOPA to present its proposal on Indigenous Rights and Culture in the Senate. While this has its merits, it does not guarantee that the San Andes Accords, signed by both parties, will be honored. President Zedillo's proposal, which backs off on several points from what was agreed to at the dialogue table, remains in the wings. (For a comparison, see SIPAZ Report, Vol. III, no. 2, April 1998, or SIPAZ web page: www.sipaz.org). Some opposition senators have expressed reservations about voting on COCOPA's proposal since, in doing so, the PRI majority could prevent its passage.

By proposing that the issue of constitutional changes on indigenous rights and culture be debated in the Senate, it would appear that the Ministry of the Interior is not taking into consideration the dynamic that allowed the San Andres Accords to be achieved, where reflections and experiences were gathered from academics, researchers and, most particularly, from indigenous organizations throughout the country.

In this regard, as long as the federal government does not accept the COCOPA proposal, as the EZLN did in October of 1996, it is difficult to foresee a resolution of this issue during the remainder of the current term. President Zedillo would have to change his mind, withdrawing his own proposal and accepting the COCOPA's. Alternatively, it would have to wait until there were a new president and/or new configuration in the Senate, in which the PRI no longer held the majority. Given the imminent elections, the federal government could be counting on passing the problem along to the next administration with an unanswered proposal for dialogue, perhaps strengthening prospects for keeping the PRI in power.

The federal initiative also proposes a new civil mediation body, in response to the June 1998 dissolution of CONAI (National Mediation Commission). This body should certainly be accepted by both parties and it should also have the respect of both. It is important to mention this because, during its time, the CONAI was strongly criticized by the government, discrediting its members and its work.

Another positive aspect of the new proposal is that the Minister of the Interior himself has expressed his willingness to be the one to head the government delegation for dialogue.

This proposal, although significant and expressing a certain willingness to reactivate the peace negotiations, does not completely meet the conditions presented by the Zapatistas in September of 1996 when they left the negotiating table. It may be difficult for the Zapatistas to respond affirmatively to this proposal, since it leaves aside, or only partially touches on, some of the key issues in this troubled, and now lengthy, negotiating process.

One issue the proposal does not address - and a controversial one in the renewal of the dialogue process - is the repositioning of the Mexican Army in Chiapas. Tens of thousands of soldiers are in the communities, negatively affecting the social and psychological lives of the residents, especially of the women and children. The heavy-duty nature of the barracks construction in strategic places throughout the entire state suggests that the military will not be leaving soon and that, as they themselves have expressed: "they came to stay."

The positions on this issue are diametrically opposed. On the one hand, the Minister of the Interior has said that the Army's presence is a delicate issue that will be discussed once dialogue is reestablished. For the EZLN, however, the withdrawal of the Army from the indigenous communities is one of its conditions for renewing dialogue.

The release of some Zapatista sympathizer prisoners was read by many as a ploy by the state government, since it did not release all those it said it had, nor were all those released recognized as being EZLN supporters. (The Voice of Cerro Hueco continues to number around 100 prisoners; see Feature in SIPAZ Report IV, No. 2.) In addition, many of these prisoners have been accused of precisely those "crimes of violence" which are not included in the government proposal.

Some groups view the federal proposal as a sham, since the state government continues to implement a policy of force and belligerent discourse against the EZLN. It justifies the incursions of the state police, as well as of the Army itself, with the statement that "the majority" of the people in the communities are asking for the presence of the armed forces "for security." "They are not going to listen to the voice of just a few and prevent the people from eating and making progress," as the State Attorney General said.

In the world arena, the government's words regarding progress in the human rights situation in the country continue to be called into question. If there indeed has been progress, it has not been enough to be able to say that Mexico is today in a different situation. Several United Nations committees, as well as the Special Rapporteur for Extrajudicial Executions, Asma Jahangir, have expressed their "worry" and "profound concern" over various issues, among them Chiapas and the administration of justice. It is possible that these opinions will not change the willingness of governments to make Mexico a commercial partner. It could, however, be significant in the implementation of clauses in those agreements, calling on the Mexican government to go further in its commitment to peace, justice and human rights.

