:: SUMMARY
Violence Spreads like an Epidemic in Chiapas
In the absence of
progress in the peace process, the violence in Chiapas has
worsened in recent months. It reached an unprecedented level
of brutality on December 22 when paramilitary forces tied
to the ruling PRI massacred 45 displaced Tzozil Indians.
A serious escalation had already occurred on November 4
when a caravan in which Bishops Samuel Ruiz and Raul
Vera were
traveling in the northern region of Chiapas was ambushed.
Three pastoral workers were wounded in the attack that
was apparently the work of a paramilitary group active
in the
area. Two days later Bishop Ruiz' sister was severely beaten.
These attacks underscore the degree to which Ruiz has become
the target of a relentless defamation campaign, thus increasing
his own personal vulnerability as well as that of the peace
process that he represents.
Unresolved conflicts have exploded in sporadic violence
in the isolated northern region. Paramilitary groups,
whether assisted by security forces or simply tolerated
by them,
operate with impunity.
Even more troubling is that the violence has extended
to other areas such as Chenalho in the Chiapas highlands.
Dozens of people have been killed and at least 6000
forced to flee
their homes because of recent fighting. An observation
mission in which SIPAZ participated at the end of November
met with
several hundred of the internal refugees and reported: " .
. . they have only torn plastic sheeting to protect
them from the constant rain, and they only have the
clothes on
their backs . . . They don't have food or clean drinking
water . . . All of their personal belongings were stolen
or burned."
The Acteal massacre marked a new low point in the deteriorating
situation. The paramilitary forces appeared dressed
in clean, black uniforms, many of them carrying high-powered
weapons
restricted to army use. They hunted down, shot and
mutilated
their unarmed victims, 36 of them women and children,
over a five-hour period. For most of that time, state
police
stood by in a nearby school, ignoring pleas to intervene
from witnesses
who escaped the carnage.
On December 23, President Zedillo harshly condemned
the attack and announced that the federal government
would
take over
the investigation. Subsequently, 46 suspects were
arrested, including the PRI Mayor of Chenalho,
Jacinto Arias
Cruz. In addition, Chiapas Governor Julio Cesar
Ruiz Ferro
and federal Interior Minister Emilio Chuayffet
resigned amid
accusations regarding their failure to prevent
the massacre.
In the days following the massacre, 5000 more soldiers
were sent to Chiapas, including 2000 more to
Chenalho. Also, 3500
refugees streamed into Polho, a base of Zapatista
support close to Acteal.
Despite the massive army and police presence,
paramilitary groups and PRI supporters continued
to threaten
and intimidate. In one incident, massacre witnesses
were
impeded from
traveling to give testimony. In another a caravan
of humanitarian
aid going to the refugees was stopped and several
people were
temporarily taken hostage.
Meanwhile the army entered a number of Zapatista
strongholds, including La Realidad, searching
for arms and conducting
interrogations in what some called a violation
of the the 1995 law governing the peace process.
Several
indigenous
communities protested the increased military
presence.
Some analysts argue that these conflicts
are in fact part of an official strategy
to weaken
communities
who have
demonstrated support for the EZLN. Given
the predictable negative fallout
from the massacre, both within Mexico and
abroad, it appears implausible that it
was ordered
by federal officials. However,
the escalating violence throughout the
northern region
and the highlands, the brazen ambush of
the bishops' caravan, the growing tension and
violence in
Chenalho, coupled with
the lack of official response made the
massacre itself predictable.
Far from curbing the paramilitary groups,
in July state
government officials granted one of the
largest ones, "Peace and
Justice," US$580,000.
All of this feeds the impression that the
paramilitary presence is part of a larger
political strategy
of waging low-intensity
warfare in Chiapas while stalling on
peace talks and watching national and international
attention
dissipate.
As a Mexican "senior
official" told the Los Angeles Times in August, "Chiapas
has disappeared as a public theme. It's
become a local, contained issue. It's
not a problem of national policy but
of security."
Since the massacre, the Mexican government
continues to send conflicting signals.
On the one hand
the government initiates
a federal-level investigation, calls
for a renewal of the
peace talks, and offers new proposals.
On the other hand, it refuses to implement
the
existing
San
Andres Accords,
it fails to contain the continuing
intimidation and violence of the paramilitary groups,
and instead targets Zapatista
communities in aggressive actions that
push legal limits.
The implications of the appointment
of Francisco Labastida Ochoa as the
new
Interior Minister
are unclear. His
predecessor, Emilio Chuayffet, was
widely viewed as a key impediment
to progress in the peace talks. Clearly
his resignation and
that of Chiapas Governor Ruiz Ferro
reflect the fact that Chiapas is
not a "local, contained issue." Labastida
Ochoa promised a renewed, concerted peace effort. However
he is viewed by some as a hard-liner. Moreover, the raid
on the Zapatista strongholds on the day he took office was
not viewed as an auspicious beginning.
In any case, the talks remain stalled,
with each side blaming the other.
The EZLN continues
to
insist that
certain conditions
be fulfilled before the talks can
be renewed, including the implementation
of the 1996
agreements on Indigenous
Rights
and Culture. The government says
that
it cannot accept the Congressional
COCOPA's implementation
proposal,
but that
it is ready to talk . . .
October and November saw large
demonstrations in Chiapas and
elsewhere in Mexico
demanding that
the government
fulfill the San Andres Accords.
Also, in the absence of progress
in the talks, the EZLN is seeking
to move ahead with a key provision
of
the agreements
regarding
the establishment
of
autonomous indigenous municipalities.
The EZLN points to
these efforts to begin building
their
vision of the future as evidence
of its commitment
to peaceful
means. The
government views such initiatives
as a destabilizing factor. The
autonomous municipalities have
been the target
of attacks on
a number of occasions, including
the
Acteal
massacre.
