:: SUMMARY

The EZLN (Zapatista Army of National Liberation) continued its political initiatives in recent months in an effort to maintain the issue of indigenous rights on the national political agenda and to defend its position as a political force with which to be reckoned. It convened two gatherings in Chiapas to build on the momentum from the March national referendum on indigenous rights and to strengthen ties with organizations elsewhere in Mexico.

For its part, the Mexican government used political and military strategies to weaken the Zapatistas. In early June, a year after the violent dismantling of four Zapatista autonomous counties, police and military forces occupied ten communities in the Cañadas region of the Lacandon Jungle. Between 100 and 1000 police and soldiers participated in each of the operations. Reasons given by the authorities for the incursions included enforcement of the Firearms and Explosives Law, the fight against drug trafficking, the arrest of criminals, to ensure the delivery of government aid, and protection of residents who had requested it. The very variety of justifications, combined with the sudden burst of incursions, suggest less explicit political/military objectives.

The Mexican government continues to insist on its inexhaustible patience in seeking a peaceful solution to the Chiapas conflict. Yet periodically it has undertaken police/military operations that serve to physically slam Zapatista communities, undermine opposition organizing efforts, and serve as examples of what Zapatistas and their allies may expect.

The results of the recent incursions, like earlier actions, included arrests, mistreatment, the displacement of 50 families who fled in fear, the destruction of household goods by the occupying forces, and new Army posts in and around the communities. In recent months there have also been numerous reports of a more aggressive attitude at military, police and immigration checkpoints in the highlands and jungle regions.

The operations in June coincided with the installation of the new Interior Minister, Diodoro Carrasco. (He replaced Francisco Labastida who quit to seek the presidential nomination of the ruling PRI in next year's elections.) Whether intended as such or not, the police/military operations served notice that Carrasco's selection does not indicate a shift in government policy. Carrasco did meet with COCOPA (the congressional commission named to support the peace process). It was the first Interior Ministry-COCOPA meeting in ten months, but it did not appear to break any new ground.

Highly publicized events continued in which purported Zapatistas turned in weapons in exchange for government economic aid. For its part, the EZLN denounced these events as a farce. Some of those involved later acknowledged that they had participated in a masquerade in exchange for financial assistance.

These questionable desertions and the police/military operations discussed above appear to be part of a comprehensive government strategy to render the EZLN politically irrelevant and to declare a unilateral peace. Other components include earlier state-level legislative initiatives on indigenous rights and culture, disarmament/amnesty, and redistricting. In addition, the federal government recently announced an (US)$11 million project, including a World Bank loan, to benefit 3000 farmers in 116 communities in the Cañadas region, a key base of Zapatista support. Government assistance is highly controversial in areas of Zapatista support. Whatever else the project may accomplish, it is likely to result in increased discord within the communities.

In the ongoing investigation of the December 1997 Acteal massacre, sentence was pronounced on an ex-soldier accused of training the paramilitary group responsible for the killings. However, as in the case of ten state police before him, he was convicted only of carrying weapons restricted to use by the military. He was sentenced to two years in prison, with the possibility of release upon payment of a fine. The Army had acknowledged that he was a soldier, but asserted that he had been on vacation at the time he was involved with the paramilitary group. He affirmed this version, but later stated that he had been told to do so. On July 19, 20 indigenous detainees were found guilty of murder, felony assault, and carrying weapons without a license and restricted to the use of the Army. They were sentenced to 35 years.

In April, COCOPA President (and PRD Congressman) Gilberto Lopez y Rivas claimed to have evidence that numerous training camps for paramilitaries were being established in Chiapas, financed by the federal and state governments. In response to the furious criticism that his assertions provoked, he presented the evidence to the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic (PGR) and called for a thorough investigation.

In July, four opposition parties plus Senator Pablo Salazar, who recently resigned from the PRI, signed an agreement to field a single candidate in the 2000 elections for governor of Chiapas. The new coalition represents a potentially formidable challenge to the historic domination of the PRI in Chiapas politics.

The government National Human Rights Commission (CNDH) denounced the continued practice of torture in Mexico, citing the PGR and the Department of National Defense (SEDENA) as the targets of most complaints. For the first time in its history, the CNDH also gave figures on complaints made against SEDENA, reporting that it had received 1679 complaints, mostly from civilians who claimed they were victimized by military personnel.

At the international level, criticism of Mexico's human rights record and handling of the Chiapas conflict included a report from Amnesty International, a finding by an asylum judge in the US that Mexico "has killed innocent civilians and engaged in repressive military action" in Chiapas, and a statement by the US Senate that, "The militarization of [Chiapas], including the violence perpetrated by pro-government paramilitary groups, has resulted in civilian casualties and has forced thousands to flee their homes."

