:: SUMMARY
Working together with Mexican civil society
groups, the Zapatista Army of National Liberation (EZLN)
organized a national referendum on indigenous rights on March
21. Before the vote, 5000 Zapatista delegates fanned out
to Mexico's 32 states. More than 2.5 million Mexicans participated
in the unofficial vote, with 96% responding affirmatively
to the four questions. Most significant was the support for
the legislative proposal of COCOPA (the congressional
Commission for Agreement and Pacification) regarding implementation
of the 1996 San Andres Accords. (That proposal was previously
rejected by the federal government. The EZLN insists on implementation
of the San Andres Accords as one condition for the renewal
of peace talks.)
While the unofficial vote had no legal authority, it may
encourage members of Congress to re-evaluate the COCOPA
legislative proposal. In addition, the referendum raises
the profile
of indigenous rights and the Zapatistas' role as next year's
presidential elections approach.
Chiapas state officials have undertaken their own initiatives
to project the message that the conflict has wound down,
the EZLN has begun to disarm, and Chiapas is moving forward
with or without the Zapatistas. In March, Governor Roberto
Albores introduced legislation regarding indigenous rights
and culture, saying that it was based on the San Andres
Accords. It was criticized for lacking substance, and
in the face
of the opposition of the EZLN, it seems unlikely to contribute
to the reduction of tensions. But it does contribute
to the image of a government engaged in pro-active peace
efforts.
The same may be said of the governor's disarmament bill,
which was approved by the state Congress in February.
While its language excludes both the EZLN and paramilitary
groups,
it nonetheless set the stage for a number of highly publicized
events in which supposed Zapatistas publicly turned in
their arms in exchange for development assistance. The
EZLN vigorously
denied that its members had participated, claiming instead
that the individuals involved were members of paramilitary
groups or common criminals and in some cases providing
detailed information about them, including their names.
However while
images of "Zapatistas" handing their arms to Governor
Albores appeared in newspapers around the world, the EZLN's
denials generally went unreported.
In any case, the referendum demonstrated that national
support for the EZLN remains high. Meanwhile, events
in Chiapas suggest
a possible strengthening of the Zapatista position
there. While throughout the conflict area, the return
of thousands
of displaced remains an urgent unmet need, in a recent
visit to the northern region SIPAZ observed that a
number of displaced
families with opposition ties have been able to return
peacefully to their villages. Also evident in certain
communities were
surprising expressions of openness to the EZLN from
representatives of the paramilitary group that has dominated
the region
for the last several years, Development Peace and Justice.
On April 7, the tension in San Andres Larrainzar increased
when the PRI (ruling party) mayor-elect took over
government offices with the backing of hundreds of state
police.
The unarmed Zapatistas, who had boycotted last October's
elections,
withdrew without a fight from the buildings they
have occupied since 1995. But 1000-3000 returned the
next
day to reoccupy
the town hall. On that occasion, the police pulled
back without violence. Governor Albores has justified
the
dismantling of Zapatista autonomous counties because
they are a threat
to the rule of law. In this case, he appeared to
reverse course when he explained that it was a political
rather
than
a legal problem, and thus it required a political
solution. Nonetheless, the government continues its legal
efforts
to redraw county boundaries in Chiapas, with the
apparent purpose
of undermining Zapatista political power.
In the continuing investigation of the December 1997
Acteal massacre, testimony from accused policemen
implicated the
police in the purchase of illegal weapons and in
the protection of the paramilitary groups that
used them.
As a result,
two former high-ranking state officials were charged.
On the international scene, Mexico was one of fifteen
countries to receive special scrutiny during
the recent session of
the UN Human Rights Commission. Coinciding with
an appeal from a hundred Mexican non-governmental
organizations,
UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Mary Robinson
announced
that she will visit Mexico in October. In a March
report, Amnesty International continued its strong
criticism
of systematic
human rights violations in Mexico, especially
in Chiapas, Oaxaca and Guerrero, states where armed
opposition
groups are active.
Near-term prospects for the solution of the conflict
appear scant. The EZLN continues its political
initiatives aimed
at maintaining public attention and mobilizing
civil society, whose role it views as key to
the conflict's
resolution.
At the same time the EZLN appears to hold out
little hope of fruitful negotiations with the
Zedillo
government.
Many political analysts believe that, for the
remainder of his term, President Zedillo
has opted for simply "administering" the
conflict in Chiapas rather than either a political or a military
solution. The political initiatives of the federal government
would seem to confirm this view. They appear aimed at achieving
peace but, because they don't include the EZLN in the resolution
of the conflict, they hold out little prospect of success.
On the other hand, the heavy militarization of the region
serves to maintain tight control at the cost of serious human
rights violations, as noted consistently by international
human rights observers.
While there are signs that some communities
are turning away from violence as a means
of dealing
with local
conflicts, the lack of solutions to the
underlying problems of grinding
poverty and political oppression make it
likely that the tension, polarization and
violence
will continue.

Recommended Actions
- Urge COCOPA to take advantage of citizen support for
its legislative proposal on indigenous rights and culture
by finding a way to present it to the federal Congress,
placing the interests of peace above partisan politics.
