:: SUMMARY
The Uncertainty of Peace
In the aftermath of the massacre of 45
unarmed Tsotsil Indians in Acteal last December, pressure
mounted to get the Chiapas peace process back on track. The
Mexican government filed criminal charges against alleged
paramilitary group members, the local mayor, and state police.
The government also forced the resignation of numerous state
officials, including the governor, and of the federal Interior
Minister, a powerful ruling party official. Doubts remain
about whether charges will be filed against higher level
officials suspected of criminal responsibility.
At the beginning of March, the governor of Chiapas announced
a peace initiative that was largely rejected by non-ruling
party sectors. Then in an effort to break the 18-month-old
stalemate in the peace process, President Zedillo introduced
his own legislation to implement the February 1996 San
Andres Accords on Indigenous Rights and Culture. His
proposed constitutional
reform diverges on a number of points from the legislative
proposal put forward in September 1996 by COCOPA, the congressional
mediation body. The EZLN had accepted that proposal, but
the government's refusal to do so has been a major obstacle
in the peace process.
Despite no longer having a congressional majority, the
ruling PRI is counting on the support of the center-right
PAN to
have enough votes to approve its constitutional reform.
The Zedillo administration argues that this reform reflects
a
Zapatista influence that is disproportionately large
in relation to the size or geographic scope of the Zapatistas.
Nonetheless
the unilateral nature of the proposal and the degree
to
which it is seen to compromise the San Andres Accords,
especially
in the interpretation of indigenous autonomy, exacerbate
the already explosive situation in Chiapas. CONAI, a
mediator in the peace talks, issued a detailed critique
of the government
proposal.The EZLN reiterated its conditions for resumption
of talks, key among which was implementation of the San
Andres Accords based on the COCOPA proposal.
Several other factors have further strained the fragile
social fabric of Chiapas in recent months. With the
exception of
those directly involved in the massacre, paramilitary
groups continue to operate with impunity in several
areas of Chiapas.
The Mexican Army presence has been stepped up, but
rather than reining in the paramilitary groups, the Army
has
appeared to target Zapatista strongholds. The January
publication
in the press of an alleged 1994 Army document calling
for assistance to paramilitary groups in order to undermine
support for the Zapatistas echoed what human rights
groups have long
charged. Meanwhile, the number of internal refugees
in Chiapas has grown to approximately 15,000, constituting
an alarming
social and political problem. The killings of several
peasant
leaders tied to opposition groups by unknown assailants
has further added to the tinderbox atmosphere.
The federal government's unilateral initiative has
been accompanied by efforts to weaken the role of
the mediation
bodies, COCOPA
and CONAI. Both groups have been charged repeatedly
with being partial, and Army officials even accused
Bishop
Samuel Ruiz, who heads CONAI, of being directly tied
to the organizational
structure of the EZLN.
Approval of the government's initiative would cast
into doubt not only the peace talks but their legal
structure
as well.
That raises the prospect of the Army being called
upon to disarm the insurgents. While the Zapatistas
are
not a formidable
military force, they do enjoy a high degree of
support in some areas, and they would not be expected
to
submit quietly.
Meanwhile the paramilitary groups appear ready
to go to war to defend their interests. What has been
a tense
situation
could quickly explode.
In January, large-scale demonstrations in Mexico
and in many other countries repudiated the Acteal
massacre.
As
international
criticism grew, the Mexican government stepped
up an anti-foreigner campaign through harassment,
expulsions,
and an intense
media effort. This campaign raises fears that
the government
seeks
to shield Chiapas from international view. However
the government insists it is only enforcing laws
against foreign meddling
in domestic politics.
The government did allow the visit of 200 human
rights observers. The delegation's sharply critical
conclusions
will help shape
the debate in Europe about Mexicós compliance with
human rights criteria as a condition for approval of a major
trade agreement. Mexicós human rights record was further
tarnished with the release of a U.N. report detailing the
widespread and unchecked use of torture by military and police
forces.
In March nearly 350 religious leaders from the
U.S. and 13 other countries released a statement
calling
upon
the Mexican
and U.S. governments "to demilitarize the conflict and
achieve a negotiated resolution." The statement also
criticized a "pattern of government tolerance" for
paramilitary activities.
With the peace process in crisis, developments
over the next few months may well fix the
future course
of the
conflict and the prospects for a just and
lasting peace.
Recommended Action
- Urge the Zedillo administration
to:
- suspend its proposal for constitutional reform until
a proposal based on the San Andres Accords
is produced that reflects a consensus among the parties
in
conflict;
- order a substantial reduction of the Army presence
in the conflict areas in Chiapas
as an authentic and concrete sign
of its will to dialogue.
