:: ANALYSIS
Mexico: Post-Election Uncertainties
On July 2nd, federal elections were held in Mexico. That night, the Federal Electoral Institute (IFE)- the agency responsible for the counting of votes- declared itself incapable of announcing a winner because of the minimal margin between the two leading candidates and postponed the announcement of the results. All the same, that night, both Andrés Manuel López Obrador (AMLO, the candidate for the Alliance for the Good of All, which includes various center and left parties: Democratic Revolution Party, PRD; Workers’ Party, PT; and Convergence) and Felipe Calderón (National Action Party, PAN, right) declared themselves the winners. In the following days, a district by district count was conducted and legal challenges were brought to the Electoral Tribunal of Judicial Power of the Federation (TEPJF). This agency must resolve the legal challenges by August 31st and September 6th is the final day to declare the new president elect.
An Incomplete Electoral Proces

Election day itself was relatively calm. 99.4% of the polling places were successfully set-up (130,407 of the 130,488 planned), which is the highest level in Mexico’s electoral history. Nearly 60% of Mexican voters participated (the abstention level was 41% as compared to 36% in the 2000 elections). At 8 p.m., the president of the IFE, Luis Carlos Ugalde, described Election Day 2006 as “exemplary and successful.” He affirmed that the 3,047 reported “incidents” (particularly in the installation of polling places) did not affect the results of the election.
In the hours that followed, the figures indicated a “technical tie” with a slim advantage for Calderón over López Obrador. AMLO denounced a discrepancy of nearly three million missing votes. The following day, the IFE stated that this was explained by the more than eleven thousand ballot boxes that were not included in the first count because they presented “inconsistencies.” When the IFE did include these votes, the margin between Calderón and AMLO reduced to 0.64%. The third candidate for the presidency, Roberto Madrazo Pintado (of the Alliance for Mexico which includes the Institutional Revolution Party, PRI, and the Ecological Green Party of Mexico, PVEM) immediately acknowledged his defeat.

Legally, the next step was the count of the ballot boxes that corresponded to the 300 electoral districts. The IFE conducted this count from Wednesday July 5th to Thursday July 6th. Unlike in the first count, from the beginning AMLO maintained a lead over Calderón, though the margin became smaller and smaller until Calderón surpassed him reaching a final lead of 0.58%. Once he was in the lead, in the early hours of the morning, Calderón made a statement for national reconciliation. The morning of Thursday the 6th, with 400 polling places still to be counted, AMLO announced that he would legally challenge the results before the TEPJF: “The apparatus and resources continue to be used by the State to favor the candidate from the right (…) it is obvious that the PREP (Preliminary Electoral Results Program which does the first rapid count for the IFE) was manipulated. There has been little transparency. The IFE lacks independence. There were orders that the ballot boxes not be opened and an unusual hurry to resolve, in less than 24 hours, a numerically tight election. We can not recognize the results. There are many inconsistencies, irregularities. We are going to challenge the election and demand that the ballot boxes be opened and that there be a vote by vote count.” On the 7th, Luis Carlos Ugalde, IFE president, declared Felipe Calderón the winner.
In the days that followed the Alliance for the Good of All submitted more than 300 pieces of support before the TEPJF. This reflected irregularities in about 50,000 of the more than 130,000 polling places set-up. The PAN and its candidate have opposed the opening of the ballot boxes and the counting of the more than 41 million votes casted. Both sides have called for peaceful social demonstrations.
The TEPJF, which it is important to recall ruled in favor of the PAN in the case of the television ads against AMLO, has the legal ability to declare the electoral process invalid if they deem it necessary. The results of the election remain pending until August 31st, the deadline for resolving the legal challenges.
First Assessments Awaiting Definite Results
Regardless of which of the two presidential candidates is declared the winner, AMLO or Calderón, they will have been elected by only one fifth of the votes, the most minimal margin in the history of Mexican presidential elections. The fact that there were close to 14 million votes for each of the two leading candidates would suggest an ongoing situation of division and a high risk of social conflict both in the short and long term.
Another aspect of this election was the polarization between the North (mainly PAN supporters) and the South (majority AMLO supporters) of Mexico. It is also important to highlight that in the elections on July 2nd, the PRD won in Mexico City, maintaining control of the post of mayor of the Federal District for the third straight election.
The federal elections for congressional representatives resulted in the election of a Congress that will be strongly divided. Whichever of the two candidates ends up winning the elections will have to do so without a parliamentary majority. If Calderón wins (his party would have the largest minority in Congress with 206 of the 500 deputies and 52 senators),. But he would have to deal with an adverse and resentful portion of the opposition. If AMLO were to become the president , his party, the Alliance for the Good of All, has won only 160 deputies and 36 senators seats.
