:: UPDATE

Mexico: Two presidents?

The longest elections in the history of Mexico

On 2 July, Mexico went through federal elections, the results of which were severely questioned (the difference between the two principal candidates was less than 1%).  La Coalición por el Bien de Todos, the Coalition for the Benefit of All, (which integrates various leftist parties: the Party of the Democratic Revolution, PRD; the Labor Party, PT, and the Convergence Party, Convergencia) legally impugned these elections by presenting a total of 225 appeals at the Federal Electoral Tribunal of Judicial Power (TEPJF) corresponding to more than 52,000 ballot boxes.

Andrés Manuel López Obrador (AMLO, the candidate for the presidency for the Benefit of All), and his followers were demanding the opening of all the electoral boxes and the counting of the ballots “vote by vote”. This was the principal slogan of the massive mobilizations that were conducted principally in Mexico City throughout the month of July before taking shape in the “Permanent Assembly”, which established a sit-in and blockades in the most important avenues of the capital until mid September.

During 36 days there was a tense wait for the decisions by the TEPJF. The result was a rejection of a total re-count of the votes and instead it ordered the opening of 9% of the electoral boxes (about 12,000 ballot boxes from 146 districts). The re-count was carried out between the 9 and 27 August. When the tendency of the TEPJF pointed towards the ratification of the triumph of Felipe Calderón (the candidate of the Party of National Action, PAN, conservative party currently in power), AMLO prioritized more and more the political way over the legal.

On 13 August, invoking article 39 of the Constitution (popular sovereignty), AMLO called on a National Democratic Convention (CND) for 16 September, the day of commemoration of the National Independency. CND proposed to elect a legitimate president and to work out 5 actions of transformation for the country: the struggle against poverty and inequality; to impede the privatization of natural and energy resources; to defend the right to information; to combat corruption and to reform the public institutions.

On 20 August, the TEPJF rejected the majority of the impugnations as “legally inadmissible”. The re-count of 9% of the ballot boxes reduced Calderón’s advantage over AMLO only by 4,183 votes.

Throughout the month of August, PAN and Felipe Calderón maintained a relatively low profile, carrying out reunions with governors, congress-people from the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) and the business-sectors. They made public calls for “national unity” and for the creation of “a government of coalition” which however raised little echo, which has to be viewed as a result of the political and social polarization that was generated during the electoral process.

A date of high political tension during the period of waiting for the TEPJF decisions was 1 September, the day when President Fox was to present his last report to the government. During the last two weeks before the event, a high level of militarization was observed around the area surrounding the Legislative Palace, where it was supposed to take place. On 15 August, sympathizers and members of the Coalition for the Benefit of All attempted to install a sit-in at the gates of the Congress and were driven away. Some media reported about the existence of “groups of deterrence” that were trained in military bases to be put into selective actions of repression against the leaders of the civil resistance.

On 1 September, the Legislative Palace was sieged by the military that accounted for a presence of 8,000 elements of the Preventive Federal Police (PFP) and the Presidential General Staff supported by tanks and snipers. Rejecting the military presence, PRD and PT congress-people occupied the Tribune. President Fox eventually decided to hand over his report in writing in the vestibule of the Legislative Palace. Only moments afterwards, a message by President Fox that had been recorded earlier was broadcasted on national television in which there was no hesitance in the attacks against AMLO and the movement supporting him.

Finally, on 5 September, the TEPJF unanimously declared Felipe Calderón as elected president and rejected all the denunciations presented by the Coalition for the Benefit of All. This rejection included those appeals alleging Fox’s interference in favor of Calderón as well as the illegal broadcast of messages, paid for by entrepreneurial sector, which impacted negatively on AMLO’s campaign. The Tribunal, while acknowledged both instances, established however that “there was no way of determining the electoral impact – if there ever was one – from both actions”. Calderón immediately made a new call for “dialogue and unity” while AMLO declared that “they were not recognizing an Executive lacking legitimacy”.

The political tension did not diminish. During the first fortnight of September, Fox and Calderón saw themselves repeatedly harassed by AMLO sympathizers. Calderón, almost secretly collected his constancy as president at the TEPJF.

On 15 September, Fox decided to move the ceremony of the commemoration of the Mexican Independency to Dolores Hidalgo, Guanajuato, with high security measures. In Mexico City, the event was led by Alejandro Encinas in his capacity as Chief of Government of the Federal District, and with the presence of the Secretary of Government, Carlos Abascal. As to the military parade 16 September, AMLO determined to clear the main avenues in Mexico City of the camps of resistance that were blocking these streets, and to spread the agenda of the CND foreseen for  the same day in order to give passage to the military. In both cases, they were able to avoid a direct confrontation.

