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:: SIPAZ REPORT: Vol 4, No. 2 - May 1999

-> Summary Recommended Actions
-> Update CHIAPAS: Contention Over Indigenous
Rights and Culture Continues
  National Consultation on
Indigenous Rights
and Culture
-> Feature Political Prisoners:
The Voice of Cerro Hueco
-> Analysis Civil Society:
Third Actor in Dispute
-> Team Activities: February - April 1999
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:: SUMMARY

Working together with Mexican civil society groups, the Zapatista Army of National Liberation (EZLN) organized a national referendum on indigenous rights on March 21. Before the vote, 5000 Zapatista delegates fanned out to Mexico's 32 states. More than 2.5 million Mexicans participated in the unofficial vote, with 96% responding affirmatively to the four questions. Most significant was the support for the legislative proposal of COCOPA (the congressional Commission for Agreement and Pacification) regarding implementation of the 1996 San Andres Accords. (That proposal was previously rejected by the federal government. The EZLN insists on implementation of the San Andres Accords as one condition for the renewal of peace talks.)

While the unofficial vote had no legal authority, it may encourage members of Congress to re-evaluate the COCOPA legislative proposal. In addition, the referendum raises the profile of indigenous rights and the Zapatistas' role as next year's presidential elections approach.

Chiapas state officials have undertaken their own initiatives to project the message that the conflict has wound down, the EZLN has begun to disarm, and Chiapas is moving forward with or without the Zapatistas. In March, Governor Roberto Albores introduced legislation regarding indigenous rights and culture, saying that it was based on the San Andres Accords. It was criticized for lacking substance, and in the face of the opposition of the EZLN, it seems unlikely to contribute to the reduction of tensions. But it does contribute to the image of a government engaged in pro-active peace efforts.
The same may be said of the governor's disarmament bill, which was approved by the state Congress in February. While its language excludes both the EZLN and paramilitary groups, it nonetheless set the stage for a number of highly publicized events in which supposed Zapatistas publicly turned in their arms in exchange for development assistance. The EZLN vigorously denied that its members had participated, claiming instead that the individuals involved were members of paramilitary groups or common criminals and in some cases providing detailed information about them, including their names. However while images of "Zapatistas" handing their arms to Governor Albores appeared in newspapers around the world, the EZLN's denials generally went unreported.

In any case, the referendum demonstrated that national support for the EZLN remains high. Meanwhile, events in Chiapas suggest a possible strengthening of the Zapatista position there. While throughout the conflict area, the return of thousands of displaced remains an urgent unmet need, in a recent visit to the northern region SIPAZ observed that a number of displaced families with opposition ties have been able to return peacefully to their villages. Also evident in certain communities were surprising expressions of openness to the EZLN from representatives of the paramilitary group that has dominated the region for the last several years, Development Peace and Justice.

On April 7, the tension in San Andres Larrainzar increased when the PRI (ruling party) mayor-elect took over government offices with the backing of hundreds of state police. The unarmed Zapatistas, who had boycotted last October's elections, withdrew without a fight from the buildings they have occupied since 1995. But 1000-3000 returned the next day to reoccupy the town hall. On that occasion, the police pulled back without violence. Governor Albores has justified the dismantling of Zapatista autonomous counties because they are a threat to the rule of law. In this case, he appeared to reverse course when he explained that it was a political rather than a legal problem, and thus it required a political solution. Nonetheless, the government continues its legal efforts to redraw county boundaries in Chiapas, with the apparent purpose of undermining Zapatista political power.

In the continuing investigation of the December 1997 Acteal massacre, testimony from accused policemen implicated the police in the purchase of illegal weapons and in the protection of the paramilitary groups that used them. As a result, two former high-ranking state officials were charged.

On the international scene, Mexico was one of fifteen countries to receive special scrutiny during the recent session of the UN Human Rights Commission. Coinciding with an appeal from a hundred Mexican non-governmental organizations, UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Mary Robinson announced that she will visit Mexico in October. In a March report, Amnesty International continued its strong criticism of systematic human rights violations in Mexico, especially in Chiapas, Oaxaca and Guerrero, states where armed opposition groups are active.

Near-term prospects for the solution of the conflict appear scant. The EZLN continues its political initiatives aimed at maintaining public attention and mobilizing civil society, whose role it views as key to the conflict's resolution. At the same time the EZLN appears to hold out little hope of fruitful negotiations with the Zedillo government.

Many political analysts believe that, for the remainder of his term, President Zedillo has opted for simply "administering" the conflict in Chiapas rather than either a political or a military solution. The political initiatives of the federal government would seem to confirm this view. They appear aimed at achieving peace but, because they don't include the EZLN in the resolution of the conflict, they hold out little prospect of success. On the other hand, the heavy militarization of the region serves to maintain tight control at the cost of serious human rights violations, as noted consistently by international human rights observers.