With presidential elections a year away, Mexico is already moving into the campaign period. The result is less interest in the Chiapas conflict. This would appear to suit the government, since debate about Chiapas underscores the lack of resolution there. Hence, rather than seek its resolution, we may expect the Zedillo government to seek to administer the conflict between now and the elections: reiterate its commitment to dialogue, continue its low intensity warfare strategy to sap or at least contain Zapatista support, and undertake social programs aimed at strengthening its electoral base. Presumably the EZLN will continue to defend its political space as best it can, but it shows no sign of willingness to return to talks as long as its pre-conditions are not met. Thus the near-term prospects for progress are bleak, and the explosive potential of the conflict remains.

Acciones recomendadas

1. Urge COCOPA to take advantage of citizen support for its legislative proposal on indigenous rights and culture by finding a way to present it to the federal Congress, placing the interests of peace above partisan politics.
2. Urge the Zedillo administration to:
   • disarm the paramilitary groups that operate in Chiapas;
   • order a substantial reduction of the Army presence in the conflict areas in Chiapas as an authentic and concrete sign of its will to dialogue;
   • recognize and respect the efforts of human rights workers and international observers whose work offers substantial support to the peace process.
3. Circulate information, such as this Report, on the situation in Chiapas.

Please write:

Lic. Ernesto Zedillo Ponce de León
Presidente de la República
Palacio Nacional
06067 México, DF - México
Fax: (int-52) (5) 271 1764 / 515 4783

Roberto Albores Guillén
Governador de Chiapas
Fax: (int-52) (961) 20917

Comisión de Concordia y Pacificación
Paseo de la Reforma # 10, piso 17
06018 México, DF - México
Fax: (int-52) (5) 140 3288

:: UPDATE

CHIAPAS: A New Wave of Harassment

During his fourth trip to Chiapas this year, President Zedillo stated,

"The government would never act with violence or repression against those who dissent. The government wants dialogue, it wants negotiation...Fortunately, there is no persecution of any kind in Mexico...That is why it makes us very unhappy, and should be of concern to everyone, that there are divisions and confrontations in some communities in Chiapas, especially indigenous communities. It is very sad that divisions and confrontations between brothers continue to occur because of political, ethnic or religious intolerance."
(La Jornada, May 18).

These words were seconded by Emilio Rabasa, the government coordinator for Dialogue and Reconciliation (recently resigned), when he stressed that

"the [government] strategy after a year and five months [since the Acteal massacre] has resulted in a climate of détente, of stabilization [in Chiapas]...Social harmony and peaceful coexistence have been encouraged."
(La Jornada, May 30)

At the end of May, Diodoro Carrasco Altamirano replaced Francisco Labastida Ochoa as Interior Minister when the latter resigned to devote himself completely to his campaign for the presidential nomination of the PRI (ruling Institutional Revolutionary Party). In early July, this change brought about a meeting between members of COCOPA (congressional Commission for Agreement and Pacification) and the Interior Ministry, after ten months without contact. Congressman Gilberto Lopez y Rivas, of the PRD (Democratic Revolutionary Party), asked the Minister if the federal government would be willing to present a new proposal on the indigenous rights and culture initiative or to withdraw theirs. Declining to make any commitments, the Minister responded that he "was going to consider it."

While these gestures reaffirm the good will of the political leaders, the reality in Chiapas does not appear to coincide with the rhetoric. Days after the COCOPA meeting, during the first week of June, a significant increase in military and police incursions into Zapatista communities was initiated. There were arbitrary detentions of purported Zapatistas, harassment by the military at checkpoints, as well as the establishment of new military camps. Between one hundred and one thousand soldiers and police participated in each of the incursions. The reasons given by state and federal officials for the operations were the enforcement of the Firearms and Explosives Law, the fight against drug trafficking, to insure that government aid was delivered, the arrest of criminals, and the protection of residents who had requested it.

There were incursions in ten communities in the Cañadas of Ocosingo, such as La Trinidad and Nazareth. The incursions brought fear to the population of these communities, and, as a consequence, around 50 Zapatista sympathizer families from Nazareth fled their homes and took refuge in a nearby community, where they remain. At the end of June, during a visit by SIPAZ to the region, the displaced from Nazareth asserted: "Arrest warrants have been issued against us for fabricated crimes. That's why we cannot return. Some of our children stayed, and the PRI supporters won't let us go in to give them food."

During the operations in El Censo and Pavorreal (also in Ocosingo), soldiers and police detained some alleged Zapatistas, accused of common crimes. The residents testified to the destruction of houses and of household goods and to physical mistreatment. According to authorities from Zapatista communities, at the time of this writing, army patrols are continuing and soldiers are aggressively interrogating the residents.

In recent months a more aggressive attitude has been noted at the military, police and immigration checkpoints. On several occasions, NGO (non-governmental organization) workers were intimidated or denied freedom of movement. Similarly, the military has been carrying out police duties (making arrests) and immigration duties (interrogating foreigners about their activities and immigration status), while immigration officials have been asking 'military intelligence' questions (asking about Zapatista contacts).

Economic Aid

During the months of April, May and June, government publicity campaigns continued concerning the turning in of arms by purported Zapatistas in exchange for government economic aid. The EZLN (Zapatista Army of National Liberation) and some local and regional social organizations have characterized these events as "a farce and theater."