The CND was realized in presence of more than one million delegates from all over the country. They proclaimed AMLO as the legitimate president and passed a Plan of 6 actions: not to accept Calderón; to empower AMLO with the right to take over the presidency on 20 November; to authorize him to form his cabinet; to undertake short-term actions of resistance and to prevent the taking over of power by Felipe Calderón on 1 December; to sustain the CND with periodical meetings and to integrate three commissions of coordination (regarding “National Politics”, “Civil Resistance” and “Organization of the Plebiscite and the Constituent”).

The CND provoked various critics, including from the left, in particular corresponding  the fact that the process was mainly led by members of political parties (instead of members by Civil Committees of support) and by polemical personalities, of whom various had previously been linked to the much criticized ex-President Carlos Salinas (PRI, 1988-1994).

The Coalition for the Benefit of All was transformed into the Progressive Front (FAP), which was registered as the same at the Federal Electoral Institute (IFE). On 17 September, AMLO moved to Tabasco with the aim to support the campaign of the candidate of the Coalition for governor.  Nevertheless, according to the preliminary results (October) PRI had won the elections.

Elections for governor in Chiapas: inverted parallelism

The federal electoral impugnations were still not resolved when on 20 August elections for governor were carried out in Chiapas. Multiple irregularities were denounced: the practice of purchase, manipulation and coercion of votes; the direct interference of the governor still in power (Pablo Salazar Mendiguchía), including in the selection of the candidates; electoral usage of social programs by the government of the state in order to favor the candidate Juan Sabines (candidate of the Coalition for the Benefit of All), among many.

The state governmental support in favor of Sabines provoked the other 4 contestants for governor to make a joint denunciation that they were having to confront an election by the State. Just shortly before the elections, PAN, the New Alliance Party (PANAL) and the Alternative Social-democratic Party invited their followers to vote for PRI, to thereby avoid a victory for Sabines. They were out of time though to register themselves as a political alliance, which obstructed the accumulation of their votes in the counting. 

Even though there was no information of major incidents during the day of elections, there was a high level of abstentions which reached almost 56%. This can be explained by various factors: historically the level of abstentions in Chiapas is one of the highest in the country, since 1995 the Zapatista bases of support have decided not to participate in any elections, and finally, the nomination of the candidates for these elections evoked discontent and confusion amongst the bases of rural and indigenous organizations. For example, until April 2006, Sabines served as the town president for PRI in Tuxtla Gutiérrez.

The results and reactions subsequent to the elections admit the observation of an inverted parallelism compared to the presidential struggle, once again with a minimal difference between the two prime candidates. Sabines immediately proclaimed himself as the elected governor; the state PRD opposed the opening of the voting boxes and the re-counting of the votes.

By presenting the following final results the State Electoral Institute (IEE) declared Sabines the winner:

He therefore won by a very slim margin (0,55%) by votes in his favor that only represent a fifth part of the total electorate. The Alliance for Chiapas (PRI and PVEM) and its allies, PANAL and PAN, objected to his triumph by presenting 391 challenges to the State Electoral Tribunal (TEE).

The TEE ratified Sabines’ triumph with similar arguments to those displayed by the TEPJF in the case of the presidential elections. Pressure against state magistrates was reported by Pablo Salazar. PRI impugned the TEE resolution at the TEPJF. On 27 October, the TEPJF ratified Sabines’ victory.

Meanwhile, Sabines had distanced himself publicly from the post-electoral mobilizations worked out by AMLO. The office of “transition” of Felipe Calderón on its hand declared its recognition of Sabines’ triumph and declared that “if PRI decides to impugn the elections at the state and federal tribunals, they will respect their decisions, but the National Alliance will not support that”.  

Chiapas: Electoral, historical and new conflicts

The electoral use of public resources was observed especially in the region that was affected by the hurricane Stan last year (the coastal and mountain regions). Before the state elections the accumulated resources and the reconstruction work were set loose and were accompanied by an intensive campaign of official broadcasting linking resources and work to the possible victory of Sabines. This campaign ceased immediately when the electoral process ended. The Federal Secretary of Social Development denounced the electoral use of the resources by the state government, questioning the public management of official numbers, for instance of the advances and the results.

In September, mobilizations and denunciations of official non-fulfillment and interruption of construction once again emerged by the victims of the hurricane Stan. What also may have had a weight in some cases is the incidence by José Antonio Aguilar Bodegas, the PRI candidate for governor, who was originally from the region.

The state elections also revived wounds and fears. In communities that were victimized by the paramilitary groups particularly between 1995 and 2000, there was exercised a “vote of fear” in favor of PRD, induced by the rumor that if PRI would win, the paramilitary groups would be re-activated.