The federal Congress may be prepared
to assume a more active role
in the coming weeks and
months. While up
until now
the Chiapas conflict has not
been a major concern, that
may be
beginning to change, especially
after the
spilling of so much innocent
blood. Congressional leaders
recently called
for a suspension of state powers
in Chiapas and for
a
special session to formally
consider the COCOPA proposal for implementing
the San Andres Accords. (Neither
proposal won quick approval.)
In the international arena,
Mexico continued to be the
target of
persistent criticism
for its human
rights record.
Amnesty
International's secretary
general lamented the lack
of "political
will to protect human rights." Human Rights Watch noted
serious human rights violations and charged that "the
police and legal systems" are responsible for many abuses.
The massive international response, both official and non-governmental,
to the Acteal massacre once again put Chiapas in the international
spotlight and demonstrated broad, abiding international concern.
Recommended
Action
- Urge the Chiapas state government
to:
- disarm the paramilitary groups, especially in
the northern region and in Chenalho;
- provide urgently needed humanitarian aid to
all displaced persons in Chenalho.
- Urge COCOPA to carry forward
the proposed constitutional revisions regarding Indigenous
Rights and Culture in
order to achieve the effective implementation of the
San Andres Accords.
- Urge the Zedillo administration
to:
- guarantee compliance with the "Federal Law
for Dialogue, Conciliation and a Just Peace in Chiapas" in
order to reduce the risk of armed confrontations
between the Mexican Army and the EZLN;
- respect the San Andres Accords and the international
covenants that it has signed regarding the
rights of indigenous peoples;
- recognize and respect the efforts of human rights
workers and international observers whose
work offers substantial
support to the peace process.
- Circulate information, such
as this Report, on the situation in Chiapas.
Please write to: Lic.
Ernesto Zedillo Ponce de León
Presidente de la República
Palacio Nacional:
06067, México, D.F.
Fax: (52-5)-516-57-62/515-47-83
Francisco Labastida Ochoa
Secretario de Gobernación
Bucareli 99, 1er piso
Col. Juárez
06699 México, DF - México
Fax: (52-5)- 546-5350/546 7380 Comisión de Concordia y Pacificación
Paseo de la Reforma # 10, piso 17
México, DF - México
Fax: (52-5)- 535-27-26
Lic. Roberto Albores Guillén
Gobernador del Estado de Chiapas
Palacio de Gobierno
Tuxtla Gutiérrez, Chiapas - México
Fax: (52 961) 20917
In addition disseminate information
- like this report - to mobilize international public opinion
and be prepared to mobilize in the event of an escalation
of violence in Chiapas.
:: UPDATE
Violence Spreads
like an Epidemic in Chiapas
The hopes raised
by the elections of July temporarily obscured the delicate
character of the peace process in Chiapas. However, the logic
of violence has ruled in recent months, once again calling
attention to the conflict in Chiapas. The most horrific incident
was the December 22 massacre in Acteal in the municipality
of Chenalho in which 45 people, mainly women and children,
were killed. (See "Chenalho - Chronicle
of a Massacre Foretold," in this issue.)
Violence had been escalating in the weeks prior to the
Acteal massacre. One alarming development was the attack
on the
bishops of the Diocese of San Cristobal de las Casas, Samuel
Ruiz and Raul Vera. On November 4, a caravan of vehicles
in which they were traveling was ambushed by a paramilitary
group near Tila in the northern region of Chiapas. Three
pastoral workers were wounded by gunfire.
Two days later, the sister of Samuel Ruiz was attacked
and beaten on the head with a hammer in the diocesan
offices in San Cristobal. According to the bishop and
to CONAI
(National
Mediation Commission), this attack is directly linked
with the other and with the ongoing campaign of persecution
and defamation of the diocese.
There have been other attacks against the Diocese of
San Cristobal in the northern region. On October 6,
members of the paramilitary group "Peace and
Justice" took
over the chapel in Limar. On October 15, they announced that
they would not allow any Catholic priests or catechists in
the municipality of Sabanilla. On November 14, members of
the same group broke up an ecumenical meeting in Salto de
Agua that was to focus on analyzing the current political
situation. Members of "Peace and Justice" did
meet with Papal Nuncio, Justo Mullor, during his December
visit
to Chiapas.
Another troubling development is that the violence
has spread to other parts of Chiapas. In the municipality
of Chenalho,
the casualties and destruction have been growing:
housing burned, families forced to flee, a mounting toll
of
dead
and wounded.
The absence of the rule of law that prevails in Chiapas
was denounced by opposition parties in the Chiapas
State Assembly
on November 27 when Governor Ruiz Ferro presented
his third Annual Report.
Amidst this bleak backdrop, some encouraging signs
must be noted as well. On November 17, representatives
of
150 communities
from the northern region met to analyze the situation
of the internal refugees. On December 4, 450
indigenous persons
who had been displaced since June, 1996 were
able to return to their homes in the community of Jesus
Carranza
in the
municipality of Sabanilla.
On December 21, the two factions of ARIC (Rural
Association of Collective Interest), a key
peasant organization
from the Lacandon Jungle Valleys, signed a
reconciliation pact that was the fruit of a year-long
process.
As we go to press, 46 persons, including the
local PRI mayor, have been arrested in connection
with
the Acteal
massacre.
In addition, Chiapas Governor Julio Cesar
Ruiz Ferro and federal Interior Minister Emilio
Chuayffet resigned
amid
accusations regarding their failure to prevent
the massacre.
The Peace Process According to Its Protagonists
After the elections last July, President
Zedillo, both in Mexico and abroad, has
repeatedly described
the
political situation in Mexico as normal
democracy, without making
much
reference to the conflicts in Chiapas
or in other parts of the country.