At the federal level, the government set in motion an unprecedented program that projects a wide government presence in 116 communities of the Cañadas of Ocosingo, Las Margaritas and Altamirano. It will have a budget of close to 109 million pesos (approximately 11 million dollars) that will theoretically benefit more than 3000 growers. Funds for the program include a loan from the World Bank. In view of implacable Zapatista opposition to allowing government programs in communities under their influence, Chiapas state Attorney General Eduardo Montoya Lievano recently declared, "The government will guarantee that aid will reach the communities, and, if it is necessary to use public force for that, then it will do so." Thus it is feared that the new program will serve to intensify social conflict in the area. Such fears are heightened by the fact that the primary consultant is Alternative Advisory Consultants, an organization directed by Diana Orive. Her brother, Adolfo Orive, is a hard-liner who was a key architect of the Zedillo administration's Chiapas policy.

Acteal

On May 20, Mario Perez Ruiz, a former soldier who had been accused of training the group that perpetrated the Acteal killings, was sentenced. However, he was only found guilty of carrying weapons restricted to use by the Army, and he received two years in prison with the possibility of release upon payment of a fine. When Perez Ruiz was detained, the Army admitted he was a soldier, but said he had been on leave during the period that the Acteal massacre took place. Perez Ruiz confirmed this account, but later he was quoted as saying that he had been told to do so.

Ten Public Security (state police) had previously been sentenced in the Acteal case. While they stood accused of having failed to stop the massacre, they too were only convicted of carrying weapons restricted to the use of the Army.

On July 19, 20 indigenous detainees were found guilty of murder, felony assault, and carrying weapons without a license and restricted to the use of the Army. They were sentenced to 35 years.

Other advances include the detention of Victorio Arias Perez, one of the alleged leaders of the paramilitaries involved in the Acteal killings, and the execution of three more arrest warrants.

In addition, Amnesty International asked the United States government to investigate Julio Cesar Ruiz Ferro (who was governor of Chiapas when the Acteal massacre took place, and who is now working at the Mexican Embassy in the US), in order to determine whether or not he had any responsibility for the massacre. The request was rejected by the Mexican Under-secretary for North America and Europe, Juan Rebolledo Gout, with the argument that: "There are no nations in the world who are exempt from human rights violations."

The CNDH

The government National Human Rights Commission (CNDH) observed that the "degrading" practice of torture still continues in Mexico. According to its information, 21 cases were recorded in 1998. The Office of the Attorney General (PGR) and the Department of National Defense (SEDENA) were cited as the departments with the most public servants who were accused of responsibility for such incidents.

For the first time in its history, the Commission also gave figures on complaints made against SEDENA. It said it had received 1679 complaints against SEDENA, the majority from civilians, and less than 400 from military personnel in the exercise of their work or from deserters. The CNDH also proposed legislative reforms in order to resolve confusion regarding whether the military or the civilian courts are the most appropriate authority for dealing with abuses committed by military persons against civilians. The Miguel Agustin Pro Juarez Human Rights Center commented that under no circumstances can the Military Justice Code be considered above the Constitution (whose Article 13 notes that matters in which the rights of civilians are violated should be taken to the civil authorities). The Pro Juarez Center also maintained that the military is not above international human rights conventions signed by the Mexican government and ratified by the Senate of the Republic. For these reasons, it argued, legislative reform is unnecessary.

At the beginning of June, the CNDH itself experienced a legislative change with the approval of reforms to Article 102 of the Constitution, where it was granted full autonomy from the federal Executive. The Senate of the Republic will now name the president of the CNDH. What was not approved was the broadening of the CNDH's powers in order to allow it to work with labor and electoral issues.

Other Developments

In April 1999, during his term as President of COCOPA, federal PRD Congressman Gilberto Lopez y Rivas announced that the PRD wing in the Chamber of Deputies had information to the effect that numerous training camps for paramilitaries were being established in Chiapas, financed by the federal and state governments. Two prominent Chiapas members of the PRI responded by calling for Lopez y Rivas' resignation from COCOPA for distorting the Chiapas reality and the duties of COCOPA. In the face of such criticism, Lopez y Rivas presented the evidence he had collected on paramilitary groups to the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic (PGR) and demanded a thorough investigation.

During the second meeting between representatives of civil society and the EZLN (May 8 and 9), the EZLN invited the national, state, regional and county coordinating groups of the national Zapatista referendum (held last March) to become contact bodies between the EZLN and civil society. This resulted in a subsequent state forum of civil society (June 20), in which more than 70 Mexican social organizations participated in order to plan follow-up efforts on the Zapatista referendum.

In July, four opposition parties plus Senator Pablo Salazar, who recently resigned from the PRI, signed an agreement to field a single candidate in the 2000 elections for governor of Chiapas. The new coalition, called the Movement of Hope, includes the National Action Party (PAN), the Democratic Revolutionary Party (PRD), the Green Ecology Party of Mexico (PVEM) and the Labor Party (PT). While the agreement does not stipulate who would be the candidate, Salazar has expressed his desire to run. Even as a PRI senator, he has been highly critical of government policy regarding the Chiapas conflict. The new coalition represents a potentially formidable challenge to the historic domination of the PRI in Chiapas politics.

