:: SUMMARY

In Chiapas, the protracted suspension of the talks between the federal government and the Zapatista Army of National Liberation (EZLN) has plunged the peace process into its most profound crisis to date. In December the government rejected a legislative proposal for implementation of the agreements on Indigenous Rights and Culture and presented an alternative. The proposal it rejected was drawn up by COCOPA, the congressional commission formed to assist the negotiation process. The government insists that its counterproposal is consistent with the agreements signed in February 1996. However many observers disagree and accuse the government of de facto reneging on the agreements and deliberately undermining the peace process.

COCOPA insists that it stands by its proposal, which was presented to both sides on a take-it-or-leave-it basis after months of talks. (The EZLN accepted it.) However in a statement on March 4, COCOPA ambiguously added that "the text is perfectible" and declined to present it to Congress without the Executive's support.

The EZLN continues to insist on specific "minimum conditions" for resuming the peace talks and is clearly loathe to negotiate new issues while the existing agreements remain unfulfilled.

Meanwhile, an upsurge of violence in Chiapas has refocused public attention on the stalled talks and the increasingly unstable situation there. In the embattled northern region, paramilitary groups tied to the PRI impose a repressive rule in some areas, resulting in confrontations, killings, robberies, and new internal refugees. On February 15 a delegation of the Northern Station for the Easing of Tension and Reconciliation (including a member of SIPAZ) was attacked and shot at by a paramilitary group while attempting to gather information on recent violence. The delegation was able to leave, but for residents of the area who don't back the ruling party, this sort of violence is a common threat against which they have little defense or recourse. At the same time, a wave of protest across Chiapas against high electricity rates has provoked violent repression by state police forces.

Two events in particular underscored the crisis of the peace process and the fragile nature of the cease-fire now in place. A land dispute and a subsequent road blockade near Palenque resulted in a confrontation in which two police were killed and five wounded. The next day two peasant leaders and two Jesuit priests were arrested, beaten and charged with the killings. Although they were later released for lack of evidence, the arrests were seen as a troubling indication of increased belligerence on the part of the government.

On March 14, an intra-communal dispute in San Pedro Nixtalucum ended in an astonishing display of repressive force as state police, shooting from the ground and from helicopters, opened fire on civilian PRD/Zapatista supporters. Four peasants were killed, many wounded, 27 arrested (including one who was charged with killing his own son!), and 300 people were added to the number of Chiapas' internal refugees. The police went on to destroy houses, belongings and crops of the PRD/Zapatista supporters.

The impunity enjoyed by security forces and paramilitary groups and the discriminatory treatment of Indigenous peoples not affiliated with the PRI reveal extreme deficiencies in the justice system.

An increase in military installations in conflictive areas in Chiapas and elsewhere in Mexico (including parts of Mexico City), combined with incidents like those mentioned, reinforces fears that the government has decided to seek military rather than political solutions, employing the strategy of low-intensity warfare.

The attempt to wear out the Zapatistas and their supporters while publicly proclaiming a commitment to dialogue and a negotiated solution is doubly risky for the government. In a situation of such high tension, with the prospects for progress in the negotiations dim, and with state and federal forces attacking and even massacring civilian Zapatista supporters, the cease-fire appears increasingly fragile and a renewed outbreak of war more possible. Moreover the inconsistency between the government's stated policy and its actions causes a loss of credibility both at home and abroad.

The July elections for Congress and some governorships will be an important measure of how the PRI government is viewed within Mexico. Polls currently indicate that for the first time in the PRI's long reign, its lower-house congressional majority is seriously threatened.

Internationally, the Mexican government has recently been subjected to criticism on human rights issues from the Inter-American Human Rights Commission and from the United Nations Committee for the Elimination of Racial Discrimination. The government's intervention to try to block a large grant from the European Union to a Mexican non-governmental organization for election monitoring is not likely to improve its image.

The hardening of the government's position is in part the repressive response of an authoritarian regime that feels itself threatened. Secret deals with major national and international economic interests are playing a part as well. Forest and mineral concessions negotiated by the government are apparently threatened by the autonomy for indigenous communities proposed by the San Andres Accords.

Delegations in April from COCOPA and the Mexican Bishops Conference to the northern region of Chiapas and conciliatory statements from the "Peace and Justice" paramilitary group strengthen the tenuous prospects for peace.

The participation of Mexican civil society in the peace process has been integral to the progress to date. The recent National Peace Conference in March that brought together 91 organizations from 19 states continues those efforts.

At the same time, the role of international economic interests in shaping the direction of the conflict in Chiapas underscores the importance of the active engagement of the larger international community in the search for a just and lasting peace.