The PRI only received 21% of the votes for president, even being defeated in its historic bastions of Oaxaca and Chiapas. In comparison with the presidential election of 2000, the PRI lost 5 million votes, transforming it into the third national political force. Nevertheless, having won 121 deputies and 39 senators at the Congressional level the PRI could still play an important role in the necessary alliances and political negotiations between the represented parties.
Finally, it is worth mentioning that the New Alliance Party (Nueva Alianza) surprisingly won 9 deputies and 1 senator, while the Socio-Democratic Alternative Party won 4 deputies.
The Impact of a Turbulent Pre-Electoral Context
The way that the electoral campaigns were carried out (reaching the point of personal disqualifications between the candidates) will surely complicate the post-electoral situation. While some observers and electoral experts reject the possibility of cybernetic fraud or old-fashioned ballot box fraud, there have been many reports of induced voting and many electoral violations in the months before the election, intensifying in the final days of June. This fact was illustrated by the results of the Monitoring of Social Programs, carried out in 22 states of Mexico by 25 NGOs, coordinated by Alianza Cívica, A.C. and Global Exchange (USA). This initiative examined how various federal social programs were being used for the conditioning and buying of votes, in this case in favor of the PAN.
As a matter of fact, in May, both the PRI and the PRD denounced that a genuine “election by the state” was happening, with the presidency being used to support the PAN candidate. Roberto Madrazo even called on the PRD to form a formal alliance to oppose this “election by the state.”
On June 6th, during the second debate between the presidential candidates, AMLO denounced the trafficking of influences and fiscal evasion by Diego Hildebrando Zavala, Calderón’s brother-in-law. Subsequent research by journalists revealed to the public the fact that through the use of his own computer science enterprises Zavala had direct and complete access to lists of the beneficiaries of the main federal social assistance programs, as well as to the Electoral List and the Preliminary Electoral Results Program (PREP).
Various sectors began to question the impartiality of the IFE in its role as a neutral arbitrator, given its minimal responses to the aforementioned issues. Weeks before the election, various analysts began to denounce the possibility of cybernetic fraud.
In June, at the same time that the majority of polls were showing a lead for AMLO, an intense television ad campaign was initiated, sponsored by the Coordinating Council of Businesses (CCE, Consejo Coordinador Empresarial). This ad campaign stigmatized AMLO as a “danger” for Mexico and induced a “vote of fear” in favor of Calderón. In other news, in the past months, the divisions in the PRI leadership intensified to the point that associated PRI members were openly calling on PRI support bases to carry out a “practical vote,” given Roberto Madrazo’s minimal chances of winning the election. Some called for supporting AMLO, while others for supporting the PAN.
A Vote of Fear in a Heated Social Context?
The multimillion peso ad campaign sponsored by the CEE also coincided with a moment of great social tension. In the months leading up to the elections, there were a series of violent incidents in various parts of the country.
In May, the case of Atenco was definitely the most talked about issue (see: www.sipaz.org). On May 3rd, a conflict emerged between 8 mobile flower vendors and the police in the city of Texcoco (State of Mexico) because of the PRD mayor’s prohibition of their vending in an area already designated for the construction of a Wal-Mart store. This conflict resulted in a violent confrontation. The result of the two brutal police operatives that followed were two deaths (a teenager on the same day, and another young man, in June, as a result of being hit in the head with a teargas grenade), several injuries, 211 arrests, and 5 deportations of foreigners. More than 20 women were sexually assaulted and 7 raped by state security forces while being transported to jail.
Currently, 28 of the 211 arrested remain in jail on serious charges (kidnapping of public officials). 146 of the arrested were released on bail ($814,125 pesos per person). The National Human Rights Commission (CNDH) received more than 150 reports of various forms of violence.
In June, the teachers’ movement in Oaxaca mobilized more than 40,000 teachers in a sit-in that was supported by broad social sectors of the state. It began with union demands (rezoning of salaries), but grew to incorporate and even prioritize a call for the resignation of the PRI governor Ulises Ruíz, a figure considered, by most of the social organizations of the state, to be very repressive. A police operative, meant to expel the sit-in, was resisted and rejected by the protesting teachers, who then cut off dialogues with the Ministry of the Interior and threatened to boycott the federal elections. There were no major problems on Election Day, and the PRI was defeated.
