:: SUMMARY

Disastrous flooding caused by torrential rains took an enormous toll in southern Chiapas in early September. Attention shifted to the human drama that cost hundreds of lives and left some 100,000 people homeless. Hundreds of communities were totally cut off, and some disappeared entirely under a thick covering of mud. In mid-October dozens of communities were still incommunicado and had not received any aid.

The government and Mexican civil society struggled to provide emergency assistance. Meanwhile a debate ensued about postponing the state and county elections scheduled for October 4.

In the end the elections went ahead except in a few of the hardest hit areas. The results were a big victory for the ruling PRI (Institutional Revolutionary Party), which won 18 of 21 state deputy elections and 82 of 102 county mayor elections. The PRI even regained the counties in the conflict area that it had lost in the 1995 elections. Now the PRI will control all the constitutional counties in the conflicted highlands, Lacandon jungle and northern region.

Charges of irregularities in the election process were made in many areas. They ranged from the relatively minor to more serious allegations. For example, in the northern region where people may be killed because of their political party affiliation, PRI election officials were accused of opening ballots and making a black list of those who voted for the opposition PRD (Party of the Democratic Revolution).

One of the most notable aspects of the elections was the high level of abstention. Overall it was 54%. However in areas of strongest Zapatista influence, it reached 74%. The EZLN did not impede the elections, as it had sought to do in the past. However many Zapatista communities simply chose not to vote.

Opposition parties denounced the electoral process and announced plans for organized protests.

In the end, there is little to suggest that the recent elections will contribute to achieving more representative government or to the resolution of the tense and polarized conflict in Chiapas that continues to erupt in sporadic violence.

Since breaking its four-month silence in July, the EZLN (Zapatista Army of National Liberation) has issued more than a dozen communiqués. In the Fifth Declaration of the Lacandon Jungle, the EZLN sought to resurrect the Law of Indigenous Rights and Culture. That is the legislation originally proposed by COCOPA (the congressional Commission for Agreement and Pacification) in order to implement the San Andres Accords. The government's refusal to agree to it has been the major stumbling block to renewing the peace talks. The EZLN is now working with sectors of Mexican civil society on a new effort for a broad dialogue between the two. In addition, in October the EZLN sent a communiqué to COCOPA, reinitiating public contact nearly two years after their last meeting. The EZLN continues to express deep mistrust of the federal government's will for peace.

Unwilling to implement the COCOPA legislative proposal, and unable to lure the EZLN back to the table as a result, the federal government has devoted less public attention to the Chiapas conflict. It appears to prefer living with the current stalemate to the alternatives. Violent attacks on Zapatista autonomous counties have not continued, but the military and paramilitary presence in the conflicted areas remains very heavy.
Meanwhile international concern about Chiapas and Mexico's human rights record has grown. Recent statements by commissions of both the United Nations and the Organization of American States criticized the impunity with which human rights abuses are committed in Mexico and listed related concerns. The Mexican government dismissed these statements, arguing that they reflect a lack of understanding of the situation. Nonetheless they constituted significant blows to Mexico's international reputation on human rights. A visit by the U.N. Secretary General and the government's invitation to the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights to visit Mexico serve to maintain international interest.

In the U.S., word of a non-binding congressional resolution critiquing Mexico's human rights record provoked a concerted effort by the Mexican government to discourage its presentation to Congress. The Mexican government called it an "unacceptable interventionist act." The measure was finally introduced, but Congress adjourned without voting on it.

Some have seen the upcoming visit of the Pope in January 1999 as an occasion that might provide momentum to break the stalemate in Chiapas. That may yet be the case. However a more sober assessment would suggest that the rigid postures of the key actors leave little hope for a resolution before the current presidential term ends in 2000.
The EZLN's overture to COCOPA reverses its recent posture of stonewalling the congressional peace commission and provides a glimmer of hope. The civil society/EZLN dialogue initiative that gets underway in November creates a new public space for spotlighting the continuing impasse. It remains to be seen whether the message it produces and the public support it is able to generate, combined with the efforts of COCOPA, will be enough to re-engage two adversaries who distrust each other deeply.