While there are signs that some communities are turning away from violence as a means of dealing with local conflicts, the lack of solutions to the underlying problems of grinding poverty and political oppression make it likely that the tension, polarization and violence will continue.

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Recommended Actions

  1. Urge COCOPA to take advantage of citizen support for its legislative proposal on indigenous rights and culture by finding a way to present it to the federal Congress, placing the interests of peace above partisan politics.
  2. Urge the federal and state governments to resolve the cases of the political prisoners in Cerro Hueco, beginning with implementation of the recommendation of the National Human Rights Commission.
  3. Urge the Zedillo administration to:
    • disarm the armed civilian/paramilitary groups that operate in Chiapas;
    • order a substantial reduction of the Army presence in the conflict areas in Chiapas as an authentic and concrete sign of its will to dialogue;
    • recognize and respect the efforts of human rights workers and international observers whose work offers substantial support to the peace process.
  4. Circulate information, such as this Report, on the situation in Chiapas.

Please write:

Lic. Ernesto Zedillo Ponce de León
Presidente de la República
Palacio Nacional
06067 México, DF - México
Fax: (int-52) (5) 271 1764 / 515 4783

Roberto Albores Guillén
Gobernador de Chiapas
Palacio de Gobierno
29009 Tuxtla Gutiérrez, Chiapas - México
Fax: (int-52) (961) 20917

Comisión de Concordia y Pacificación
Paseo de la Reforma # 10, piso 17
06018 México, DF - México
Fax: (int-52) (5) 140 3288

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:: UPDATE

CHIAPAS: Contention Over Indigenous Rights and Culture Continues

At the beginning of March, Chiapas Governor Roberto Albores Guillen presented his own state legislative proposal concerning indigenous rights and culture. Albores said that this proposal was based on the San Andres Accords and the proposal that President Zedillo had sent to the federal Congress last year. However, the proposal appears to be vague and to not take the San Andres Accords into account, especially regarding the right to free determination and the autonomy of the indigenous peoples. As for natural resources and land, the proposal does nothing other than stipulate penalties for environmental crimes, and it does not grant any rights in this regard to the indigenous communities.

The legislation was introduced at the same time as the preparations for the Zapatista "National Consultation for the Recognition of the Rights of the Indigenous Peoples and for an End to the War of Extermination." (For details on the consultation, see "Zapatista Consultation," elsewhere in this issue).

Approval of the 'Amnesty Law'

On February 25 the state Congress approved the Amnesty Law for the Disarmament of Civilian Groups in Chiapas, and sent it to the federal Congress for its approval. The state government organized hundreds of meetings with communities and organizations in order to promote the law and to obtain the support of the people of Chiapas. In this regard, a representative from a community group in Chilon commented to SIPAZ, "The government consultation was only carried out in PRI [ruling party] areas, and they gathered signatures of ejido [communal landholdings] representatives in order to buy support."

The proposal that was approved excludes members of the EZLN from the amnesty, as well as those civilian organizations with structures, administration or training similar to the Army's. Persons who voluntarily turn in their weapons will be offered economic and technical assistance in order "to promote their economic development." The time period for weapons to be turned in will be 120 days after the law goes into effect.

Meanwhile, the state government announced that, in the five years since the uprising, 15,000 Zapatista sympathizers have left the ranks of the EZLN, and it attributed responsibility for the desertions to Sub-commander Marcos. One example of this, according to the government, was the weapons turn-in by fourteen alleged Zapatista militia at the end of March in Ocosingo, an event accompanied by a large publicity campaign. The EZLN called the matter "a farce and theatrics," and claimed that the fourteen purported Zapatistas were in fact members of MIRA (Anti-Zapatista Indigenous Revolutionary Movement), a paramilitary group active in the area. Recently there have been other weapons turn-ins by alleged Zapatistas, which have been denounced in similar terms by the EZLN.

Signs of Détente and New Tensions

From 1995 through 1997, the northern region was the most violent region because of the conflicts between the paramilitary group, Development Peace and Justice and PRD (center-left opposition party) and Zapatista supporters.

Recently fourteen families returned to the community of Cruz Palenque, in the county of Tila. They had left the community in 1997 because of threats from PRI and Development Peace and Justice members. In order to effectuate the return, an accord was signed between the community and the refugee families. In a visit by SIPAZ a few days following their return, the families reported that they had not yet received the aid promised by the government in order to rebuild their houses. There is still some distrust in the community between the two groups, but the representative of a family that belongs to Development Peace and Justice expressed goodwill: "What we want now is for all of us to live quietly; that there be no threats, that there be no fear."

The government's inter-institutional coordinator for the region, Rodolfo Anlehu, spoke to SIPAZ about these and other returns: "The communities cannot live in peace unless the displaced return. The programs for the return of the displaced are made directly with officials in the communities now, and not with organization leaders [such as Development Peace and Justice]."