In the report it presented to a meeting of the Latin American Bishops Conference, the Mexican Bishops Conference said that the Mexican government has utilized two strategies in the Chiapas conflict: wearing down the EZLN and marginalizing the Diocese of San Cristobal and its Bishops, Samuel Ruiz and Raul Vera. They added that the stalemate in the negotiations is owing to intolerance on both sides and the failure to carry out the San Andres Accords.

International Concern

In its 1998 Annual Report, Amnesty International confirmed that it continues to receive denunciations on human rights violations committed by the Federal Army and paramilitary groups tied to the Mexican government. They added that some of the most frequent violations involve political prisoners, harassment of leaders of non-governmental organizations and the expulsion of foreign observers.

Asylum was granted in the United States to former Mexican Army Captain Jesus Valles who had fled to the US in 1994. Basing her decision on human rights reports and expert testimony, the judge wrote, "There is reason to believe the Mexican government has killed innocent civilians and engaged in repressive military action" in Chiapas, and that Valles has "a well-founded fear of persecution" because of his "refusal to obey orders to kill captured EZLN rebels and engage in such repressive action."

On July 1, the US Senate approved a foreign aid bill that included language expressing strong concern about the unresolved conflict in Chiapas. "The militarization of the region, including the violence perpetrated by pro-government paramilitary groups, has resulted in civilian casualties and has forced thousands to flee their homes." Noting the lack of progress toward a resolution, the Senate statement urges the Mexican government to fix a date for the visit of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights and "to take steps to create conditions conducive to a political dialogue."

:: FEATURE

The Return of the Heart:

Justice and Community Reconciliation in the Indigenous Tradition

"[The State] will promote the recognition within Mexican statute law of the authorities, regulations and procedures related to internal conflict resolution of the indigenous peoples and communities, so that the law shall be applied on the basis of their internal regulatory systems, and, through simple procedures, their proceedings and decisions shall be recognized by the jurisdictional authorities of the State."
(Excerpt from "Commitments of the Federal Government with the Indigenous Peoples," part of the San Andres Accords signed in February 1996 with the Zapatista Army of National Liberation/ EZLN)

Much has been written about Chiapas since the armed uprising of January 1994. Little, however, is known about the daily life of the indigenous communities, of their methods for confronting the "problems" (the word they use for conflicts, retaining it in Spanish when speaking in their own languages). The question is not even addressed in the media or in much of what has been written on the issue. It is taken as a given that solutions to conflicts that arise across the region must necessarily come from "outside." If one observes more closely, however, one comes to understand that there may be much to learn from those whom some consider to be ignorant.

Authorities at the Service of the People

Political and religious hierarchies play a key role in managing conflicts in the indigenous communities of Chiapas. Antonio Pauli, a sociologist who has worked in Chiapas for many years, points out that, in Tzeltal (one of the main indigenous languages in the state), the word 'authority' means 'he who has a task.' The meaning, therefore, is different from the practice of western society. The indigenous understand authority as a service to the community. No one is even paid to do it, rather they have to "pay" with their work.

Pauli adds: "More than anyone else, the authorities should be working in the smallest jobs in such a way that they make 'their hearts small.' The one who 'thinks much of himself,' the one who shows off, does not have truth in his heart. This is a principle, a basic value for the indigenous: humility."

Although it is not present in all the communities, another factor that could be surprising for outsiders is that, in the filling of 'positions,' the most competent, or those noted for their capacity for leadership, are not necessarily going to be the ones chosen. It is often more likely to be people on the fringes who appear to distance themselves from traditional customs. Assuming the role of a community authority is seen as a good way of learning and socialization in order for these persons to become 'bats'il winik' ('true men', a concept that exists in the main indigenous languages of Chiapas).

The authorities do not have as much time for working in their fields (the lands where they cultivate maize and beans), and some of them must take care of the expenses for the community's fiestas. In order to carry out the responsibilities of their positions, it therefore becomes necessary for their families to be economically supportive, which strengthens relationships. Family unity is essential in order to avoid conflicts or to confront them when they do occur.

The community dimension is omnipresent. In Tzeltal, the very idea of 'sin' means to 'break a social compact.' For example, it is not a sin to use alcohol, but it is a sin to create a problem in the community by going around drunk.

Dialogue is favored, and the majority of decisions are reached by consensus. What is important is that everyone speaks and says their piece, what they think. This can be surprising for the 'kaxlan' (non-indigenous person) who attends a community assembly for the first time: each indigenous person could be speaking for twelve to fifteen minutes, and even more than one person at the same time. The person who is quiet is so because he is not in agreement, and he must be pressured to express his disagreement, although never directly. This tendency is also seen in the workshops we give as SIPAZ, or in those in which we participate in the communities, when several persons begin repeating more or less the same thing. The point for them is to assure each other that the idea is shared by everyone.