RECOMMENDED ACTION

1. Urge members of the Zedillo administration to:
   • respect the San Andres Accords and the international covenants that it has signed regarding the rights of indigenous peoples;
   • recognize and respect the efforts of human rights workers and international observers whose work offers substantial support to the peace process
   • enhance the political climate in such a way as to promote the participation of the entire citizenry in the upcoming elections.
2. Urge COCOPA and the Congress to carry forward the proposed constitutional revisions regarding Indigenous Rights and Culture in order to achieve the effective implementation of the San Andres Accords.
3. Write to your own congresspersons or members of parliament, updating them on the situation in Chiapas and asking them to communicate to the Mexican government their concern for the prompt completion and implementation of a just peace agreement.

Please write to:

Comisión de Concordia y Pacificación
Paseo de la Reforma # 10, piso 17
México, DF - México
Fax: (52 5) 535 27 26
Congreso de la Unión
Palacio Legislativo
San Lázaro
15969 México, DF - México
Fax: (52 5) 542 1558

Lic. Ernesto Zedillo Ponce de León
Presidente de la República
Palacio Nacional
06067 México, DF - México
Fax: (52 5) 271 1764 / 515 4783

Emilio Chuayffet Chemor
Secretario de Gobernación
Bucareli 99, 1o. piso
Col. Juárez
06699 México, DF - México
Fax: (52 5) 546 5350 / 546 7380

Lic. Julio C. Ruiz Ferro
Gobernador del Estado de Chiapas
Palacio de Gobierno
Tuxtla Gutiérrez, Chiapas - México
Fax: (52 961) 20917

:: UPDATE

A Smoldering Cease-fire

Just when it seemed that national attention would focus on the campaign for the July elections, especially in Mexico City, Chiapas returned to the spotlight. In spite (or because) of the massive military presence in Chiapas, there has been a sharp increase in violence in several parts of the state. This "low-intensity conflict" orchestrated by the government appears to be aimed at doing away with the organized indigenous/peasant movement, which is an important source of support for the Zapatista Army of National Liberation (EZLN). In recent months this war has caused the flight of hundreds of families from their homes and dozens of killings, ambushes, assaults and arrests.

The negotiations between the Zapatistas and the federal government are in their most profound crisis to date. Dialogue has been suspended since September of 1996. The accords signed over a year ago remain a symbolic piece of paper. The congressional Commission for Agreement and Pacification (COCOPA) has experienced internal division and has adopted a rather indecisive public posture. The significance of the role of the National Mediation Commission (CONAI, presided over by Bishop Ruiz) has diminished as well in the last few months. Mexico's organized civil society is worn down and somewhat disconnected from events in Chiapas. The prospects for the peace process in the coming months, as the election campaign becomes more prominent, are not encouraging.

The central issue would appear to be the differences between the parties in conflict with regard to the legislative proposal prepared by COCOPA for implementation of the agreements on "Indigenous Rights and Culture" (see SIPAZ Report, Vol. 2, No. 1). It is clear, however, that there is much more to it. Although the EZLN accepted the proposal, the government rejected it, saying the the autonomy provisions, as defined by COCOPA, would mean creating other countries within the country of Mexico. The government presented a counterproposal, asserting that it was consistent with the San Andres Accords on Indigenous Rights and Culture.

At the beginning of March, COCOPA released a statement concerning the uncertainty of the peace negotiations in Chiapas. In synthesis, COCOPA

• affirms its legislative proposal of 20 November, 1996;
• accepts that the language of the text could be improved;
• feels that the government and the EZLN could agree on another alternative to resolve the existing differences;
• rejects presenting its proposed legislation unilaterally to Congress.

The COCOPA statement prompted demonstrations throughout the country. Protestors demanded that COCOPA keeps its word and bring the proposal to the National Congress. Sub-commander Marcos of the EZLN responded in a communiqué,

"This is a summary of the situation, Honorable Legislators: A constitutional reform was agreed. It was not carried out. It was agreed that COCOPA would prepare it. It was not carried out. It was agreed that COCOPA's proposal would be accepted. It was not carried out. It was agreed that COCOPA would accept only a 'yes' or 'no' from the parties regarding its proposals, not alternative proposals. It was not carried out. The EZLN was not the one who failed to comply in any of these cases."

And he adds,

" We will not dialogue with the federal government until it complies with the minimum conditions which make the peace process serious, just and dignified."

Another development that was interpreted as a "low blow" to the peace process was the boycott of the meeting of the Commission for Verification and Follow-up (COSEVER) which was supposed to take place on February 14 of this year. Representatives of the federal government, in open contradiction to previous agreements, did not attend the meeting.
During the months of February and March, considerable national attention focused on the election campaign. In most surveys, the front-runners correspond to who is paying for the poll. Overall the indication of the polls is that of the three most important parties competing, the PAN, the PRD and the PRI, the ruling PRI has the least support.

Meanwhile, the PRD is enjoying a significant growth of support on a national scale, as is evident from the results of the Morelos state elections, where they won 12 municipalities and gained a number of legislative representatives.