- recognize and respect the efforts of human rights
workers and international observers whose
work offers substantial support to the peace process.
- Ask the COCOPA to renew its efforts to maintain its
unity with regard to its proposals and actions and
to continue its facilitative efforts in the peace
process, prioritizing
the commitment to peace over partisan politics.
- Circulate information, such as this Report, on the
situation in Chiapas.
Please write:
Lic.
Ernesto Zedillo Ponce de León
Presidente de la República
Palacio Nacional
06067 México, DF - México
Fax: (int-52) (5) 271 1764 / 515 4783
Francisco Labastida Ochoa
Secretario de Gobernación
Bucareli 99, 1o. piso
Col. Juárez
06699 México, DF - México
Fax: (int-52) (5) 546 5350 / 546 7380
Comisión de Concordia y Pacificación
Paseo de la Reforma # 10, piso 17
México, DF - México
Fax: (int-52) (5) 535 27 26
:: UPDATE
Chiapas: the Uncertainty
of Peace
In March, with the presentation by the Zedillo administration
to the Mexican Congress of a unilateral proposal for constitutional
reforms regarding indigenous rights and culture, the peace
process in Chiapas entered into one of its most serious
crises.
Meanwhile, the growing militarization and paramilitarization
of Chiapas and the approximately 15,000 internal refugees
with no short-term hope of returning home only made the
situation more explosive. With the killings of several
peasant leaders
and other outbreaks of violence in the northern region,
the warning signs multiplied.
Proposals of the Government
Since the beginning
of the year, the federal government maintained a constant
presence in the communications
media. On January
16 in Nayarit, President Zedillo said that it would
be an error to establish constitutional distinctions
for the Indians, "...treating
them as though they were not equal to other Mexicans." A
week later in the Yucatan, he declared that there
will not be a military solution in Chiapas. On January
31 in Switzerland,
he stated that the violence in Chiapas is caused
by confrontations between the EZLN (Zapatista
Army of National Liberation) "and
other groups." He added that
the treatment that the government had given to the
problem "had
been exemplary." In a February interview with
The New York Times , he lamented that the federal
government had
not had a stronger presence in Chiapas and that "we
have been too soft for the good of the negotiations," but
that that was no longer appropriate.
On March 1, the federal government presented its
four ("indispensable" according
to the Interior Minister) observations regarding the constitutional
reform proposed by COCOPA (Commission for Agreement and Pacification;
the commission created by the Mexican Congress to assist
the peace talks.) The government insisted that its concerns
were aimed at preserving national sovereignty, the integrity
of the national territory, the functioning of the distinct
levels of government, and respect for the law regarding the
communications media.
On March 14, President Zedillo announced a legislative
proposal regarding indigenous rights and culture
that, according to
the government, combined the positions of all
the political parties, the observations of the federal
government,
and the COCOPA proposal. The Interior Minister,
Francisco Labastida
Ochoa, said that with this proposal the government
would fulfill the San Andres Accords and that
if
the peace
talks were not renewed, the government unilaterally
could declare
peace in Chiapas. He added that it is not up
to the Zapatistas to define the system in Mexico but
rather
to all Mexicans.
The center-left opposition PRD (Party
of the Democratic Revolution) accused the government
of violating
the principle of bilaterality.
In response, the ruling PRI (Party of the
Institutional Revolution) blamed the PRD for wanting to prolong
the conflict in order
to gain an electoral advantage.
Earlier in March, the PAN (center-right
National Action Party) had presented its own legislative
proposal regarding
indigenous
rights and culture. A committee made up of
representatives from both parties is charged
with drafting a
bill that combines the two proposals.
Senator Pablo Salazar Mendiguchia, a PRI
representative on COCOPA, suggested a different
approach.
He proposed that
Civic Alliance, known for its election
monitoring, hold a referendum so that the indigenous
communities could
vote on the various proposals.
Also in March, the governor of Chiapas
presented his "State
Accord for Reconciliation." His initiative was immediately
supported by groups tied to the PRI while other groups rejected
it as a unilateral proposal.
Campaign Against CONAI and COCOPA
Currently both CONAI (National
Mediation Commission, headed by Bishop Samuel
Ruiz) and COCOPA are
in a weakened position.
The year began with a new campaign
against Bishop Ruiz. PRI members and Chiapas
business people
called for
his resignation
from CONAI. Military intelligence
disclosed "proof" of
clergy-EZLN ties in the form of Bibles published by the diocese
found in safe houses searched by the military in Altamirano.
The commander of the Seventh Military Region also directly
accused Bishop Ruiz of ties to the EZLN.