Mediation and Conflict Resolution

A human rights promoter in the Agua Azul region explained to Pauli the process of serving as mediator: "When everyone is sitting down, I ask them not to speak in that tone of voice [shouting] any longer. They almost always begin to become more reasonable. You can gauge the anger a bit by the tone of voice, by the decibel level."

A leader of one of the main social organizations in the Cañadas region says: "As soon as we have a fight, what do we do?...We have to look at the causes. If the problem is very serious, and if it continues to get worse, we have to find someone else, another compañero who knows how to lower the tone of the dispute."

In Tzeltal, the word for 'mediator' means 'to be in the middle.' The testimony of the same leader makes us aware of a profound experience and reflection on the issue of 'impartiality': "You have to see the great person, the good man, the good being in both parties. If your heart hurts, you cannot be the mediator....If you hurt as part of the community, it is one thing. But if your heart aches for one of them, no. That is why you cannot seek the father or the brother. The mediator always has to be from a family different from the two parties. That is why you need many authorities from which to choose the most suitable person. Or, rather, there is not an 'official' mediator. You have to look for the right mediator from among all the authorities."

The conclusion of his statement emphasizes some values that are basic for mediation: "It is very important to tolerate, tolerate, tolerate. Because they are going to want to attack you, they are going to want to get you on their side, they are going to want to win you over so that you are with one or the other."

The "Return of the Heart": The Incorporation of Changes and Reconciliation

In a workshop by the Peace Education Collective (CEPAZ) near Altamirano, the participants defined reconciliation in these terms: "To reach agreement on a problem in order to resolve it," "to live in peace, not causing problems," "to ask forgiveness, pardon of the one you're having a fight with before going to the community."

The idea of forgiveness requires more explanation, since their understanding is different from western understanding. In Tzeltal, they speak of the "return of the heart." The aggressor asks his victim to "return his heart," which reveals a profound concept of reconciliation as the rebuilding of relationships. It should be noted that this action is undertaken in a community context.

Forgiveness, however, is not forgetting. One example of this is the case of Las Abejas (the 45 victims of the Acteal massacre of December 1997 belonged to this group). Following the massacre, they publicly forgave the murderers, but that did not prevent them from seeking justice.

Indigenous Justice: Reparation More than Punishment

One characteristic of indigenous resistance has been its ability to fluctuate between custom and modernity, exclusion and integration. On the other hand, regarding justice, the western legal system is conceived in a fairly rigid manner. The procedures seek to establish whether or not the accused is guilty and the possible sentences, which are already written down in the penal code. For the indigenous, however, the key to justice is reaching agreement. Generally speaking, the "enforcement of the law" is not above the will or the desires of the people. A satisfactory solution must prevent future conflicts. In effect, if one of the persons involved is not satisfied with the agreement, it is likely that there will be reprisals and an endless spiral of revenge, instead of reconciliation.

At a workshop in Chilon facilitated by CEDIAC (Center for Indigenous Rights; see "An Outbreak of Hope," elsewhere in this issue), the group of traditional judges performed a socio-drama concerning a fairly common problem in the communities: a fight between a drunk and the brother of a girl the drunk had tried to seduce. They noted: "Public Ministry [the constitutional legal authority] did not look for the root of the problems. In the socio-drama, the problem is not because of the woman, but rather because of the person who sold the alcohol in the first place. Public Ministry did not ask who started the problem, and they saw nothing other than its consequences. That is not how a good agreement is reached."

As for the idea of punishment, there is, similarly, not an individual perspective, but rather a more global and comprehensive one. In the same workshop on reconciliation, an indigenous human rights promoter in the municipality of Altamirano commented on the Mexican legal system: "It is not good justice. When someone is killed, the government takes the person to jail. The rights of the family are not recognized. But everyone is suffering: the one who was killed, the one who killed, the families of both. Measures must be taken for the families, agreements must be sought, so that the community is not disrupted." Another promoter in another region added: "Seeking justice is looking for the way for us to remain as brothers and to stop thinking of ourselves as enemies."

More than punishment, it is important to 'make amends' for the damage done. To return to the example of a murder, the idea of reparation would mean that the murderer should take responsibility for the subsistence of the victim's family. It should be noted that, at the present time, the federal penal system prevails in those cases.

Breakup of Unity, Crisis of Authority

In spite of their richness, traditional methods of indigenous conflict resolution do not appear to be sufficient for responding to the current social order in Chiapas. In circumstances of widespread violence, it becomes difficult to find paths of reconciliation. Also, secondary conflicts, even those that appear minor, are worsened because of the polarization generated by the "macro" conflict between the EZLN and the federal government. Divisions, a high level of tension among the different groups (whatever their nature, whether political or religious), violent incidents, deterioration of the social fabric: this is the reality in Chiapas since 1994.