In the Highlands, old conflicts were once again sharpened (religious, by the arbitrary imposition of traditions and customs, natural resources) which were made even more complex by inter-party disputes (PRI-PRD). In various regions, the mobilization against the high electricity tariffs was maintained.

In the northern Zone, a violent police operation was carried out to expel 30 Zapatista families in the community of the Ch’oles, autonomous municipality El Trabajo (Tumbalá) that were accused of having deprived   the owner of his private property.

In September, the offices of the Human Rights Centre Fray Bartolomé de las Casas were broken into. It represents the 18th case of intimidation and threat against human rights defenders in Chiapas in the course of this year, all of them still being with impunity.

The Other Campaign repositioning itself

In September, after several months of low political and media profile, the Zapatista Army of National Liberation (EZLN) announced the reset of national tour of Delegate Zero (sub-commander Marcos) . It had been suspended after the repression in Atenco in May. It has as its aim to between 8 October and 30 November to visit the 11 states still not covered in the tour before May. The support to the Popular Front in Defense of the Land (FPDT) in Atenco was maintained. Since 29 September, 3 Zapatista commanders are staying in Mexico City.

During this month, an extensive communiqué in 5 parts called “The Zapatistas and the Other Campaign: the pedestrians of the history” was diffused. The first part is a historical recovery of what made them break with the political class, about the Sixth Declaration from the Lacandona Jungle (June 2005) and the initiative to construct something new, from below and to the left.

An analysis follows on the political situation in the country in which the criticism against the PRD, AMLO and against what he calls the “supposed left” is explained. It heavily criticizes the fact that the people that are leading the CND and who are in the inner circle around AMLO were high-ranking officials during the period of president Salinas. It questions whether AMLO’s project was as neo-liberal as the one of Calderón, but that it was “administrating the crisis and controlling the social discontent”. It recognizes the legality and the good intentions of those that mobilized themselves against the fraud and in favor of AMLO. However, it affirms “this is not our track”. It expresses their support for Oaxaca (in various documents, subcomandante Marcos has explained that they will not offer a more direct support in order not to cause the APPO accusations of having links with armed groups) and justifies the rebellion of indigenous peoples, young people, sexual and maquila workers, women and leftist anti-capitalist organizations.

The new agenda proposed includes the realization of a new consultation about 6 points to define the Other Campaign: characteristics, structure, alliance politics, differences, those convoked and not, common tasks. This consultation will be carried out from October 2006 till February 2007.

On the other hand, the EZLN announced the realization of the second Inter-galactic Encounter against neo-liberalism and in favor of Humanity which will take place in the caracol of Oventik, Chiapas from 30 December 2006 to 2 January 2007. In order to facilitate their preparation, the “Caracoles” (Zapatista centers that correspond in their regional level to their autonomous construction) were re-opened, even though the red alert was not lifted for the insurgents.

:: ARTICLE

Conflict in Oaxaca: popular mobilization and government repression

On Sunday October 29^th, more than 4000 agents of the Federal Preventive Police (PFP) took over control of Oaxaca City’s historical center and various surrounding streets after having broken through the barricades with about 14 water cannon tanks. Initial reports issued by social organizations spoke of about 4 dead (including a minor), dozens injured, around 50 people arrested and about 50 houses raided. How did this happen?

The city and the state of Oaxaca have been at the center of the Mexican political agenda since June. Something quite unusual since Oaxaca has always been one of the most neglected states, both economically and politically. On June 14^th, a picket organized by Section 22 of the National Trade Union of Education Workers (SNTE) in the historical center of Oaxaca City was violently removed by the security forces, with a death toll of 4 and with 92 injured (according to trade union sources, without official confirmation). As a consequence of this, a trade union dispute that mainly demanded a pay raise for teachers suddenly turned into a much wider conflict involving different sectors and social movements of Oaxaca.

In order to understand these events, one needs to take into account the growing discontent provoked by the PRI government (PRI – Party of the Institutional Revolution) of Governor Ulises Ruiz since he was sworn in 2004 after a much disputed election and with a very narrow margin. His government has often been accused of being authoritarian and not respectful of human rights, with peasant and indigenous movements being violently repressed.⁽¹⁾ The local newspaper Noticias de Oaxaca, critical of Governor Ulises Ruiz, was subjected to a month-long picketing of its office by members of the Workers and Peasants’ Revolutionary Confederation (CROC), a trade union said to have close ties with the government. Thirty-one newspaper staff were trapped inside for the entire duration of the picketing. The newspaper is still subjected to continuous threats.⁽²⁾ Other allegations of abuse against Ulises Ruiz’ government include the harassment of non-PRI local mayors to force them into supporting the PRI candidate for the 2006 presidential election, Roberto Madrazo, pending their possible dismissal from duty by the state congress, also ruled by the PRI.