On October 1, during his seventh visit
to Chiapas, he said that the causes that
might
have justified
the "sad and
dramatic" events of the armed uprising of 1994 no longer
existed, and he announced an "Agreement
for the Well-being and Social Development
of the Highlands."
A few days later, he told the French
newspaper Le Monde that he did not
believe that a
short term solution
was possible
in Chiapas and that he regarded Zapatista
leader Sub-Commander
Marcos as "an idealist who
has not chosen a good means." He
added, "We invited the EZLN
to renew the talks and we continue
to await its reply." He also clarified that
the government could have responded with force, "but
it did not do so and it will not do so."
On October 3, the leader of the official
delegation for the peace talks, Pedro
Joaquin Coldwell,
stated that
the recent
attempts to create autonomous municipalities "contribute
to increasing nonconformity and discord." (Provisions
for greater autonomy for indigenous communities are included
in the 1996 San Andres Accords that have yet to be implemented.)
After the attack on the bishops, he acknowledged that in
the northern region there was reason "to
fear that the situation could become
completely out of control." He
asserted that the government should comply with the signed
agreements "without any
haggling," and that "it
should give signals that it wants
to negotiate, and the EZLN as well." He
also commented, "In reality, none
of the proposals [of Marcos] threaten the integrity of the
State, all of them are negotiable and capable of being institutionalized." Regarding
autonomy, he added that he did not think that it could lead
to "balkanization," but rather that it was "an
opportunity that we should not allow
to pass."
However, in November, during a meeting
with Presbyterian pastors, he stated
that the
COCOPA (Commission
for Agreement and Pacification)
proposal for implementing the San Andres
Accords "contains errors
and inadequacies that could be
dangerous." He also said, "If
the EZLN would retract its declaration
of war, it would be an important
step for the dialogue."
After the Acteal massacre, President
Zedillo condemned the killings
and, while stating
his support for
the government of Chiapas Governor
Ruiz Ferro, announced
that it would
take
responsibility for a thorough
investigation. The federal government also sent
thousands of additional
troops
and police to conflicted areas
in Chiapas and at the same
time called
for a renewal of peace talks.
On December 26, Coldwell met with
Samuel Ruiz,
President of
CONAI, and gave
him a proposal
for ending the conflict. It included
an immediate renewal of peace
talks, the investigation
of the Acteal massacre
and the situation in Chenalho,
the presence of the army to prevent
further
violence,
and ideas
for political
and social
programs to combat poverty.
On January 3, after the resignation
of Interior Ministry Secretary
Emilio Chuayffet,
President
Zedillo named
Francisco Labastida Ochoa to
the post. He gave him ten priorities,
one of which was the conflict
in
Chiapas.
With regard to the army, in October
500 troops installed a new
military base
near La Realidad
with the objective
of cutting the link between
the ex-Aguascalientes of Guadalupe
Tepeyac and the military
base of San Quintin.
Five hundred
civilian Zapatistas from the
autonomous municipality of
San Pedro de Michoacan organized
a
protest demonstration.
On October 28, Mario Renan
Castillo, military commander
for the region,
reported that
the Mexican Army
had reduced its
troop strength in Chiapas
by 50%. (This information could
not be
confirmed.) Several days
later, General Wabi Rosel
dismissed the possibility
of a new
offensive against the EZLN. In November, the Secretary
of Defense denied that the
army
trained or
organized paramilitary
groups
in Chiapas
and
asserted that the armed forces
comply with their constitutional
duties.
However, members of the paramilitary
group "Peace and
Justice" attended the going-away party of General
Renan Castillo (when changes in military leadership were
made.)
After the Acteal massacre,
5,000 additional troops were
sent to
Chiapas (including
2,000 to Chenalho).
This provoked
protests
on the part of civil society,
including demonstrations
in some indigenous
communities. The army
was placed on a state
of alert and has recently
engaged in searches for arms,
including
in the
conflict area.
As part of
these efforts,
on January
3 the army occupied the Zapatista
stronghold La Realidad for
several hours, raising
fears and tensions
in
the region.
After the march in Mexico
City in September, the EZLN
opted
for promoting
the autonomy
process. Hence the
creation of the autonomous
municipality of Ernesto "Che" Guevara
was intended to demonstrate that autonomy "is
a reality that we are building" and that "our path is civil
and peaceful." The state government denounced the
unconstitutional character of such an initiative, and CONAI
commented that
it may generate new conflicts.
In a statement at the end
of October, Sub-Commander
Marcos
said that
the top hierarchy of the
Catholic Church wants
to assume a "more
active role in the conflict." That
means reducing the role of Samuel Ruiz and the Diocese of
San Cristobal in the peace process. The long-term objective
would be to use "its
influence over the largely
Catholic indigenous in the
EZLN in order to 'lead them'
to a quick
signing of peace, the unconditional
surrender of their weapons,
and a break with and an attack
against the political and
military leadership of the
EZLN." In addition, Marcos
highlighted the regrouping of different organizations under
the rubric "third way," that is, allied neither
with the government nor with the Zapatistas. Two days later,
the four Catholic bishops of Chiapas responded, "The
imputations that have been
made are unacceptable...The
Church does not need the
permission or the applause
of anyone in
order to fulfill its mission" and its "efforts
for dialogue and reconciliation."
The December visit of Papal
Nuncio Justo Mullor sharpened
the differences.
The
EZLN boycotted
his visit to
Tila, making it clear that
he was not welcome.
On November 5, in what may
be seen as an expansion of
Zapatista
influence
toward
the Guatemalan
border, 2000
EZLN sympathizers
marched in Frontera Comalapa
to demand the fulfillment
of the San
Andres
Accords.