The heartrending statement by a 60-year-old displaced person from Las Abejas, who lives in a refugee camp close to Chenalho, vividly illustrates the situation we are trying to communicate here: "My son is one of them, of the paramilitaries. He is 28. I don't know what is in his heart. He came twice to kill us. He said to me: 'Papa, we are with the PRI (ruling party). We don't want the Zapatistas or the civiles [a term used to refer to Las Abejas, a civil society organization]. They only come to cause problems.' And I said to him: 'But son, the civiles don't do anything. They don't steal or cause problems.' But he didn't want to listen. One night he came and said to me: "Papa, I burned my hand, my hand is hot. But I still have to kill. I want to kill more.' Yes, he participated in the Acteal massacre. They didn't take him prisoner. I don't know where he is. He's out there, he's free. So it is. I don't know what is in his heart. I don't know."

In this context of extreme divisions, traditional methods are seen to be insufficient, given that everyone does not recognize the same authorities in order to present their grievances. These authorities lose strength when they belong to, or are identified with, one or another political group. They do not have the same power to call the parties together, even though a meeting is the first step in any process of conflict resolution.

For example, in areas where the Zapatistas have established autonomous counties, there are two parallel systems of justice: the state system - seen as under the control of the ruling PRI - and the one chosen by the autonomy authorities - identified as Zapatista. The official system is generally more costly, sometimes corrupt, and difficult for the indigenous to understand. Facing this system, the indigenous are seen to be more defenseless, because of their poor command of Spanish and their lack of knowledge of their rights. Many are fearful in the face of a system that is perceived to be, and has been, arbitrary and not very efficient. Nonetheless, and although there are exceptions, political affiliations and/or ideological distrust make it quite unlikely that an indigenous PRI supporter would turn to the corresponding official of an autonomous county.

In other areas, the difficulty of integrating differences has led communities to become more closed, defending their customs even to the point of violence, and also to develop caciquismos (the concentration of political authority in the hands of an individual or small group), with their attendant corruption and arrogance.

Meanwhile, many of the measures implemented by the state government, or from the federal level, on indigenous rights and culture are unilateral, not taking into account the opinions and concerns of the indigenous themselves with regard to what they would see as real solutions to their problems. The effective implementation of the San Andres Accords - fruits of the negotiations between the EZLN and the federal government in 1996 - would allow the indigenous peoples' own forms of conflict resolution to be taken more into account, even though in and of themselves, they are not sufficient to respond to the current problems either.

Certainly, when greater homogeneity and unity existed in the communities, it was easier to reach consensus. But it is important that that system not be idealized, since it often meant the exclusion of any "dissident" voice and the expulsion of many. This is why we believe it is important to highlight and to save the best of both worlds, learning to develop a deep tolerance of difference.

An Outbreak of Hope - Reconciliation in Practice

At the end of May 1999, SIPAZ was invited to participate in the celebration of the first anniversary of the return of a group of displaced persons in a community in the highlands of Chiapas. This return took place following a long process of negotiation and mediation, carried out in great part with the help of the Center for Indigenous Rights, CEDIAC.

History of the Conflict

In 1997, the community accepted a government project for the construction of a road leading from the main highway. EZLN sympathizer families were opposed to this decision, because they feared that the road would facilitate the entrance of the Army. These families decided not to participate in the communal work on the project, and this was perceived as being a violation of a community agreement. Because of this, some PRI-affiliated persons decided to take drastic measures, burning the houses of some families from the other group. In response, various EZLN sympathizer families, including their leader, had to flee the community and take refuge in the mountains. The aggressors sold some animals and belongings of the families who had fled, in order to buy weapons.

A few months later, some of the displaced Zapatista sympathizers returned in order to take revenge, murdering four PRI persons and wounding others. Following this tragedy, the other Zapatista sympathizer families fled the community out of fear of reprisals.

Reconciliation Initiative

The departure of these families left the community dispirited. The leader of the community took the initiative of asking the diocese for help. That was when the Jesuit Mission and CEDIAC entered into a process of reconciliation, with the help of a traditional Tzeltal judge (Melsanwanej) and his wife. They also invited elders and their wives from other communities to accompany the reconciliation process.

One of the roles of the Melsanwanej and the elders is "to strengthen the heart" of each person (the women's as well as the men's), giving words of encouragement. Unlike judges in western society, Tzeltal judges seek to secure an agreement between the parties involved, instead of only punishing the guilty.

In order to achieve this, the first work of the Tzeltal judge and his wife was to speak separately with the two parties. The displaced informed them that those responsible for the murders had fled. These families also said that they were thinking of establishing a new community. However, upon speaking with the Melsanwanej and his wife, they realized this would not be very feasible, since they had neither land nor money. On the other hand, what the PRI supporters from the community wanted was the punishment of those guilty of the murders. The Melsanwanej told them their demands were valid, but they would have to deal with them through the legal system (in order to carry out the investigation, issue arrest warrants, etc.). They also made them see that they were part of the problem as well, through the burning of houses and the stealing of animals.