This massive uprising was also caused by the structural poverty and marginalization that the state of Oaxaca and its people have suffered for centuries. It is, in fact, one of the poorest states of the Republic, together with Chiapas and Guerrero, and the one that has the largest indigenous population.

The resistance to the attempt by the security forces to disperse the teachers’ protest on June 14th united numerous movements that opposed the state government in one demand: the resignation of governor Ulises Ruiz.

For this purpose, a new city-wide picket was then set up in Oaxaca City (taking over streets, public buildings, radio and TV stations, etc) and the APPO (Popular Assembly of the People’s of Oaxaca) was created. The APPO started from the beginning to operate as a de facto government, agovernment in resistance,preventing security forces (for years perceived in Oaxaca as repressive and disrespectful of human rights) from entering the picketed zones; regulating various aspects of the city life and providing alternative information to contrast the official propaganda, through various radio stations and internet.⁽³⁾Managing to bring together 300 organizations is in itself quite an achievement since, regardless of the traditional force of the social mobilization in Oaxaca, internal differences have usually caused divisions. At the same time, and thanks to this process, popular movements (gathering political parties, social organizations, trade unions etc.) in more than 20 municipalities of Oaxaca took over their town halls, forcing out all the mayors close to Governor Ulises Ruiz, and establishing themselves as the only legitimate governing authority.

By the end of October, the APPO and the teachers’ movement, which had controlled the city for approximately 5 months, had been subjected to various repressive actions: at least 10 killed; imprisonment of 5 of its leaders; harassment and threats, etc.  On the other hand, some people began criticizing the excessive violence in the actions taken by the APPO and the teacher’s union as a de facto government, especially in terms of maintaining security in the city.

Home analysts praised the movement of Oaxaca as real hope and as a sign of a new awakening of the conscience of the people of Oaxaca, tired of the tyranny of the PRI. They dubbed the movement as the “Commune of Oaxaca”, therefore establishing a parallel with the Commune of Paris, a popular government that, pulling together various revolutionary movements, ruled the French capital during two months in 1871⁽⁴⁾.

At the same time, strong criticism was voiced against the APPO for its violent nature (denied by the APPO), for the problems caused by the road blocks to the population and for the alleged real agenda of the teachers’ movement, all focused on trade union gains. There has also been an attempt to link the popular movement to guerrilla groups, an allegation that was strongly refuted as propaganda released by the state government to justify an intervention by the federal security forces (Federal Preventive Police or the Army).

To learn more about the human rights violations that were being committed, especially against the popular movement, in Oaxaca, the Oaxaca Human Rights Network (RODH) and the National Network ‘All Human Rights for All’ called for a civil observation mission to take place in September. SIPAZ took part in this mission detecting and reporting the existence of serious human rights violations: killings; arbitrary detentions of leaders and consequent fabrication of charges against them; de facto violation of the right to freedom of expression as well as continuous threats, creating a general climate of fear. All this seems to respond to a premeditated strategy of the state government to break down the movement. A preliminary version of the report prepared by the Civil Observation Mission (Misión Civíl de Observación) can be downloaded from the page dedicated to Oaxaca on SIPAZ’s website.⁽⁵⁾

During these months of crisis, the state government seemed to be heading to an imposition of public order with the use of force, asking for the support of the federal security forces to disperse the picket. Initially, however, the federal government which still had to deal with the consequences of the events in San Salvador Atenco⁽⁶⁾ in May, and which needed to protect its public image in view of the federal elections, opted for dialogue with the movement. For this purpose, a table of negotiation was established between APPO, the teachers’ trade union and the Minister of Interior. However, the negotiation was characterized for its lack of a real disposition to compromise: the APPO and the teachers’ union demanded the removal of governor Ulises Ruiz as non-negotiable and Carlos Abascal (Minister of the Interior) insisted on the lack of legal means for the federal government to remove a governor. This deadlock was in part motivated by the result of the federal elections of July 2nd. The protest vote against the PRI in Oaxaca led to the idea that calling for new state elections would probably produce a victory for the PRD.

Another option would be for governor Ulises Ruiz to ask to be relieved from office, in order for the state Congress (lead by the PRI majority) to appoint an interim governor.

There are, however, other interests at stake: the negotiations between PRI and PAN are characterized today by the narrow majority won by the PAN in the federal Congress, which forces it to collaborate with the PRI to govern more easily. In September, the APPO organized a massive march to Mexico City with the aim of demanding the “dissolution of powers” (desaparición de poderes), a constitutional legal figure that would imply the appointment by the Senate of a new state government.