In a statement on November
7, Sub-Commander Marcos said
that
the attack on
the bishops was meant
as a clear message
to
the EZLN: "Neither
mediation, nor dialogue,
nor peace." He
emphasized that, "The
strategy of the government
for Chiapas is to administer
and feed the conflict in
such a
way as to be able to present
it to the public as a war
between Indians." He
added, "The
federal government is preparing
a military solution to the
conflict."
The EZLN blamed the federal
government for the Acteal
massacre. It also
accused the
government of breaking
the Dialogue
Law by harassing Zapatistas
within the conflict area,
as defined
by the law.
At the end of September,
COCOPA members for the new
Congress
were named.
(COCOPA is made
up up
representatives
of
all of the political parties
represented in the national
Congress.) The press criticized
the low
profile
of most of the members and
noted that two
of them
(one from
the
PRI and a former
PRI member now with the PRD)
are tied to elite groups
in Chiapas.
At the end of December, after
a visit to Chiapas and a
meeting with Attorney
General
Madrazo
Cuellar, COCOPA
issued
a joint
statement with the Interior
Ministry underscoring the
urgency of renewing
the peace talks.
In general, the political
parties have given more priority
to
other issues
(the budget,
reducing taxes, etc.)
or political maneuvering
in the new, more open Congress.
However, on December 14 the
PRD (Party of the Democratic
Revolution)
accused
the government
of bearing primary
responsibility for the oppression
in Chiapas. One week later,
the PRD coordinated a humanitarian
aid project
for the displaced in the
northern region and stated
that it would
try to stop official support
for the
paramilitary
group "Peace and
Justice." (According
to the Mexican daily La Jornada,
in July the Chiapas state
government signed an agreement
with that group to provide
$580,000 to support agricultural
development.) On December
24, after the Acteal massacre,
the PRD and the PAN (National
Action Party) called for
a suspension of the powers
of the Chiapas state government.
Throughout this period, CONAI
has denounced the escalating
violence.
In a November
5 press release,
CONAI condemned
the attack on the bishops
and noted that
" all of their denunciations and proposals regarding the northern
region of the state have
not been taken into account by the authorities, that the paramilitary groups
continue to operate
with impunity, and that the
absence of the rule of law is spreading in Chiapas."
Some weeks later, Bishop
Samuel Ruiz, President
of CONAI, told a group
of European members
of parliament that efforts to find a solution
are faced with "darkness and contradictions." He
noted that there is currently
no contact between the sides and that the talks
will not resume as long as the violence
continues.
On December 24, CONAI requested
that President Zedillo
suspend the powers
of the state
government and disarm
the paramilitary
groups.
On October 12, demonstrations
took place throughout the
country. In
Mexico City,
some 3000 indigenous
completed their "March
for Dignity," demanding the fulfillment of the San Andres
Accords. That same day, 4000 demonstrators in San Cristobal
de las Casas asserted that "peace
is becoming increasingly
remote in Chiapas because
of the government's failed
commitments." In
Ocosingo, 400 representatives
of 40 indigenous groups formed
the Coordinating Committee
of Autonomous Organizations
of the State of Chiapas (COAECh)
that will struggle to achieve
the fulfillment of the San
Andres Accords. Another space
for dialogue at the grassroots
level was afforded by the
Conference for Reconciliation
and Peace organized by CORECO
(Commission of Support for
Unity and Community Reconciliation)
in Ocosingo in November.
On November 29, 10,000 indigenous
from all over the state marched
in San Cristobal to demand
the fulfillment of the San
Andres Accords.
In October Mireille Rocatti,
President of the National
Human Rights Commission
(CNDH),
commented
that
some international non-
governmental organizations
are
hiding "petty interests" behind
their defense of human rights and that they become "instruments
of sophisticated interventionism in Third World countries." In
Chiapas, the State Human
Rights Commission (CEDH)
is pushing a legislative
initiative to control independent
organizations.
At the beginning of November,
CONPAZ (Coordinating Agency
of Non- governmental
Organizations
for Peace), which
was created in Chiapas
in January, 1994, announced
its dissolution
because of internal problems.
However, according to members
of the coordinating
team, "the non-governmental
organizations [who were
members of CONPAZ] leave
strengthened
and more
free to chart their own
political course in the
future."
Mexico and the International
Community
During the visit of Amnesty
International General Secretary
Pierre Sane
at the end of September,
neither President
Zedillo nor his Secretary
of Government, Emilio Chuayffet,
met with
him. Mr. Sane asserted, "The political will to defend
human rights is lacking." The Mexican government stated
that an appointment had never been agreed to, which was contradicted
by Sane. His criticisms regarding human rights were diluted
in the polemic caused by his "snubbing."
On October 5, President
Zedillo met with French
human rights
groups in
Paris who
questioned the attitude
of his government
regarding human rights.
Later in Bonn, a journalist
asked why he had not received
Pierre Sane when he visited
Mexico. Zedillo denied
that
version of
the events, saying, "Sane
went to Mexico with the
intention of not seeing
me and of creating
a scandal; and I am still
waiting for an apology.
I am deeply offended because
he lied."
These controversies may
complicate the ratification
of the Free
Trade Agreement
with the European
Union that
was signed
on December 8. A clause
in the agreement stipulates
that it
may be suspended
if certain standards
regarding democracy
and human rights are not
maintained. For that reason,
at the beginning
of October
the Mexican
government
created the Intersecretarial
Human Rights Commission,
which will
be charged
with analyzing the cases
of human rights violations
presented
by
international non-governmental
organizations.
In its global report, Human
Rights Watch also criticized
the serious
human rights
violations
in Mexico,
in particular in the rural
areas. The report identified
the "police
and legal systems" as
the perpetrators of many
abuses.