- Urge the federal and state governments to resolve
the cases of the political prisoners in Cerro Hueco,
beginning with implementation of the recommendation
of the National Human Rights Commission.
- Urge the Zedillo administration to:
- disarm the armed civilian/paramilitary groups
that operate in Chiapas;
- order a substantial reduction of the Army presence
in the conflict areas in Chiapas as an
authentic and concrete sign of its will to dialogue;
- recognize and respect the efforts
of human rights workers and international observers
whose work
offers substantial
support to the peace process.
- Circulate information, such as this Report, on the
situation in Chiapas.
Please write:
Lic. Ernesto Zedillo Ponce de León
Presidente de la República
Palacio Nacional
06067 México, DF - México
Fax: (int-52) (5) 271 1764 / 515 4783
Roberto Albores Guillén
Gobernador de Chiapas
Palacio de Gobierno
29009 Tuxtla Gutiérrez, Chiapas - México
Fax: (int-52) (961) 20917
Comisión de Concordia y Pacificación
Paseo de la Reforma # 10, piso 17
06018 México, DF - México
Fax: (int-52) (5) 140 3288

:: UPDATE
CHIAPAS: Contention Over Indigenous Rights
and Culture Continues
At the beginning of March, Chiapas Governor
Roberto Albores Guillen presented his own state legislative
proposal concerning indigenous rights and culture. Albores
said that this proposal was based on the San Andres Accords
and the proposal that President Zedillo had sent to the federal
Congress last year. However, the proposal appears to be vague
and to not take the San Andres Accords into account, especially
regarding the right to free determination and the autonomy
of the indigenous peoples. As for natural resources and land,
the proposal does nothing other than stipulate penalties
for environmental crimes, and it does not grant any rights
in this regard to the indigenous communities.
The legislation was introduced at the same time as the
preparations for the Zapatista "National Consultation for the Recognition
of the Rights of the Indigenous Peoples and for an End to
the War of Extermination." (For details on the consultation,
see "Zapatista Consultation," elsewhere in this
issue).
Approval of the 'Amnesty Law'
On February 25 the state Congress approved the Amnesty
Law for the Disarmament of Civilian Groups in Chiapas,
and
sent it to the federal Congress for its approval. The
state government organized hundreds of meetings with
communities
and organizations in order to promote the law and to
obtain the support of the people of Chiapas. In this
regard, a
representative from a community group in Chilon commented
to SIPAZ, "The government consultation was
only carried out in PRI [ruling party] areas, and they
gathered
signatures
of ejido [communal landholdings] representatives in
order to buy support."
The proposal that was approved excludes members of
the EZLN from the amnesty, as well as those civilian
organizations
with structures, administration or training similar
to the Army's. Persons who voluntarily turn in their
weapons
will
be offered economic and technical assistance in order "to
promote their economic development." The time period
for weapons to be turned in will be 120 days after the
law goes into effect.
Meanwhile, the state government announced that, in
the five years since the uprising, 15,000 Zapatista
sympathizers
have
left the ranks of the EZLN, and it attributed responsibility
for the desertions to Sub-commander Marcos. One example
of this, according to the government, was the weapons
turn-in by fourteen alleged Zapatista militia at
the end of March
in Ocosingo, an event accompanied by a large publicity
campaign.
The EZLN called the matter "a farce and theatrics," and
claimed that the fourteen purported Zapatistas were in
fact members of MIRA (Anti-Zapatista Indigenous Revolutionary
Movement), a paramilitary group active in the area. Recently
there have been other weapons turn-ins by alleged Zapatistas,
which have been denounced in similar terms by the EZLN.
Signs of Détente and New Tensions
From 1995 through 1997, the northern region was the most
violent region because of the conflicts between the paramilitary
group, Development Peace and Justice and PRD (center-left
opposition party) and Zapatista supporters.
Recently fourteen families returned to the community
of Cruz Palenque, in the county of Tila. They had left
the
community
in 1997 because of threats from PRI and Development Peace
and Justice members. In order to effectuate the return,
an accord was signed between the community and the
refugee families.
In a visit by SIPAZ a few days following their return,
the families reported that they had not yet received
the aid
promised by the government in order to rebuild their
houses. There is still some distrust in the community
between the
two groups, but the representative of a family that belongs
to Development Peace and Justice expressed goodwill: "What
we want now is for all of us to live quietly; that there
be no threats, that there be no fear."
The government's inter-institutional coordinator for
the region, Rodolfo Anlehu, spoke to SIPAZ about these
and
other returns: "The communities cannot live
in peace unless the displaced return. The programs
for the return of the
displaced are made directly with officials in the communities
now, and not with organization leaders [such as Development
Peace and Justice]."
The leader of Development Peace and Justice in the
municipality of Tila, Diego Vazquez, stated, "We are of the same
blood, one single family. We are mistaken to be fighting...The
EZLN is not an obstacle, it's not an enemy. It's the defender
of the poor, of the Indians." Another leader in Tila,
Sabelino Torres, confirmed to SIPAZ that Development Peace
and Justice has entered a new stage of reconciliation in
the region: "Everything that happened should
be forgotten. There has been bitterness and hatred
and deaths, but we want
to begin all over. There should not be roadblocks...A
meeting is planned between Development Peace and
Justice and Abu
Xu [an organization of Zapatista supporters]. We
want to begin again and to live according to our
traditions and customs."