The PRI's fear of losing its historic hegemony may explain the recent hardening of government policies. The impression is given that the rule of law, so prominent in the public pronouncements of the government, is increasingly far from being established in Mexico. For example, the government has rejected the recommendation by the Inter-American Human Rights Commission (IAHRC) of the Organization of American States (OAS) to release General Gallardo from prison. Gallardo has been detained for over three years in a military prison, solely because he recommended to the Armed Forces that they appoint an Ombudsman to monitor human rights abuses within the military. At the same time, the government is pushing a campaign aimed at limiting the powers of the IAHRC in countries that are members of the OAS It has also sought to block a donation of nearly US$400,000 that the European Union had earmarked for the Mexican Academy of Human Rights for observation of the campaign for the governorship of the Federal District that includes Mexico City.

Regarding foreign relations, for several days the press featured the issue of the United States' certification of Mexico as being fully cooperative in efforts to stop drug trafficking. The delay of the U.S. government in deciding whether or not to grant Mexico certification (a matter strictly related to U.S. law but which can have major economic and political repercussions in the countries under review) caused a series of reactions, especially after the Mexican government arrested General Jesus Gutierrez Rebollo on February 18. According to the charges, General Gutierrez, who was in charge of combatting drug traffic, was instead protecting and receiving benefits from Amado Carrillo, who runs the infamous Juarez drug cartel.

President Clinton finally authorized the certification. Nonetheless, the U.S. House of Representatives approved a resolution decertifying Mexico, but suspended implementation of the decision for 90 days. The resolution established six areas of concern in which Mexico would have to demonstrate "substantial progress" in order to be recertified.

On the national level, several organizations and experts in the field are issuing warnings about the constantly growing levels of militarization in the country. Social organizations, human rights activists, and indigenous and peasant communities have been the most affected by this phenomenon. Parts of the country which have seen the worst side of the military presence are: Chiapas, Oaxaca, Guerrero, the Huastecas and Mexico City. In the Iztapalapa area of Mexico City, approximately 3,000 soldiers from the Mexican army stood in for the police for several months so that they could attend an extended training session sponsored by the military.

In Chiapas alone, reports from the press and from non-governmental organizations describe an alarming increase in the presence of military encampments, particularly in the areas of the highlands, the jungle and the northern part of the state. This militarization has brought with it a systematic violation of human rights. Paramilitary groups in the northern region continue to act with the complicity of the police forces, provoking constant insecurity through confrontations, assassinations, robbery, and the displacement of entire families from their villages.

To mention only a few of the more recent incidents: the paramilitary group called "Peace and Justice" ambushed a delegation of journalists and observers from the Northern Station for Easing Tension and Reconciliation (which included a SIPAZ team member) just outside the community of Paraiso in Sabanilla; PRI supporters attacked Zapatista sympathizers in the community of Aguas Blancas; state police violently repressed peaceful demonstrations around the state against high electricity rates, and entire communities and even municipalities had their power cut off.

The events which occurred on March 7 in the community of San Martin Chamizal again focused national and international attention on Chiapas. Two policemen were killed and five were wounded in an ambush against the security forces. The following day, two leaders of the indigenous and peasant organization Xi'Nich, Ramon Parcero Martinez and Francisco Gonzalez Gutierrez, and two Jesuit priests, Jeronimo Hernandez Lopez and Gonzalo Rosas, were illegally arrested. The men were accused of being accomplices to murder, disrupting the peace, and acting against the physical integrity and patrimony of the state, as well as association with criminal intent.

According to their testimonies, the men were violently arrested, tortured and kept incommunicado for over 20 hours. This news generated a series of demonstrations in the state of Chiapas and letters of protest flooded state and federal authorities demanding their immediate release. Finally they were freed by a judge for lack of evidence.

On March 14, again in the northern area of Chiapas, in the community of San Pedro Nixtalucum, municipality of El Bosque, bloody events jolted the national conscience. It started out with verbal abuse between PRI sympathizers and PRD/Zapatista supporters over a dispute that could have been settled peacefully with minor sanctions. However it became a real massacre with the arrival of the state police forces who, without even attempting to investigate the facts, began shooting at the PRD/Zapatista supporters. According to accounts of local villagers, the shots came from police trucks and from helicopters overhead firing automatic weapons. The attack resulted in at least four deaths, several wounded and 27 arrests. Since the attack, an army unit has moved into the community and the continual harassment of Zapatista sympathizers by federal and state security forces has caused approximately 300 people to flee and seek refuge in the mountains. (See "San Pedro Nixtalucum - Another Trap for the Indigenous.")