The international community
was quick to repudiate
the Acteal
massacre. President Clinton
condemned it, and
the Mexican
government was harshly
criticized in some
U.S. media outlets. The
Secretary General of the
United Nations,
Kofi Anan,
condemned "the
repugnant crime in Chenalho." The
Interamerican Human Rights
Commission gave the Mexican
government six months
to report on its investigation
of the case and to announce
which measures it would take
in response. Human rights
groups requested a visit
by the U.N. Special Rapporteur
for Extrajudicial
Executions, who is in charge
of investigating crimes against
humanity.
::
ANALYSIS
Four years after
the January 1994 Zapatista uprising, a peaceful solution
to the conflict seems increasingly distant. In political
terms, the November ambush of the bishops of the Diocese
of San Cristobal in the northern region as well as the beating
of the sister of Bishop Samuel Ruiz may be seen as attacks
on CONAI and by extension on the negotiation process. The
stagnation of the peace talks has exacerbated tensions and
social decomposition. Paramilitary groups tied to powerful
political and economic interests have emerged to act with
impunity. Thousands of indigenous have been displaced. And
the violence has increased and spread, reaching a new level
of brutality with the December 22 massacre of 45 indigenous
in Acteal.
The unchecked violence of the paramilitary groups has prompted
many voices, ours included, to decry the deteriorating
situation and warn of the risk of larger confrontations.
As long as
the violence and repression continue, the political and
social conditions for a possible renewal of the peace
talks appear
remote.
Faced with the lack of progress in the negotiations, Zapatista
communities and others are developing autonomous municipalities.
In this manner they seek to build in the present the
alternatives that were envisioned in the San Andres Accords
but that
have not been legislated.
These initiatives have been viewed by many as factors
that risk increasing tensions in a number of areas.
According to the Chiapas PRI chairman, the development
of the autonomous
municipality of Polho was the "detonator of
the violence" in
Chenalho. Representatives of the state and federal government
have also argued that they reflect ideas of "segregation
and anarchy."
This is part of a war of information and disinformation
on the part of both sides, the EZLN and the government,
to blame
the other for the lack of progress in the peace process.
Meanwhile, when the government cites technical legal
problems as its reason for not accepting the COCOPA
proposal for
implementing the San Andres Accords, the consequence
may be a matter of
life or death for thousands of indigenous.
The extension of this fratricidal war from the northern
region to the highlands (Chenalho) has led many
analysts to believe
that the eruption of these conflicts responds to
a government strategy to justify the presence of
the
federal army
and state police and to intimidate and undermine
the social
organization of entire communities who have declared
themselves EZLN supporters.
While the attempt to remove the "water" (the civilian
support base) from the "fish" (the EZLN) is textbook
counter-insurgency strategy, developments such as the Acteal
massacre raise the chilling specter of the recent tortured
history of Guatemala where no tactic of repression was too
extreme.
Given the predictable negative fallout from the
massacre, both within Mexico and abroad, it is
unlikely that
it was ordered by federal officials. However,
the escalating violence
throughout the northern region and the highlands,
the brazen ambush of the bishops' caravan, the
growing tension
and
violence in Chenalho, coupled with the lack of
official response made
Acteal a massacre long foretold. It is difficult
to
cite any action by either the federal or the
state government
in Chenalho or elsewhere to curb the paramilitary
groups and forestall such a predictable explosion.
Moreover,
state government officials recently granted one
of the largest
paramilitary groups, "Peace and Justice," US$580,000.
All of which feeds the impression that the paramilitary presence
is part of a larger political strategy of waging low-intensity
warfare in Chiapas while stalling on peace talks and watching
national and international attention dissipate. As a Mexican "senior
official" told the Los Angeles Times in August, "Chiapas
has disappeared as a public theme. It's become
a local, contained issue. It's not a problem
of national policy but of security."
In this sense, the suggestion by federal officials
that the massacre was the result of "inter-communal and inter-familial" conflicts
obscures as much as it illuminates. Needless to say, the
indigenous peasants who pulled the triggers did not provide
their own new uniforms or AK-47s.
Since the massacre, the Mexican government
continues to send conflicting signals. On
the one hand
the government initiates
a federal level investigation, calls for
a renewal of the
peace talks, and offers new proposals. On
the other hand, it refuses to implement the existing
San
Andres Accords,
it fails to contain the continuing intimidation
and violence of the paramilitary groups,
and it appears
to violate
the law governing the peace process ("Federal
Law for Dialogue, Conciliation and a Just
Peace in Chiapas," approved
by Congress in March 1995. As this report goes to press in
early January, information is coming in about incursions
of the army into Zapatista strongholds, confiscation of weapons,
and interrogations of indigenous peasants in the conflict
area.)
The appointment of Francisco Labastido Ochoa
as the new Interior Minister was itself
seen as a
mixed
signal. It responded
to the post- massacre chorus that called
for the resignation of Emilio Chuayffet,
widely
viewed as a key impediment
to progress in the peace talks. Labastido
Ochoa promised a renewed,
concerted peace effort. However he is viewed
by
some as a hard-liner. Moreover, the occupation
of the
Zapatista stronghold
of La Realidad on the day he took office
was not viewed as an auspicious beginning.
Whether
the
change reflects
an actual
policy shift toward political solutions
and a greater will
to achieve a just and lasting peace remains
to be seen.
The replacement of Chiapas Governor Ruiz
Ferro by PRI deputy Roberto Albores Guillen
on January
7 is
significant
less
for any policy shift that may result
than as a reflection of the impact of the enormous
criticism that has
been brought to bear as a result of the
massacre. Once again
Chiapas
is revealed for what it is: a blistering
sore
whose
infection reaches well beyond its isolated
mountains.
For their part, the police and army,
despite their enormous presence, have
not managed
to provide
security in large
regions of the state. President Zedillo
sent 5000 additional troops
to Chiapas after the massacre, but
their apparent focus on Zapatista supporters
only generated
more protests,
heightening the risk of new conflicts.