COCOPA was also the target of multiple
attacks. The PRI president of the
Indigenous Affairs
Committee of the
Congress criticized
its work as "inefficient" and "protagonistic." PAN
members stated that the San Andres Accords should be re-interpreted,
and they questioned the role of COCOPA. Recently, together
with the PRI, the PAN threatened to withdraw its representatives
from COCOPA if the peace talks are not re-established.
On January 11 CONAI called on the
government to dissolve the paramilitary
groups
and to refrain from ambiguous
statements and double messages.
On January 22 COCOA
and CONAI proposed
ten "indispensable conditions" for renewing the
talks, among them the fulfillment of the San Andres Accords;
respect for the Law for Dialogue, Conciliation and a Just
Peace in Chiapas (the legal framework for the peace talks);
a reduction of the military presence in Chiapas; and the
disarming of the paramilitary groups and punishment of those
responsible for the Acteal massacre.
In March, in spite of being weakened
by a lack of internal consensus,
COCOPA again
requested
an "urgent" meeting
with the EZLN and clarified that it was not going to draft
a new legislative proposal.
On March 17 CONAI stated, "The
procedure with which the constitutional reform is being
advanced...is incongruent
and in violation of the spirit
of the dialogue process and of peace." Moreover, "it departs" from the
San Andres Accords (see accompanying table). According to
CONAI, the manner in which the government is acting opens
the possibility that the Law for Dialogue could be rescinded
and that military action could begin.
In response, the PRI and
the PAN criticized the "partiality" of
CONAI. The government coordinator for the dialogue, Emilio
Rabasa Gamboa, commented that CONAI "does
not fulfill its mediating
function when it promotes
the positions of
the Zapatistas."
EZLN: A Dialogue of the
Deaf
The EZLN is increasingly
isolated. In January,
it declared, "We
do not want everything.
We only want the fulfillment
of what the government
has signed and which
is well known. We only
want that COCOPA should
honor its word and
defend its initiative." In
February the EZLN reiterated
that it will not accept
modifications to the COCOPA
proposal.
At the beginning of
March, Subcommander
Marcos commented
that the conditions
stated in 1996
for renewing the
talks continue to
be in effect: the fulfillment
of the San
Andres Accords and
the activation of
COSEVER (Commission
of
Follow-up and Verification);
serious
proposals for the
next round of talks on
Democracy and
Justice;
a cessation
of the
military and paramilitary
harassment; an independent
government
representative
to the talks; and
the release of the
Zapatista political
prisoners.
On January 24, 300
prisoners were
freed. However,
none of them were
part of
the support base
of the Zapatistas.
In
the following weeks,
11 political prisoners
obtained
their
freedom. Thirty-seven
more remain in
jail.
An "Army of Peace"?
(President Zedillo, February
20)
At the beginning
of the year,
in the aftermath
of the Acteal
massacre,
military
officials
announced that
they would
apply "indiscriminately" the
Federal Firearms and Explosives Law. That would violate the
Law for Dialogue which recognizes that the disarming of the
Zapatistas would be the undoing of the peace talks. Francisco
Labastida, the new Interior Minister, also announced the
disarming of "all
armed groups." Subsequently
he clarified that this
would not include the EZLN.
On January
21 the Minister
of National
Defense
announced
that the Army
will remain
in
Chiapas "as
long as necessary," and
he stated that he was unaware
of the existence of any
paramilitary groups. Subsequently
he said that weapons should
not be allowed
to do the talking. However
an escalation of the militarization
is observable: new checkpoints,
intensification of patrols,
low-level over flights,
etc. According to CONAI,
there are currently 70,000
troops in Chiapas. On February
20, in a
celebration of the 85th
anniversary of the Army,
President Zedillo said
that the Mexican Army will
be the guarantor
of the dialogue and will
avoid falling into provocations.
Controversy
about the
role of
the Army in
Chiapas
was heightened
when Proceso,
a leading
Mexican
intellectual
weekly,
published what it claimed
to be
an October
1994
Mexican
Army document
calling
for "the advising and support of the self-defense
forces
or other paramilitary groups" in order "to
break the
support relationship that exists between the population
and the
[Zapatista Army]." The
Mexican Defense Ministry
denied its authenticity.
National
and International
Civil
Society
After
the Acteal
massacre,
national
civil
society
staged
a number
of
demonstrations
calling
for an
end to
the
violence
in Chiapas.
In addition
a Pilgrimage
for
Peace
went
from
Chiapas
to Mexico
City.
More
than
500
indigenous
Catholics
participated
from
the 42
parishes
of the
Diocese
of San
Cristobal.
The international
community
also
manifested
its
repudiation of
Acteal
through
many
marches,
protests
and
scathing
media
commentary.
On
January 12 protests
took
place
in
27 countries
as
part of a
Day
of International
Solidarity.