Ironically, while all this violence was transpiring in Chiapas, the Mexican Secretary of Foreign Relations presented a document to the United Nations in Geneva, Switzerland that reiterated the desire of the Mexican government to reach a peaceful solution to the conflict in Chiapas, as well as to find a solution to the problems that had caused the armed uprising of January 1994. On March 18, La Jornada reported that the United Nations Commission for the Elimination of Racial Discrimination considered the document "insufficient and in contradiction with reality, especially with regard to Chiapas." The Commission expressed an ongoing concern for the indigenous peoples and land tenure issues, the need to establish an impartial system of justice, conditions of extreme poverty, and the conflict. The special relateur for Mexico, Regis de Gouttes referred to the "impunity with which paramilitary groups such as Peace and Justice and the Chinchulines continue the repression of the indigenous people under the protective shield of the authorities." Another member of the Commission, Rugiger Wolfrum, emphasized that ,"The facts indicate that the peace process is suspended, that the government does not respect the San Andres Accords and ignores Agreement 169 of the International Labor Organization, and that COCOPA has been weakened." In spite of claims to the contrary from the Mexican government, the UN Commission stated that, "The situation in Chiapas is explosive, as it has been since the beginning of the conflict, and consequently it will continue to be of concern to the Commission." Finally, the Commission urged the Mexican government to pass a law which would make any form of segregation or exclusion of the indigenous communities a punishable offense.

The crisis in the peace dialogue has served as a new incentive to seek a convergence of perspectives and efforts. A key initiative in this regard was the September call of CONAI for a broad National Dialogue that brings together organizations and issues in one unified movement that has as its principle focus peace, democracy, justice, and dignity.

The State Conference for Peace, which took place in San Cristobal in February, provided an indication of how far such an effort has to go. Although fewer than half the organizations in Chiapas participated in the conference, those that were there agreed to redouble their efforts to bring all of the groups together.

This conference was in preparation for the National Peace Conference which took place in Mexico City March 14-16. Ninety-one organizations from different regions of the country were present, representing 19 states with 564 people participating. The salient message of the conference was the commitment to work together for the achievement of peace. It was also agreed that these peace conferences must continue in order to give continuity to the advance of the construction of a just and democratic Mexico.

In April separate delegations from COCOPA and the Mexican Bishops Conference toured the northern region in an indication the the escalating violence is a matter of growing concern. Both groups committed themselves to continued efforts to renew the stalled peace talks. The bishops delegation also called for a reduction of the military presence in Chiapas.

In another encouraging development, the paramilitary group "Peace and Justice" proposed to the bishops' delegation a northern region dialogue to further the search for peace. Noting that the EZLN demands are the same as those of the communities torn apart by conflict, the group suggested that the dialogue include the EZLN, the churches, political parties, the government, and other actors involved in the conflict.

:: ANALYSIS

A Smoldering Cease-fire

SIPAZ shares the opinion of many other analysts who believe that the current political dynamics in Chiapas are aimed at undermining the peace process. Whether the escalated violence is due to a power vacuum caused by the inability of the state government to control the situation there or due to a deliberate plan of the federal government, it would appear that the Mexican government is doing what it can to definitively collapse the peace process.

The arbitrary arrests of the Xi'Nich leaders and the two Jesuit priests in Palenque and the subsequent abuse of their civil rights can be interpreted as an attempt to weaken two of the most significant actors in the peace process: the indigenous/peasant movement and the Catholic Diocese of San Cristobal de las Casas. Since the Jesuit Jeronimo Hernandez was an advisor to the Zapatistas during the San Andres negotiations, the arrests also appeared to be indirectly aimed at CONAI and the EZLN.

The direct participation in - or acquiescence to - violent confrontations by the security forces, be they police or military, underscores the fragility of the cease-fire now in place. The most serious incident, when the police opened fire on Zapatista supporters in San Pedro Nixtalucum, points to a troubling intention: after neutralizing the political and military strength of the Zapatistas, proceed to attack their unprotected bases of support through repression, arrests, or killings.

It appears clear that this spiral of violence is a planned part of the counterinsurgency strategy. The repression of the indigenous/peasant movement; the fabrication of crimes in order to eliminate opponents; the general impunity enjoyed by the security forces and the paramilitaries; the provocation of division and confrontation within the communities: all of this creates a dynamic that undermines the logic of peaceful conflict resolution. At the same time, the disorder created serves to justify the militarization of new areas by the federal army.

Although the impact of the low-intensity warfare strategy is growing, the government's public image is deteriorating in the process. Its policies are perceived as two-faced, its rhetoric as double-talk. In an electoral year such a profound loss of credibility could be very costly.

Seen in this light, the reticence of the EZLN is understandable: why return to a negotiating table when the other party does not respect agreements already made?

In such a tense situation, with the civilian base of the EZLN sometimes under attack and even massacred, the cease-fire appears more fragile, and a confrontation between the army and the EZLN more possible.

Many people are perplexed by the intransigence of the Mexican government. Why obstruct mediation and verification and risk a renewed outbreak of war? Why risk the political cost of ignoring the pressure not only of organized civil society but also of prestigious international organizations, including the United Nations Committee for the Elimination of Racial Discrimination and the European Union, who are calling on Mexico to implement the San Andres Accords signed in February of 1996?

A complete answer to these questions must include reference to the powerful economic interests that are at play. Indigenous autonomy is a threat to control of the rich natural resources in Chiapas. Several sources have referred to secret deals made with transnationals during the Salinas administration for the extraction of oil and uranium in Chiapas and the implementation of forestry plans that would produce big, quick profits at the price of the irreversible deterioration of the land. These deals were made without consultation with the affected indigenous communities.