In this climate of violence
and
insecurity, the elections scheduled
for October 1998 may become a point of great
danger for
the already
feeble peace
process. The civil authorities appear
either in collusion with the violence
or simply
outstripped by the reality.
Human rights groups and opposition
political parties
talk of an
absence of the rule of law, and call
for the resignation of the governor.
Although both sides, the government
and the EZLN, have expressed their
desire
to renew
the peace
talks, in
this climate of "dirty
war" the actions and the public statements of each have
become more radical in some respects. In their most recent
communications, the Zapatistas have assailed actors such
as the Catholic hierarchy and social and indigenous organizations
that have always shown sympathy and solidarity with their
struggle. Increasingly, criticisms of some Zapatista positions
or errors they have made are heard. The result is splits
among the civil society groups who are seeking peaceful solutions
to the conflict.
In this discouraging context, one spark
of hope may be seen in the opposition-controlled
Congress.
While
up
until now
the Chiapas conflict has not been
a major concern, that may be beginning
to change,
especially
after the spilling
of
so much innocent blood. Whether -
or how much - more blood and violence
may be necessary
before the constitutional
reforms proposed by COCOPA successfully
implement
the San
Andres
Accords depends a great deal on the
role of
Congress, the political parties and
COCOPA in the coming
weeks and months.
Sensitive to all this, the international
community has continued to follow
developments in Mexico
and to provide
support for
the process of change there. A
variety of international human rights organizations
have called upon
the Mexican government
to attend with greater speed to
cases of human rights violations. The fact
that
President
Zedillo did not
meet with the general
secretary of Amnesty International
during his
visit to Mexico and, later, the
severe criticism he received
from
French
and German human rights groups
had a big impact. Finally the massive
international response,
both official and
non-governmental, to the Acteal
massacre once again put Chiapas in the international
spotlight and demonstrated broad,
abiding international
concern.
:: FEATURE
Violence in Chenalho:
Chronicle of a Massacre Foretold
In September
1997 a latent conflict exploded in the municipality of
Chenalho in the Chiapas highlands. As a result, thousands
of indigenous fled their communities in the face of intimidation,
violence, and the burning of houses by paramilitary groups.
The conflict reached horrific level on December 22 when
dozens of members of a paramilitary group massacred 45
displaced indigenous persons in the village of Acteal.
Background
The conflict is between members of the ruling PRI and "Cardenistas" (members
of the Cardenista Front for National Reconstruction Party)
on one side and Zapatista sympathizers on the other.
A third actor that has been a victim of these confrontations
but is not viewed as part of either side is a group called "Las
Abejas" (the Bees), which has goals similar to the
Zapatistas but which does not support armed struggle.
The violence has been concentrated in communities around
Polho, the center of the autonomous municipality of Chenalho.
This area includes important natural and economic resources.
The conflict began in May, 1997 with a dispute between
PRI members and the Zapatistas over a gravel quarry and
collaboration on the building of a road.
The situation deteriorated in the middle of September
after the Zapatista march in Mexico City (see SIPAZ
Report, Vol. II, No. 4). This display of Zapatista political
strength at the national level incited the local PRI
and Cardenistas of Chenalho to begin a violent campaign
against the Zapatistas. In the communities of Puebla
and Los Chorros, the PRI authorities demanded financial
support for purchasing arms and ammunition in order to
prepare an attack against the seat of the autonomous
municipality in Polho. Those who refused to contribute
were rounded up and beaten. Fourteen houses were burned
and 60 families fled from Los Chorros.
The violence continued in the following months (burning
of houses, robberies, attacks on women, killing by both
sides) and an increase in arms trafficking was noted.
At the end of October, there was a significant increase
in the number of indigenous families (PRI members among
them) who fled their homes out of fear of new confrontations.
By the end of November, estimates of the number of displaced
ranged from 2000 to 4500 people, the large majority of
them either Zapatista supporters or members of Las Abejas.
All of these events appear to be not so much coincidental
as part of a strategy of weakening civil society, especially
any groups opposed to the government. According to the
refugees, the majority of the acts of violence are the
work of paramilitary groups that are tolerated and at
times supported by state police. In some cases the army
apparently collaborated in the aggression. The violence
appears to follow the same pattern as we have seen in
the northern region of Chiapas.
Displaced flee to the hills
At the end of November, an observation mission (in which
SIPAZ participated) visited the region. In just a few
hours of traveling between Yabteclum and Polho, the group
met 800 internal refugees from Los Chorros, Yibeljoj
and Majomut. In a public statement, the group declared,
"
Sixty per cent are children; there are elderly, youth,
and adults from a variety of political parties and churches.
The conditions of health, clothing, housing and nutrition
are critical. They have only torn plastic sheeting to
protect them from the constant rain, and they only have
the clothes on their backs...They don't have food or
clean drinking water."
The observation group also documented that in the community
of Pechiquil, dozens of members of Las Abejas were
being held against their will in conditions of virtual
slavery.
The group presented a complaint on their behalf to
the National Human Rights Commission (CNDH).
On December 3 the Undersecretary of Government, Uriel
Jarquin stated that "in Yibeljoj there are
no houses that have been burned and neither has there
been any
aggression." However, faced with the serious situation
of the displaced in Chenalho, the Chiapas CNDH office
asked Governor Ruiz Ferro to adopt "immediate" precautionary
measures for the hundreds of displaced from Chenalho
and to guarantee their security.
A glimmer of hope
At the beginning of December, the constitutional municipality
of Chenalho and the autonomous municipality of Polho
began talks with the assistance of CONAI, CNDH and
other organizations. They agreed in principle to a
halt to
the violence, mutual tolerance, support for the displaced
from all sides, rebuilding of houses that were burned,
and the creation of a Verification Commission. However,
within a few days the work of the commission faltered
because of a lack of security. CONAI observed that
in addition there had been "difficulties in
the negotiations, given the interlacing of state interests
and a counterinsurgency
strategy." Citing the lack of favorable conditions,
the Polho authorities decided not to attend the dialogue
meeting on December 19. As a result, the Chenalho authorities
suspended the talks.