RECOMMENDED ACTIONS

• Urge the Zedillo administration to:
  • guarantee the security of the EZLN delegation and the necessary conditions for its contacts with COCOPA and for the November 20-22 consultation with civil society sectors;
  • disarm the paramilitary groups that operate in Chiapas;
  • order a substantial reduction of the Army presence in the conflict areas in Chiapas as an authentic and concrete sign of its will to dialogue;
  • recognize and respect the efforts of human rights workers and international observers whose work offers substantial support to the peace process.
• For citizens of the European Union:
  • petition the members of your respective governments and parliaments to ensure the careful execution of the "democracy clause" that is part of the trade agreement between the European Union and Mexico.
  • Urge COCOPA to strengthen its efforts to maintain unity behind its proposals and actions and to continue its work of assisting the peace process, placing the interests of peace above partisan politics.
• Circulate information, such as this Report, on the situation in Chiapas.

Please write:

Lic. Ernesto Zedillo Ponce de León
Presidente de la República
Palacio Nacional
06067 México, DF - México
Fax: (int-52) (5) 271 1764 / 515 4783

Francisco Labastida Ochoa
Secretario de Gobernación
Bucareli 99, 1o. piso
Col. Juárez
06699 México, DF - México
Fax: (int-52) (5) 546 5350 / 546 7380

Comisión de Concordia y Pacificación
Paseo de la Reforma # 10, piso 17
México, DF - México
Fax: (int-52) (5) 535 2726

:: UPDATE

CHIAPAS: WHICH WAY TO DEMOCRACY?

In September, the coastal and border regions of Chiapas became a disaster area as a result of torrential rains, with hundreds of dead and disappeared in 40 counties. (See "Disaster in Southern Chiapas," also in this issue). As a result of flooding rivers and landslides, highways and bridges were destroyed, and some communities were completely covered with mud. This latest disaster came on top of the already tense situation in the highlands, Lacandon jungle and northern region of Chiapas, caused by the still unresolved conflict between the government and the EZLN (Zapatista Army of National Liberation).

In the wake of the catastrophe, a heated discussion ensued regarding the viability of carrying out the October 4 elections. The state government and the State Electoral Council (CEE) argued that conditions existed for proceeding with the elections and that the Constitution prohibited postponing them. However, the opposition PRD as well as the PRI senator from Chiapas, Pablo Salazar Mendiguchia, proposed a postponement until December. In the end, the CEE decided to postpone the elections in three state legislative districts and eight counties severely impacted by the flooding and to take interim measures to comply with the state Constitution.

The vote was characterized by a high level of abstention (54%) and by reports of irregularities throughout the state. The EZLN did not attempt to impede the voting. However, many communities of Zapatista supporters chose not to vote. The PRI won 18 of 21 legislative districts and 82 of 102 counties. The PRI even regained the counties in the conflict area that it had lost in the 1995 local elections. (For more information, see "Elections in Chiapas," also in this issue.)

EZLN

After breaking its four-month silence, the EZLN emitted a dozen communiqués between the middle of July and the elections. In several documents it blamed the failure of the peace talks on the federal government and also criticized the economic policies of President Zedillo. Days after the flooding, the EZLN denounced the diversion of humanitarian aid for personal and political party ends as well as the deficiencies of the emergency response plan.

In the Fifth Declaration of the Lancandon Jungle at the end of July, the EZLN invited civil society and the indigenous peoples to undertake a national consultation on the proposed "Law of Indigenous Rights and Culture" drawn up in 1996 by COCOPA (the congressional Commission for Agreement and Pacification). It accepted the response of civil society groups to establish a dialogue between civil society and the EZLN with the purpose of exchanging proposals regarding the proposed consultation and seeking solutions to the Chiapas conflict. According to the EZLN, this encounter will take place November 20-22 in San Cristobal de las Casas.