Combining this information with recent public events, the anthropologist Ronald Nigh, who has lived in Chiapas for many years, offered an analysis that is echoed by some other political observers in Mexico. While it is somewhat speculative, it cannot be simply dismissed out of hand. Nigh observes,

" When [COCOPA] presented its proposal for constitutional changes reflecting the government's signed commitments to Indian rights, Zedillo asked the Zapatistas for 15 days to study the issue. The President than boarded [his jet] and flew, not to Washington, but to Wall Street, where he met with Henry Kissinger and other top financial celebrities. Upon his return he announced the rejection of the proposed legislation by presenting a counterproposal, clearly designed to be unacceptable, which the Zapatistas rejected. In less than one month, Environmental Minister Carabias announced a large World Bank loan for 'forestry', i.e., commercial plantations. The government had won the approval of the financiers at the cost of throwing Chiapas, and the whole country, into a state of uncertainty and tension."

However, the executive branch of the government is not solely responsible for the crisis in the peace process. Congress, through COCOPA, showed its subordination to presidential authoritarianism in its March 4 statement. In it, in a gesture that many analysts described as a "surrender," COCOPA treated as concluded the episode in which the Zedillo administration rejected the COCOPA legislative proposal, and COCOPA announced that it would seek meetings with both sides to explore new alternatives.
In Chiapas, it is the judiciary - in the person of state Attorney General Jorge E. Hernandez Aguilar - that is responsible for the absence of the rule of law and of due process for Indians who are arrested without warrants, accused of fabricated crimes by their political enemies, convicted without proof, and denied access to a just and impartial trial.

Looking toward the future, the fate of the peace process depends in good measure on the capacity of the various sectors that are committed to seeking change to unite their efforts and to articulate their proposals in a joint project that encompasses their differences. This participation of civil society is precisely what Gonzalo Ituarte, Technical Secretary of CONAI, has referred to as "the great originality of the Mexican peace process." The recent National Peace Conference in Mexico City is an example of the potential for change that exists in Mexican society.

It is hoped that these efforts of civil society, together with the recent initiatives of COCOPA and the Mexican Bishops Conference, will help to reduce the current levels of violence in Chiapas and elicit clear indications from the Mexican government of its will to reactivate the peace talks.

:: FEATURE

THE TRAGEDY OF THE CHOLS:

A PEOPLE TORN APART BY VIOLENCE

In recent months the attention of public opinion has focused on the conflict in the northern region of Chiapas, hitherto relatively unknown due to the area's geographic, political and cultural isolation. A virtual civil war has come to light through the insistence of national and international non-governmental organizations and organized civil society who have succeeded in piercing the wall of silence.

Many of the inhabitants of the northern region had demonstrated their sympathy with the EZLN by participating in the Zapatista takeover of local municipal governments in December 1994; building a Zapatista meeting facility (Aguascalientes); and heeding the Zapatista call to abstain from voting in the 1995 elections. Nonetheless, the northern region has not been recognized as part of the "conflict area."

Geopolitically the northern region represents a strategic corridor connecting the Zapatista-held territories with the Chontal Indian civil resistance movement and the PRD (Democratic Revolutionary Party) stronghold in the state of Tabasco. Consequently there has been a growing military presence in the area and an escalation of activities by PRI-backed paramilitary groups, in particular an organization called "Peace and Justice" (Paz y Justicia).

A HISTORY OF OPPRESSION AND MARGINALIZATION

The northern region is commonly considered to include the municipalities of Tila, Sabanilla, Salto de Agua and Tumbala, extending to the borders of Chilon and Palenque and the state of Tabasco. Most of the inhabitants in the northern region are Chol Indians whose ancestors built some of the richest expressions of the Mayan civilization. Because of the difficult geographical conditions and the firm resistance of the Chol people, the area was not easily brought into submission by the Spanish conquerors of the 16th century.

The political instability and the relative poverty of the region combined with the hostile mountainous terrain kept the Chols isolated and marginalized. Displacement of the Chols from their tribal lands began toward the end of Spanish rule when the "caxlanes" (foreigners; includes whites and mixed bloods) began to demand land from the authorities in order to log hardwoods and exploit other valuable tropical products.

BITTER COFFEE

By the end of the 19th century, the economics of the region were transformed significantly by the emergence of foreign-owned agro- export enterprises. The main product from these isolated plantations was coffee. Most Chols lost their land and became virtually enslaved. The Mexican revolution (1910-17) had a negligible effect on the social and economic structures there.

The agrarian movement began to grow in Chiapas only in the 1920s. It reached its peak a decade later during the nationalist presidency of Lazaro Cardenas when land-holdings were redistributed to the Chols.