The visit of a Nobel Peace Laureate - The Psychological Wall

Mairead Corrigan Maguire, 1977 Nobel Peace Laureate from Northern Ireland, visited Chiapas September 9-12. She was invited by SIPAZ, and her visit came after she participated in the 30th anniversary celebration of the University of Monterrey. In San Cristobal de Las Casas, Maguire spoke with representatives of several organizations and traveled to Acteal to pray with Las Abejas (the Bees) and to hear of their experience. The Nobel Laureate made the following comments during a press conference given at the conclusion of her stay:

With my visit to Chiapas ... I would like to emphasize that I have not come to give lessons or solutions, but rather to humbly listen, learn and share. Although I understand the Mexican concern about international presence in general, and about those issues that have to do with human rights and social development in particular, for me, international encounters are not about trying to impose strategies or about taking away from the people the possibility of solving their own problems. They have more to do with encouraging one another, with demonstrating solidarity, with discovering, together, new and creative forms of peaceful resistance.

Looking around, speaking with the people, I have been able to realize that there are many dedicated, courageous Mexicans, with many skills, people working with all their hearts to improve their lives and those of their loved ones (family, ethnic community and society as a whole). I feel very privileged to have had the opportunity to meet these people and to learn from them.

... In my country, we have seen, and lived through, many peace plans. Two years ago, the Good Friday Accords were signed ... But the walls ... have still not disappeared. The barbed wire was taken down, and in its place flowers and plants were put close to those walls. I believe that making the walls appear to be natural, a part of the environment, could be even worse. It should not be like that. I most sincerely believe that the most difficult wall to destroy is the one we have in our minds: the wall of fear, the wall of distrust.

Some parts of the Good Friday Accords are already being implemented in Ireland; others are not yet. I believe it is partly dependent on our politicians and representatives involved. Partly on their sincerity and humility, and partly on their willingness to overcome the mutual distrust that goes back for many years. We also need to begin laying aside all weapons, in order to be able to build trust once more. Finally, it depends on the people, on their presence, on their pressure, on the transformation of their hearts and on their determination to make the process move forward, assuring that everyone works together. In a similar way, in Chiapas the primary challenge is to build and to reinforce the processes of reconciliation at all levels of society.

... from the deepest part of my being, I am convinced that injustice, pain, suffering and anger do not have to endure. If we join the forces and energies of all the people that we can from different places in the world, I passionately believe that we can achieve a change. I leave Mexico with much optimism, gratitude and hope for the future, for this country as well as for Northern Ireland.

:: FEATURE

Northern Region: A Powder Keg of Violence

"My daughter is with them ['Development, Peace and Justice,' DPJ; also known as 'Peace and Justice']. She comes to see me only in secret, in order to warn me that I'm still being threatened in the community where we came from, that I can't return or go through that community."
Displaced person from the lower Tila region. (1)

"In the beginning, the entire community was with Peace and Justice. They told us we were going to organize so that all the communities would be working together, and that they were going to send us credits for economic projects and government works. But the leaders didn't follow through. The only thing we received was problems: there have been many deaths. The leaders of that group are enjoying themselves while the people are suffering."
Former member of DPJ (La Jornada, 4/5/99)

In 1994, the Zapatista uprising brought public attention, nationally and internationally, primarily to the Canadas of the Lacandon Jungle, the base of operations of the EZLN. However, following the elections in August of 1994 and leading up to those in October of 1995, violence broke out in the northern region, making it one of the most troubled areas in the state.

Today, the northern region continues to be an area that is very rarely visited, but it is an area of high tension that suffers from recurrent outbreaks of violence. The small number of national and international observers is owing to the history of violence against them. The lack of interest in this region can be explained by its geographic, historical, political and cultural isolation.(2)) SIPAZ is one of the few organizations that visits the region, meeting with the different actors and seeking a better understanding of the complicated dynamics among them.

The Groups in Conflict

Members of the opposition identify themselves as being from the PRD (the Democratic Revolutionary Party), from Abu Xu (Arrieras Nocturnas), Catholics associated with the diocese of San Cristobal, EZLN supporters, or members of civil society, "The Organization" or "Organized Civil Society." They began organizing in the late seventies, with the Catholic Church or by themselves, in order to respond to economic disasters (such as the steep decline in world coffee prices) and to community leaders' disillusionment over the neglect and perceived contradictions in government practices (2). Following the 1994 uprising, some communities, or some parts of them, became (or were publicly identified as) Zapatista supporters.

The varied identity of the opposition can be explained by its very isolation. All of these groups are struggling for change, but given the context of war they live in, they have chosen not to clearly tie themselves with one side or another in order to avoid more harassment.