A Solution

At first there was much resentment against the displaced over the death of the four PRI supporters. Many talks were necessary in order to reduce tensions and in order for everyone to accept their responsibility. In the end, everyone was in agreement that the return of the displaced was the best solution. It was agreed that the community would help in the rebuilding of the homes of the displaced and pay for the roofing and that the lumber would be taken from the ejido (community lands). Those responsible for the murders still have not been found, and the case remains open at the Public Ministry office.

The return took place a little more than a year ago. During the first months following the return, CEDIAC monitored the situation. At the present time, the indigenous of the community continue the reconciliation process. Sadness is still present among some persons, and the tension can be felt, since it is a process that requires time. In this case, however, the two parties involved continue to be willing to actively try to find a solution that will be shared and respected by both sides and that will create the space that will enable them to live together in mutual respect.

On the Office of Melsanwanej...

The work carried out by the Melsanwanej (Tzeltal Judge or 'Arranger') gathers together the ancestral experiences and the practices of Mayan forebears in seeking justice. It was in 1995 that the office of Melsanwanej began to be formalized. It began with an initiative from the communities, with the help of CEDIAC, the Jesuit Mission and the county president of Chilon at the time (a member of the PRD). Since then, men and women from the Tzeltal communities began being formally trained to assume the office of Tzeltal Judges. The work of the Melsanwanej takes in hundreds of communities, in some five counties in Chiapas. The Melsanwanej are chosen to serve their communities, working jointly with the Principals in order to seek just solutions to the problems that occur in the communities, exploring the possible paths for re-establishing lost harmony. The Principals are moral authorities, chosen by the community, who safeguard the tradition inherited from their ancestors. When they make their judgement, the Melsanwanej receive the ceremonial staff and kneel on a mat. The mat signifies that the authority is taking charge, in order to keep the leaves that make up the mat interwoven, that is, in order to maintain unity and harmony with justice and truth within the community. The Melsanwanej are also helped in their work by the Coltaywanej, that is, by human rights promoters who support and educate concerning individual and collective rights in their communities and who denounce violations of those rights.

:: ANALYSIS

Words of Peace, Policies of Force

During the last few months, the atmosphere in Chiapas has once again grown tense. The recurrence of violence by security forces has taken place within a context in which the Zapatista movement has taken new initiative and demonstrated its power of convocation. Since its meeting with representatives of civil society in November of 1998, the Zapatista referendum on "Indigenous Rights and Culture" last March, and the two referendum follow-up meetings (in May and June), the EZLN has been able to show that it continues to be a force that must be reckoned with.

At the state level, the holding of these last events has brought the EZLN closer to social organizations that in many cases present the same demands as the Zapatistas, even though all of them do not embrace the same methods of struggle.

At a national level, the EZLN has found an echo in other popular movements that have been having an impact on the current situation: the movement against the privatization of the electricity industry and the student movement at the National Autonomous University of Mexico (that has been on strike for several months now). Certainly the issue of Chiapas does not provoke as much interest as it did at the beginning of the conflict. Nonetheless, the EZLN has opened paths to other forms of organization and ways of doing politics. In addition, it has managed to place the indigenous question on the national political agenda and to keep it there.

In the face of the persistence of the Zapatista movement in spite of five years of efforts to undermine it, the response by the state government has been one of progressive adaptation. At the beginning of the year, several legislative proposals were introduced that appeared to be seeking a solution to the conflict, while excluding the EZLN: 'The Amnesty Law for the Disarmament of Civilian Groups in Chiapas,' 'The Indigenous Rights and Culture Law' and the redistricting proposal (see SIPAZ Report, Vol. IV., No. 2, May 1999).

Then, barely a week after the Zapatista referendum, a propaganda offensive began around purported Zapatista 'desertions.' The purpose of this campaign was to make the national and international public think that the conflict had lost intensity and that the EZLN no longer had the same level of support in the indigenous communities. The turning in of weapons and ski-masks was repeated in various places, creating much confusion, even though it was later revealed that the supposed 'Zapatistas' had not been such since at least 1995, and some had never been Zapatistas. Some of them admitted publicly that they had lent themselves to this masquerade in exchange for financial aid. Through this campaign, that includes the promise of further aid, the government is counting on wearing down the indigenous communities after more than five years of resistance. It is trying to respond (some say that it is pretending to respond) to the demands presented by the Zapatistas (but without the Zapatistas) so that the impression is created that the situation in Chiapas is under control.

As a last recourse for weakening the Zapatista movement, the government seems to have opted for reverting to a strategy of force. As in the past, the harassment has been directed not just against the Zapatistas, but also against social and peasant organizations (possible allies of the EZLN).

Since March 1995 - immediately following the Federal Army's incursion in the Lancandon Jungle in order to arrest the Zapatista leadership - the state and federal governments have maintained their public positions calling for peace and dialogue. During that time, however, there have been numerous periods of police-military harassment (in particular the dismantling of four Zapatista autonomous counties last year).