Governor Ulises Ruiz has refused to resign, which has brought the conflict to a stalemate and paralyzed the institutions in Oaxaca. By mid-October, the Mexican armed forces had started to massively mobilize in the state of Oaxaca, dispatching land, sea and air units,⁽⁷⁾ causing fear of violent intervention. At the same time, the Ministry of Interior continued issuing a series of ultimatums in which he reiterated the resort to the use of force in case the teachers did not return to teaching and the APPO did not return control of the city to the authorities in Oaxaca City.⁽⁸⁾

On Friday October 27^th, a series of violent events occurred in Oaxaca City: 4 people were killed (including a US journalist) and several others were injured, in various parts of the city. According to some local human rights organizations, there is evidence of the participation of local police officials as well as organized groups, trained and armed by the state government, in these violent attacks against the opposition movements.

As a response to this situation, the federal government announced the intervention of federal security forces in Oaxaca. On Sunday the 29^th, the PFP started to enter the city very early in the morning and, by nightfall it had taken control of the central square. The PFP was confronted by a pacific protest that tried to impede its passage with non-violent means. On the previous days, the APPO had issued a call to its supporters asking them not to react to provocations.

Acts of violence were, however reported, with different figures according to the various sources: while the APPO reported at least 4 casualties, the federal government declared that no casualties had been reported following the policing operation.

On the same day, Sunday, a group of unidentified people wearing with faces covered clashed with security forces in Mexico City after blocking a road and hijacking two buses to build the “first barricades” in the Federal District. The APPO and the teachers’ union publicly condemned the actions of the group. An hour later, the police had retaken control of the two buses and reopened the circulation. The following morning, 20 prisoners were liberated.

On Monday October 30^th, governor Ulises Ruiz reiterated his position, declaring that his resignation is “not the debated matter, nor the solution to the political crisis of the state”. Later on in the day, the House of Representatives (Cámara de Diputados) approved, with the exception of the PRI and the PVEM, a motion to urge Governor Ulises Ruiz to resign. Immediately after, the government of Oaxaca submitted a constitutional controversy appeal against this motion based on the fact that the House of Representatives had exceeded its powers. It must be noted that the leader of the PRI in the House of Representatives, Emilio Gamboa Patrón, in a public declaration, voiced the possibility for Governor Ulises Ruiz to resign.

On the same day, in the afternoon, the Senate of the Republic that had previously refused to declare the “dissolution of powers” in Oaxaca, unanimously (including the PRI) asked Governor Ulises Ruiz to “reconsider resigning to contribute to the reestablishment of the governability, the normality and the peace”. The Senate also issued a call to all parts to contribute to the return of the peace in Oaxaca.

On Monday, October 30^th, a number of demonstrations were planned in Oaxaca and in several other parts of the Republic. The intervention of the PFP marks a change in the prolonged conflict in Oaxaca, without guaranteeing any long-term solution. On the contrary, various analysts note that it could mean the beginning of an escalation of the violence.  Meanwhile, the fear of more violent episodes on a larger scale is still pending.

1. See “Oaxaca: Important Dates” in SIPAZ Website (Return...)
2. http://www.jornada.unam.mx/2006/08/21/050n1soc.php (Return...)
3. http://www.asambleapopulardeoaxaca.com/ (Return...)
4. Though this experience was new and led to positive changes in social matters, the Commune of París ended in repression causing 30.000 dead and 50.000 executed. (Return...)
5. http://www.sipaz.org/ofini_esp.htm (Return...)
6. http://www.jornada.unam.mx/2006/06/13/021a1pol.php (Return...)
7. http://www.jornada.unam.mx/2006/10/01/ (Return...)
8. http://www.jornada.unam.mx/2006/10/14/007n1pol.php (Return...)

:: FOCUS

The Criminal Justice System in Mexico: Non-fulfillments and Human Rights Violations

Between July and August 2006, three deaths were denounced in prisons in Chiapas. Two happened in “El Amate” (CERESO -Centre for Social Rehabilitation- number 5) and one in Chiapa de Corzo. All of them were justified by the authorities and by the Public Prosecutor as natural deaths, denying the possibility of torture even though the autopsies revealed suspicious elements. For instance, José Gabriel Velázquez Pérez, a 34 year old carpenter who died on the 27^th of August, suffered trauma and massive hemorrhage in his abdomen, most likely caused by someone beating him. He had been arrested in his mother’s house; during his arrest, tear gas was used; and during his transfer to the prison in Chiapa de Corzo he was beaten by police officers. According to José’s wife, he told her: “Take me out of here, I’m dying, I need oxygen, they’re beating me, get me out of here, I’m being beaten by the police officers.” His death was made public a few hours later.