In
the United
States,
the
demonstrators
demanded
an
end to military
assistance
to
Mexico. In
the
last two
years,
Mexico
has
sent
384
officials
to
the U.S.
School
of
the Americas
(a
center for military
training,
including
counterinsurgency.)
On
January
15,
the
European
Parliament
passed
a
resolution condemning
the
Acteal
massacre.
It
noted
the
lack
of
response
of
the
security
forces
that
should
have
prevented
or
stopped
the
massacre,
and
it
demanded
the
punishment
of
those
responsible
and
the
dissolution
of
the
paramilitary
groups.
In
March the
new Minister
of Foreign
Relations, Rosario
Green, said
in Brussels
that there
are no
obstacles to
the ratification
of the
trade agreement
between Mexico
and the
European Union.
At the
same time,
Mexican non-governmental
organizations visited
Europe to
make presentations
on the
human rights
situation to
the European
Parliament and
to the
Human Rights
Commission of
the United
Nations.
Beginning
in February,
there was
an increase
in the
campaign against
the international
presence in
Chiapas: harassment
by immigration
officials, defamation
in the
communications media,
expulsion of
human rights
observers and
of the
French parish
priest, Michel
Chanteau, who
had worked
in Chenalho
for 32
years. An
indigenous person
from the
northern region
was murdered,
apparently by
the paramilitary
group Peace
and Justice,
after having
given his
testimony to
members of
the International
Civil Commission
(a delegation
of 200
observers who
visited Chiapas
in mid-February.)
In
March, nearly
350 religious
leaders from
the U.S.
and around
the world
issued a
joint statement,
initiated by
SIPAZ, urging
the Mexican
and U.S.
governments to
take resolute
action "to de-militarize the conflict and achieve
a negotiated resolution" in Chiapas and to address the "pattern
of tolerance" for
paramilitary groups like
the one responsible for
the Acteal massacre.
:: ANALYSIS
Is a Unilateral Peace Possible?
Never since the
beginning of the peace talks in 1995 has the specter of war
hung so heavily over Chiapas. Never have the actors in the
conflict so polarized their positions as they have in the
first months of this year. With the Zedillo administration's
unilateral legislative proposal on Indigenous Rights and
Culture, the very legal framework of the peace talks has
become uncertain.
The federal government is attempting to fulfill the San
Andres Accords on its own. Ironically, for more than
two years the
government has refused to recognize what its negotiators
had signed, at least in the form in which COCOPA presented
it.
urrently the government is facing a great
deal of pressure, both at the national and international
levels,
to resolve
the conflict in Chiapas. Charges of human rights violations,
escalating political violence, the perception of uncertainty
and instability - all cast a long shadow over the Zedillo
administration, especially as the PRI looks toward the
national elections of 2000. With this initiative, the
government seeks
to find a short cut to a resolution of the conflict. In
order to sell its plan, the government has orchestrated
a media
campaign, especially in those media outlets that it controls,
assailing the EZLN for "blocking peace," CONAI "for
losing its impartiality," and COCOPA "for
not having done its work well." If the government's initiative is approved, the principle
of bilaterality will be lost. In that case, the peace
process will be at risk, along with the support of the
mediators
(CONAI) and co-adjutants (COCOPA). That would open up
the worrisome prospect that the Law for Dialogue, Conciliation
and a Just Peace in Chiapas would be derogated in order
to permit the "legal" disarming of the Zapatistas
and the use of military force in the event that they resist.
If this were to happen in this high-risk moment, the
likelihood of a return to armed conflict between the
EZLN and the
Army would be very high. And given that the Zapatistas
are of
the communities, rather than apart from them, we could
expect a guerrilla-style war in which the indigenous
communities would be forced to take the brunt of what
might well be
a
prolonged counterinsurgency campaign.
In these sadly unhopeful terms, the words of PRI Senator
and COCOPA member Pablo Salazar Mendiguchia sound with
singular terror and crude realism: "No one today
can guarantee that there will not be another Acteal."
We note that with the horrific massacre in Acteal and
other events of brutal violence in that area and in other
parts
of Chiapas, the only sure thing that has come from the
first quarter of 1998 is an enormous social uncertainty.
In Chiapas we see the continuation of a "low-intensity" war,
although the cost is very high for the indigenous communities.
They are the ones who supply the victims of this war and
who suffer the most as a result of the presence of the security
forces. They are also the targets of aggression and constant
threats by the growing number of paramilitary groups that
operate at the fringes of the law, sometimes with the support
of the security forces themselves, as became clear in Acteal
and as has been asserted for the last two years with regard
to the "Peace and Justice" group in the northern
region of Chiapas.