In spite of these words of reconciliation, tension
continues elsewhere, such as in the county of Sabanilla
where,
according to statements by Catholic Church representatives,
Development
Peace and Justice maintains total control.
Tension also increased in the county of San Andres.
On April 7, the PRI mayor-elect took over the
county offices
with
the assistance of 300 police officers. (The Zapatistas
boycotted last October's elections.) These buildings
had been in the
possession of the Zapatista Autonomous Council
since 1995. There were no arrests. San Andres
was the seat
of the dialogues
between the federal government and the EZLN in
1995 and 1996. The day following the dislocation,
a group
of between
one
and three thousand (depending on the source)
Zapatista sympathizers retook the facilities without
confronting
the police, who
withdrew from the site. The governor decided
not to use force to resolve the problem, explaining, "It's not a legal
matter, it's political." And he announced the search
for a solution through dialogue.
Two police officers indicted in the Acteal massacre
of December 1997 made important statements
implicating the
police in
the purchase of weapons for those who perpetrated
the massacre. They also accused the former
Coordinator for Public Security,
General Jorge Gamboa Solis, of being responsible
for
the impunity with which PRI loyalists are able
to carry illegal,
high-powered weapons in the county of Chenalho.
As a result, arrest warrants were issued in
February for the
general
and the former Attorney General, Jorge Enrique
Hernandez
Aguilar.
In March, 24 members of the Patriotic Command
for the Conscientization of the People (CPCP)
were
detained. This is a group made
up of dissidents from within the federal
army. Members of the CPCP organized a march in December
1998 in
Mexico
City
in order to demand reforms in military legislation.
They are now accused of the crimes of desertion,
disobedience, insubordination and defamation
of the army. The 24
new
detainees, including the leader, Lieutenant
Colonel Hildegardo Bacilio
Gomez, join ten others detained in previous
months.
Visit of the High Commissioner for Human Rights
In October, the High Commissioner for Human Rights for
the United Nations, Mary Robinson, will visit Mexico.
During
the Human Rights Commission session at the UN in Geneva,
she commented to representatives of Mexican NGOs that
her visit to Mexico "will not give the Mexican government
an easy out." She also stated that her visit "should
be preceded by a visit from the Special Rapporteur for
Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions and by a
technical evaluation commission." More than a hundred
human rights organizations and national networks had requested
that Mary Robinson and the special examiners visit Mexico.
In the March-April session, Mexico was on the list of the
fifteen 'priority' countries for the Commission.
The human rights organization, Amnesty International
(AI), continued to strongly criticize the Mexican government.
In
its report, "In the Shadow of Impunity," published
in March, AI spoke of systematic human rights violations
throughout the country. AI emphasized that they are especially
severe in Chiapas, Oaxaca and Guerrero, where armed opposition
groups are present. Secretary of Foreign Relations Rosario
Green complained that AI had not taken into account, nor
recognized, the progress the federal government has made.
In response, the Secretary General of Amnesty International,
Pierre Sane, stated: "As long as those responsible
for the massacres in Acteal, Aguas Blancas, El Charco
and El
Bosque have not been taken before the courts and legal
processes begun, [and] also in view of the fact that
army officials
and members of paramilitary groups supported by official
bodies are involved, the situation has not changed."
In its annual report, the US State Department also criticized
the human rights situation in Mexico. The report documented
cases such as extrajudicial killings, disappearances,
torture and police corruption. In addition, violence
against women
and discrimination against indigenous peoples were
cited.
During his visit to Mexico in January, Pope John Paul
II alluded to the Chiapas conflict, saying: ``There
will be
no solution without recognition that the indigenous
people were the first owners of the lands, and, therefore,
the
first with rights to them."

National Consultation on Indigenous Rights and Culture
On March 21, 15,000 polling places were
set up at the EZLN's initiative, in order for Mexicans to
express their opinions regarding indigenous rights. More
than 2.5 million Mexicans responded to the call, and 96%
of them voted affirmatively on the four questions (see consultation
text elsewhere in this issue). At some of the polling places,
one could observe two Zapatista representatives, a man and
a woman, sometimes with a child in arms, masked with their
customary red scarves. In some cases they were protected
by a security band made up of local civil society groups.
In the Fifth Declaration of the Lacandon Jungle in July
1998, the EZLN launched the idea of a national consultation
on
indigenous rights and culture as agreed to in the San Andres
Accords. The details for this consultation were discussed
during the meeting with civil society, from November 20
-22, 1998, since civil society's participation and logistical
support were necessary for it to be carried out.
Civil society groups began organizing the publicity stage
of the consultation in January 1999, calling for the
formation of promotional brigades. According to the Contact
Office
(that registered the brigades), some 2000 brigades were
formed throughout Mexico, with more than 18,000 persons
participating.
Mexicans living abroad were also invited to express their
opinions, and brigades were formed in some 156 cities
in 23 countries throughout the world. Some indigenous
in the
US also decided to promote and to participate in the
consultation, since they argued that borders did not
exist, and it was
their right to express their opinions concerning the
rights and culture of indigenous peoples.