The Acteal Massacre
On the morning
of December 22, dozens of men dressed in black uniforms
and carrying high-powered weapons
drove into Acteal, a village close to Polho. Two to
three hundred
displaced persons, mostly members of Las
Abejas, had sought refuge in Acteal. Many of them were
gathered
in prayer in the chapel. The paramilitary group opened
fire on the unarmed worshipers, killing some immediately
and chasing others through ravines and into caves,
shooting as they went. Witnesses testified that the
bodies were
mutilated and even the wombs of the pregnant women
were torn open. The butchery went on for five hours.
In the
end 45 were dead and another 25 lay wounded.
Witnesses who managed to flee called Gonzalo Ituarte,
Justice Vicar of the Diocese of San Cristobal de las
Casas, an hour after the attack began. Immediately
he informed the Chiapas Secretary of Government, Homero
Tovilla Cristiani. Some time later Mr. Tovilla called
back to say that everything was normal in the area.
During
nearly the entire massacre, state police were in Acteal,
a few hundred meters from where the attack took place.
Even after local neighbors and fleeing victims informed
them of the bloodshed, they did not intervene.
Interior Minister Emilio Chuayffet later denied that
the federal government had any responsibility, "not
even by omission," for the massacre. However, Raul
Vera, Coadjutor Bishop of San Cristobal, said that on
October 18 he wrote the minister saying: ``We have information
that paramilitary groups are multiplying ... former soldiers
and police are training civilians to fight their brothers,
ruling party congressmen are sponsoring the sale and
the trafficking of weapons, acting as protectors and
coordinators of the various paramilitary groups.''
Vera said the government never responded to the letter.
After the massacre, Chuayffet acknowledged receiving
the letter but added, "Those who commit such
acts have two advantages in their favor: surprise and
secrecy....It
is very difficult, practically impossible, to prevent
all incidents of violence like this in the world simply
by being aware that an atmosphere of violence exists."
On December
23, President Zedillo condemned the attack and announced
that the federal government would take
over the investigation. Subsequently, 46 suspects with
PRI and (Cardenista) affiliations were arrested.
The PRI Mayor of Chenalho, Jacinto Arias Cruz, was
also arrested and charged with being the instigator.
In the days following the massacre, 5000 more soldiers
were sent to Chiapas, including 2000 more to Chenalho.
The authorities of Polho issued a formal protest regarding
the heavy army and state police presence around Polho,
arguing that it was making the people fearful and that
it had not been requested.
In a rescue operation on December 27 under the protection
of the Red Cross, CNDH and non-governmental organizations,
3500 displaced persons were transported from X'Cumumal
to Polho. The refugees had been threatened for several
weeks by unknown armed groups. That same day, with
the assistance of the army and the federal Attorney
General's
office, 500 persons who had been held against their
will by PRI supporters in four communities were freed
and
transported to Polho. As a result, the number of refugees
in Polho has risen to 5,000, making it the largest
refugee camp in Chiapas. The number of refugees in
San Cristobal
also grew to around 500.
Speaking about the cause of the conflict, Attorney
General Jorge Madrazo Cuellar commented, "The
massacre occurred because of inter-communal and inter-familial
conflicts." However,
the President pro tem of COCOPA, Carlos Payan Velver,
observed that the president of Mexico and the governor
of Chiapas bear a very high degree of responsibility.
The EZLN issued a statement blaming the state and federal
governments for the massacre.
WOMEN
AND LOW INTENSITY WARFARE Media
reports on Chiapas often neglect the fact that behind
the certainly alarming statistics (the result of the
violence and the ever more worrisome dimensions of
poverty, malnutrition, illiteracy, etc.), there are
beings of flesh and bones, families, and communities
that are struggling to survive.
The cease-fire of January 1994 has not meant an end
to the violence. The conflict between the government
and the EZLN has continued and has extended in the
form of an increasingly complex low intensity war:
militarization and paramilitary groups, divisions in
organizations and communities, an information war (via
everything from rumors to the mass media), etc. This
counter-insurgency strategy seeks to "take
away the water from the fish," the EZLN being the fish
and civil society, as a source of material and intellectual
support, whether actual or potential, being the water.
In this context, the already critical situation of
Indian women in Chiapas has deteriorated. But the reality
of their daily lives is little known.
Here we offer a space for the heart of these women
to speak and to hear their voice, as victims of low
intensity warfare and as protagonists who seek to control
their own lives and to contribute to the peace process.
HOW LOW INTENSITY WARFARE AFFECTS WOMEN...
As human beings
The biggest impact on the life of the women is the
fact that, because of the presence of the Mexican army
alongside their communities, their activities are restricted.
They are afraid (as we will see, with reason) to go
to the corn fields, to the river to bathe or wash clothes,
to gather firewood, to sell their handicrafts.
Women from Comitan and Las Margaritas complain of the
military checkpoints: "They stop us, they ask
for our identification and for information about the
Zapatistas, about the catechists in our communities,
etc." In fact, checkpoints and patrols, both
of the military and of paramilitary groups, are part
of
daily life in many parts of Chiapas. A woman from Tila
tells us her story: "We are hungry because we
can't work. We can't go out to buy what we need. They
[the paramilitary group 'Peace and Justice') are armed,
so we cannot defend ourselves. They won't allow us
to leave. they are there, watching the road, in a truck
with their guns. And they continue arming and arming
the people."