The leader of Development Peace and Justice in the municipality of Tila, Diego Vazquez, stated, "We are of the same blood, one single family. We are mistaken to be fighting...The EZLN is not an obstacle, it's not an enemy. It's the defender of the poor, of the Indians." Another leader in Tila, Sabelino Torres, confirmed to SIPAZ that Development Peace and Justice has entered a new stage of reconciliation in the region: "Everything that happened should be forgotten. There has been bitterness and hatred and deaths, but we want to begin all over. There should not be roadblocks...A meeting is planned between Development Peace and Justice and Abu Xu [an organization of Zapatista supporters]. We want to begin again and to live according to our traditions and customs."

In spite of these words of reconciliation, tension continues elsewhere, such as in the county of Sabanilla where, according to statements by Catholic Church representatives, Development Peace and Justice maintains total control.

Tension also increased in the county of San Andres. On April 7, the PRI mayor-elect took over the county offices with the assistance of 300 police officers. (The Zapatistas boycotted last October's elections.) These buildings had been in the possession of the Zapatista Autonomous Council since 1995. There were no arrests. San Andres was the seat of the dialogues between the federal government and the EZLN in 1995 and 1996. The day following the dislocation, a group of between one and three thousand (depending on the source) Zapatista sympathizers retook the facilities without confronting the police, who withdrew from the site. The governor decided not to use force to resolve the problem, explaining, "It's not a legal matter, it's political." And he announced the search for a solution through dialogue.

Two police officers indicted in the Acteal massacre of December 1997 made important statements implicating the police in the purchase of weapons for those who perpetrated the massacre. They also accused the former Coordinator for Public Security, General Jorge Gamboa Solis, of being responsible for the impunity with which PRI loyalists are able to carry illegal, high-powered weapons in the county of Chenalho. As a result, arrest warrants were issued in February for the general and the former Attorney General, Jorge Enrique Hernandez Aguilar.

In March, 24 members of the Patriotic Command for the Conscientization of the People (CPCP) were detained. This is a group made up of dissidents from within the federal army. Members of the CPCP organized a march in December 1998 in Mexico City in order to demand reforms in military legislation. They are now accused of the crimes of desertion, disobedience, insubordination and defamation of the army. The 24 new detainees, including the leader, Lieutenant Colonel Hildegardo Bacilio Gomez, join ten others detained in previous months.

Visit of the High Commissioner for Human Rights

In October, the High Commissioner for Human Rights for the United Nations, Mary Robinson, will visit Mexico. During the Human Rights Commission session at the UN in Geneva, she commented to representatives of Mexican NGOs that her visit to Mexico "will not give the Mexican government an easy out." She also stated that her visit "should be preceded by a visit from the Special Rapporteur for Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions and by a technical evaluation commission." More than a hundred human rights organizations and national networks had requested that Mary Robinson and the special examiners visit Mexico. In the March-April session, Mexico was on the list of the fifteen 'priority' countries for the Commission.

The human rights organization, Amnesty International (AI), continued to strongly criticize the Mexican government. In its report, "In the Shadow of Impunity," published in March, AI spoke of systematic human rights violations throughout the country. AI emphasized that they are especially severe in Chiapas, Oaxaca and Guerrero, where armed opposition groups are present. Secretary of Foreign Relations Rosario Green complained that AI had not taken into account, nor recognized, the progress the federal government has made. In response, the Secretary General of Amnesty International, Pierre Sane, stated: "As long as those responsible for the massacres in Acteal, Aguas Blancas, El Charco and El Bosque have not been taken before the courts and legal processes begun, [and] also in view of the fact that army officials and members of paramilitary groups supported by official bodies are involved, the situation has not changed."

In its annual report, the US State Department also criticized the human rights situation in Mexico. The report documented cases such as extrajudicial killings, disappearances, torture and police corruption. In addition, violence against women and discrimination against indigenous peoples were cited.

During his visit to Mexico in January, Pope John Paul II alluded to the Chiapas conflict, saying: ``There will be no solution without recognition that the indigenous people were the first owners of the lands, and, therefore, the first with rights to them."

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National Consultation on Indigenous Rights and Culture

On March 21, 15,000 polling places were set up at the EZLN's initiative, in order for Mexicans to express their opinions regarding indigenous rights. More than 2.5 million Mexicans responded to the call, and 96% of them voted affirmatively on the four questions (see consultation text elsewhere in this issue). At some of the polling places, one could observe two Zapatista representatives, a man and a woman, sometimes with a child in arms, masked with their customary red scarves. In some cases they were protected by a security band made up of local civil society groups.

In the Fifth Declaration of the Lacandon Jungle in July 1998, the EZLN launched the idea of a national consultation on indigenous rights and culture as agreed to in the San Andres Accords. The details for this consultation were discussed during the meeting with civil society, from November 20 -22, 1998, since civil society's participation and logistical support were necessary for it to be carried out.