In Chiapas, at the beginning of May, the state government ordered two police operatives to dislodge the sit-ins set up by those affected by Hurricane Stan in Escuintla and Motozintla, where the civil population protested the government’s failure to fulfill its promises and the delays in the reinforcement of the river banks. On May 8th, there was another operative carried out in Bochil (Highlands) to dislodge the municipal presidency, which had been occupied for over a month, protesting acts of corruption committed by the municipal president. According to figures from the Fray Bartolomé de Las Casas Human Rights Center, the results of this repressive operative were dozens of injuries and 64 arrests.
The Other Campaign: Post-Atenco Changes

The political process initiated by the Zapatista Army for National Liberation (EZLN) one year ago, suffered changes as a result of the conflict in Atenco. The same day of the conflict, Delegate Zero (Subcomandante Marcos) suspended the national tour and stated his intention to stay in Mexico City until all of the political prisoners are released. At that same moment, a Red Alert was declared in all of the Autonomous Municipalities and Good Government Councils (Juntas de Buen Gobierno) in Chiapas. Marcos opened himself to the commercial mainstream media and participated in a series of mobilizations and meetings with different social sectors. There were also local demonstrations held in a number of Mexican states. In May, there were also two major meetings: the Fourth National Indigenous Congress (CNI) was held in the State of Mexico, with 800 representatives from 31 different indigenous groups from 25 states, and the National Conference for the dissemination of strategies for Legal Defense, with 30 NGOs from 17 Mexican states participating.
Nevertheless, priority was given to freeing those detained in Atenco. On May 28th, at the National March for the Liberation of the Prisoners and for Justice for the Raped Women of Atenco, held in Mexico City, Subcomandante Marcos stated “for the Zapatistas, the Other Campaign has moved on to the organizational phase. While there are some important issues relating to the definition of its profile that remain pending, the Other Campaign is now responding as a national organization (in the 32 states), with ethics (not leaving the prisoners to their own luck), high morals (superimposing itself on the terror that the government attempted to implant in Atenco), and with the ability to create autonomous and independent mobilizations (separate, concentrated mobilizations).” Depending on the source, the number of participants at this demonstration varies between seven thousand and fifty thousand people.
The next day, in a national meeting of adherents to the Other Campaign, Marcos called for “a national concentration to peacefully and civilly impact the electoral process,” on July 2nd. This was questioned by some intellectuals and analysts as an action that would favor the interests of the extreme right.
In other news, there have been reports that the judicial processes against those detained in the two operatives and the incorporation of previous investigations regarding the cases of rape against female detainees have been the subject of multiple delays, obstacles, and corruption. On the other side of the situation, only 23 low ranking police officers have been held on minimal charges, and they were immediately released on bail.
At the international level, the outcry from the Other Campaign, regarding the repression and human rights violations in Atenco, has had greater impact. Along with the national demonstrations, 124 actions were carried out in 52 cities of 24 countries, in protest of the violence in Atenco and in response to the call made by the Intergalactic Commission of the Other Campaign.
International human rights organizations such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch issued reports on the issue. The Civil Commission of International Human Rights Observation (CCOIDH), which met in Mexico from May 29- June 4th, released a preliminary report of the violation of the rights of the civil population of Atenco: “the police operative included the excessive use of force, opposite to the principles of proportionality, reasonability, and absolute necessity that should guide it.” The report affirms that all the high-ranking police should be fired and that all the detainees be freed, based on their presumed innocence.
State Elections: Ruptures and Party Changes
The federal elections (primarily for president) have overshadowed the state electoral process in which the next governor of Chiapas will be decided on August 20th. The announcement of the candidates and alliances was marked by tensions, ruptures, and party changes. The registered candidates are:
-
Juan Sabines for the PRD/Convergence (until the end of April 2006, he was the municipal president of the capital of Chiapas, Tuxtla Gutiérrez, for the PRI party).
- Antonio Aguilar Bodegas for the PRI/PVEM (former Senator, see the April 2006 SIPAZ Report).
- Francisco Rojas Toledo for the PAN (federal deputy, former mayor of Tuxtla form 2001-2004, and former candidate for senator).
- Gilberto Gómez Maza for the Socio-Democratic Alternative Party (founder of the PRD in Chiapas, he resigned from the party in 2002 in protest of the internal breakdown and the control that the current governor, Pablo Salazar Mendiguchía, exercised over the PRD State Committee).
- Emilio Zebadúa for the New Alliance Party (PANAL) (former civil advisor for the IFE, former Secretary of State for Chiapas and former federal deputy for the PRD, he started his campaign with support from mainly indigenous PRD supporters, in the Highlands and Selva regions).
