On January 1, 1994, the Zapatista Liberation Army (EZLN) declared war on the Mexican govern-ment and occupied four county seats in the state of Chiapas: San Cristobal de las Casas, las Mar-garitas, Altamiro, and Ocosingo. Its principal demands were "work, land, housing, food, health, education, independence, liberty, democracy, justice, and peace" (First Declaration of the Lancandon Jungle). The EZLN stressed that it opted for armed struggle due to the lack of results achieved through peaceful protests (such as sitins and marches).

After 12 days of war, which led to between 145 (according to government statistics) and 1000 (according to the Zapatistas) deaths, the government unilaterally declared a ceasefire and began its first dialogue with the EZLN in the Peace Cathedral, with the bishop of San Cristobal de las Casas, Samuel Ruiz, as their mediator. As an act of good faith, the government freed the Zapatista prisoners and the EZLN released its only hostage, General Absalon Dominguez, ex-governor of Chiapas.

In July, after extensive consultation with its support bases, the EZLN rejected the government's proposals saying these proposals did not respond to the demands of the EZLN. According to the EZLN the proposals were rejected by 98% of those voting in the support bases. They decided to maintain the ceasefire and open a dialogue with civil society. With the Second Declaration of the Lacondon Jungle, they convoked the National Democratic Convention, which took place in August. Six thousand representatives of popular organizations from across Mexico took part.

On the other side, the federal government did not seem disposed to undertake further in-depth negotiations with a rebel movement whose influence it wished to ignore. To force the govern-ment to take them seriously, on December 19, 1994 the Zapatistas penetrated the siege imposed by the Federal Army and with out shedding any blood, they seized 38 county seats declaring them rebel autonomous municipalities. The conflict in Chiapas became a thorn in the side of the government, especially given the fact of the upcoming presidential elections. The economic situation continued deteriorating. At the end of the year, in the midst of fears and rumors of in-stability, Mexico suffered one of the most severe financial crises in recent history.

In January a meeting took place between the Zapatista Commanders and the then Secretary of State, Esteban Moctezuma Barragán. The date for the next meeting was set for February 9.

However, instead of government representatives the Mexican army arrived and launched a large offensive. This offensive did not achieve its goal of arresting Zapatista leaders. Some observers believed the government was making an error in treating the EZLN as a movement of manipulated indigenous peoples which would disappear once its leaders were stopped and in believing that the government could continue to marginalize the indigenous population. The Zapatistas did not respond to this provocation. Nonetheless, the Mexican army did manage to set up bases in a large number of indigenous communities.

In March the Congress approved the Law for Dialogue, Reconciliation, and Peace with Dignity in Chiapas. This law involved the renewal of the peace talks, the cessation of military operations against the EZLN, and the suspension of the arrest orders against the suspected leaders. The Commission for Agreement and Pacification (COCOPA), to be made up of deputies and senators of all the political parties represented in Congress, was set up to facilitate these negotiations.

The first meeting between the Zapatistas, the CONAI, and the government delegation took place in the ejido of San Miguel, in the Municipality of Ocosingo. The negotiations stretched out over several months, with many interruptions, in a comummunity in the highlands of Chiapas, San Andres Larrainzar, which the Zapatistas rebaptized as Sacamch’en de los Pobres. The negotiations were to last six months and cover the following themes: Round One - Indigenous Rights and Culture, Round Two - Democracy and Justice, Round Three - Welfare and Development, and Round Four - Women's Rights.

In August and September the EZLN launched a national and international referendum to define the direction of its struggle. More than 1 million people responded, the marjority supporting the transformation of the EZLN into a new kind of political force. From the very first days following the uprising the Zapatistas had opened up a dialogue with the civil society, not only in Chiapas but in all of Mexico, something which has been one of its greatest strengths and forms of protection.

In the beginning of January, the EZLN announced the creation of the Zapatista Front for National Liberation (FZLN), a new political force that was independent, peaceful, and not a part of a political party (Fourth Declaration of the Lacondon Jungle). Also, a National Indigenous Forum convened by the EZLN attracted more than 300 representatives from at least 35 indigenous communities. The participants agreed to form the National Indigenous Congress (CNI).