Civil society groups began organizing the publicity stage of the consultation in January 1999, calling for the formation of promotional brigades. According to the Contact Office (that registered the brigades), some 2000 brigades were formed throughout Mexico, with more than 18,000 persons participating. Mexicans living abroad were also invited to express their opinions, and brigades were formed in some 156 cities in 23 countries throughout the world. Some indigenous in the US also decided to promote and to participate in the consultation, since they argued that borders did not exist, and it was their right to express their opinions concerning the rights and culture of indigenous peoples.

Nine days prior to the consultation, 5000 EZLN delegates (2500 couples) gathered in the five Aguascalientes in Chiapas. From there they departed to all 32 states in the country in order to promote the event. The government's coordinator for negotiations in Chiapas, Emilio Rabasa, said that in order to avoid problems, the Zapatista delegates should not carry arms, and he also mentioned that the participation of foreigners in the consultation would not be allowed. Subsequently, in one of the EZLN communiqués, Sub-commander Marcos clarified that the delegates would be civilian supporters of the EZLN, not individuals with a military position.

The promotion of the consultation in Mexico presented a great challenge: how to be able to promote indigenous rights and culture throughout the country, among non-indigenous people living far from Chiapas, and how to explain the differences between the COCOPA's legislative proposal that came out of the San Andres Accords and the proposal made by the government in March of 1998. In addition, the consultation had to be promoted without much support from the media. And, in those places with little media access, rumors circulate with greater ease. In some communities, among the humble people, it was said that: "If you participate in the consultation, the Zapatistas are going to take you away by force and make you fight with them."

The Episcopal Commission for Indigenous Ministry of the Mexican Bishops Conference decided to support the consultation. Even though it had been called by the EZLN, according to the Commission, it was in fact a consultation for the benefit of the indigenous peoples who deserve fair attention to their demands for dignity and development. The Papal Nuncio, Justo Mullor, however, came out against the consultation. Similarly, the Interior Minister, Francisco Labastida Ochoa, stated that the vote was rigged, with questions that were the equivalent of: "Would you rather be poor or rich? Sad or happy?"
It is true that the questions were composed in such a way as to make it almost impossible to vote "no." Thus, those who did not support this process abstained from voting. But, according to the EZLN, the results were not as important as the massive mobilization and participation of civil society generated by the consultation. In fact, the level of participation was greater than in the first consultation, convened by the EZLN in 1995 in which 1,300,000 citizens expressed themselves.

Generally speaking, the consultation was carried out without problems. In some cases there were denunciations of harassment of Zapatista delegates and/or of brigade coordinators by police forces or paramilitary groups in different states in order to prevent them from holding it. In some counties in Chiapas, Tabasco, Michoacan, Oaxaca and Veracruz, the consultation was not held because the security of the Zapatista delegates could not be guaranteed, since some of the brigade coordinators had received death threats directed towards the delegates. After the consultation, organizers in the county of San Juan Lalana, Oaxaca also received threats that they were going to be jailed. They were accused of being part of the EPR (Popular Revolutionary Army).

In the communities that decided to do so, the indigenous and peasants could express themselves in the manner of their traditional "practices and customs." In the communities of the county of Amatan, for example, up to four assemblies were held: one for men, one for women, one for young people and one for children (over the age of 12). The autonomous counties also held assemblies where agreement was reached through consensus. In several counties in Chiapas, communal assemblies were held between the 15th and the 20th of March. The organizers were afraid that aid from some government programs might arrive on the 21st (the day of the national vote) in order to divert the peasants' attention and reduce participation in the assemblies.

The Rosenblueth Foundation, which oversaw the vote count, closed the counting with 85% of the polling places and assemblies tabulated. They counted a total of 2.5 million votes in Mexico. Almost 50% of the votes had come from four states: Chiapas, the Federal District, Oaxaca and Veracruz. Abroad, with 60% of the votes counted, there had been a total of 45,000 votes. Another 8000 votes from non-Mexican persons abroad were tallied.

Reactions to the consultation results varied according to the source. For the Interior Minister, the fact that 5000 hooded Zapatistas could travel freely throughout the Republic demonstrated that it was not true that a military siege existed, nor a war of extermination in Chiapas. In his statements, Secretary Labastida said: "It is inconsistent that an armed group goes around asking for demilitarization and disarmament, when what that group has to do first is to disarm itself." Negotiations coordinator Emilio Rabasa echoed Labastida's thoughts, saying that if the EZLN wanted to speak out politically, it should lay down its arms. He also urged the EZLN to return to the negotiating table with the government if it says that it is for peace in Chiapas.

According to some sectors of civil society, the consultation was a success, because for them, this initiative demonstrated the capacity for organization, creativity and unity of thousands of men and women throughout the country. Some thousands of indigenous were able to make their case directly to different sectors of Mexican society: students, businesspersons, workers, sports figures, women, etc.