Another point to consider is that frequently, the women
are the most exposed because they are the ones who
stay in the communities with the children and the elderly
when the men flee to the mountains. They are the ones
who show their face. Among the murdered in the December
22 massacre in Acteal in the municipality of Chenalho
were 21 women (four of them pregnant).
As women
The conflict impacts in a distinct manner in the women.
As Marta Figueroa of the Women's Group of San Cristobal
underscores, "The question of gender is almost
invisible. It isn't even thought about, but it has
always been like that in war. Women are a privileged
channel for the reproduction of fear." Mercedes
Olivera of CIAM (Center for Investigation and Support
for Women) adds that women are seen as "an
object and as a military objective" in the sense that
they are the ones "who give life to the next generation
of guerrillas" and in some sense represent "the
means to defeat the populace." In fact, actions
against women are aimed at frightening and dispiriting
not only them but the whole community.
Harassment and rape
Threats of a sexual nature are quite common. According
to women's groups in San Cristobal, there are many
cases of harassment and rape, but for the most part
they are not reported. Rosalinda (in a workshop of
indigenous women) explained to us one of the reasons
for this silence: "The violence is lived in
silence, and it echoes in our physical health and also
we redirect
it against ourselves, since we feel guilty. Violence
and submission are learned."
Terror and rumors
In one of their meetings, the women of CODIMUJ (Diocesan
Coordinating Committee for Women) realized that the
thing that most divides the communities are the rumors.
Tere gives us an example of how rumors generate confusion
and finally disinformation: "Another thing
is the rumors that go around. It is the means of information
for the people. For example, my mother asked me yesterday
if it is true that they pay people to be in the 'Peace
Belts' [protection offered by civil society during
the talks between the EZLN and the Mexican government.]"
These rumors feed a climate of tension that sometimes
borders on the paranoid. In many communities, troop
movements heighten these anxieties. (Might that be
one of their functions?) Juana from Amatenango del
Valle expresses her fears: "The government
really doesn't want dialogue. The PRI supporters say
that
there is going to be war. So I believe that there is
going to be war."
Prostitution
Another form of violence against women is the growth
of prostitution. Many 16 or 17-year-old prostitutes
are Central Americans who entered illegally in the
country, apparently without the immigration officials
seeming to mind. However there are also growing numbers
of cases of indigenous women who "go with the
soldiers." They pay 100 pesos for virgins, 50
pesos for the others. The prettiest are "reserved" for
high-ranking officers. It seems that the soldiers deceive
them with promises or that they are convinced by the
misery of the situation in which they and their families
live. There are also some cases of child prostitution,
of 11-13-year-old girls sold or "loaned" by
their fathers in order to alleviate situations of hunger.
This causes great dishonor in the communities (unfortunately,
for the girl, not for the father).
Health
Parallel to the prostitution, there has been a growth
in sexual diseases, and some cases of AIDS have been
identified. Marta Figueroa of the Women's Group of
San Cristobal commented, "For the most part,
the soldiers reject the use of condoms. On some occasions,
in workshops to promote awareness, they threw them
on the ground in a flaunting manner."
According to the testimony of women's organizations
from San Cristobal, the tension generated by the conflict
is even reflected in the kinds of sicknesses that the
Indigenous display, illnesses that at times are of
a psychosomatic character, such as gastritis, headaches,
etc. Another related theme is the control that can
be exercised through the provision of health services. "We
have seen the pressure on many indigenous women who
have come seeking medical services. There is always
a big interrogation about whether they are Zapatistas
or not, where they are from, etc." (Yolanda, K'nal
Antsetik, an organization that works with women's cooperatives
in the Chiapas highlands).
As spouses and mothers
The situation of constant conflict and the economic
crisis generates permanent anxiety among the populace.
Among other manifestations, this is evidenced by an
increase in domestic violence. "The violence affects
all the families: some are the victims of it; others
learn it and reproduce it." (Francisca, in a workshop
of indigenous women.) In addition, the military presence
brings with it a "barracks culture" that
impacts negatively on the daily life of the communities
and the families (alcoholism, drug addiction, or as
we have seen, prostitution and its corollary, sexually
transmitted diseases.)
In difficult times, with an extraordinary degree of
self-denial, the women express that "their mother's
heart" is what tells them what to do when they
see their children frightened, hungry, or sick. Naturally,
one of their main concerns is the children's health.
There are many children's diseases that, according
to them, "nothing can be done about." However
in reality, many of them are treatable. In 1994, Chiapas
had the highest level of infant mortality in Mexico,
with the principle cause of death being diarrhea. The
women are also concerned with education: the lack of
teachers, schools closed because of the conflict, or,
in divided communities, schools where the Zapatista
children can't go.
Also there is a growing number of children of soldiers.
The mothers carry on under the most difficult emotional
conditions because they are branded by the community.
These situations evoke in these women self-hatred or
hatred against the community. Many turn to abortion
as a form of self-punishment. According to Consuelo
Lievano, the founder of Community Home "Yach'il
Antzetik" (for pregnant women in difficult circumstances),
the women will make comments like "now I must
pay because I got involved [in prostitution]." She
also underscores that since 1994, the number of abandoned
children has risen.
Other mothers, members of CODIMUJ, expressed their
concern for the sons who go to the prostitutes and
then encourage their spouses and sisters to prostitute
themselves. Also, for others, the presence of a new
source of employment that offers training and a guaranteed
paycheck leads them to enlist in the army.
In a more general manner, another phenomenon that "affects
the heart" are the divisions that take place within
the home. "There are a number of cases of women
who accused their husbands (who are now in prison)
with made up charges in order to protect their sons," says
Mercedes Olivera of CIAM. Tere of Civic Alliance comments, "I
have companions that had conflicts with their spouses
or with their sons because they wanted to carry on
as before, that is, that the women would stay at home
serving them, and they didn't want to let them participate
in something more | 