Government policy

In his Annual Report in September, President Zedillo avoided mention of the Chiapas conflict. The omission generated strong indignation on the part of COCOPA members, opposition parties, and some civil society and church sectors. Interior Secretary Francisco Labastida Ochoa responded by pointing out that in the appendices of the Annual Report, the government proposes seven avenues to pursue in order to resolve the Chiapas conflict. These include stimulating economic growth, protecting the rule of law, providing assistance to the displaced, approving initiatives for an indigenous rights law for Chiapas, and seeking dialogue with the Zapatistas. In August, Chiapas Governor Roberto Albores Guillen had announced his plan for an indigenous rights law for Chiapas that he said would guarantee the rights of the indigenous peoples in accordance with their traditional practices and customs.

In July the federal government proposed a plan to reduce tensions in Chiapas that granted an important role to COCOPA. The plan called on COCOPA to appeal to the EZLN to take a number of measures, including disarming, avoiding violence in the indigenous communities, and encouraging the participation of its supporters in the effort to redraw county boundaries and create some new counties. A month later COCOPA rejected the government's request, saying that it could not become a tool of the government. In an October 18 communiqué, the EZLN reinitiated public contact with COCOPA, acknowledging its role in the peace process.

Since the violent incidents in June in the autonomous county of El Bosque where eight Indians and two policemen died, there have been no further open attacks on the autonomous counties. Nonetheless they continue to suffer the pressure of the heavy military presence and the threats of paramilitary groups. In July the Secretary of the Interior expressed the commitment of the federal government not to seek recourse in violence, but he also asserted that, "there will be no more gratuitous concessions" to the EZLN because that armed movement thwarts the peace process.

According to a poll done by the Rosenbluth Foundation in August, the Mexican people are very critical of the policy of the government. Almost three-quarters of those surveyed agreed that the indigenous peoples had good reason to rebel against the government in January 1994. Sixty per cent believe that there is a lack of consistency between what President Zedillo says and what he does. Fifty-five per cent consider the Mexican Army to be a danger to the indigenous peoples.

Strong international criticism

On August 20, the Sub-committee on the Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities of the Human Rights Commission of the United Nations approved a resolution calling on the Mexican government to end the impunity for those who violate human rights and to guarantee the security of human rights defenders. It also called on both sides in the Chiapas conflict to give priority to dialogue, and it proposed to the U.N. Human Rights Commission that it continue to monitor the human rights situation in Mexico. In the diplomatic world of the U.N., the resolution's careful language amounted to a significant rebuff of Mexico's human rights record. The Mexican representative to the U.N. commented that the Subcommittee's statement "is absurd," and that it was the product of legal experts "who have no political responsibility."

The Interamerican Human Rights Commission of the Organization of American States issued a report at the end of September regarding the human rights situation in Mexico. Although it acknowledged political and democratic advances, it criticized the violations of the human rights of the indigenous peoples and the impunity that "has led to the illegal tendency of the population to take justice into its own hands." In addition it mentioned the heavy militarization of some Mexican states, including Chiapas.

During the visit of U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan to Mexico at the end of July, Mexican non-governmental organizations (NGOs) presented reports and documents regarding the human rights situation in the country. Interior Secretary Francisco Labastida Ochoa said that Annan left Mexico convinced that the Mexican government is doing everything possible to resolve the Chiapas conflict peacefully. In September, Foreign Relations Secretary Rosario Green invited the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, Mary Robinson, to visit Mexico.

Also in September, U.S. citizen Tom Hansen, ex-director of Pastors for Peace, received a favorable ruling from a federal judge on the appeal of his expulsion from Mexico in February 1998. The judge said that the actions for which Hansen was expelled (observing the government/EZLN peace talks in 1995 and participating in the Intercontinental Gathering against Neoliberalism in 1996) are not prohibited.

A delegation of Amnesty International that visited Chiapas in September stated that the detentions that took place during the dismantling of some of the autonomous counties in the first half of the year were "arbitrary" and inappropriate under the rule of law.