These appointments and the ruptures they implied for the parties as well as for the voters suggest a high level of abstentionism (it generally fluctuates between 60-70%). In particular, this is likely to be true for the population of the large area affected by Hurricane Stan last year (41 municipalities total, 26 which were severely affected), with the rainy season in full swing, it will be physically and emotionally difficult to travel to the polling places to vote. (see the report “The Area Affected by Stan: Social and Electoral Tensions”)
The impact of the federal electoral process on the state context remains unknown. Another significant political occurrence has been the PRD candidate, Juan Sabines’s signing of the “Declaration of Comitán,” the proposed Development Plan for the state. This document was developed and publicly presented by Roberto Albores Guillén (former PRI governor and former precandidate for the state election) who is supported by a large sector of the voters. Sabines publicly promised to incorporate the proposals of this Declaration into his Government Plan.
According to various analysts, this Plan presents neoliberal characteristics. For example, the construction of a broad network of highways and freeways, the creation of a “new Cancún in northern Chiapas” and the establishment of a irrigation system with agroindustrial objectives in the Soconusco and Coast areas. On the other hand, the Plan also includes counterinsurgency actions, including the creation of new constitutional municipalities, most of which would be superimposed on autonomous Zapatista municipalities.

:: FOCUS
“The land is not for sale- we work it and defend it”
In Zirahuén, Michoacán, on July 14, 15, and 16, the “Second National Meeting for the Defense of Our Land and Territory and Against PROCEDE (Program of Certification of Ejido Rights and Plot Titles) and PROCECOM (Program of Certification of Communal Rights)”1 was held.

The announcement for the Meeting stated: “The implementation of programs like PROCEDE and PROCECOM, most often enacted through illegal means, with deception, manipulation, and bribery, as well as promises of public works, services, and other government programs, with many irregularities committed, denotes the existence of a policy of the State that violates current laws like the Agrarian Law, the Civil Code, the Indigenous Customary Rights, the actual Mexican Political Constitution, and a series of International Treaties, related to Human Rights, signed by the Mexican State.”
Although PROCEDE was scheduled to end in 2006, the program continues in effect. Many social and campesino organizations warn that this form of implementing such policiese likely tol continue with future governments, just with different acronyms and programs.
A Bit of History
PROCEDE was created on January 5th, 1993 with the objective of “giving juridical certainty to land ownership through the distribution of land parcel certificates and/or certificates for communal land rights, as well as land plot titles that favor the individual members of the agrarian groups that solicit and approve the programs” (http://www.pa.gob.mx/Procede/info_procede.htm). This is an inter-institutional federal program that involves the collaboration of the Agrarian Reform Secretary (SRA), the Agrarian Secretary (PA), the National Institute of Statistics, Geography, and Information (INEGI), and the National Agrarian Registry (RAN).
In discussing PROCEDE, there are constant references to the Reform of Article 27 of the Constitution and the new Law (both issued in February 1992). To a great extent, both were part of the negotiations that led to the implementation of the North American Free trade Agreement (NAFTA), which Mexico signed with the United States and Canada in 1994.
The reforms in 1992 had various consequences for Mexican campesinos:
“a) The end of all of the land redistribution that started after the revolution of 1910 (...);
b) Lifting the legal prohibition that existed for ejido and communal lands, allowing them to now be bought, sold, rented, seized, or mortgaged and expired.
c) Permitting and promoting the ejidos and communities that possess valuable natural resources to participate in commercial sectors, associating with corporations or banks, involving their lands or forests and mountains that can now be seized or mortgaged and transferred.”2
From there comes the strong opposition of many campesino organizations to these reforms, which they consider counter-reforms and steps backwards from the achievements of the Mexican Revolution. In the early 1990s, there were many marches, sit-ins, highway blockades and occupations of government offices as attempts to have the campesino opposition heard. It is also important to note the expression of land as one of the principle demands of the Zapatista Army of National Liberation (EZLN) when they rose up in arms on January 1st, 1994, strategically parallel to the implementation of NAFTA on the same day.
13 Years Later
According to the report from the National Agrarian Registry (http://inet.ran.gob.mx/ran/archivos/PROCEDE/index.html), there are 27,664 ejidos and 2,278 communal land groups, totaling 29,942 agrarian groups. The ejido members and communal land holders are estimated to possess approximately 9 million parcels and plots, which covers more that half of the national territory.
Communication and sensitization efforts with the members of the ejido groups, as well as the compilation of complementary information, has allowed for the assessment of the viability of incorporating the program throughout the nation.