On February 16, the San Andres Accords, the results of the negotiations regarding Indigenous Rights and Culture (Round 1), were signed. In March the second round, that pertaining to Democracy and Justice, was opened. The government delegation barely participated, wanting to avoid expanding the topic to a national or contstitutional level as had happened with the previous round. Meanwhile, repression increased in the entire state: suspected Zapatistas were arrested, paramilitary groups, e.g., Chinchulines and Peace and Justice, carried out a number of actions and militarization persisted.

In September, the EZLN decided to leave the negotiations so long as the government did not comply with the conditions that the Zapatistas deemed necessary for a credible process. Those conditions included the freeing of Zapatista prisoners, a government delegation with decision-making power and which was respectful of the Zapatista delegation, the installation of the Commission for Follow-Up and Verification (COSOVER), serious and concrete government proposals for the “Democracy and Justice” round of negotiations, and an end to the climate of military and police persecution against indigenous communities.

In November, the parties agreed that the COCOPA would prepare a bill to implement, through constitutional reform, the signed accords of Round One. The understanding was that the parties would accept the initiative as a whole without any comment or correction. In December of 1996, the EZLN accepted the initiative. The government, on the other hand, made modifications that substantially changed the COCOPA's proposal.

In January, the EZLN accused the government of violating the agreement by presenting an alternative proposal. The EZLN refused to resume the negotiations until the government met its five conditions. During the year, the EZLN organized large demonstrations to pressure the government to implement the San Andres Accords, the most spectacular being the march of 1111 Zapatistas to Mexico City. These demonstrations were unsuccessful. The government appeared to have decided to let the situation languish. More and more characteristics of low intensity warfare appeared in the conflict:

• The manipulation of public opinion on both a national and international level. (On the one hand the government was “engaged in peace talks,” the army was performing “social labor”, and there were limited military confrontations. On the other hand, there were rumours, manipulations of mass media by the government as well as government restrictions on the possibility for international observation, etc.)
• The maintenance of an information, military and paramilitary barrier around dissident communities.
• The terrorizing of the civil population, suspected Zapatistas and their support bases, through selective "exemplary" actions in the hopes of preventing the insurgency from spreading to other parts of society.
• The use of a strategy of "divide and conquer" on an inter and intra-community level through the repression and intimidation of social organizations.

The government appeared to count on the EZLN losing its legitimacy in this prolonged low intensity war with all its complex political, militaristic, economic, juridical, and informative dimensions. At the same time the CONAI and the San Cristobal diocese were subjected to criticism and defamation campaigns.

A wave of violence was unleashed in the entire state from the Northern Zone (numerous actions by Peace and Justice including an attack against the Bishop of San Cristobal) to Chenalho, culminating in the massacre at Acteal of 45 people. The number of displaced people increased significantly to around 4000 in the Northern Zone and approximately 10,000 in the Highlands.

In 1998, the contradiction between the efforts towards peace and the policy of force engaged in by the government became more evident. The peace process appeared to have reached a definite stalemate when there appeared three different proposals for constitutional reform with regards to Indigenous Rights and Culture: one from the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), the party in power, an initiative backed by President Zedillo, and another from the National Action Party (PAN). For this reason, the possibilities that the COCOPA bill (approved by the EZLN) would be considered by Congress grew more distant. Faced with this stalemate, the CONAI dissolved in June. Bishop Samuel Ruiz explained that this decision was made based on the government attacks made against his life, the Diocese of San Cristobal, and the CONAI. For him, this was an act of protest, and not a simple withdrawal. The COCOPA failed to fulfill its function and was unable to play a significant role within a structure sometimes limited and even paralyzed by partisan interests.