In return, the Chols remained faithful to the ruling PRI (Institutional Revolutionary Party) for several decades. However, by the 1970s the hegemony of the PRI began to weaken as a result of several factors. The Chol people were being influenced by the focus on empowerment of the pastoral ministry of the diocese of San Cristobal and by the activities of social organizations (including the Union of Unions - later to become the very influential Rural Association of Collective Interest, ARIC.) The world market price of coffee collapsed. In addition a general sense of disillusionment with the central government took hold among community leaders - such as catechists, bilingual teachers, and cooperative officials - in the face of the abandonment and the contradictions perceived in government policy.

Once again the Chols found themselves marginalized and isolated as a group. However at this point a deep schism emerged between those who had begun to consider the PRI as a traitor to their cause and the traditionalists who supported the PRI unconditionally. This latter group, in particular some schoolteachers and cooperative officials, gave birth to the paramilitary group "Peace and Justice".

ELECTIONS OF DISCORD

The PRI's loss of dominance in the northern region became evident more in the 1994 and 1995 elections than from the Zapatista uprising. In the 1994 gubernatorial and congressional elections, the victory of the opposition was concealed by official party fraud.

No longer being able to count on an ideological consensus, the PRI maintained control through brute force. "Peace and Justice" was organized in early 1995 in Tila. It began its paramilitary attacks on the population in March. The first victims were catechists, school teachers and community leaders. The violence escalated as the electoral campaign proceeded. Between June and July several members of the opposition PRD (Democratic Revolutionary Party) were killed in ambushes. In August the paramilitary group joined forces with cattle ranchers to remove peasants from occupied lands. In September, attacks on the opposition in PRI-dominated communities escalated and many PRD-affiliated families were forced to flee their homes. At this point the PRD supporters began to respond. Although much fewer in number, these PRD attacks drove PRI supporters from some communities where they were a minority.

In the October 1995 elections, the violent intimidation by the PRI- supporters and the Zapatista orders to boycott the vote resulted in large-scale abstention. The result was the victory once again of the PRI even though it did not receive more than 22.5% of the potential votes. It was in this election that Samuel Sanchez Sanchez, a Chol school teacher from Tila and founder of "Peace and Justice," was elected to the state legislature. "Peace and Justice" members, including Marcos Albino Torres, also won seats on the Tila municipal council.

THE ENDLESS WAR

The aftermath of those elections was a generalized loss of legitimacy of the electoral process and a radicalization and polarization of the opposing sides - fertile ground for the open conflict that has since developed.

While the Chiapas state government has, in the past year, promoted negotiations between the conflicting sides to deal with the issue of the internal refugees, often the government representatives failed to appear for meetings. The situation would be left in the hands of "Peace and Justice" who, with the support of the state police, at times harassed and even arrested the representatives of the displaced people.

In June of 1996 the PRD took to the offensive and ensuing confrontations resulted in deaths on both sides. A rumor of impending bombings by the army, which openly supports the PRI people, led to the flight of over 1,400 PRD-supporters from the communities around Jolnixtie (Tila). In little over a year, the number of killings in the northern region has risen to more than 300 and the number of displaced people to about 3,000. Meanwhile, the state authorities refer to the situation as nothing more than "unrest".

THE NORTHERN STATION: A WHITE FLAG ON THE BATTLEFIELD

Responding to this wave of violence, in August 1996 two local non- governmental organizations, the Fray Bartolome de las Casas Human Rights Center (CDHFBC) and the Center for Indigenous Rights (CEDIAC), and two international organizations, SIPAZ and Global Exchange, formed a team to monitor and document the situation in the northern region. The project was called the Northern Station for Easing of Tension and Reconciliation. In October the Coordinating Agency of Non-Governmental Organizations for Peace (CONPAZ) joined the effort. As the name suggests, besides monitoring the region, the project proposed to contribute to the search for means of achieving peace in the Chol region.

The presence of the team in the region did not go unnoticed. Their movements were watched and obstructed, team members were threatened, detained, robbed and even attacked by the paramilitary group "Peace and Justice." The local police forces and the military began to maintain a certain distance from the paramilitaries in an attempt to project a public image of impartiality and a concern for bringing about peace. Public officials accelerated the process of returning displaced people to their communities. (No doubt the Zapatista demands for an end to the violence in the northern region as one of their conditions for returning to the peace talks was also an influential factor.)

The extreme vulnerability of the displaced was underscored by the numerous complaints, accusations and demands which the Northern Station gathered from victims. They found many cases of civil rights abuses and intimidations by the paramilitary groups which continued to act with impunity.

Notwithstanding the lack of guarantees from the authorities and the threats from "Peace and Justice," which now refused to participate in negotiations with the government and the displaced PRD members, between October 1996 and January 1997 all the displaced families from Tila returned to their communities. However, the harassment has not ended. According to Congresswoman Adriana Luna Parra, in Jolnixtie a payment of 1000-1500 pesos is demanded of those who return as well as a signed promise to not affiliate with any opposition party. They are allowed to enter and leave only with safe conduct passes signed by "Peace and Justice." (La Jornada, March 30, 1997)

In addition, the fragile stability in Tila contrasted with an alarming eruption of violence between PRI- and PRD-supporters in the neighboring municipalities of Sabanilla, Palenque and El Bosque. Since the beginning of 1997, about 20 people have been killed and hundreds more have been driven from their homes. (See "A Smoldering Cease-fire" .)