In the latest operations, the police played a more active role than the Army, since the actions of the latter are restricted in the 'conflict' zone (according to the March 1995 Law for Dialogue, Conciliation and a Just Peace in Chiapas). It is easy to find a pretext for entering the communities when the justification given is the existence of problems - some alleged and some real - between Zapatistas and PRI (ruling party) supporters. At the same time, the army is continuing to assume a role that does not correspond to it under the Constitution, displaying more and more aggressiveness at the checkpoints in the region, especially in the highlands.

These developments may have various objectives. On the one hand, they serve to maintain a 'moderate' level of repression and constant intimidation that is aimed at generating sufficient fear to undermine popular support for the EZLN (in the terms of the counterinsurgency manuals, 'taking away the water from the fish'). On the other hand they could be attempts to provoke a violent response from the Zapatistas, which would cause them to lose the support of civil society, or, in an extreme case, justify a more hard-line military strategy).

Some analysts speak of the creation of 'paramilitary groups' as part of the government's counterinsurgency strategy. Following the Acteal massacre, widely condemned by national and international society, there have not been such visible violent actions by groups of this nature. Nonetheless, denunciations continue to mount of the establishment and training of armed groups or of threats made by them. In the Taniperlas region - where a Zapatista autonomous county was dismantled in 1998 - we heard an interesting and much broader definition of the function of paramilitary groups: "They are those who help the police or the soldiers," pointing out community leaders, leaders of organizations, Zapatista sympathizers and even human rights promoters.

Some saw the appointment of the new Interior Minister as a positive sign for Chiapas, owing to Carrasco Altamirano's work while he was governor of Oaxaca (including the passage of an indigenous rights and culture law). Others, however, upon hearing him say "there will be no change in the government position of favoring the solving of the conflict through dialogue," conclude that, in practice, the government will continue the same policies. In fact, the police/military repression that intensified in early June followed on the heels of his becoming Interior Minister.

One element of concern regarding a possible resolution of the conflict is that, within the framework of the year 2000 presidential elections, the issue of Chiapas has been pushed into the background. The front pages of the newspapers are primarily covering the contests within the political parties to choose their presidential candidates. The fact that the PAN (center-right National Action Party) did not attend the first meeting between COCOPA and the new Interior Minister - because of disagreements with the PRI - seems to be an obvious demonstration of their partisan priorities.

It would not be of much benefit to the federal government if Chiapas were to be an issue of electoral debate, because of the lack of progress it has made in the resolution of the conflict. It would be more convenient for the Zedillo government to 'administer' the conflict until the elections, continuing its policies of attrition in order to avoid, as far as possible, an open confrontation.

'More of the same' could be the phrase for summing up the prospects in Chiapas. On the one hand, the talk of dialogue and peace by the government, and along with it, social policies within a pre-election strategy. On the other hand, the EZLN promoting actions that give it greater national and international coverage and seeking alliances with other movements, so that it does not drop off the political agenda.

Given these facts, little progress can be expected in the delicate situation in the state. However, the events and political jostling at all levels that accompany the struggle for political power in Mexico may generate more conflict in Chiapas and elsewhere.

:: Team Activities

May - July 1999

Among others:

Visits and Contacts

• Several visits to the northern region (counties of Yajalon, Tila and Tumbala), in order to speak with peasants, displaced persons who have returned to their communities, representatives of various churches and social organizations, Development, Peace and Justice leaders and local officials.
• Visit to the Cañadas region of Taniperla, in order to speak with residents, human rights promoters, the Army and Public Security (state police).
• Visit to Nazareth in Nuevo Paraiso (Ocosingo county), in order to speak with internal refugees.
• Visit to a community in the highlands, on the first anniversary of the return of internal refugees.
• A one-week visit to the Civilian Peace Camp in X'oyep, Chenalho.
• Meetings with the German, Dutch and French embassies, with European Community representatives in Mexico City, and with a delegation from the US State Department.

Information

• Preparation and distribution of an Urgent Action appeal on the increase in repression by the Federal Army and the police in indigenous communities in the Cañadas region.
• Interviews with religious leaders (Evangelical and Catholic) for the preparation of a document on the religious situation in Chiapas.
• Organization of the program for a delegation from the Colorado Council of Churches (US), including visits to Venustiano Carranza, Nicolas Ruiz and Acteal, as well as meetings with several organizations in San Cristobal.
• Organization of part of the program for visits by representatives from the embassy and the Department of State of the United States.
• Reception of national and international delegations, among them a delegation of representatives of Catholic and Evangelical churches in Switzerland.

Education

• Facilitation of monthly workshops on 'Active Nonviolence' for members of NGOs working in Chiapas.
• Participation in a CEPAZ (Peace Education Collective) workshop on 'Conflict Resolution' in a community in Altamirano.
• Assistance to Civic Alliance for a workshop on 'Conflict Analysis' in Villa de las Rosas.
• Participation in a workshop on 'Problem Resolution' according to traditional Tzeltal methods in a community near Chilon.
• Facilitation of two workshops on 'Communication' in Yajalon and Comitan for members of civil society organizations.
• Participation in a workshop on 'Conflict Resolution' in the Bible School of Holistic Formation.
• Training in 'Systematization of Peace Processes' in Guatemala.