These are examples of a very widespread phenomenon. Several international organizations, including Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch and the United Nations (UN), have signaled that the culture of torture is still present in Mexico. It is a phenomenon very difficult to fight since it is institutionalized and directly linked to the practice of power in many organizations of the Mexican state. The judicial and prison systems are not an exception: they show serious contradictions with Mexican laws and fundamental rights of imprisoned people recognized internationally.

Impunity: An Endemic Issue

The use of torture is partly caused by shortcomings in the criminal and forensic investigation systems. According to the report published in 2001 by the UN Special Rapporteur on the Independence of Judges and Lawyers, Dato Param Cumaraswamy, the impunity in Mexico reaches percentages of “between 95% and 98%.” He describes this situation as endemic and believes it means the denial of the rule of law. A number of NGOs, the UN and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights⁽¹⁾ have also expressed their concern about the human rights violations that promote and guarantee impunity in Mexico, urging the Mexican authorities to put an end to this situation.

Amnesty International describes several characteristics of the impunity in cases of human rights violations. First of all are the limits placed by the way civil cases are handled by the prosecutor. Second, the fact that human rights violations involving members of the army are judged in military courts. In June 1994, three Tzeltal women of 12, 15 and 17 years old were illegally detained, raped and tortured near Altamirano, Chiapas. None of the perpetrators (soldiers, according to the witnesses) have been judged, so the case has been taken to the Interamerican Court of Human Rights. Third, the judges’ acceptance of forced confessions as evidence.

Torture for the purpose of getting forced confessions is a common practice in Mexico. For example, Gonzalo Sánchez López and Manuel Gómez Sántiz were arrested and beaten by police officers on the 4^th of July, 2006. According to their testimonies, the police officers put plastic bags on their heads, causing asphyxia and making Manuel faint. Finally, they signed a confession. Manuel was taken to the town where the homicide took place, and the police officers put a gun in his mouth to force him to inform where the body was hidden. It was never found. Gonzalo and Manuel are still in prison.

Another worrying sign, denounced by Amnesty International, is the lack of access to justice for the indigenous population. Even if 10% of the Mexican population (30% in Chiapas, with most of the imprisoned population being indigenous people) is indigenous and justice is theoretically guaranteed by Mexican law, access to translators and interpreters in indigenous languages is very deficient.

There are more barriers to the access to justice, such as inadequate legal defense. Many of the public defenders are not well trained; they earn low salaries, are overworked and are not independent enough from the Public Ministry. Neither are the judges independent: the UN Special Rapporteur on the Independence of Judges and Lawyers denounced after his visit to Mexico in 2001 that between 50% and 70% of the judges are corrupt, representing a “terrible social issue.” The influence of “narco” (drug trafficking) is seriously damaging the judiciary system, corrupting all its levels.

Little Progress

When President Fox (2000-2006) was sworn in, he promised to respect human rights and to strengthen the rule of law. He even announced a reform to make human rights more evident in the Constitution. Amnesty International expressed their approval of such plans. However, as his term of office is coming to an end, it is obvious that impunity has prevailed and continues prevailing today. The announced measures have not been taken, as Nigel Rodley, UN Special Rapporteur on Torture, denounced in March 2002.

The little progress made during Fox’s presidency was criticized again by the new Special Rapporteur on Torture, Manfred Nowak, in March 2006, when he wrote the recommendations for the improvement in the observance of the Mexican state’s duties as a party state of the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. He alleged that very few of the recommendations made by the Special Rapporteur in 1997 have been applied by the Mexican government.

Confessions made in front of police officers, and not a judge, are still accepted as evidence, even though Fox’s cabinet promoted a constitutional reform to establish confessions made in front of a judge as the only ones acceptable. This reform was rejected by the Senate, as well as the proposal to ensure that presumption of innocence is respected in cases linked to organized crime. Another example of the recommendations that were never fulfilled is the elimination of the arraigo⁽²⁾, a figure very broadly used in Mexico which permits the police to keep a person under arrest for a period of up to 60 days, once this person has been presented to an attorney, even if there is no proof of responsibility or no crime at all. It is important to remember that, according to Human Rights Watch, more than 40% of the prisoners in Mexican prisons are in “preventive prison”: they’ve never been found guilty and they’re waiting for a trial.

The following are some other ignored recommendations: compensations to victims of torture by public officers, access to independent doctors (both established by the Istanbul Protocol), independence of judges in trials against public officers and a legal time limitation for investigations concerning human rights (including torture). There is a situation of de facto amnesty or impunity for police and army officers violating human rights, also in cases where human rights defenders are threatened and harassed.