Regarding DPJ members, they say they already existed prior to 1994, "but before they were called PRI" (indicating their clear ties with the ruling party). Various statements from members of DPJ indicate that their organization, including taking up arms, began in order to defend themselves from attacks by the Zapatistas. As is explained in "Neither Rights, Nor Human," (3): "Terror and death began to reign throughout the Ch'ol region. No one worked in peace any longer. They had to dedicate all their time to political-religious activism. The movement was everything. You had to go out under the shadow of night, masked, attacking, robbing, kidnapping, and assassinating community leaders who were against you. The slogan was, 'everyone is part of the Nocturnal Ants' [Arrieras Nocturnas, the Spanish translation for the Ch'ol name, Abu Xu]."

On various occasions, the conflict in Chiapas has been presented as a religious conflict, especially in the northern region. However, as we have observed in the past, it is more accurate to see it as religious differences being used to reinforce political divisions. In some cases, the words of the religious leaders themselves have created more polarization and aggression at the grassroots level.

In 1995, as state election campaigns were underway, violence was unleashed (attacks, roadblocks, assassinations and displacements). It became apparent that the political opposition had a chance of winning, which would have been the first proof of the PRI's loss of hegemony in the region (a decline that had begun in the late 70's).

The Role of the Government and of the Army

Several human rights organizations emphatically hold that DPJ (registered in March 1995 as 'Development, Peace and Justice, A.C.') is the façade for a paramilitary organization and that its relationship with the state government is part of a strategy of low intensity warfare that includes support for groups made up of local people who sow terror in order to destroy political opposition.

In May of 1999, Congressman Gilberto Lopez y Rivas (PRD) presented a complaint to the federal Ministry of Justice concerning the existence of paramilitary groups in Chiapas, including documents to back up his statements. The Fourth Report by the PRD Parliamentary Group(4), refers to "the application of a counter-guerrilla military tactic known as 'anvil and hammer,' that involves the Army and police forces adopting the role of containment (anvil), and allowing paramilitary groups to carry out the attack role (hammer) against the EZLN and its sympathizers." It also explains that "the primary goal is to avoid for the Armed Forces the disrepute of carrying out an unequal war."

Pedro, a former DPJ leader in the community of Cruz Palenque, states that "the paramilitaries are watching over the roads, collecting taxes, ambushing, stealing the property of opposition peasants, threatening and killing those who don't support them...There are paramilitaries who are working as Public Security [state police] officers and patrolling communities in the region. They receive training in military camps in the area." (La Jornada, 4/5/99)

There are thousands of witnesses to the presence of the Mexican Army and state police standing alongside of DPJ, in the displacements of 1996. The dislocated people even saved gun cartridges from weapons that are for the exclusive use of the Army. Despite these factors, officials have always denied the existence of paramilitary groups. According to them, it is just "armed civilian groups whose purpose is self-defense."

As a result of the 1995 elections (in which there was fraud and an abstention rate of 63%), many DPJ leaders were elected as public officials. This seemed to legitimize their control over the region. Samuel Sanchez Sanchez, one of the founders, was elected to the state congress, and several leaders ended up on the Tila County Council.

Two days prior to the 1997 elections, the state government, through its Interior Ministry, signed an agreement for economic development with DPJ for a total of 4,600,000 pesos (US$580,000 at that time). This agreement was signed by representatives of the state government and, as an 'honor witness,' by the Commander of the VII Military Region, Mario Renan Castillo. The PRD's Fourth Report states: "Renan Castillo was trained by the United States Army at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, one of the main counterinsurgency schools. Hence, one of his primary tasks was applying in Chiapas what he had learned in matters of counterinsurgency warfare..." (4)

Current Situation

It is quite difficult to obtain exact figures on the violence in the northern region. Estimates of the number of killings varies from dozens to hundreds. DPJ has been accused of having committed the great majority of these violent acts. Members of opposition organizations commented to us that on some occasions they have responded with ambushes to the attacks, roadblocks, killings and displacements perpetrated by DPJ. On the other hand, those from DPJ present themselves as victims. In "Neither Rights, Nor Human" they mention that, between 1995 and 1997, there were 89 assassinations, with 66 of the victims from DPJ. (3)

The testimony from the former radio operator for DPJ is chilling: "Here there is neither peace nor justice, we have only killed among brothers, all because of the government and of the Peace and Justice leaders, who take advantage of the people for their own benefit... They are robbing and killing, no one stops them; no one is controlling them any more, not even their own leaders." (La Jornada, 4/5/99)

Since the middle of 1997, violence has diminished substantially, although some violent incidents have occurred: assassinations, shoot-outs, roadblocks, incursions by the Army. One explanation of this could be that DPJ managed to achieve control over the region. The fear sown between 1995 and 1996 was enough to prevent opposition persons and observers from traveling about freely. Rumors have been one of the most widely used mechanisms for fanning the fear. The consequences of these rumors have been greater polarization among the peoples and the prevention, in many cases, of possible rapprochement.