By the assemblies’ will, the Program has been incorporated in 96% of the nation’s agrarian groups. 91% of them have achieved, in agreement with their neighbors, the delimitation of their properties, as well as of their parcels and plots. This mediation effort has been completed in 90% of the cases. Finally, the regularization of 89% of the national total, as well as the certification and/or titling of 77.5 million hectares, has been completed.
In the face of the previously mentioned risks, it is important to note the calculation that throughout Mexico, less than 3% of all of the ejido and communal land certified in the past 13 years has come into the “Regime of Full Domain” and been totally privatized (Source 2).
There are three states that have fallen behind in the application of PROCEDE: the Federal District (in the mountains that surround Mexico City there are still ejidos and communities that cover 30,496 hectares), Oaxaca, where PROCEDE has advanced by 52%, and Chiapas, by 54% (Source 2, reflective of the end of 2005).
The Clash of Two Visions

The states with the most minimal national advance (Oaxaca & Chiapas) are in the southern part of Mexico and have a large indigenous population. In the ancestral indigenous worldview, nature is considered integral, sacred, and collective, and cannot be sold.
This idea is illustrated in this quote: “It is important to highlight the mystical element in the concept of territory. Territory is not just a piece of land, it cannot be defined in one single word (there is no direct translation in any of the primary indigenous languages of Chiapas). It has to do with where we plant our corn, where we are born, where we marry, and where we have our children. It has to do with the forest, the animals, the sacred places, the caves, the lagoons, the hills. The people are the territory. 3
This conception of land has a profound impact in the organizational forms that currently exist in a good number of the indigenous communities: “All of this, which implies seeing nature and the Earth as a mother and not as a slave, has historically been a way of working and producing in the Mesoamerican cultures. The political resistance of these cultures relies on the maintenance and strengthening of the community structures for decision-making and solidarity collaboration, as well as the preservation of the collective perception that the land and its resources are the property of everyone, of the whole community, which gives it its use and family responsibility.”4.
The indigenous vision of the land clashes with a more commercial vision: the land has been reduced, by the current economic system, to its solely material dimension, as a resource to exploit. It has been fragmented in various moments of Mexican history, under the protection of the law.
The statements made by the Agrarian Reform Secretary, Lic. Florencio Salazar Adame, on the television program Teleformula, on October 5th, 2005, can illustrate this commercial vision: “The objective of PROCEDE is, on the one hand, to avoid agrarian conflicts, and on the other hand, to incorporate those lands into the market (...) Before the reform of (Article) 27, the campesino was just the worker of the land. We need to review Zapata so that the current system of production for self-consumption transitions to production for the market.”
Criticism of PROCEDE
Many campesino and civil organizations have denounced PROCEDE and PROCECOM for the divisions they generate within communities and ejidos (some members accept the programs, while others do not). This is particularly critical in the case of Chiapas, which is already considered to have a fractured social fabric as a result of the armed conflict and the consequences of the strategy of Low-Intensity Warfare implemented to confront it.
In some cases, the decision is not made in the assemblies or abiding by the legal methods that guide this process: “If in the first assembly meeting less than 75% of the ejido members are present, the law states that a second assembly meeting must be called and that it be held one month later. This waiting period is often not respected. In the second assembly, the number of ejido members drops from 75 to 50%. At this point, an assembly act is signed by the attendees with consequences for those who do not attend. The agrarian officials justify their actions: ‘We did our work according to the decisions made by the community in accordance with the assembly’.”5
Many others question the fact that it promotes the monopolization and the sale of collective lands. “From my point of view, one part of it is ok, in finding solutions to conflicts over plot divisions. But by parceling the collective lands, whoever has money can buy and sell plots, whether they are from that community or not, and little by little they go controlling more land” (Source # 4, resident of the Northern-Selva Region of Chiapas).
Or another example: “Now, many campesinos don’t have anywhere to get their firewood, because the mountains have been parceled, and now they can’t go to the mountain because it has an owner” (Source 4, resident of the Northern-Selva Region of Chiapas).
At the Second National Meeting, one participant said: “We are all capitalists. The capital we have is the land. If we sell it to another person, it will be sold and resold until the land ends up in the hands of those that the government wants. It is just a question of time before the upper or middle class controls the land. We have very powerful enemies. They are well aware of the laws and they know how to manipulate them. The rich know all the tricks and they move forward.”