The role of international observers in the most violent
parts of the state becomes more important in view of
so many human
rights violations. The current campaign against foreigners
has resulted in the expulsion of dozens of persons in
the last two years, among them individuals who have offered
their pastoral services to indigenous communities for
many
years
as part of the Diocese of San Cristobal. The government
accuses the foreigners of meddling in internal politics.
However,
the scope and intensity of the campaign, especially when
considered in the light of the actual activities of the
accused, raise fears that the government is attempting
to carry on
a war without witnesses.
In this context, the "State
Accord for Reconciliation" promoted
by the governor of Chiapas has been seen by many sectors,
including the opposition parties, as an attempt to show the
international community a prompt response to the Acteal massacre
and as a means of preparing the ground for the local elections
in October and the national presidential elections in 2000.
The international community has been attentive, playing
a very important role, especially following the Acteal
massacre.
In particular the European Union has communicated its
protests and concerns regarding the increase of the violence
and
the lack of progress in the peace process. In connection
with
the ratification of the trade agreement with Mexico,
these declarations may be a significant factor in moving
the
Mexican government to renew the peace talks and to advance
toward
a peace that guarantees the sustainable and just development
of the Mexican people, especially those sectors - such
as the indigenous - who are most marginalized and impoverished.
Never in the history of Mexico has the theme of indigenous
rights been in the center of national attention. As this
historic debate unfolds in the Congress, war and peace
hang in the balance. As Senator Salazar commented in
an interview, "An
initiative may be perfect in a technical sense, but it
doesn't do any good if it does not lead to peace."
:: FEATURE
Days of Desperation: The Internal Refugees of Chiapas from the Northern Region to the
Highlands
Beginning in 1995
with the appearance of paramilitary groups like Peace
and Justice and Los Chinchulines in the northern region of Chiapas,
thousands of Chol Indians abandoned their homes as a result
of violence and death threats. At the end of 1997, there
were more than 4,200 displaced persons in that region. Over
the last year, new paramilitary groups began to appear in
other areas such as the Chiapas highlands, generating a significant
increase in the number of displaced. Between May and December,
approximately 6,000 Tsotsiles and Tseltales fled their communities
in the county of Chenalho in the highlands. After the Acteal
massacre in December 1997, 4,000 more fled their homes in
the face of paramilitary threats. It is estimated that currently
the number of displaced in Chiapas is approximately 15,000.
In the northern region, the majority of the displaced are
in the counties of Tila and Sabanilla. In the highlands
there are 14 displaced communities in the area around
Polho, headquarters
of the autonomous Zapatista county government of Chenalho.
The largest refugee camp is in Polho itself. There are
other camps in Acteal and X'oyep and three camps in San
Cristobal
de las Casas.
The majority of the displaced in the highlands belong to
Las Abejas (the Bees, the group that was the target
of the Acteal massacre) or are Zapatista sympathizers. In
the northern
region, many are members or supporters of the center-left
opposition PRD (Party of the Democratic Revolution).
According to them, the problem often starts when members
of the PRI (the ruling Party of the Institutional
Revolution)
forcefully demand that members of other parties or
organizations join their group. They impose mandatory
contributions
of from 30 to 300 pesos a week and that money is used
to buy
arms. They give an ultimatum: "cooperate,
flee or die."
Not all the displaced belong to the same side in the
conflict. Recently some Chol families who belong
to Peace and Justice
were expelled from their homes in the county of Tila
and hundreds of PRI members were displaced in Ocosingo,
Chilon,
Altamirano and Chenalho by Zapatistas or Zapatista
sympathizers.
However, and even though there are not official figures,
a basic knowledge or a quick visit to these areas
reveals that the number of displaced who are ruling
party supporters
is a definite minority.
A life of sadness
One factor shared in common by the displaced is
their suffering. When they flee their communities,
they
leave all their
belongings. And when they arrive at their places
of refuge, they find
a hopeless existence: common sicknesses become
more debilitating; clothing, shelter and food
are precarious
and insufficient;
they have no economically productive activities;
at times there is no water; and rarely are
there any schools.
One grave example of what it means to be displaced
is X'oyep, a camp of about 1,000 persons
who are members of Las Abejas
. They arrived at X'oyep on foot, most of
them having walked all night in the mud and rain.
One child was
born
during
the journey.
Each of the 32 families who lived in X'oyep
took some of the refugees into their home,
even though
there
was not
sufficient space. The women, who between
them had two mills and a few
comales (pan used for cooking), have to
make tortillas day and night so that there is
enough for everyone.
The cramped
quarters and the lack of water, combined
with the frigid winter temperatures in
the highlands,
produce
sickness.
Approximately 80% of the children and 60%
of the adults suffer from fever.