On April 17-18, an evaluation meeting was held in Chiapas, attended by 200 people. Organizers repeatedly emphasized that they felt satisfied and strengthened by the process: "We overcame the fear," "We worked side-by-side with some groups that we normally have no contact with," "We saw a lot of new faces." The EZLN has invited civil society groups to join in a meeting May 7-10 at the Aguascalientes in La Realidad in order to analyze the results of the consultation and to discuss follow-up plans.

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Text of the National Consultation

“ For the Recognition of the Rights of the Indigenous Peoples and For an End to the War of Extermination"

  1. Do you agree that the indigenous peoples, in all their strength and richness, should be included in the national project and take an active part in the building of the new Mexico?
  2. Do you agree that indigenous rights should be recognized in the Mexican Constitution in accordance with the San Andres Accords and the corresponding proposal by the Commission for Agreement and Pacification of the Congress of the Union?
  3. Do you agree that we should achieve true peace through the path of dialogue, demilitarizing the country with the return of the soldiers to their barracks, as established by the Constitution and the laws?
  4. Do you agree that the people should organize themselves and demand that the government "govern obeying" in all aspects of national life?

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:: FEATURE

Political Prisoners: The Voice of Cerro Hueco

I arrive at the jail and the first thing they ask me at the entrance is to show my identification. I go down six steps, and four women at a table go through the articles I want to bring in. My bag stays there. After that, I am subjected to a physical search. I go through the second set of bars and then down 20 steps. After passing through four more sets of bars, I find myself in the Cerro Hueco jail. Some of the inmates approach me, asking for money. Others ask me who I'm looking for, and they offer to help. "I'm looking for the Voice of Cerro Hueco people," I tell them, and someone leads me to their cell. The place is a large, 64-square-meter room, divided by a wooden wall. On a second floor, additional spaces have been created with wooden partitions. More than 55 persons sleep in this place, the majority of them on the floor.

There has been talk about the inadequacies of the Mexican penal system for many years. It is said that the CERESOs (Social Rehabilitation Centers, the formal name for Mexican jails) have not offered viable alternatives for
the persons who, for a variety of reasons, find themselves incarcerated. In Chiapas, a large percentage of the prisoners are indigenous. These persons from different cultures, with different customs regarding the administration of justice, with a mother tongue that is not Spanish, are at a greater disadvantage when it comes to knowing about and defending their rights to a clean and just process in their cases.

While it is true that the government of Chiapas has been able to secure personnel who speak the languages and understand the culture of the indigenous, the reality is that this has not been sufficient. This partly explains the emergence, within the CERESO #1 of Tuxtla Gutierrez, of a group organized to defend the rights of indigenous prisoners. Known as the "Voice of Cerro Hueco," the group is made up primarily of indigenous, from the Tzotzil, Tzeltal, Chol and Tojolabal ethnic groups.

How Was The Voice of Cerro Hueco Created?

Following the January 1994 armed uprising, there was an increase in the number of indigenous prisoners in Cerro Hueco and in other jails in the state. In the northern region (Chol area) during 1995 and 1996, the PRI-affiliated paramilitary group Development Peace and Justice carried out many attacks (killings, house burnings, cattle rustling, etc.) against PRD sympathizers or Zapatista supporters. In police actions characterized by many irregularities, members of these opposition groups were arrested. During this time period, the Chols came to represent 70% of those detained due to political conflicts.

In response to this situation, the indigenous prisoners began organizing themselves in order to find lawyers to take their cases. Gustavo Estrada Gomez, who has been a member of the Voice of Cerro Hueco since its inception, recalled: "We began talking, because there wasn't any organization here, and there was no one to look at our files and resolve our cases; only the public defenders and the local and federal courts, and they are absolutely part of the government." Since the conflict began, there have been a total of 250 political prisoners. Today about 80 still remain in Cerro Hueco and in other jails in the state.

The Hunger Strikes

The internal talks began in July and August of 1996, as did the first organizing work and the raising of awareness as to their rights. It was through these activities that they decided to begin a hunger strike on September 1 of that year. The organization, with around 80 members, was formally created with that event. By coincidence, on that same date the EZLN decided to leave the negotiating table at San Andres and not return until the government had agreed to its five conditions, including the release of the political prisoners. This and other conditions still have not been met, and the imprisoned indigenous continue to struggle from their cells through a variety of means, including hunger strikes.

The state government, in order to counter the pressure generated by the hunger strikes, released several leaders at the end of 1996. It was they who would begin the movement's external representation. From that time forward, they would maintain communication with NGOs, the media and a variety of officials.

The Wejlel March

In May of 1997, in order to break the blockade imposed by Development Peace and Justice and in order to seek the release of the prisoners, hundreds of Chol EZLN and PRD sympathizers, accompanied by some foreigners, set off from the northern region. They headed for the state capital in order to ask for a hearing with the governor. The marchers overcame a variety of obstacles in order to reach Tuxtla. When they finally arrived, they organized a sit-in in front of the Government Palace. They waited for 100 days, but the meeting with the governor never took place. They did manage to negotiate with other officials and to achieve the release of some leaders. The majority of the prisoners from the northern region were freed after this period. However, persecution against Zapatista supporters continued, and the number of prisoners began to increase again. One of the methods that the government used was the dismantling of the autonomous counties.