Another risk arises because the campesinos have to turn over their lands as a guarantee, and if they fail to pay back the credit, they lose their lands: “As an ejido we have organization, unity, strength; but once they individualize us, this is all weakened (...) Also, we do not know how to work these Programs. Even if I have my documents, I go to the bank and I ask for a loan, I sign my name, and at the moment that I cannot pay because I do not know how to manage the finances or the work, or I start drinking, I waste all my money and my signature ends up being the property of the bank” (Source 4, Resident of Bachajón Northern-Selva Region Chiapas). Also, when one enters PROCEDE, they are required to start paying the predial taxes not only on the plot but also on the parcel.
Irregularities have also been identified in the way that these programs are “proposed.” Theoretically: “PROCEDE has been and will continue to be, a Program of support for campesino initiative, voluntary and free, with the principle of the strict respect for the free will of the agrarian groups and the operation of it is equally sustained by the organization and active participation of the ejido members and communal landholders, which is achieved through the assemblies, where they freely decide the delimitations, destiny and allocation of their lands, in the presence of a public official and abiding by the established technical-judicial framework.” Nevertheless, there have been many reports of cases where the agents from the Agrarian Secretary visit campesinos’ homes to convince the families/heads of household to join the program.
In several cases, it has been discovered that other government programs, like PROCAMPO (Program of Direct Support to the Rural Areas) or promises of support, have been used to pressure people: “The official says that if you join the program, you will receive more assistance; he says that being united as we are, we won’t be able to find any sort of projects. And so my community believed him and that is why we joined. But the assistance we were supposed to receive never arrived; we were deceived” (Source 4).
Other critics state that the measurement of the land is incorrect. Furthermore, if they are deemed “excessive,” they are expropriated without any recognition of the time of possession and the passive use, which would give them a positive prescription (Source 4).
Finally, PROCEDE has been denounced for worsening the situation of inequality, insecurity, and discrimination of campesina women: “At first glance, the new Agrarian Code (February 1992) gives the impression of being neutral on the question of gender, as Article 12 of this law states ‘The men and women who hold ejido titles are the ejido members,’ which demonstrates the formal equality that exists in the agrarian sector. Nevertheless, this equality has not been manifested as real equality. (...) In practice this program has turned the politics of titling over to the ‘heads of household’ or simply those who are individual ejido members, once again excluding the women from access to property, in this case, to the land.”6
Organizing in Defense of the Territory
In the seminar on indigenous rights organized by the Fray Bartolomé de Las Casas Human Rights Center, one of the working groups concluded: “To strengthen the defense of our territory we need to organize ourselves to not fall into the traps set by the neoliberal government, and to organize ourselves as the people in resistance.”
The indigenous communities certainly have decades, or rather, centuries of experience in resistance. In the case of Chiapas, since the 1970s, the indigenous and campesino movements have grown and independent campesino organizations have emerged.
Another factor has been the organization of meetings: the First National Meeting Against PROCEDE and PROCECOM “One Decade After the Agrarian Reform,” held February 5th and 6th, 2003 in the community of San Felipe Ecatepec, San Cristóbal de Las Casas, Chiapas; the First State Meeting Against PROCEDE and PROCECOM, held in the Ejido Petalcingo, municipality of Tila, Chiapas March 10-12th, 2006, and most recently the Second National Meeting for the Defense of Our Land and Territory and Against PROCEDE and PROCECOM, July 14th-16th, 2006, in Zirahuén, Michoacán.
At this most recent meeting, a decision was made to create a National Network in Defense of the Land and the Territory and Against PROCEDE/PROCECOM, to maintain a permanent interchange of experiences, as well as coordination and mutual support in the regional and state struggles.
The Final Declaration also proposes actions: “We decided to strengthen the community unity through the assemblies, with a territorial vision of autonomy; promoting the construction of community alternatives for the managing and sustainable use of the natural resources and for agro-ecological production based in local self-sufficiency and food security, creating regional markets that recover bartering. We will generate an intense informational campaign, at the local, national, and international level (...) We will also organize mobilizations in our states and regions, in support of legal actions to document illegal actions committed by the government in their effort to impose PROCEDE and PROCECOM.”
The call for unity was constant throughout the Meeting and it will certainly be necessary to face a process that creates the continuation of PROCEDE. The Declaration also expresses the fear that “in the next Presidential administration, regardless of who the next President is, the application of the privatization programs will increase.”
1- Ejidos: Each ejido member receives a parcel of land, and all decisions pertaining to the group’s land must be decided in the complete assembly of ejido members.