Nine days prior to the consultation, 5000 EZLN delegates
(2500 couples) gathered in the five Aguascalientes
in Chiapas. From there they departed to all 32 states
in
the country
in order to promote the event. The government's coordinator
for negotiations in Chiapas, Emilio Rabasa, said that
in order to avoid problems, the Zapatista delegates
should not carry arms, and he also mentioned that the
participation
of foreigners in the consultation would not be allowed.
Subsequently,
in one of the EZLN communiqués, Sub-commander Marcos
clarified that the delegates would be civilian supporters
of the EZLN, not individuals with a military position.
The promotion of the consultation in Mexico presented
a great challenge: how to be able to promote indigenous
rights
and
culture throughout the country, among non-indigenous
people living far from Chiapas, and how to explain
the differences
between the COCOPA's legislative proposal that came
out of the San Andres Accords and the proposal made
by the
government
in March of 1998. In addition, the consultation had
to be promoted without much support from the media.
And,
in those
places with little media access, rumors circulate
with greater ease. In some communities, among the humble
people, it was
said that: "If you participate in the consultation,
the Zapatistas are going to take you away by force
and make you fight with them."
The Episcopal Commission for Indigenous Ministry
of the Mexican Bishops Conference decided to support
the
consultation.
Even
though it had been called by the EZLN, according
to the Commission, it was in fact a consultation
for the
benefit
of the indigenous
peoples who deserve fair attention to their demands
for dignity and development. The Papal Nuncio,
Justo Mullor,
however,
came out against the consultation. Similarly, the
Interior Minister, Francisco Labastida Ochoa, stated
that the
vote was rigged, with questions that were the equivalent
of: "Would
you rather be poor or rich? Sad or happy?"
It is true that the questions were composed in
such a way as to make it almost impossible to vote "no." Thus,
those who did not support this process abstained from voting.
But, according to the EZLN, the results were not as important
as the massive mobilization and participation of civil society
generated by the consultation. In fact, the level of participation
was greater than in the first consultation, convened by the
EZLN in 1995 in which 1,300,000 citizens expressed themselves.
Generally speaking, the consultation was carried
out without problems. In some cases there were
denunciations of harassment
of Zapatista delegates and/or of brigade coordinators
by police forces or paramilitary groups in different
states
in order to prevent them from holding it. In
some counties
in Chiapas, Tabasco, Michoacan, Oaxaca and Veracruz,
the consultation was not held because the security
of the Zapatista
delegates could not be guaranteed, since some
of the brigade coordinators had received death threats
directed
towards
the delegates. After the consultation, organizers
in the county of San Juan Lalana, Oaxaca also
received
threats that they were going to be jailed. They
were accused
of
being
part of the EPR (Popular Revolutionary Army).
In the communities that decided to do so, the
indigenous and peasants could express themselves
in the manner
of their traditional "practices and customs." In the communities
of the county of Amatan, for example, up to four assemblies
were held: one for men, one for women, one for young people
and one for children (over the age of 12). The autonomous
counties also held assemblies where agreement was reached
through consensus. In several counties in Chiapas, communal
assemblies were held between the 15th and the 20th of March.
The organizers were afraid that aid from some government
programs might arrive on the 21st (the day of the national
vote) in order to divert the peasants' attention and reduce
participation in the assemblies.
The Rosenblueth Foundation, which oversaw the
vote count, closed the counting with 85%
of the polling
places and
assemblies tabulated. They counted a total
of 2.5 million votes in Mexico.
Almost 50% of the votes had come from four
states: Chiapas, the Federal District, Oaxaca
and Veracruz.
Abroad, with
60% of the votes counted, there had been
a total of 45,000 votes.
Another 8000 votes from non-Mexican persons
abroad were tallied.
Reactions to the consultation results varied
according to the source. For the Interior
Minister, the fact
that 5000
hooded Zapatistas could travel freely throughout
the Republic demonstrated that it was not
true that a military
siege
existed, nor a war of extermination in
Chiapas. In his statements,
Secretary Labastida said: "It is inconsistent that an
armed group goes around asking for demilitarization and disarmament,
when what that group has to do first is to disarm itself." Negotiations
coordinator Emilio Rabasa echoed Labastida's thoughts, saying
that if the EZLN wanted to speak out politically, it should
lay down its arms. He also urged the EZLN to return to the
negotiating table with the government if it says that it
is for peace in Chiapas.
According to some sectors of civil society,
the consultation was a success, because
for them,
this initiative
demonstrated the capacity for organization,
creativity and unity
of thousands of men and women throughout
the country. Some
thousands of
indigenous were able to make their case
directly to different sectors of Mexican
society:
students, businesspersons,
workers, sports figures, women, etc.
On April 17-18, an evaluation meeting
was held in Chiapas, attended by 200
people.
Organizers
repeatedly
emphasized
that they felt satisfied and strengthened
by the process: "We
overcame the fear," "We worked side-by-side with
some groups that we normally have no contact with," "We
saw a lot of new faces." The EZLN has invited civil
society groups to join in a meeting May 7-10 at the Aguascalientes
in La Realidad in order to analyze the results of the consultation
and to discuss follow-up plans.