The Detention of Zapatista Autonomy Authorities

In 1998, the state government, arguing the need to enforce respect for the rule of law, began the task of dismantling the so-called "autonomous counties" through combined police-military operations. These "autonomous counties" had been announced by EZLN supporters in a number of communities in the conflict area (see SIPAZ Report, Vol. III, No. 3). The dismantling of the autonomous counties took place during a three-month period in the following manner:

  • Taniperlas (Ricardo Flores Magon County) - April 11, 1998.
  • Amparo Aguatinta (Tierra y Libertad County) - May 1, 1998.
  • Nicolas Ruiz (county with a PRD administration) - June 3, 1998.
  • El Bosque (San Juan de la Libertad County) - June 10, 1998.

As many as 200 persons were arrested during these operations. Several dozen remain in custody today.

The dismantlings were carried out violently and included a series of human rights violations and irregularities in the legal processes. Don Juan, a peasant in his sixties who has been imprisoned since October 6, 1997, demonstrates the impact these operations have on individuals: "It makes me angry, because I'm not from that class that they say, a criminal. [The police] took us out in the park so that everybody could see us...I thought they were going to humiliate us there. Right now my concern is my wife who is sick from an accident she had. She doesn't have anyone to take care of her, and if I'm here much longer, I don't know what's going to happen."

In its investigation of the Taniperlas case, the CNDH (government National Human Rights Commission) verified the incidents that occurred and the inappropriate measures and actions taken by various officials. This led to their release of Recommendation No. 49/98, directed to the governor of Chiapas, inviting him to:

" ...review and reevaluate the legal situation of the current complainants and those affected by...the existence of various irregularities, as well as the absence of basic procedural formalities...[and] give orders to begin the administrative proceedings against the public servants who participated in the arbitrary detention of...[list of the persons detained follows]."

Similar irregularities also were present to some degree in the other operations that were carried out.

The government never considered the political impact inside Cerro Hueco of the arrival of a number of autonomous county authorities. The Voice of Cerro Hueco's structure itself changed from an Executive Committee to an Autonomous Representative Council. This process took two months to take shape, and it is still continuing to be consolidated today. The Council meets every Sunday, and there is a General Assembly every Monday where agreements are reached and initiatives undertaken.

Through this new format, which will soon have been in existence for one year, the Zapatista principle of "govern by obeying" is being made continuously more effective. As the current Coordinator of the Council, Amado Galvez Gomez, comments: "When someone comes to talk with the organization, they no longer go to just one person. Instead they meet with the Council, and the Council makes the decisions. There has been a very great change in the Voice of Cerro Hueco."
The President of the "Tierra y Libertad" Autonomous County Council, arrested along with his compañeros on May 1, 1998, goes into more detail: "Every region named its representatives to the Council...and whether or not we are Zapatistas...here we remember that we should respect each other, and that our struggle is for autonomy and for the right to demand our liberty with justice and dignity."

On April 14 this year, the academic Sergio Valdez Ruvalcaba (who had been arrested in Taniperlas) left the jail. He had to post bail of 5600 pesos (about $500). A week before leaving, Sr. Valdez commented to SIPAZ that, if he were to leave by posting bail, it would be due to a decision by the Council of the Voice of Cerro Hueco, based on the judgment that his collaboration could have greater impact outside the jail. Luis Menendez, another of those detained at Taniperlas, commented: "Remaining in the jail is a signal, inwardly, of human solidarity with my compañeros, and, outwardly, of a denunciation of the justice system that exists in Chiapas."

Precarious Situation in the Jail

The Cerro Hueco jail has a capacity of 3-400 prisoners. However, it currently houses around 1200 inmates, with most of them stacked on top of each other. Medical services are sporadic and insufficient, and it is almost impossible to develop an income that would support a family. It is difficult to secure an adequate market to sell the handicraft products that they make.

This situation has obvious repercussions for the families who remain outside, unprotected now, since the prisoners had been the means of those families' support. Maria Antonieta, the wife of a prisoner from one of the autonomous counties, commented while nursing her daughter, "We are suffering a lot, and we're confronting several kinds of problems, such as health and feeding my children. I had to solve them myself, although I was dying from weeping and desperation. I even got sick, but now, so what? What else can I do if the bad government doesn't listen?"

Flaws in the Legal System

The issue of Mexico's legal system has been the subject of studies as a consequence of several cases that have been presented before national, as well as international, bodies. Among the latter are Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, the Inter-American Human Rights Commission of the Organization of American States, as well as some UN committees. From their reports, one may conclude that Mexico has a very good legal system, but that it fails at the moment of enforcing those laws. Due to diverse reasons - among them corruption and the manipulation by individual, partisan and state interests - true outrages have been committed against the fundamental rights of persons and groups by the legal system.