- Communal Lands: The land belongs to the collective of the members of a community, and as such, the benefits of that land are distributed among everyone. (volver)
2 - “13 Years Later: PROCEDE... Proceeding?” Maderas del Pueblo Sureste AC & Foro Para el Desarollo Sustentable AC, February 2006. (volver)
3 - Annual Permanent Seminar “The Rights of the Indigenous Peoples, First Session: The Right to Territory for the Indigenous Peoples” Fray Bartolomé de Las Casas Human Rights Center, November 2005. (volver)
4 - “The Impact of PROCEDE on Natural Resources, Community Life, and the Social Fabric of the Indigenous Tseltal Communities of the Northern Selva Region on Chiapas,” Maderas del Pueblo Surests AC, Foro Para el Desarollo Sustentable AC, February 2006. (volver)
5 - YORAIL MAYA #4, Fray Bartolomé de Las Casas Human Rights Center, June 2002. (volver)
6 - Bulletin of the Centro de Derechos de la Mujer de Chiapas AC, April 2005. (volver)

:: ARTICLE
Elections in the Northern Zone of Chiapas: Relative Tranquility
For someone from outside, this place can seem somewhat surreal, almost like traveling through time. We find ourselves in a community where wood houses are the majority and pigs, chickens and other animals roam freely. At night you can hear the howler monkeys. At first, the only things to remind us of the date, July 2nd, 2006, are the posters of the presidential candidates that hang from the trees.

Just before 9 am, the representative from the IFE (Federal Electoral Institute) arrived at the school field where those in charge of the polling place were busy setting up. He seemed stressed by the fact that the voting lists had not yet arrived, and that officially, the voting should have started at 8 am. The issue is that there are “two times”: “Fox’s time” (daylight savings time) and “God’s time” (in the communities, they do not follow daylight savings time). According to “God’s time,” it was only 8 am. Fifteen minutes later the polling place was opened and the first people arrived to vote.
We arrived there early to observe the start of the electoral process. From afar, we saw those in charge struggling with the table and the three ballot boxes (for president, senators, and deputies). This made us think of the furniture you buy that is supposedly easy to assemble at home, but is always far more difficult than the instructions let on, with some screws inexplicably remaining.
While the people were approaching to begin voting, the officials counted the ballots twice, posted signs about how to vote, and filled out a huge quantity of paperwork.
At each polling place, there were also observers representing the political parties present to monitor the electoral process. In this particular community there were only observers from the PRD (Party of the Democratic Revolution) and the PRI (Institutional Revolution Party). The PAN (National Action Party) does not have much of a presence in the communities of this region.

The environment was almost festive. In the years of greatest conflict in the Northern Zone of Chiapas, from 1995- 2000, the political polarization was very intense: with, on one side, PRI supporters, which included members of “Development, Peace & Justice,” a group accused of paramilitary activity, and on the other side, the “opposition” (primarily PRD members and Zapatista support bases). The memory of that period of time, during which more than 100 opposition members were killed or disappeared, remains etched in the minds of the people. The fear instilled in those years remained present in the days and weeks before the election. We were thanked for our presence, as it helped them to feel safer. In this situation, the people were very clear that they did not want any problems. For example, the Zapatista support bases stated: “we will not let ourselves be provoked, and we will not provoke others, and we just hope that they will respect our decision not to vote.”
In the Northern Zone no major incidents were reported. Some difficulties arose because of the distance to the polling places or because of the fact that some displaced people, most of whom have returned to their communities, had to vote in predominantly PRI communities, in many cases the home communities of those they considered to be their aggressors. People from one community went to the closest polling place, only to find that their names did not appear on the lists. Without this seeming “abnormal” to them, they then went to the next community to see if they could vote there. This is notable because what is assumed to be normal is actually a situation of “electoral offenses,” such as the buying or coercion of votes in the context of the campaigns. Another aspect pertinent to the majority of communities is that there is rarely truly free and secret voting. The first reason for this is that everyone knows everyone else. The second reason is that frequently the decision for whom to vote is decided collectively in the community’s assembly.
In the district that pertains to the Northern Zone, the results show the Coalition for the Good of All (which includes the PRD, the Workers Party and Convergence) as the winner, as was the case throughout Chiapas. Chiapas had a relatively high voter turnout with 49.37% of voters voting.
http://www.elecciones2006.unam.mx/PREP2006/PRESIDENTE/ESTADOS/7_Pre.html
There is major concern in the face of the upcoming state elections (August 20th), with the candidates “closer,” leading to potentially more “aggressive” campaigns. As they say in the communities, “this is just the beginning...”

:: SIPAZ Activities
April - June 2006
INTERNATIONAL PRESENCE AND ACCOMPANIMENT
In June, we spent 10 days in various communities and cities of the Northern and Jungle Zones of Chiapas in order to have interviews with various actors from the region: displaced peoples, leaders of different political groups, government agencies, church members, zapatista base communities, as well as campesino and social organizations. SIPAZ traveled to the region before the federal elections, and was present the day of the elections, to observe the context in which the electoral process was being developed in these zones.