A non-binding "Sense of Congress" resolution on Chiapas was introduced into the U.S. Congress on October 9. While it was not voted on before Congress adjourned, the fact that it was presented at all reflects a significant increase in congressional concern about Mexico's human rights record. The resolution called for effective measures to ensure that U.S. military aid does not contribute to human rights violations; disarming the paramilitary groups and reducing the military presence in Chiapas; concerted efforts by the government and the EZLN to renew negotiations; and respect for human rights monitors. It had 15 co-sponsors in the Senate and 37 in the House of Representatives.

The Mexican Foreign Relations Ministry issued a communiqué stating that, "The initiative expresses several slanted, and even erroneous, opinions regarding the situation in Chiapas," and called it an "unacceptable interventionist act." The government's coordinator for the Chiapas talks, Emilio Rabasa, was sent to Washington in an unsuccessful attempt to discourage its introduction.

:: ANALYSIS

A few weeks shy of the first anniversary of the Acteal massacre, things have not improved in Chiapas. In September the southern part of the state suffered disastrous flooding, yet another burden for a people that has already had to bear five years of a conflict that still has few near-term prospects for resolution.

The catastrophe showed again the deficiencies of the government in responding quickly and efficiently to urgent needs. However the public attention and the emergency aid permitted the displacement of the principle conflict from the center of national attention. In addition, the government's announced plans to repair the damage, compensate the victims and return things to normal may easily become another instrument of co-optation and control of the population in a region where opposition political parties have been strong. At the same time, the humanitarian sense expressed by Mexican society in response to the natural disaster is an indication that the solidarity toward the people of Chiapas has not been exhausted.
Banking scandals, the fall of the peso, the fires several months ago and the flooding in September, even the extra-marital problems of Clinton have all been distractions from the deteriorating situation caused by the prolonged stalemate of the conflict in Chiapas. Not even the recent local elections have succeeded in dissipating the gray clouds that literally and metaphorically have covered the Chiapas skies in recent months.

The October 4 elections were characterized by a high level of abstention, especially in the areas of greatest Zapatista influence. The low turnout demonstrates the scant confidence in the ability of the political system to resolve pressing problems. The lack of physical and political conditions for free and fair elections, the insecurity and fear, the ambiguous posture of the EZLN (it did not impede the vote, but it also did not encourage it) also limited participation.

In this context, the triumph of the PRI in the highlands, Lacandon jungle and northern region of Chiapas leaves control of the entire area of greatest Zapatista influence in the hands of the current government. Now it will find less resistance to using all of its resources and its bureaucratic apparatus to extend its influence and reduce support for the EZLN. There is also concern about the potential for an increase in paramilitary activity in the counties where the PRI regained control. In other areas, paramilitary activity has been significantly strengthened through collusion with local PRI political authorities.
On the other hand, the limited political base of the new county authorities (elected with the support of between 13 and 30% of the eligible voters) constitutes a potentially destabilizing factor. Opposition groups have announced plans for protests, including the possibility of occupying county government offices in order to impede the installation of the new PRI officials.
The state government views the elections as a success. However, the documented irregularities and the high level of abstention indicate that once again, the electoral process is not a viable and effective means of democratizing the country, installing representative local governments, and finding real solutions to the Chiapas conflict.

While in Mexico the Chiapas issue seems to be relegated by some to the bottom of the political agenda, internationally it has become more prominent. Evidence includes the increasing frequency of visits to the state by foreign embassy staffpersons (including 9 visits by U.S. military personnel in recent months, according to U.S. Embassy sources) as well as statements by U.S. government spokespersons and members of Congress, Canadian and European members of parliament, and commissions of highly respected institutions such as the United Nations and the Organization of American States.
These groups have recommended that the Mexican authorities redouble their efforts to reduce the indices of violence and discrimination in Chiapas and other states. The government, with the argument of defending its sovereignty, minimizes the criticism, saying that it is based on false information. Nonetheless, the strength of these international criticisms has led the government to invite Mary Robinson, the U.N. High Commissioner on Human Rights, to visit Mexico.