Flu, respiratory ailments, dysentery, diarrhea,
gastroenteritis, and typhus multiply, and
there is a high risk of
cholera. On a daily basis the four community
health workers
attend to hundreds of sick. However without
sufficient medicine,
their efforts are inadequate. In one two-week
period, there were six deaths caused by
curable diseases.
As one woman
said, "There is always sadness
[here]. We want to return to our homes."
To make the situation worse, the violence
in the county of Chenalho caused the
loss of 90%
of the
coffee crop.
Speaking
through tears of pain and sadness, Maria,
a displaced person from Quextic now staying
in
San Cristobal,
told us, "My
coffee field was left behind...the fruit
was so pretty."
At the end of January, 115 displaced
persons from the community of Canolal,
members
of Las Abejas
, arrived
on the outskirts
of San Cristobal to take refuge in
a camp where there were already 100 displaced
from Quextic.
Now 239
people live
together in dormitories, sharing one
kitchen.
They don't have money
or work or hope. Some of their houses
were burned by their aggressors, and
their livestock,
crops,
and belongings
were stolen. They are not accustomed
to the cold at the altitude
of San Cristobal, and sickness proliferates.
Maria, who lost her daughter in the
Acteal massacre and
today takes
care
of her three orphan grandchildren,
reflected, "It seems
like we are not Christians. It seems
that we are animals."
The controversy around humanitarian
aid
Because of a lack of trust, the majority
of the refugees do not accept aid
from the federal
government.
For
example, the representatives of
X'oyep protested that the materials
for latrines given by the government
were broken and in deplorable condition.
In
addition a
woman showed
us candy
that the government
had sent for the children.that
had mold and worms on it.
Out of the same fear, the communities
reject the aid that comes from
the Mexican Army.
On January
2 soldiers
arrived
in X'oyep to offer food but the
community refused to accept it.
The next day,
the troops returned
with reinforcements.
This time they tried to enter
the community, but the people
mobilized in an organized manner
to impede their entry. According
to the
testimony
of the residents,
the soldiers
lifted up
the dresses of five women, beat
some of the men, and walked on
the feet
of people
without
shoes.
A helicopter
arrived.
Because the soldiers were wearing
gas masks, the people thought
that they
were going
to launch tear
gas. In
spite of the
danger, the unarmed community,
with women and children in the
forefront,
did not
permit the
helicopter
to land nor
the soldiers to enter.
The troops did not go far away.
For several weeks after that,
a group
of about 15
soldiers wearing
an armband
that said "Social
Work" worked on widening the road to X'oyep. One kilometer
outside of X'oyep there is a military post where cooked food
and medical attention is offered. On average four people
go each day. Sometimes nobody goes. One woman from X'oyep
told us that the only thing that the Army is good for is
to intimidate the people. "We
were afraid of their weapons...and
we don't want to live with
the Army. It would be better
if they just left. We don't
want them to stay, because
they
did not come to solve the problem."
In Chiapas there is a long
history of co-optation and
dependency
through which
the federal
government gives
assistance at
certain times, asking in
exchange the unconditional support of
the people.
Several groups of
the displaced, for example
Las Abejas , refuse this
official aid because they say that if
they accept
it, the government
will
demand that
they be
silent and not make any complaints.
In addition, several persons
commented to
us that if they
accept the aid,
the government will use that
fact as propaganda.
On the other hand, humanitarian
aid arrives from other
sources such as
churches,
Mexican and international
non-governmental organizations,
and the Mexican Red Cross.
The problem
is that that aid is often
inadequate or inappropriate.
According
to officials of the autonomous
county of Polho, for example,
in January
the displaced
received
medicines
from the
Mexican Red Cross that
were out-dated. They commented, "If they
couldn't kill us with bullets,
now they want to kill our women and children with medicine
that is useless or dangerous."
No escape from the threats
The displaced refugees
in San Cristobal say
that they
continue
to be threatened
by the
PRI paramilitaries
who come around
their refugee camp
and intimidate them, saying
things like, "We
are going to finish off [ Las Abejas ] once and for all." The
displaced have repeatedly expressed their fear at having
seen in the streets the very persons whose threats caused
them to flee their communities in the first place: "They
walk around happy as
can be."
The situation is complicated
by the family ties
that cross political
divisions. Sometimes
the displaced have
members
of their own family
who are making threats.
Vicente, from Quextic,
has a brother-in-law
who
is with
the
PRI who "goes
around with his AK-47" and who participated in the Acteal
massacre in which Vicentés pregnant cousin was killed.
Uncertain future
In Sabanilla, the
displaced have
engaged in a series
of meetings
with the state
Secretary of
Government.
As a result,
in February
some of the displaced
in the northern
region returned
to
their places
of origin.