Text of the National Consultation
“ For the Recognition of the Rights of the Indigenous Peoples
and For an End to the War of Extermination"
- Do you agree that the indigenous peoples, in all their
strength and richness, should be included in the national
project and take an active part in the building of the
new Mexico?
- Do you agree that indigenous rights should be recognized
in the Mexican Constitution in accordance with the
San Andres Accords and the corresponding proposal by the
Commission
for Agreement and Pacification of the Congress of the
Union?
- Do you agree that we should achieve true peace through
the path of dialogue, demilitarizing the country
with the return of the soldiers to their barracks, as established
by the Constitution and the laws?
- Do you agree that the people should organize themselves
and demand that the government "govern obeying" in
all aspects of national life?

:: FEATURE
Political Prisoners: The Voice of Cerro Hueco
I arrive at the jail and the first
thing they ask me at the entrance is to show my identification.
I go down six steps, and four women at a table go through
the articles I want to bring in. My bag stays there. After
that, I am subjected to a physical search. I go through the
second set of bars and then down 20 steps. After passing
through four more sets of bars, I find myself in the Cerro
Hueco jail. Some of the inmates approach me, asking for money.
Others ask me who I'm looking for, and they offer to help. "I'm
looking for the Voice of Cerro Hueco people," I tell
them, and someone leads me to their cell. The place is a
large, 64-square-meter room, divided by a wooden wall. On
a second floor, additional spaces have been created with
wooden partitions. More than 55 persons sleep in this place,
the majority of them on the floor.
There has been talk about the inadequacies
of the Mexican penal system for many years. It is said that
the CERESOs (Social Rehabilitation Centers, the formal
name for Mexican jails) have not offered viable alternatives for
the persons who, for a variety of reasons, find themselves
incarcerated. In Chiapas, a large percentage of the prisoners
are indigenous. These persons from different cultures, with
different customs regarding the administration of justice,
with a mother tongue that is not Spanish, are at a greater
disadvantage when it comes to knowing about and defending
their rights to a clean and just process in their cases.
While it is true that the government of Chiapas has been
able to secure personnel who speak the languages and understand
the culture of the indigenous, the reality is that this
has not been sufficient. This partly explains the emergence,
within the CERESO #1 of Tuxtla Gutierrez, of a group organized
to defend the rights of indigenous prisoners. Known as
the "Voice
of Cerro Hueco," the group is made up primarily of indigenous,
from the Tzotzil, Tzeltal, Chol and Tojolabal ethnic groups.
How Was The Voice of Cerro Hueco Created?
Following the January 1994 armed uprising, there was an
increase in the number of indigenous prisoners in Cerro Hueco
and in other jails in the state. In the northern region (Chol
area) during 1995 and 1996, the PRI-affiliated paramilitary
group Development Peace and Justice carried out many attacks
(killings, house burnings, cattle rustling, etc.) against
PRD sympathizers or Zapatista supporters. In police actions
characterized by many irregularities, members of these opposition
groups were arrested. During this time period, the Chols
came to represent 70% of those detained due to political
conflicts.
In response to this situation, the indigenous prisoners
began organizing themselves in order to find lawyers
to take their
cases. Gustavo Estrada Gomez, who has been a member of
the Voice of Cerro Hueco since its inception, recalled: "We
began talking, because there wasn't any organization here,
and there was no one to look at our files and resolve our
cases; only the public defenders and the local and federal
courts, and they are absolutely part of the government." Since
the conflict began, there have been a total of 250 political
prisoners. Today about 80 still remain in Cerro Hueco and
in other jails in the state.
The Hunger Strikes
The internal talks began in July and August of 1996, as
did the first organizing work and the raising of awareness
as to their rights. It was through these activities that
they decided to begin a hunger strike on September 1
of
that year. The organization, with around 80 members,
was formally created with that event. By coincidence,
on that
same date the EZLN decided to leave the negotiating table
at San Andres and not return until the government had
agreed to its five conditions, including the release
of the political
prisoners. This and other conditions still have not been
met, and the imprisoned indigenous continue to struggle
from their cells through a variety of means, including
hunger strikes.
The state government, in order to counter the pressure
generated by the hunger strikes, released several leaders
at the end
of 1996. It was they who would begin the movement's external
representation. From that time forward, they would maintain
communication with NGOs, the media and a variety of officials.
The Wejlel March
In May of 1997, in order to break the blockade imposed
by Development Peace and Justice and in order to seek
the
release of the prisoners, hundreds of Chol EZLN and PRD
sympathizers, accompanied by some foreigners, set off
from the northern region. They headed for the state capital
in order to ask for a hearing with the governor. The
marchers
overcame a variety of obstacles in order to reach Tuxtla.
When they finally arrived, they organized a sit-in in
front of the Government Palace. They waited for 100 days,
but
the meeting with the governor never took place. They
did manage to negotiate with other officials and to achieve
the release of some leaders. The majority of the prisoners
from the northern region were freed after this period.
However, persecution against Zapatista supporters continued,
and the number of prisoners began to increase again.
One
of the methods that the government used was the dismantling
of the autonomous counties.