WHO'S WHO IN THE NORTHERN REGION

According to state legislator Samuel Sanchez Sanchez, the establishment of "Peace and Justice" was a response to the growing radicalization of PRD and Zapatista supporters in the communities. In other words, the paramilitary group was designed as an instrument of counterinsurgency. It is financed by ranchers' organizations, and it is directed by an elite group of indigenous leaders. Politically it is backed by PRI leaders in Tila, and it enjoys the overt and covert support of congresspeople, the police forces, the Mexican military, and the judicial system. The Public Ministry office has been an accomplice of the paramilitary group, accepting unproven charges and ordering the arbitrary arrests of PRD supporters. Indeed "Peace and Justice" has been very effective in neutralizing members of the opposition. Dozens of Chol political prisoners are currently imprisoned in Chiapas, organized in the movement called "The Voice of Cerro Hueco Prison."

It is clear that the PRD and the EZLN have a strong base of support in the northern region even though this support does not necessarily translate into militant membership. Rather the Chols joined with these organizations in questioning the authority of the PRI. However, in our opinion both the PRD and the EZLN have neglected these supporters during some very difficult moments. Only at the end of August, after a year of continuous crises, did the EZLN include the cessation of the violence in the northern region in its demands to the government. In practice, this concern never became an important issue. Only in the last months of 1996, with the 1997 elections in view, did the PRD attempt to develop a more permanent relationship with its Chol base of support by sending state and federal legislators to the area.

Another ambivalent player in the unfolding tragedy of the northern region has been the government of the state of Chiapas with its internal contradictions and two-faced policies. While publicly expressing a will to broker negotiations for peace, the government continues to allow the PRI-supported paramilitary groups to act with absolute impunity.

Perhaps the least known actor in this scenario has recently become a major protagonist. The Mexican army, which in the past has repeatedly aligned itself with "Peace and Justice," has now adopted a role consistent with the strategy of low-intensity warfare: it is implementing social assistance programs in the communities and articulating a discourse and policies aimed at winning the hearts and minds of the people and legitimating its image in public opinion. At the same time it is extending its presence in order to militarily control the entire conflict area.

ANGELS AND DEMONS: RELIGION AS AN IDEOLOGICAL WEAPON

Although the roots of the problem in the northern region are essentially political, the conflict has been presented by some as a religious issue. There are obvious parallels between the ideological differences of the PRI and the PRD and the religious polarization that has emerged between the conservative teachings of the evangelical churches and the liberation theology movement within the Catholic Church. There is also a strong relationship between the leadership of "Peace and Justice" and some evangelical pastors. In fact the roles have sometimes overlapped. Their rhetoric, too, is very similar: both groups demonize Bishop Samuel Ruiz and his pastoral agents, accusing them of creating division between the Chol people and provoking the violence.

Because of the growing religious intolerance, in which both the Catholic and the evangelical churches have been participants, religious leaders, in particular from the Presbyterian Church and from the diocese of the Catholic Church in San Cristobal, have promoted new ecumenical initiatives aimed at nurturing a process of reconciliation in the communities. This task is as difficult as it is necessary in order to revitalize the weakened peace process.

WHAT NEXT?

The wave of violence that has hit the northern region of Chiapas in the first few months of this year (See "A Smoldering Cease-fire" ) indicates that the problem, which was hitherto contained primarily within four municipalities, is spreading to other parts of the state. Once again, the impunity that has accompanied past violence is demonstrated to be the surest way to guarantee more of the same.

The Northern Station has repeatedly declared that this conflict cannot be ignored in the dialogue between the EZLN and the government. The standstill of the peace talks since September of last year, which Sub-Commander Marcos has described as at a "terminal stage," dramatizes the urgency of achieving a political solution to the conflict. The continued exclusion of the northern region from the formally recognized "conflict area" opens the possibility of a new frontier of war, unprotected by the presence of permanent observers, where brutal counterinsurgency tactics can be deployed with a minimal political price.

Meanwhile, the electoral campaign and the upcoming legislative elections in July present both a threat and a challenge to the federal, state and local political leadership: either repeat the experiences of 1994 and 1995 that brought the Chols to the brink of civil war or undertake a legitimate political struggle, respecting political differences. In the coming months, the state and federal governments will have a great responsibility for the course of events there and in the rest of Chiapas.

[This article is based on a publication entitled "Ni Paz ni Justicia" ("Neither Peace nor Justice"), written by the Fray Bartolome de las Casas Human Rights Center.]