At a national level, the government body, the CNDH (National Human Rights Commission) has documented several cases throughout the country. One of the constants in these cases has been the number of irregularities by public officials in several parts of the legal process.

In the case of the prisoners of the Voice of Cerro Hueco, the following factors have been consistently cited: unjust detentions, accusations based on false testimony, and obvious irregularities in the procedures followed in their cases. One important aspect is the fact that their legal files include the information that they are members of the political opposition (independent social organizations, EZLN support groups, or members of the PRD), even though their political affiliation is supposedly irrelevant to their charges.

Another constant, according to Miguel Angel de los Santos, a lawyer for many of these prisoners, is that "...the public ministry agent acted with a speed that we all know is not characteristic of the Mexican legal system. Inquiries were carried out in record time, which is not seen in other cases...The judge is required by law to thoroughly and objectively review the preliminary inquiry. However this is not being done, and that has to do with the speed...to the point where public security police immediately orchestrate operations as if they were already waiting for the arrest warrant. That's what happened in the cases of [the autonomous counties of] Taniperlas, Tierra y Libertad, Nicolas Ruiz and in other individual cases."

The cases of homonyms deserves special mention (Manuel Fernandez Perez, Miguel Hernandez Perez, Antonio Lopez Vazquez), whose names are exactly the same as other detainees. Because of this, they have been charged with other crimes, and this has led to their sentences being extended. The authorities, however, have not investigated this in depth (with the Federal Electoral Commission or with the Civil Registry) in order to properly delineate responsibilities.

According to lawyer de los Santos, "This system of obtaining justice has reached such a point that persons accused of a crime are presumed guilty until they themselves demonstrate their innocence. On the contrary, the law says that a person should be considered innocent until those accusing him present evidence indicating his responsibility for those acts."

In these circumstances, inasmuch as they are not isolated actions but rather a form of administering justice rooted in the structure of power itself, the legal resolution of political prisoners' cases is much more complicated. The solution will also have to be political.

The existence of so many legal irregularities and the human suffering that this has caused underscore the importance of visits by the UN Special Rapporteur for the Independence of Judges and Lawyers and by the Working Group on Arbitrary Detentions, as requested by a hundred Mexican NGOs during the recent session of the UN Human Rights Commission in Geneva.

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:: ANÁLISIS

Civil Society: The Third Actor in the Dispute

The "National Consultation For the Recognition of the Rights of the Indigenous Peoples and for an End to the War of Extermination," promoted by the EZLN and groups from civil society, has been one of the most significant events so far this year. It has allowed the EZLN to break the military, political and news blockade that seemed to characterize its position of late.

At a political level, it was a means of retaking the initiative in the stalled peace process. The military circle was broken through the departure from their communities - without much hindrance from the army - of the 5000 Zapatista delegates who went out to publicize the consultation. The news blockade was punctured through these delegates' activities in all corners of the country.

It is the first time that the Zapatistas have managed to extend their movement to all the states in the nation, relating to social sectors that had been, up to this point, rather far removed from the Chiapas reality (from workers to youth and even to businesspersons). Such a broad-based mobilization seems to illustrate that, in contrast to some comments in the media, time has not worn down the support of the citizenry for the Zapatista movement, nor has it isolated it. It is also evidence of the commitment by many actors in civil society to the search for peace.

A great deal of resources were invested in this initiative, even when the economic crisis (in a country with more than 40 million people living in poverty) invites a greater individualism. In fact, these difficulties - economic, as well as in terms of media access - make the value of this effort of organization and participation even more striking.

Its significance could be even more meaningful as a complementary way of doing politics, where direct consultation with the people could contribute to the establishment of laws and constitutional changes. The consultation results send a clear message to the possible presidential candidates for next year's elections: the conflict in Chiapas will have to form part of the political agenda. In addition, while the consultation results are not legally binding, they represent a call to legislators of all parties to re-evaluate the COCOPA's proposal for constitutional revisions (which has yet to be formally presented to Congress).

The re-accommodation of political forces within the framework of the preparations for the year 2000 presidential elections could have repercussions for the potential resolution of the Chiapas conflict. The creation of new alliances among particular political actors will certainly modify the dynamics of political power in the Congress.

A number of political analysts think that there will be no major changes made in the Zedillo government's policies regarding the Chiapas conflict until the 2000 elections. According to them, the administration will try to "administer" it, nothing more. While one continues to hear messages of peace from the federal government, as well as from state officials, many of their actions seem to lead more towards generating greater conflict at the local level.

The state government seems to have opted to seek a solution to the conflict through laws that exclude the EZLN from the political scene or that try to reduce its importance. These proposals were presented at moments that coincided with the carrying out of the Zapatista consultation, and they were reinforced by the federal executive branch, through a series of visits to the state by President Zedillo.