Amnesty International denounces extrajudiciary executions and the disappearance of people, which happen without anyone being taken to trial. Arbitrary detentions, torture and ill-treatments by public officers are still common in Mexico. Many detainees are dying as a result of torture they suffered during their arrest. On the 22^nd of July, the Tzotzil indigenous man Jesús Hernández Pérez died in the prison of El Amate. His family was told that his last meal “had not agreed with him” and he had subsequently died. However, his widow saw he had haematomas and scratches on his face. She believes it is obvious that he had suffered a violent death, which was finally confirmed by his death certificate. Nevertheless, his body was immediately buried, even if it is legally prescribed that exhaustive research be done when people under the custody of the State die. The Fray Bartolomé de Las Casas Human Rights Centre has demanded an investigation about these events.

The Symptomatic Existence of Political Prisoners.

“Nothing is more revealing about the situation of human rights in a certain country than the existence of political prisoners”, said Paulo Sergio Pinheiro, UN Special Rapporteur on Human Rights in Burma. The exact number of political prisoners in Mexico today remains unknown. It depends on the definition of the terms “political prisoner” and “prisoner of conscience.” A political prisoner is a person kept in prison or under any other kind of arrest because his or her ideas challenge or menace the established political system. The term “prisoner of conscience” includes both political prisoners and people imprisoned for their religious or philosophical beliefs.

According to the list of political prisoners and prisoners of conscience compiled by the Cerezo Committee, there are 395 prisoners of this kind in Mexico⁽³⁾. In Chiapas there are around 50 of them⁽⁴⁾, although many more consider themselves prisoners of conscience⁽⁵⁾. Political prisoners are often members and leaders of social organizations, or people involved in political activities in some way. They are often accused of kidnappings or homicides (crimes fabricated by the authorities) and forced to declare themselves guilty in front of a judge.

Being a political prisoner can be an advantage, compared to the vulnerability and isolation suffered by other prisoners. In the Cereso #14, prison of “El Amate”, several prisoners that claim they are imprisoned for supporting the Zapatista Army (EZLN) and La Otra Campaña⁽⁶⁾ have organized themselves under the name of “La Voz del Amate”⁽⁷⁾, the Voice of El Amate. It is the continuation of “La Voz de Cerro Hueco” (Cerro Hueco is the name of an old prison, now closed), which was created as a response to the massive imprisonments after the Zapatista uprising on 1994. Since January 2006, this group of prisoners has held protests against their detention, asking for recognition of their rights as political prisoners. According to human rights organizations, the prison authorities have encouraged other prisoners to harass members of “La Voz del Amate.”

The Other Campaign has prioritized the issue of the defense and liberation of political prisoners, especially after the events in Atenco last May. During his national tour, Delegate Zero (Subcomandante Marcos) has visited several prisons.

Worrying Conditions inside the Prisons

The conditions inside the prisons are far from legal. In many of them there are problems of overpopulation, prisoners suffer violence, the staff is not properly trained and there are no adequate sanitary facilities. It is very alarming that inmates are being hired to act as guardians. There is usually a parallel power tolerated by the prison authorities, with posts held by the prisoners (the “precisos”, for instance). Other worrying aspects are corruption (which undermines authority and produces abuses) and violent confrontations among adverse factions, linked to drug trafficking, inside the prisons. ⁽⁸⁾

Mexican and international human rights organizations continue their struggle to make the prison system’s severe deficiencies more visible. However, there have not been big changes in the government’s policies, nor in the public opinion’s perception. In both areas prisoners are still perceived as guilty of breaking the social order and therefore they have to pay for what they have done.

There are also shortages in the attention given to imprisoned people, in social and psychological questions. From the very moment of their detention, they suffer a long and painful chain of injustices, which includes ill-treatments and torture, and which does not always produce the solidarity that is needed from their families and organizations. After this recurring chain of suffering, sometimes for years, rehabilitation and the recovery of a “normal” life in freedom is not likely to happen.

Although the Mexican legal system acknowledges the priority of the international treaties signed by the government in its Constitution (Art. 133), and therefore acknowledges several conventions and treaties regarding human rights of imprisoned people and the prohibition of torture, practice is far from what these conventions dictate. It is said that prisons are a reflection of a society, which should lead us to deeper considerations on the matter.

1. The Interamerican Court of Human Rights is part of the Interamerican system for protection of Human Rights. It interprets and applies the American Convention on Human Rights. http://www.corteidh.or.cr/ (Return...)
2. So far, only the state of Chihuahua has declared the arraigo unconstitutional.
    http://web.amnesty.org/library/Index/ESLAMR410412005?open&of=ESL-MEX (Return...)
3. http://www.nodo50.org/comitecerezo/presos.htm (Return...)
4. http://zapateando.wordpress.com/2006/06/18/encuentro-nacional-por-la-libertad-de-los-presos-politicos/ y http://www.jornada.unam.mx/2006/07/17/020n1pol.php (Return...)
5. http://espora.org/~p/egoteca/mot.php3?id_mot=9 (Return...)
6. http://espora.org/~p/egoteca/article.php3?id_article=263&var_recherche=voz+del+amate (Return...)
7. Read the SIPAZ report from May 1999 (Return...)
8. http://www.phaseloop.com/foreignprisoners/prison-mexico.html (Return...)