The Detention of Zapatista Autonomy Authorities
In 1998, the state government, arguing the need to enforce
respect for the rule of law, began the task of dismantling
the so-called "autonomous counties" through combined
police-military operations. These "autonomous counties" had
been announced by EZLN supporters in a number of communities
in the conflict area (see SIPAZ
Report, Vol. III, No. 3).
The dismantling of the autonomous counties took place during
a three-month period in the following manner:
- Taniperlas (Ricardo Flores Magon County) - April 11,
1998.
- Amparo Aguatinta (Tierra y Libertad County) - May
1, 1998.
- Nicolas Ruiz (county with a PRD administration) -
June 3, 1998.
- El Bosque (San Juan de la Libertad County) - June
10, 1998.
As many as 200 persons were arrested during these operations.
Several dozen remain in custody today. The dismantlings were carried out violently
and included a series of human rights violations and irregularities
in
the legal processes. Don Juan, a peasant in his sixties who
has been imprisoned since October 6, 1997, demonstrates the
impact these operations have on individuals: "It
makes me angry, because I'm not from that class that they
say,
a criminal. [The police] took us out in the park so that
everybody could see us...I thought they were going to humiliate
us there. Right now my concern is my wife who is sick from
an accident she had. She doesn't have anyone to take care
of her, and if I'm here much longer, I don't know what's
going to happen."
In its investigation of the Taniperlas case, the
CNDH (government National Human Rights Commission) verified the incidents
that occurred and the inappropriate measures and actions
taken by various officials. This led to their release of
Recommendation No. 49/98, directed to the governor of Chiapas,
inviting him to:
" ...review and reevaluate the legal situation of the current
complainants and those affected by...the existence of various
irregularities, as well as the absence of basic procedural
formalities...[and] give orders to begin the administrative
proceedings against the public servants who participated
in the arbitrary detention of...[list of the persons detained
follows]."
Similar irregularities also were present to some
degree in the other operations that were carried
out.
The government never considered the political impact
inside Cerro Hueco of the arrival of a number
of autonomous county
authorities. The Voice of Cerro Hueco's structure itself
changed from an Executive Committee to an Autonomous Representative
Council. This process took two months to take shape, and
it is still continuing to be consolidated today. The Council
meets every Sunday, and there is a General Assembly every
Monday where agreements are reached and initiatives undertaken.
Through this new format, which will soon have been
in existence for one year, the Zapatista principle
of "govern by
obeying" is being made continuously more effective.
As the current Coordinator of the Council, Amado Galvez Gomez,
comments: "When someone comes to talk with the
organization, they no longer go to just one person. Instead
they meet with
the Council, and the Council makes the decisions. There
has been a very great change in the Voice of Cerro Hueco."
The President of the "Tierra y Libertad" Autonomous
County Council, arrested along with his compañeros
on May 1, 1998, goes into more detail: "Every
region named its representatives to the Council...and whether
or
not we are Zapatistas...here we remember that we should
respect each other, and that our struggle is for autonomy
and for
the right to demand our liberty with justice and dignity."
On April 14 this year, the academic Sergio Valdez
Ruvalcaba (who had been arrested in Taniperlas)
left the jail. He
had to post bail of 5600 pesos (about $500). A week before
leaving,
Sr. Valdez commented to SIPAZ that, if he were to leave
by posting bail, it would be due to a decision by the Council
of the Voice of Cerro Hueco, based on the judgment that
his
collaboration could have greater impact outside the jail.
Luis Menendez, another of those detained at Taniperlas,
commented: "Remaining
in the jail is a signal, inwardly, of human solidarity with
my compañeros, and, outwardly, of a denunciation
of the justice system that exists in Chiapas."
Precarious Situation in the Jail
The Cerro Hueco jail has a capacity of 3-400 prisoners.
However, it currently houses around 1200 inmates, with most
of them stacked on top of each other. Medical services are
sporadic and insufficient, and it is almost impossible to
develop an income that would support a family. It is difficult
to secure an adequate market to sell the handicraft products
that they make.
This situation has obvious repercussions for the
families who remain outside, unprotected now,
since the prisoners
had been the means of those families' support. Maria Antonieta,
the wife of a prisoner from one of the autonomous counties,
commented while nursing her daughter, "We are suffering
a lot, and we're confronting several kinds of problems, such
as health and feeding my children. I had to solve them myself,
although I was dying from weeping and desperation. I even
got sick, but now, so what? What else can I do if the bad
government doesn't listen?"
Flaws in the Legal System
The issue of Mexico's legal system has been the subject
of studies as a consequence of several cases that have been
presented before national, as well as international, bodies.
Among the latter are Amnesty International, Human Rights
Watch, the Inter-American Human Rights Commission of the
Organization of American States, as well as some UN committees.
From their reports, one may conclude that Mexico has a very
good legal system, but that it fails at the moment of enforcing
those laws. Due to diverse reasons - among them corruption
and the manipulation by individual, partisan and state interests
- true outrages have been committed against the fundamental
rights of persons and groups by the legal system.
At a national level, the government body, the CNDH
(National Human Rights Commission) has documented
several cases throughout
the country. One of the constants in these cases has been
the number of irregularities by public officials in several
parts of the legal process.