Questioned concerning the latest assassinations in the region, Diego Vazquez, a founding member of DPJ, responded: "If people from DPJ were involved, they should be punished, because they shouldn't go on as before. Here in Limar, those from the PRD and DPJ are planting together. There is a bit of coexistence now. We shouldn't be fighting anymore." (1)This kind of surprising statements create a certain confusion.

The Critical Situation of the Displaced

One of the most visible and dramatic consequences of the violence unleashed in the region is the more than 4000 displaced, most of whom belong to the opposition. (1) DPJ speaks of "self-displacements," suggesting that opposition members do it intentionally, in order to create more confusion.

Many of the displaced feel that conditions for their return do not exist. They are living on lands lent to them by other peasants, barely providing them with enough to eat. One displaced person from Ojo de Aguas commented to us: "Since lands are scarce, no one wants the displaced. I believe it's because they are not suffering. Because of that, they have no idea...They don't understand what a displaced person suffers...We don't know where to go, or what to do...I just think and think all night long. And I'm getting myself sick from thinking so much." (1)

Those who returned between 1996 and 1997 have more security as to their harvests. Nonetheless, they are not without problems. They are often pressured by those in DPJ to join their organization, to abandon the Catholic religion, or to report on their meetings, and they must ask permission in order to leave the community. (5)

One of these returned persons commented to us: "On July 18, 1996, they carried out an operation, the Army and the police, along with DPJ. They shot up the church, they broke the images, they looted houses and stole our animals. We went to the mountains to hide. Many people died. One of my little boys died, he got sick and we couldn't take him to the doctor out of fear of ambushes by Peace and Justice. On October 10, 1996 we managed to return. But we have no guarantees for our lives." (1)

Another critical point is the demand presented by delegates of 18 opposition communities of the lower region of Tila, demanding indemnification from the state government for the losses of stolen cattle, destroyed houses, lost harvest, etc., that occurred in previous years during attacks by DPJ where state police were present. They have still not received a response. The government argues that it cannot pay because it was not responsible. On the other hand, they are being offered programs. But, according to Manuel from Jolnixtie: "We don't want their programs, we want justice. We want them to return to us what they have stolen, whether in money or in animals. Or could it be that the police and the Army aren't from the government?" (1)

Reconciliation and Challenges

Despite all the foregoing, there are encouraging signs of rapprochement. In the community of Emiliano Zapata, county of Tila, despite the divisions (40 families from DPJ and 25 from the opposition), they managed to avoid displacements. One of their representatives commented to us that those from DPJ wanted to make them join their ranks. "We dialogued with them, and got them to respect us. We made an agreement with them, right from the beginning, so that those from DPJ in other communities will respect us as well. It was very difficult to reach the agreement, but after three months of talks, we managed to reach an agreement with the ejidal (communal lands) commissioner." (1)

On February 27, 1999, fourteen displaced families returned to Cruz Palenque, where they were welcomed by 20 of the 26 families from DPJ who had remained in the community. The former leader of DPJ had repented, and he had sought out the Inter-institutional Regional Coordinator (of the state government) in order to begin negotiations. Six families from this community, however, are still with DPJ, and tensions continue. There have been conflicts concerning the community radio, which is in the hands of DPJ, and over the death of a dog, killed by the son of DPJ leader. According to the son, it was in self-defense. According to Pedro (his uncle and the dog's owner, who no longer belongs to DPJ), the killing was intentional. A meeting was called with the County President, the Inter-institutional Regional Coordinator and DPJ leaders. Up to this moment, the problem still has not been resolved. The meeting has not yet been held because of the failure of the County President and government representatives to follow through. This example of disagreement might appear insignificant, but it is symptomatic of the polarization, the precariousness and the explosive nature of the situation in this and in other communities.

A new factor in the dilemma: The internal divisions in DPJ

Over the last few months, alleged internal divisions in the DPJ organization have begun coming to public light. The dissidents (under the leadership of Cristobal Gomez Torres and Diego Vazquez) are accusing former leaders Samuel Sanchez, Marcos Albino and Raymundo Trujillo of having stolen more than four million pesos (US$430,000) the organization had received for economic programs. Over the course of more than four years, no results had been seen from these funds.