After breaking its four-month silence in July, the EZLN issued several communiqués in which it commented on important recent events, dismissing the policies of the federal and state governments. For its part, the government declined to take seriously the documents and the assertions of the rebel army. Chiapas Governor Roberto Albores Guillen even referred to EZLN Sub-commander Marcos as a criminal. As things stand now, with the key actors having assumed rigid postures, it appears very difficult to achieve any kind of resolution before the current presidential term ends in 2000. A suggestion by the Catholic bishops that a peace accord might be signed before the arrival of the Pope in January seems to be a quite remote possibility.

Although it has lost some political clout, COCOPA continues to be actively engaged in seeking a real solution to the conflict, and it takes the EZLN more seriously than before. On October18 the EZLN announced a new willingness to meet directly with COCOPA, although it continues to resist direct contact with the federal government.

The recent election campaign was not the opportunity in which Chiapas civil society was able to make its voice heard regarding the future course of the state. Now expectations turn toward the new space of dialogue sought by sectors of national civil society and the EZLN and planned to begin in November. Once again it would appear to be civil society that may be able to peacefully pressure the political actors to take responsibility to resolve the Chiapas conflict and to change the strategy of militarization.

As long as this does not happen, the electoral path to democratization is likely to continue to be insufficient and inadequately representative of the majority, as we have just seen demonstrated in the recent elections in Chiapas.

:: FEATURE

ELECTIONS IN CHIAPAS: PRI WINS AMID LOW TURNOUT

Chiapas local and state elections were scheduled for October 4. Seats at stake included 111 mayors and 40 representatives to the state legislature (24 elected by district and 16 awarded on the basis of proportional representation.) However, one week before the vote, the State Electoral Council (CEE) decided to suspend elections in eight counties and three districts in the area devastated by the torrential rains in the first week of September. A number of organizations and political leaders had argued that the elections should be postponed for all of Chiapas.

Victory for the PRI

Clearly the PRI (the ruling Institutional Revolutionary Party) was the big winner in the elections. It won 18 of 21 state representative districts and 82 of 102 mayoral seats where the voting took place. The center-left PRD (Party of the Democratic Revolution) won 15 counties and one legislative district, and the center-right PAN (National Action Party) won five counties and two legislative districts. In the conflicted highlands, jungle and northern region of Chiapas, the PRD did not win a single county and even lost those it had previously held. Now those areas will be governed exclusively by the PRI.
The fact that the elections were held in only 21 of 24 districts caused a heated discussion among the political parties regarding the distribution of the 16 state legislative seats awarded on the basis of proportional representation. According to the opposition parties, the law prohibited the distribution of the seats based on results from only 21 of the 24 districts. However, the CEE approved a plan whereby two seats were set aside, pending the outcome of elections in the disaster area. Of the remainder, the PRI received seven seats, giving it a majority of 25. The PRD received four, giving it a total of five. And the PAN received three, giving it a total of five as well. Two other parties have one representative each.

No guarantees for clean elections

Prior to the vote, the non-governmental organization Civic Alliance observed that in 14 of the 24 electoral districts, at least one of the minimal conditions listed by the U.N. Human Rights Commission for the realization of free, authentic and fair elections was not assured. Those 14 districts are located in the conflict area and in the area affected by the flooding. The high overall level of abstention (around 54%) tends to support the Civic Alliance conclusion that, "...to continue the current course, the electoral process will not achieve its basic function, and it may instead become a factor that postpones the possibility of achieving the minimal agreement between the various political and social forces that the situation in Chiapas makes so urgent."

San Juan Chamula impedes the vote

The polling took place without serious incidents, except in the county of San Juan Chamula. There, the local authorities impeded the installation of the 59 polling places in order to force the liberation of five prisoners detained on a variety of charges, including murder. According to the traditionalist Catholic authorities there, the detained are political prisoners. It should be noted that the voting in San Juan Chamula always has favored the PRI.