However, many
more are awaiting
the
punishment
of those who
are guilty
and a more
secure environment before
they return.
They ask, for
example, that
the paramilitary
groups be
disarmed.
Meanwhile the
physical
and mental consequences
are increasingly
worrisome.
The displaced
express
profound
emotions
of sorrow and
suffering. "I don't know where I am going to die," were
the words of one young man. And in spite of all that, these
people continue to resist, defending life and showing what
it means to live with dignity.
Las Abejas (the Bees) Continue to Fly:
Promoting Peace in Times of War
On December 22 of
last year, 45 displaced indigenous persons were massacred
by a paramilitary group in Acteal in the county of Chenalho.
News of this brutal massacre spread around the world and
provoked a great deal of indignation both in Mexico and internationally. "How
could those innocent and unarmed Indians be slaughtered,
in the very act of praying and fasting for peace?"
The victims were members of Sociedad Civil Las Abejas (The
Bees Civil Society), an organization that struggles for
a just and dignified peace using nonviolent means.
Who are the members of this organization? Why did they
make such a clear choice for nonviolent means of struggle?
Were
they innocent and defenseless? Did they know the consequences
of this kind of struggle?
Here we present a profile of Las Abejas and their peaceful
struggle through the testimony of the Catholic catechists
of the group who also serve as its spokespersons.
History
The history of Las Abejas began in 1992 when there
was a land conflict in the community of Tzanembolom
in the
county
of Chenalho. An inherited parcel was to be divided
between a brother and two sisters. The brother
did not want to
share the inheritance with his sisters because
they were women.
He wanted them to renounce their rights of inheritance
to the land. As is the custom, the community held
an assembly and decided that the land should be divided
in three equal
parts. The brother was not in agreement, and he
promised part of the property to some friends, including
some
from other communities. This group began to threaten
the rest
of the community with violence. In response, the
residents
of Tzanembolom took the initiative of visiting
neighboring communities to propose the formation of an
organization
that
would enable them to defend themselves in case
of attack. On December 9, 1992, 22 representatives met
in
Tzajalchen
to form the organization Las Abejas.
After the meeting three persons were attacked and
shot. One of them died and two were seriously
wounded. Instead
of arresting
the suspected attackers (the dissatisfied brother
and his friends), the authorities arrested, without
warrant,
five
persons who had participated in the meeting,
accusing them of being responsible for the violence in
the
area. The
prisoners were taken to San Cristobal de las
Casas.
Las Abejas organized a pilgrimage to San Cristobal
and set up a vigil in the cathedral plaza. "For
six days we marched from there to the jail,
with prayers, drums, and
Indian music. Later indigenous brothers and
sisters from Simojovel, San Andres, Chalchihuitan
and Pantelho
joined
us."
Finally the state attorney general's office
felt obliged to free the detained for lack
of evidence.
Las Abejas
Las Abejas explain their name in this way: "We came
together in 1992 because we are a multitude and we want to
build our house like the honeycomb where we all work collectively
and we all enjoy the same thing, producing honey for everyone.
So we are like the bees in one hive. We don't allow divisions,
and we all march together with our queen, which is the reign
of God, although we knew from the beginning that the work
would be slow but sure." There is another interpretation
of the symbolism of the bee: "It
is a very small animal that stings. Our
struggle is a struggle of peaceful
stings."
After this initial success, Las Abejas
continued to organize. Now it has groups
in 25 communities
in Chenalho
with
a total of 4,000 members, the large
majority of them Catholic.
During
its five-year history, Las Abejas has
strengthened other organizations in
the region, such
as health, human rights,
alternative marketing, women's, and
musical groups. As part of their struggle, Las
Abejas practices "civil resistance." Members
do not pay their electrical bills nor land taxes. They decided
not to accept aid from the government until the government
fulfills the San Andres Accords and there is a just and dignified
peace in Chiapas. "We also
don't obey the county and state governments
because we did not elect them
and they
are not just."
Las Abejas and the Zapatistas
After the Zapatista uprising in 1994,
Las Abejas participated in the
Peace Belts
(protection offered by civil society
during the talks between the EZLN
and the Mexican
government.) However
Las Abejas did not become Zapatistas.
Instead they decided to remain
a civil movement. "Just as the
body has two eyes, two hands, two
legs, the society has to have two legs.
The EZLN is one and we as civilians
are the other. We are not EZLN because we don't follow
its orders.
We are committed
to peaceful struggle and not with weapons."