In the case of the prisoners of the Voice of Cerro
Hueco, the following factors have been consistently
cited: unjust
detentions, accusations based on false testimony, and obvious
irregularities in the procedures followed in their cases.
One important aspect is the fact that their legal files include
the information that they are members of the political opposition
(independent social organizations, EZLN support groups, or
members of the PRD), even though their political affiliation
is supposedly irrelevant to their charges.
Another constant, according to Miguel Angel de
los Santos, a lawyer for many of these prisoners,
is that "...the
public ministry agent acted with a speed that we all know
is not characteristic of the Mexican legal system. Inquiries
were carried out in record time, which is not seen in other
cases...The judge is required by law to thoroughly and objectively
review the preliminary inquiry. However this is not being
done, and that has to do with the speed...to the point where
public security police immediately orchestrate operations
as if they were already waiting for the arrest warrant. That's
what happened in the cases of [the autonomous counties of]
Taniperlas, Tierra y Libertad, Nicolas Ruiz and in other
individual cases."
The cases of homonyms deserves special mention
(Manuel Fernandez Perez, Miguel Hernandez Perez,
Antonio Lopez Vazquez), whose
names are exactly the same as other detainees. Because of
this, they have been charged with other crimes, and this
has led to their sentences being extended. The authorities,
however, have not investigated this in depth (with the Federal
Electoral Commission or with the Civil Registry) in order
to properly delineate responsibilities.
According to lawyer de los Santos, "This
system of obtaining justice has reached such
a point that persons accused of
a crime are presumed guilty until they themselves demonstrate
their innocence. On the contrary, the law says that a person
should be considered innocent until those accusing him present
evidence indicating his responsibility for those acts."
In these circumstances, inasmuch as they are
not isolated actions but rather a form of administering
justice rooted
in the structure of power itself, the legal resolution
of political prisoners' cases is much more
complicated. The
solution will also have to be political.
The existence of so many legal irregularities
and the human suffering that this has caused
underscore the importance
of visits by the UN Special Rapporteur for the Independence
of Judges and Lawyers and by the Working Group on Arbitrary
Detentions, as requested by a hundred Mexican NGOs during
the recent session of the UN Human Rights Commission
in Geneva.
 :: ANÁLISIS
Civil Society: The
Third Actor in the Dispute
The "National Consultation For the
Recognition of the Rights of the Indigenous Peoples and for
an End to the War of Extermination," promoted by the
EZLN and groups from civil society, has been one of the most
significant events so far this year. It has allowed the EZLN
to break the military, political and news blockade that seemed
to characterize its position of late.
At a political level, it was a means of retaking the initiative
in the stalled peace process. The military circle was broken
through the departure from their communities - without
much hindrance from the army - of the 5000 Zapatista
delegates
who went out to publicize the consultation. The news blockade
was punctured through these delegates' activities in all
corners of the country.
It is the first time that the Zapatistas have managed to
extend their movement to all the states in the nation,
relating to social sectors that had been, up to this
point, rather
far removed from the Chiapas reality (from workers to
youth and even to businesspersons). Such a broad-based
mobilization
seems to illustrate that, in contrast to some comments
in the media, time has not worn down the support of the
citizenry
for the Zapatista movement, nor has it isolated it. It
is also evidence of the commitment by many actors in
civil society
to the search for peace.
A great deal of resources were invested in this initiative,
even when the economic crisis (in a country with more
than 40 million people living in poverty) invites a
greater individualism. In fact, these difficulties -
economic,
as well as in terms
of media access - make the value of this effort of
organization and participation even more striking.
Its significance could be even more meaningful as a
complementary way of doing politics, where direct
consultation with
the people could contribute to the establishment
of laws and
constitutional changes. The consultation results
send a clear message to the possible presidential candidates
for
next
year's elections: the conflict in Chiapas will have
to form part of the political agenda. In addition,
while
the consultation
results are not legally binding, they represent a
call
to legislators of all parties to re-evaluate the
COCOPA's proposal
for constitutional revisions (which has yet to be
formally presented to Congress).
The re-accommodation of political forces within the
framework of the preparations for the year 2000
presidential elections
could have repercussions for the potential resolution
of the Chiapas conflict. The creation of new alliances
among
particular political actors will certainly modify
the dynamics of political power in the Congress.
A number of political analysts think that there
will be no major changes made in the Zedillo
government's policies
regarding
the Chiapas conflict until the 2000 elections.
According
to them, the administration will try to "administer" it,
nothing more. While one continues to hear messages of peace
from the federal government, as well as from state officials,
many of their actions seem to lead more towards generating
greater conflict at the local level.
The state government seems to have opted to seek
a solution to the conflict through laws that
exclude the EZLN from
the political scene or that try to reduce its
importance. These
proposals were presented at moments that coincided
with the carrying out of the Zapatista consultation,
and they
were
reinforced by the federal executive branch,
through a series of visits to the state by President
Zedillo.
A prime example of this tendency has been the "Amnesty
Law for the Disarmament of Civilian Groups in Chiapas." There
have been several criticisms made of this proposal. According
to some, the conditions are not in place for an amnesty.