In the face of these divisions, the state government has demonstrated extreme diligence in attending meetings of rapprochement between the two sides. This availability for DPJ is in contrast with the government absence in the meetings to resolve conflicts in Cruz Palenque, as we have already mentioned.

As detailed elsewhere in this report, the federal government is calling on the EZLN to return to the dialogue table. This initiative could mean a new effort for détente in the northern region, which the EZLN included as one of its conditions for renewing peace talks.

According to some analysts, another explanation of the government's attitude in the region is that the government has an interest in supporting DPJ in order to prevent a new deterioration of the situation or an opposition victory in the next elections.

Waiting for the Elections

The relative decline of violence in the northern region over the last two years (in comparison with 1995 and 1996) is certainly encouraging. Nonetheless, it is in large part owing to the fact that terror has already been well-established. Down deep, the situation has not changed. Mistrust, polarization and violence always on the point of exploding continue to prevail. It will take time to overcome the fear of the "other" and end talk such as "we don't speak with them anymore, and we're not going to speak, because we don't know what is in their hearts anymore."

As long as this situation does not change, the northern region could once again become the scene of a type of war that, even if not open, nonetheless results in killing after killing and does not end. In this context, reporting on what is going on in the region can help to break the cycle of fear and prejudice.

From both sides, we hear: "We are tired. We don't want any more violence. We want to work, we just want to work..." But what do the leaders really want? And how much might they be serving other interests? Whom do these divisions serve?

Sadly, the conclusion of the SIPAZ April 1997 report still obtains: "On the other hand, the launching of the electoral campaign and the proximity of the elections...present a new threat and a new challenge for the political actors in the north: a repetition of the experiences of 1994 and 1995, that almost led the Ch'ols to civil war, or taking on the legitimate and respectful political struggle of the different electoral options. The state and federal governments will have a great responsibility in the direction events take here..."

(1) SIPAZ interviews in the lower region of Tila between March and August of 1999.(Return.)

(2) SIPAZ Report, April 1997, Vol. II, No. 2 (Return)

(3) "Neither Rights, Nor Human in the Northern Region of Chiapas: The Other Truth of Events in the Ch'ol Region, as a Response to the Version Disseminated by the Fray Bartolomé de Las Casas Human Rights Center - January 1994 to September 1997," Development, Peace and Justice. November 1997.(Return)

(4) "Fourth Report on the Mexican Armed Forces," Parliamentary Group of the Democratic Revolutionary Party, LVII Legislature of the Congress of the Union, April 30, 1999. Presented by Federal Deputy Gilberto Lopez y Rivas in his role as Acting President of the COCOPA, to the Ministry of Justice of the Republic. (Return)

(5) "Displaced Population of Chiapas," Onécimo Hidalgo and Gustavo Castro, of the Center for Economic and Political Research of Community Action (CIEPAC), July 1999. (Return)

Document consulted: "Neither Peace Nor Justice, A General and Broad Report on the Civil War Suffered by the Ch'ols of the Northern Region of Chiapas - December 1994 to October 1996," 'Fray Bartolomé de Las Casas' Human Rights Center," October 1996.

:: ACTIVITIES THE SIPAZ TEAM IN CHIAPAS

August - October 1999

Between August and October 1999, team activities included the following, among others:

Visits and Contacts:

• Several visits to the northern region (communities in the county of Tila) in order to talk with peasants, returned displaced persons, representatives from various churches and social organizations, leaders of Development, Peace and Justice and local officials.
• Visits to communities in the highlands in order to speak with religious persons.
• Visit to Mexico City for meetings with NGOs and diplomatic representatives.

Information:

• Preparation and dissemination of an Urgent Action on the military incursion in Amador Hernandez, county of Ocosingo.
• Meetings with religious leaders (Evangelical and Catholic) in order to prepare a document on the religious situation in Chiapas.
• Organization of program and accompaniment for two delegations: Fellowship of Reconciliation and Witness for Peace/SOA Watch/EPICA of the US.
• Organization of program and accompaniment for the Nobel Peace Prize laureate from Ireland, Mairead Maguire.
• Co-organization of program for the Inter-religious Conference in San Cristobal and Acteal.
• Organization and facilitation of an exchange on international accompaniment and human rights observation with Mexican and international NGOs.

Education:

• Facilitation of three workshops on Alternative Conflict Resolution (ACR) in Yajalon for members of civil society organizations.
• Facilitation of an 'ACR' workshop with coffee growers in Simojovel.
• Facilitation with Richard Rutschman of "Playing for Peace" workshop with NGOs and children in San Cristobal.