The Zapatistas accept the path
of Las Abejas because "For
them [the EZLN] the participation of civil society is very
important." Las Abejas decided to participate in the
FZLN (Zapatista Front for National Liberation) as Sociedad
Civil Las Abejas. The Zapatistas and Las Abejas have the
same goals, but "our way is different. We believe in
the Word of God. We know how to read the Bible. We must love
our enemy; we cannot kill. Above all, we are all poor peasants,
brothers and sisters." In times of conflict Las Abejas
always seeks dialogue. "We have the same language, so
we can talk together to resolve our conflicts." They
are well aware of the risks they run, because as they say, "We
are the cushion between the government
and the Zapatistas..., if this
cushion tears, it is easier for
the government
to attack our brothers in the EZLN."
The violence that does not end
During the violence unleashed
in Chenalho in the last months
of
1997, Las Abejas
members painted on their
houses: "civil
society, neutral zone." For them "neutral" means
that they do not want to be part of the violence between
the PRI supporters and the Zapatistas. They did that because, "We
do not want problems, we
do not carry arms, we want
dialogue. We know other means
of struggle. But the PRI
supporters did
not respect that. They burned
our houses and stole our
harvest."
The majority of the members
of Las Abejas had to flee
their homes and
communities
as a result
of
the threats,
harassment
and attacks of the paramilitary
groups. Now they live in
refugee camps in
Acteal, X'oyep,
Tzajalchen
and
San Cristobal.
In these camps they reject
the
humanitarian aid that comes
from the government. "First we want them to punish those
responsible for the massacre," they
say. Martyrdom in Acteal
All of the victims of the
Acteal massacre were
from Las Abejas.
The survivors
believe that
they were
chosen because
it was
known "...that we do not have arms to defend ourselves.
In previous attacks of PRI members against Zapatistas, some
PRI members were also killed." The victims knew that
they were going to be attacked because they had received
a warning the day before. "But
we decided to trust in
God, and we began to
pray in the church. Now
we
know that
they are martyrs. We
are going to build a
sanctuary for them in
Acteal. We know that
God received the 45
and that God
is preparing to receive
us also. Because the
struggle continues. We
are not afraid to die.
We are ready to
die, but not to
kill. If God permits
us some more days here,
all right. If not, that
is all right also."
Las Abejas is not a weak
and defenseless group,
as some
people say and as
they were seen by
the paramilitary
killers. To
the contrary: in a
situation increasingly dominated
by the logic of violence,
Las
Abejas has become a
dangerous and
threatening actor, "armed with the love of God," that
breaks with the philosophy of "an eye for an eye" and
unmasks, with its peaceful attitude, the illegitimate violence
of power that it confronts. "Some
of us died, sowing
the seed of peace for
others. We know that
the
struggle continues
in our children. And
now the whole world
knows us and understands
us. In spite of what
happened in Acteal,
we believe in our
struggle."
The
Investigation of the Acteal
Massacre
Achievements
and Obstacles Three
months after the December
1997 Acteal massacre, which
left 45 dead and 25 wounded,
the investigation to identify
those responsible is still
in an initial stage.
The Attorney General reveals
irregularities
The federal attorney general's
office, which assumed responsibility
for the investigation,
disclosed a number of irregularities
and illegalities that began
months before the massacre.
According to state police
officials stationed in
Los Chorros near the massacre
site, that police post
protected armed civilian
groups tied to the ruling
PRI and helped them to
obtain and transport high-caliber
weapons. Police commander
Felipe Vasquez Espinoza
said that he had received
orders "from above" to
undertake these activities.
The National Human Rights
Commission (CNDH), which
first visited the area
in May of last year, had
asked state authorities
to take precautionary measures
to protect those displaced
by the violence. Along
with other human rights
groups, the CNDH believes
that if such measures had
been taken in time, the
massacre could have been
prevented.
A preliminary report of
the attorney general's
office revealed that the
bodies were collected on
the early morning of December
23 without protecting the
crime scene, without the
involvement of experts
in rural criminal investigation,
without photographic documentation
of the bodies, and without
documenting where shell
casings were found. All
of these procedural irregularities
took place in the presence
of state police authorities
and state attorney general
officials.
Contradictory statements
Statements to the CNDH
by state officials and
high-level police officials
revealed numerous contradictions
and inconsistencies - to
the point of accusing each
other- in an effort to
avoid direct responsibility.
General Jorge Gamboa Solis,
ex-coordinator of police,
altered documents that
might have contained information
necessary to clarify events.
The state Minister of Government,
Homero Tovilla Cristiani,
gave contradictory accounts
regarding the time at which
he ordered an investigation
of the reports of violence
in Acteal.
With regard to the collection
of the bodies, there are
three distinct versions
which involve among others
the ex-Assistant Secretary
of Government, Uriel Jarquin
Galvez, the Assistant Attorney
General for Indigenous
Justice, David Gomez Hernandez,
and the state police commander
in the area. As the CNDH
coordinator for San Cristobal
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