For others, it is not clear who is covered under this law,
since it excludes the EZLN and civilian organizations with
a structure, training or discipline similar to the Army's
(which would seem to be very close to the definition of
a paramilitary group). On the other hand, the state government
has organized a multiplicity of meetings in order to promote
it, generating even more confusion. The strongest critics
argue that this law is just part of a propaganda campaign
that is aimed at demonstrating that the government is working
towards resolving the conflict or that it is only the EZLN,
by not wanting to disarm, that is hindering its resolution.
Another more recent example is the proposal
for the state law on Indigenous Rights
and Culture.
Once
again, there
were strong criticisms that cast it as
one more way to hamper
the EZLN in its demand for the carrying
out of the San Andres Accords based on the COCOPA
proposal.
It should
be recalled
that last year, two other proposals for
federal constitutional
changes in this area were introduced: one
from the Zedillo government and another
from the
PAN (center-right
opposition
party). It is difficult to believe that
the conflict would now be resolved if either
the Zedillo or
the PAN proposal
had been approved. In the same sense, neither
can the state proposal generate many expectations.
The conflict
will
not easily be resolved unilaterally, without
the
participation of the Zapatistas and of
all the actors.
Another way to wrest political space from
the EZLN is through the imminent approval
of new
county
boundaries within the
framework of redistricting by the state,
thus extending the control of state officials
over
the indigenous
communities.
This could generate more conflicts, since
it leads to the establishment of centers
of power
in PRI
strongholds, apart
from any apparent geographic logic.
On another matter, the displacing of
the Autonomous County Council from
the government
offices
in San Andres Larrainzar
- an especially symbolic site since
it was the site of the peace dialogues -
is seen
as one
more element
within
the
strategy that is seeking to counteract
the development of the Zapatista autonomous
counties.
It is unclear
what led
the state government to reverse course
and withdraw the police when the Zapatista
supporters
returned
in numbers
the next
day. Clearly, building on the success
of the consultation, the Zapatistas
will use
San Andres
to continue
to advance the autonomy project.
All these proposals were widely covered
by the media, along with a rather
successful propaganda campaign,
whose objective
was to discredit the EZLN. That campaign
was implemented through strong criticisms
of the
national consultation
by different members of the state
and federal governments, and,
in a much more "spectacular" way,
through the turning in of weapons by purported
EZLN members to the
Chiapas governor.
The event itself was staged. The deserters
either had never been Zapatistas or at
least had not been Zapatistas since
1995. And they had been allowed to pass
unmolested through several military checkpoints
where travelers are searched
for illegal arms and explosives.
At the end of the day, each party
continues to try to assign all
the responsibility
for the
stalemated peace
process
to the other. In its new plan for
dialogue, delivered to COCOPA
in January, the government says
it wants a direct dialogue with the
EZLN, and
that it
considers
the EZLN to be
intransigent. It expressed openness
to the possibility of a national
mediation effort of high prestige,
discretion and professionalism.
For the moment,
this option is
not
considered to be
very realistic. The EZLN refuses
to dialogue without the fulfillment
of the five conditions it presented
in 1996, beginning with
the implementation of the accords
already
signed.
Civil society is at the heart of
the dispute. As the elections
draw near,
it is the center
of attention
of the political
parties. For the EZLN, it has
turned out to be the only factor capable
of disentangling
a situation
that
remains
stalled,
even as it constantly becomes more
complex and
conflictive.
 ::
TEAM ACTIVITIES
November 1998 - January 1999
Team Activities included the following:
Information
- Visit to the northern region (counties of Yajalon,
Tila, Sabanilla and Tumbala); included interviews with
displaced
persons who had returned to their communities as
well as representatives of several churches, social organizations,
Development Peace and Justice, and local and state
officials.
- Visit to the counties of El Bosque, Simojovel and
Huitiupan; interviews with representatives of social organizations
and churches.
- Several visits with political prisoners organized
as "The
Voice of Cerro Hueco" at the Cerro Hueco prison
in Tuxtla Gutierrez.
Contacts and visits
- Organization of the program for a Witness for Peace
delegation. The visit included meetings with several organizations
in San Cristobal and a trip to Ocosingo and the community
of El Chorro.
- Organization and accompaniment of a delegation of
eight United States citizens; included meetings with representatives
from several churches and human rights organizations,
as well as visits to Venustiano Carranza, Nicolas
Ruiz
and
Acteal.
- Meeting in Tuxtla Gutierrrez with the president of
COPARMEX (Confederation of Business Owners of
the Republic of Mexico,
Business Center of Chiapas).
- Meetings with representatives from the embassies
of Canada, France and Great Britain.
- Observation of the Zapatista consultation in the
county of Amatan (Chiapas).
- articipation in the weekly prayers for peace
at the ecumenical Bible School of Holistic
Formation.
Education
- Presentation of monthly workshops on 'Conflict
Analysis and Strategies for Peace' and 'Introduction to Nonviolence.'
- Initiation of a workshop series on conflict resolution
with young people from the Diocese of San Cristobal
de Las Casas.
- Internal training on the theme of 'Stress Management
and Accompanying Traumatized Persons.'
- Participation in a workshop on 'Conflict Resolution.'
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