During the morning, 1000 Indians gathered in the main plaza of the county seat for a spontaneous meeting. The local authorities obliged all businesses to close. In the plaza there were large banners with slogans against the "Protestant sects." The road to San Andres was blocked for a short period, and a toll was requested of passing drivers. Around midday, after a brief speech by the authorities, the people left the plaza and the businesses re-opened.

The prohibition of voting in San Juan Chamula cast doubt on the validity of the vote for the state legislature representative, since less than 80% of the polling places in that district were in place. However, the CEE accepted the results and awarded the seat to the PRI candidate who had won in the other counties of the district.

Observers and political parties denounce irregularities

Observers and political parties charged that some polling places opened late, mistakes were made by election officials due to inadequate training, and illegal campaign propaganda was evident in or around voting sites. In the area of Tapachula, state police conducted interrogations of election officials.

The EZLN issued a communiqué on October 2 in which it said it would not obstruct the elections. Hence there was no burning of ballots or polling places by EZLN supporters, as had occurred in the previous elections. However, many communities of Zapatista supporters chose not to vote.

In the northern region, the elections took place in a climate of tension because of the presence of the paramilitary group Peace and Justice. PRD representatives reported irregularities. For example, they asserted that PRI election officials examined ballots and compiled a "black list" of names of those who voted for the PRD.

In Nicolas Ruiz, where the PRD won, PRI supporters denounced irregularities committed by election officials. In Venustiano Carranza, the PRD reported illegal campaigning and vote buying by PRI supporters.

In a press conference two days after the elections, three opposition parties (PRD, PAN and Democratic Party of Chiapas) charged that in Ocosingo, conditions did not exist for clean elections, and consequently they did not recognize the results. With an abstention level of 74% in that county (which includes large areas of strong Zapatista support), the PRI won with 52% of the vote. The three parties noted that as a result, the legitimacy of the government rests on the support of 13% of the registered voters and therefore, the government lacks credibility. They also charged that there had been death threats against members of the opposition, transporting of voters using government equipment, and cases of vote-buying by the PRI, for example by offering assistance through PROCAMPO (a governmental program for rural development).

The campaign and the communications media

Civic Alliance of Chiapas published an investigation of campaign coverage by the communications media. The investigation took place over two weeks in August. Key findings included the disproportionate coverage given to the PRI as opposed to other political parties in three media outlets. Red Radio Chiapas dedicated 45% of its coverage to the PRI while the corresponding figure for radio station XEWM was 68%. The newspaper Cuarto Poder dedicated 70% of its coverage to the PRI. Regarding the actual content of the coverage, in general the report did not find a preference for a particular party.

CIVIL SOCIETY:

An unknown quantity in the resolution of the Chiapas conflict

In Mexico today, there is much talk of "civil society." The communications media report that "civil society" makes proposals to political leaders, takes initiatives, organizes referendums and marches, and otherwise mobilizes.

Since 1994, particularly in the most critical moments of the peace process, numerous communiqués of Zapatista leader Marcos have been directed to "civil society," asking it questions and making proposals.

After the dissolution of CONAI (National Mediation Commission), in the Fifth Declaration of the Lacandon Jungle issued in July, the EZLN renewed its exhortation of the social and political actors to become involved in the resolution of the impasse in the Chiapas conflict. "It is the hour of the indigenous peoples, of civil society, and of the National Congress." In September, the EZLN accepted the invitation to dialogue with civil society. On the agenda: a national consultation on the proposed "Law of Indigenous Rights and Culture" and the search for solutions to the Chiapas conflict.

But what is this "civil society" and what does it do? What has been - and what might be - the role of this little known actor in the Chiapas conflict?

The emergence of a new political and social force

It is difficult to determine when the concept of "civil society" first appeared. It did not come out of nowhere. Rather it emerged as a way of talking about those important sectors of society with greater awareness of their strength and of their capacity to organize and to participate directly in the resolution of problems the government fails to address adequately.
The student mobilizations of the 1960s were of particular relevance in this gestation process. Later the earthquake that devastated the capital in 1985 led to the emergence of new initiatives around common needs and interests. Civil society grew in maturity.