SAN PEDRO NIXTALUCUM:

Another trap for the indigenous

In the Tzotzil community of San Pedro Nixtalucum (municipality of El Bosque), as in so many others in Chiapas, the population is divided between PRI supporters (pristas) and PRD/Zapatista supporters. The latter, participating in the autonomy movement, consider themselves part of the self-proclaimed "Autonomous Municipality of San Juan de la Libertad." Hence two parallel civil authorities exist, and they have resolved conflicts between them by their own means.

The confrontation that took place on March 14 between the two groups was at the point of a peaceful resolution when the intervention of security forces precipitated deadly events. State police, judicial police, and army troops arrived in San Pedro in three vehicles and two helicopters just when the pristas and the PRD/Zapatista supporters had completed an agreement to end the confrontation and to exchange the prisoners held by each side.

Witnesses say that the security forces arrived with a great show of force and intervened in support of the pristas, freeing the prisoners detained by the PRD/Zapatista supporters. They then detained the PRD/Zapatistas who had been held, beating them and throwing them into vehicles to take them to the jail in Tuxtla Gutierrez, the state capital. When they tried to leave, they were met by a blockade of PRD/Zapatista supporters. At that point, the police opened fire. Flying in one of the helicopters, a local PRI official pointed out individuals and houses identified as Zapatista, and the bullets rained down on them. While some fled toward the hills, the police pursued others into their houses, beating them and dragging them out, and plundering and destroying their food stores and belongings. The result was four dead, many wounded, more than 300 refugees, and 27 arrested, all from the PRD/Zapatista side.

Ironically the detained PRD/Zapatistas have been accused of a variety of crimes that include the murder of their own companions. One of them is accused of killing his own son, who was among those shot by the police. Another of his sons, a minor, was shot and wounded and is also being held prisoner and accused along with his father.

Journalists and observers who visited San Pedro Nixtalucum after the massacre testified to the desolate scene: houses destroyed and empty, police and soldiers camped at the entrance to the community, and many of the pristas themselves upset, because they too are victims of the violence promoted by the legal authorities as part of their counterinsurgency strategy. "We don't want to be killing each other," declared a local PRI supporter to a reporter.

The same anxiety, bewilderment and helplessness was evident in the Indians in the Tuxtla Gutierrez jail. Some of them don't even understand Spanish. They don't know why they were arrested. They didn't even see what happened after they had been locked inside the police vehicles. They show their gunshot wounds and signs of torture to visiting human rights investigators and members of the CONAI, and they ask, who will care for our crops? who will feed our wives and children? and when will we simply be left to live in peace?

As SIPAZ we ask, how much is the life of an indigenous person in Chiapas worth? How many more lives will have to be lost before they achieve justice, peace and respect for their human dignity?

:: ACTIVITIES OF THE SIPAZ TEAM IN CHIAPAS

FebrUARY - aPril de 1997

Between February and April the activities of the SIPAZ team included:

• Hosting the meeting of the Steering Committee of SIPAZ in San Cristobal de las Casas, Chiapas. The team coordinated interviews with: Mexican army officials and members of the Peace and Justice paramilitary group in El Limar; the Municipal President and members of the Northern Station for Easing of Tension and Reconciliation in Chilon; the Association of Cattle Ranchers and the Municipal Council in Ocosingo; the Director of the San Carlos Hospital and the Municipal President in Altamirano; and with representatives of organizations based in San Cristobal. Subsequently, in Mexico City the Steering Committee met with Mireillie Roccatti, the new President of the official National Commission for Human Rights; Rodolfo Stavenhagen, current President of the Commission of Follow- up and Verification; and Oscar Gonzalez, President of the Mexican Academy of Human Rights.
• Participation in the Conference of Health Care Workers in the community of Moises Gandhi, Ocosingo and in the Conference of Indigenous Organizations of Chiapas in the community of Patiwitz, Ocosingo.
• Participation in investigative delegations to areas of high conflict and violence levels (Chenalho, Palenque, Pantelho, Paraiso, etc.)
• Production of several Urgent Actions and the quarterly SIPAZ Report; distribution to the international community.
• Participation in the February State Conference for Peace (San Cristobal de las Casas) and the March National Conference for Peace (Mexico City), an initiative of Mexican civil society to coordinate a national effort to promote peace and democracy in Mexico.
• Participation in a workshop on "Managing Fear and Security Concerns in Conflict Situations" in Mexico City.
• Visits and interviews with persons displaced by violence in Nuevo Merida (Palenque), Santa Catarina (Sabanilla), and La Realidad (Las Margaritas).
• Contacts with CEDECH (Chiapas Center for Defense of Evangelicals), the Presbyterian Church, and the Baptist Church to promote opportunities for dialogue and reconciliation in situations of religious conflict in Chiapas.
• Participation in a delegation of international observers in the state prison of Cerro Hueco in order to investigate prisoner conditions, especially of those from San Pedro Nixtalucum and the northern region of Chiapas.
• Ongoing work developing and maintaining contacts with human rights and environmental groups in the states of Oaxaca and Tabasco.
• Interviews with members of the FZLN (Zapatista Front for National Liberation) and FIPI (Independent Front of Indigenous Peoples).