A prime example of this tendency has been the "Amnesty Law for the Disarmament of Civilian Groups in Chiapas." There have been several criticisms made of this proposal. According to some, the conditions are not in place for an amnesty. For others, it is not clear who is covered under this law, since it excludes the EZLN and civilian organizations with a structure, training or discipline similar to the Army's (which would seem to be very close to the definition of a paramilitary group). On the other hand, the state government has organized a multiplicity of meetings in order to promote it, generating even more confusion. The strongest critics argue that this law is just part of a propaganda campaign that is aimed at demonstrating that the government is working towards resolving the conflict or that it is only the EZLN, by not wanting to disarm, that is hindering its resolution.

Another more recent example is the proposal for the state law on Indigenous Rights and Culture. Once again, there were strong criticisms that cast it as one more way to hamper the EZLN in its demand for the carrying out of the San Andres Accords based on the COCOPA proposal. It should be recalled that last year, two other proposals for federal constitutional changes in this area were introduced: one from the Zedillo government and another from the PAN (center-right opposition party). It is difficult to believe that the conflict would now be resolved if either the Zedillo or the PAN proposal had been approved. In the same sense, neither can the state proposal generate many expectations. The conflict will not easily be resolved unilaterally, without the participation of the Zapatistas and of all the actors.

Another way to wrest political space from the EZLN is through the imminent approval of new county boundaries within the framework of redistricting by the state, thus extending the control of state officials over the indigenous communities. This could generate more conflicts, since it leads to the establishment of centers of power in PRI strongholds, apart from any apparent geographic logic.

On another matter, the displacing of the Autonomous County Council from the government offices in San Andres Larrainzar - an especially symbolic site since it was the site of the peace dialogues - is seen as one more element within the strategy that is seeking to counteract the development of the Zapatista autonomous counties. It is unclear what led the state government to reverse course and withdraw the police when the Zapatista supporters returned in numbers the next day. Clearly, building on the success of the consultation, the Zapatistas will use San Andres to continue to advance the autonomy project.

All these proposals were widely covered by the media, along with a rather successful propaganda campaign, whose objective was to discredit the EZLN. That campaign was implemented through strong criticisms of the national consultation by different members of the state and federal governments, and, in a much more "spectacular" way, through the turning in of weapons by purported EZLN members to the Chiapas governor. The event itself was staged. The deserters either had never been Zapatistas or at least had not been Zapatistas since 1995. And they had been allowed to pass unmolested through several military checkpoints where travelers are searched for illegal arms and explosives.

At the end of the day, each party continues to try to assign all the responsibility for the stalemated peace process to the other. In its new plan for dialogue, delivered to COCOPA in January, the government says it wants a direct dialogue with the EZLN, and that it considers the EZLN to be intransigent. It expressed openness to the possibility of a national mediation effort of high prestige, discretion and professionalism. For the moment, this option is not considered to be very realistic. The EZLN refuses to dialogue without the fulfillment of the five conditions it presented in 1996, beginning with the implementation of the accords already signed.

Civil society is at the heart of the dispute. As the elections draw near, it is the center of attention of the political parties. For the EZLN, it has turned out to be the only factor capable of disentangling a situation that remains stalled, even as it constantly becomes more complex and conflictive.

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:: TEAM ACTIVITIES

November 1998 - January 1999

Team Activities included the following:

Information

  • Visit to the northern region (counties of Yajalon, Tila, Sabanilla and Tumbala); included interviews with displaced persons who had returned to their communities as well as representatives of several churches, social organizations, Development Peace and Justice, and local and state officials.
  • Visit to the counties of El Bosque, Simojovel and Huitiupan; interviews with representatives of social organizations and churches.
  • Several visits with political prisoners organized as "The Voice of Cerro Hueco" at the Cerro Hueco prison in Tuxtla Gutierrez.

Contacts and visits

  • Organization of the program for a Witness for Peace delegation. The visit included meetings with several organizations in San Cristobal and a trip to Ocosingo and the community of El Chorro.
  • Organization and accompaniment of a delegation of eight United States citizens; included meetings with representatives from several churches and human rights organizations, as well as visits to Venustiano Carranza, Nicolas Ruiz and Acteal.
  • Meeting in Tuxtla Gutierrrez with the president of COPARMEX (Confederation of Business Owners of the Republic of Mexico, Business Center of Chiapas).
  • Meetings with representatives from the embassies of Canada, France and Great Britain.
  • Observation of the Zapatista consultation in the county of Amatan (Chiapas).
  • articipation in the weekly prayers for peace at the ecumenical Bible School of Holistic Formation.

Education

  • Presentation of monthly workshops on 'Conflict Analysis and Strategies for Peace' and 'Introduction to Nonviolence.'
  • Initiation of a workshop series on conflict resolution with young people from the Diocese of San Cristobal de Las Casas.
  • Internal training on the theme of 'Stress Management and Accompanying Traumatized Persons.'
  • Participation in a workshop on 'Conflict Resolution.'

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