In May and June, we were present as observers at the Civil Mission of Verification, convoked by the Fray Bartolomé de Las Casas Human Rights Center, to observe the current situation of the military presence and the conditions created by 12 years of conflict in the indigenous communities of Chiapas. (see the preliminary results from the Mission of Verification of the Circumstances of Exception in Chiapas, June 29th, 2006: http://www.frayba.org.mx)
In May, as observers, we attended the Forum for the structuring of the National Front for the Struggle Towards Socialism (Chiapas).
On June 17th and 18th, as observers, we attended the state Forum for the National Plan of Struggle, convoked by members of the Other Campaign in Chiapas.
At the beginning of May, we were observers at several events of the Other Campaign in Mexico City.
INFORMATION
We received visitors, delegations (including ones from coalition members Witness for Peace and Global Exchange), students, and journalists, primarily from the USA and Europe, providing information about the current situation in Chiapas and the work of SIPAZ.
At the beginning of May, a first bulletin was published about the violent events in San Salvador Atenco. Ten days later this document was updated.
We continue our collaboration with the Fray Bartolomé de Las Casas Human Rights Center, Civic Alliance, PROPAZ (Swiss Program of Observation and Peace Promotion in Chiapas), and Peace Watch- Switzerland in a program of observation and monitoring of political and civil rights of the peoples of Chiapas during the electoral process and the Other Campaign, which will continue until December. In June, a collaborative bulletin was published about the area affected by Hurricane Stan in 2005. (see: “The ‘Stan’ Zone: Social and Electoral Hotspot”)
At the end of June, SIPAZ along with other members of this same program, met with election observers from the European Union.
We continue to participate in the seminar series “The Works of Immanuel Wallerstein: A Grammar for Understanding the Current World From a Critical Perspective,” coordinated by the Immanuel Wallerstein Center for Study, Information and Documentation.
INFORMATION
We received visitors, delegations (including ones from coalition members Witness for Peace and Global Exchange), students, and journalists, primarily from the USA and Europe, providing information about the current situation in Chiapas and the work of SIPAZ.
At the beginning of May, a first bulletin was published about the violent events in San Salvador Atenco. Ten days later this document was updated.
We continue our collaboration with the Fray Bartolomé de Las Casas Human Rights Center, Civic Alliance, PROPAZ (Swiss Program of Observation and Peace Promotion in Chiapas), and Peace Watch- Switzerland in a program of observation and monitoring of political and civil rights of the peoples of Chiapas during the electoral process and the Other Campaign, which will continue until December. In June, a collaborative bulletin was published about the area affected by Hurricane Stan in 2005. (see: “The ‘Stan’ Zone: Social and Electoral Hotspot”)
At the end of June, SIPAZ along with other members of this same program, met with election observers from the European Union.
We continue to participate in the seminar series “The Works of Immanuel Wallerstein: A Grammar for Understanding the Current World From a Critical Perspective,” coordinated by the Immanuel Wallerstein Center for Study, Information and Documentation.
PEACE ADVOCACY
Peace Education
In June, we took part in an ecumenical space for reflection and prayer with members of various churches of Chiapas.
Development
We continued to participate in the Network for Peace (Red por la Paz), an integrated space for action and reflection for 16 organizations working to support peace and reconciliation processes throughout Chiapas. In May, the Network for Peace designed and distributed some materials dedicated to the communities on the facts of violence occurred in San Salvador Atenco.
At the end of April, we took part in a meeting of the Mexican Network of Peace Builders in Mexico City. At the beginning of May, a joint statement was issued on the events in Atenco. We also participated in a meeting of the same Network in San Cristóbal de Las Casas, at the beginning of June. The topic discussed in this occasion was the features of the conflict in Chiapas today.
From 10-13 May, we participated to a forum in Vienna, Austria, called “"Linking Alternatives 2", a meeting of social movements of Latin America, Europe and the Carribbean that took place while the presidents of these regions were also meeting. It was an opportunity to exchange experiences and alternative policies between social movements of Latin America and Europe.
At the beginning of June, we took part in a space promoted by PROPAZ and SERAPAZ (PROPAZ y SERAPAZ (Services and Support for Peace) aiming at sharing, analyzing and reflecting on the projects of Nation that are currently being debated. Approximately 80 people from Chiapas, Mexico City and Oaxaca participated to the meeting.

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