:: ACTIVITIES – SIPAZ

July-October 2006

PRESENCE AND INTERNATIONAL ACCOMPANIMENT

CHIAPAS

In August, we spent 10 days in various communities and towns of the Lacandon Jungle and Northern zones of Chiapas to interview various people and organizations: displaced people; leaders of various political groups; government authorities; members of churches; Zapatista support bases as well as peasant and social organizations. This visit was conducted before and during the state elections, to observe how process developed in these areas.

As part of our ongoing relationship with political and social actors in Chiapas, we visited Chenaló (Highlands zone) in July, September and October. We also met with members of the Directive Board of the Abejas in San Cristóbal de Las Casas in August.

On 29 and 30 July, we were present as observers to the Second State Assembly of the Other Campaign, in San Cristóbal de Las Casas.

At the end of September, we attended the “1st Regional Meeting of the Selva for the Defence of Our Right to Land and Territory” (“1er Encuentro Regional de la Selva para la Defensa de Nuestro Derecho a la Tierra y al Territorio”), that took place in Comitán.

OAXACA

Between 4 and 8 of September we participated in an observation mission organized by the Oaxaca Human Rights Network (RODH) and by the National Network All Rights for All (Red Nacional Todos los Derechos para Todas y Todos) to verify and document human rights violations that had been committed after the violent repression of the protests of the 14 July. See complete report (available in Spanish only): Informe Preliminar Misión Civil de Observación a Oaxaca: “Violaciones a los Derechos Humanos en Oaxaca. Del paro magisterial a la movilización popular”

GUERRERO

In mid-August, we participated in the International Seminar on the Human Rights of the Indigenous Peoples that took place in Iguala de Independencia. On the following days, we accompanied Prof. Rodolfo Stavenhagen, UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights and fundamental freedoms of Indigenous People, for part of his unofficial visit to the Costa and Montaña zones of this state.

OTROS

Between 14 and 16 of July, we attended the 2nd National Meeting for the Defense of Our Land and Territory and Against the PROCEDE and PROCECOM (2° Encuentro Nacional por la Defensa de Nuestra Tierra y Territorio y Contra el PROCEDE y el PROCECOM) that took place in Zirahuén, Michoacán.

In order to continue monitoring the delicate political context, at the national level, we attended the National Democratic Convention (CND), that took place in Mexico City on 16 of September, as observers.

INFORMATION

We received several visits from various individuals and groups interested in the situation in Chiapas and the work of SIPAZ. These included: students; journalists; and a delegation of the Jubilee Economic Ministries and a delegation of the Marin Task Force for Latin America (both members of our coalition).

In October, we coordinated an eight-day visit of a delegation of the Mayan Ministries (also members of our coalition, from the United States) to Chiapas.

We also released some interviews with various US and Canadian radio stations, on the state and national post-electoral context.

We continued our collaboration with other organizations within the Project of Observation and Monitoring of the Political and Civil Rights of the Peoples in Chiapas, during the electoral process and the activities of Other Campaign, in Chiapas. The project will come to an end in December. A joint bulletin on the federal elections was issued in July and one on the state elections in August.

A new section of our website on Oaxaca has been finalized and made available.

We continued our participation in the seminar: “The Work of Immanuel Wallerstein: a grammar to Understand Today’s World in a Critical Perspective” coordinated by the “Center for the Study, Information and Documentation: Immanuel Wallerstein”, in San Cristóbal de Las Casas.

PEACE PROMOTION

PEACE EDUCATION

In August, we participated in an ecumenical space of reflection and prayer with members of different churches of Chiapas.

In September, we co-facilitated a workshop on “Peace, War and Violence” organized by Advisory Service for Peace (SERAPAZ) and the Autonomous University of Mexico City (UNAM), in Mexico City.

At the beginning of August, we were invited to give a presentation at the symposium “Working in International Networks” organized by the Mason University, in Washington, USA.

NETWORKING

We participated to the monthly meetings of the Network for Peace (Red por la Paz), a space of action and reflection co-organized by 16 organizations supporting peace and reconciliation in Chiapas. In mid-September we participated in a meeting of the Mexican Network of Peacebuilders (Red Mexicana de Constructores de Paz) in Mexico City.

We also participated in to two workshops on “Facing the prison personally and collectively”, organized by the Collective Ik. We conducted various interviews with the various organizations working on this issue in Chiapas.