However, some observers think that those events only included a limited part of Mexican society and that it was only in the 1990s, with the armed uprising of the Zapatistas and the economic crisis, that a very broad spectrum of social sectors mobilized.

Initial organizational efforts

The more or less spontaneous efforts of earlier times have been fleshed out in recent years. Organizational initiatives outside of governmental structures have increased, focusing on everything from neighborhood to national and international issues, forming and re-forming networks and coalitions. Some pursue legal status, hire staff and develop a more formal structure. These are referred to as non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Focused on specific social issues (such as indigenous rights, gender, human rights, ecology, children, health, development, etc.), they have achieved a growing influence at the local, regional, national and even international levels.

Speaking broadly of such social movements, Manuel Canto of the Antonio Montesinos Center (CAM) notes, "It is more accurate to speak of 'organizations of civil society' instead of 'civil society.' They are voluntary associations of citizens who come together to achieve social objectives and who seek to influence public affairs."

Civil and political society

The growth in the number of civil organizations has fortified considerably the process of democratization in Mexico during the last decade. Many organizations have emerged to contribute to the solution of grave problems in Mexican society as well as to pressure local, state and national government to become more aware of its responsibility.

In 1994 the NGO Civic Alliance was founded at the initiative of citizens and civil groups interested in monitoring the federal and state elections of August of that year. It was the first time that Mexican society decided to undertake citizen electoral observation, reacting to the lack of impartiality and credibility in previous elections. In that year, for the first time, it was possible to document in a systematic manner widespread electoral fraud.

A key factor in the growth of civil society groups is the perception that the authorities have not responded to the demands of the citizens. Hence in Chiapas, several grassroots organizations decided to support candidates independent of the political parties in local elections. In 1995 the indigenous youth organization Yomlej did this in the county of Chilon and succeeded in electing the next mayor.

Recently the same process was repeated in Yajalon and Ocosingo with independent candidates. In Yajalon, the organization Flores Magon proposed its own candidate, Gustavo Robles, on the PRD (Party of the Democratic Revolution) ticket. He commented to SIPAZ, "The authorities do not listen to our legitimate demands. Now we are seeking political power in order to try to meet our needs." The organization Flores Magon made great efforts to raise awareness among the voters in order to involve them in the political process. "So," said Robles, "we have won whether or not we win the election. Now the people know much better what their role can be in resolving their problems." (In fact, they lost in the October 4 elections.)

The traditional political structures sometimes find it difficult to understand or accept this new kind of political and social force. A representative of Civic Alliance in San Cristobal de las Casas told SIPAZ, "We went to talk with the mayor about a citizen consultation we were undertaking so that he would understand the objective beforehand. He did not understand and he only asked us, 'And what do you want from me? What do you need?' His way of thinking is still, 'What can I give to quiet them.' But as aware citizens, we are seeking the cooperation of the political forces in order to resolve problems. In addition to educating the citizens it is necessary to educate the government and the politicians about how to take seriously civil society. But it is also a learning process for us, and in Chiapas it is more difficult because the situation is so polarized."

Civil society in the beginning of the Chiapas conflict

At the beginning of 1994, CONPAZ (Coordinating Agency of Non-governmental Organizations for Peace) was formed to seek responses to the violence of the government in response to the EZLN uprising. In the succeeding months, other organizations were born in order to address problems of health, human rights, popular education, gender and other pressing issues.

Teresa, who during the uprising sold tortillas in a school, related her decision to participate actively in the citizen movement in this way: "When for the first time I saw the Zapatistas and Marcos walking through downtown San Cristobal, I thought, 'They are doing something, and I don't do anything.' The aerial bombardment three days later against the inhabitants of my town moved me to assume my responsibility. It was on January 12 that for the first time I participated in a march and I began to become involved in efforts to stop the war."

Civil society played an important role at the local, national and international levels in stopping the war in the first days of 1994 as well as in limiting subsequent violence (for example through the Peace Belts that provided security at peace talks and through the Civilian Peace Camps in indigenous communities). Civil society also worked to ensure that the peace process included a broad national dialogue.

However the enervation that resulted from the prolonged stalemate in the peace process and internal divisions, added to the weight of multiple national economic and social problems, have weakened civil society in recent years. Many analysts have also asserted that in order to make a qualitative leap, civil society must overcome its tendency to focus on short term reactions to events and the atomization that have inhibited the implementation of a more strategic vision. If it can meet this challenge, and especially in the wake of the dissolution of CONAI, civil society has the potential to become a key actor in creating new movement in the stalled peace process.

Coordination and Convergence

The strengthening of civil society in Chiapas continues today. The magnitude of the problems and the diversity of interests of the various civil society organizations has made it necessary to seek a greater degree of coordination among NGOs in order to be more effective. There have been a number of such attempts in the past. Recently 15 NGOs that work in Comitan and the border area came together to form the Comitan Network (Espacio Comitan). Another initiative is the "Forum: Let's Stop the War in Chiapas," made up of several NGOs from San Cristobal and Comitan. It brings together organizations from Chiapas that work on issues such as health, education, human rights, and gender, seeking to respond to the low intensity war there.

At the national level there are also several such coordination networks, each with its own area of work. The Convergence of Civil Organizations for Democracy (Convergencia de Organismos Civiles para la Democracia), for example, includes 140 groups in 16 states. It organized the participation of 39 groups in the government/EZLN peace talks. The Network of Civil Human Rights Organizations 'All Rights for Everyone' (Red de Organismos civiles de Derechos Humanos - Todos los Derechos para Todos) documents human rights abuses and publicizes them at the international level.

Tribunal against Violence and Impunity

A recent initiative is the National Assembly for Peace (Asamblea Nacional por la Paz) that was formed in August 1998 after the dissolution of CONAI. It includes the National Indigenous Congress, the Convergence of Civil Organizations for Democracy, and some churches. One of its most important projects is the Tribunal against Violence and Impunity that was proposed by Forum: Let's Stop the War in Chiapas. The formation of the tribunal is still in its preparatory stage. It is expected to get underway in 1999. According to the organizers, the initiative "...is a response of civil society to the violence against society and the indigenous peoples by the government and to the impunity enjoyed by those who break the law. The government does not fulfill its obligations, and this is what we wish to demonstrate through the tribunal, examining prototypical cases. In this way we want to manifest the dissent of civil society in the face of the government's argument that 'there is no war and there are no human rights violations in Chiapas.'"

Harassment and threats

Some civil society groups who seek nonviolent change for Mexico have been victims of a campaign of harassment and threats. Some have even abandoned the movement out of fear. Leaders and staff of NGOs receive threatening anonymous phone calls in their homes, as happened several times in September to Ana Valadez Ortega of Doctors of the World. Others observe that they are being followed by unknown persons, as in the case of the leaders of the group K'nal Antzetik in San Cristobal. The organization IDEFEM (Feminine Investigation and Development) in Comitan told SIPAZ that some authorities attempted to intimidate them and followed them on some of their trips to the rural communities where they work. In areas of paramilitary presence in the highlands, northern region and Lacandon jungle, some indigenous organizations continue to be threatened, and some leaders have been assassinated. In spite of the denunciation of these and other incidents, none of these killings have been solved.

Conclusion

The evolving awareness of broad sectors of Mexican society gave birth to a growing number of organizations and associations which have had wide-ranging impacts. In the face of the incapacity or ill will of the national and state authorities when it comes to solving the most pressing problems of the population, we see a certain coming together and coordination among the NGOs and other civil society groups in an effort to collaborate on seeking real solutions.

Civil society has been and continues to be a key actor in the democratization of Mexico. Other peoples may have a lot to learn from this process. It demonstrates the value of solidarity in a context where individualism reigns, that a society is the fruit of those who actively build it, and that the people are the makers both of the present and of the future they desire for their children.