Meanwhile, the militarization of Chiapas continued. CONAI and human rights organizations estimated 70 thousand soldiers, 1/3 of the Mexican armed forces were stationed in Chiapas (the number may have been smaller, without losing the disproportionatness of the fact). The political-military operations against the autonomous Zapatista counties greatly increased (Flores Magon in April, Tierra y Libertad in May, Nicolas Ruiz and San Juan de la Libertad in June). These operations led to the detentions of dozens of people. Such detentions were illegal under the Law for Dialogue. The Zapatistas responded violently in only one case, that of San Juan de la Libertad in the municipality of El Bosque where eight deaths occurred.

At the state level the new governor, Roberto Albores Guillen, launched a large offensive, through different campaigns, to re-establish "a state of Law and Order." These campaigns included a state accord for "Reconciliation in Chiapas," a remunicipilization plan, and a law for "Amnesty and Disarmament of Armed Civil Groups in the State of Chiapas." The initiatives were severely criticized by the opposition because they excluded the EZLN and were seen as actions that would provoke more divisions.

Faced with these penal, military, and legal offensives, the EZLN remained silent for several months. They then made another effort for further dialogue with civil society by announcing a national referendum on the COCOPA bill based on the San Andres Accords. The EZLN was thus trying to refute the claim the government had made from the beginning - namely that the conflict was regional and not national in scope.

This tendency to regionalize the conflict to the maximum was reinforced in 1999. The government seemed to want to resolve the causes of the conflict (see 1994) but without any dialogue with the Zapatistas regarding economic development. Governor Roberto Albores Guillen presented his initiative regarding the Law for Indigenous Rights and Culture to the State Congress. The initiative was strongly criticized by the opposition parties and by social organizations for respecting neither the San Andres Accords nor the consultation process which led to their elaboration. However, the Albores initiative gave the impression that the government was doing something.

In March, the EZLN showed that it would continue to be a major player, as was evidenced by the national consultation which it organized jointly with other civil society organizations. More than 2.8 million Mexican citizens participated in this consultation on the Recognition of Indigenous Peoples and an End to the War of Extermination.

In response, various campaigns were launched in the spring to discredit the Zapatistas and their sympathizers. One of the first of these was to make a big show out of the surrender of arms belonging to alleged Zapatistas. It turned out that these individuals either were no longer, or indeed never had been, Zapatistas and that, in fact, the arms were handed over in exchange for government aid.

The state and federal authorities used the pretext of the Laws Regarding Firearms and Explosives, the war on drugs, the arrest of criminals, and the need to protect citizens who asked for protection to increase military and police raids on Zapatista communities.

However, in spite of its avowed good intentions, the government did not succeed in convincing public opinion on a national or international level. The proof of this was the increase in visits from high level representatives from the United Nations (UN) who commented that they were once again taking up the topic of Chiapas and, possibly, the impunity of paramilitaries.

On December 30th, the Vatican announced the transfer of the coadjunt bishop of San Cristobal, Raúl Vera a Saltillo, to the north of the country. Bishop Samuel Ruiz had presented his resignation in November, but it still had not been accepted. The transfer of Vera, who was to succeed Ruiz and follow the line of the Diocese, and the uncertainty that followed generated fears in the inner circles in respect to the possible effect on the possibilities for peace.

In the case of Chiapas, any analysis of the year 2000 has to be understood within the context of both the state and federal elections. Hopes of achieving significant advances toward peace before the end of the Zedillo presidency were few. For several months the elections presented an element of uncertainty and instability, especially in the volatile context of Chiapas.

The national elections of July 2 marked an historic change for Mexico. After 71 years of uninterrupted rule, the PRI lost the presidency to Vicente Fox, leader of the center-right opposition party. Contrary to what was predicted, there were few complaints of fraud (although there were more in the rural areas), and even President Zedillo and the PRI candidate recognized the victory of Vicente Fox just a few hours after the results were announced. The party represented by Fox, the PAN, also won the majority of seats in the House of Deputies.

Pablo Salazar, representing a coalition of opposition parties, was elected governor of Chiapas on August 20, another unexpected reversal for the PRI, which had dominated politics in Chiapas for decades.

The months before the new governments (national and state) took office were a time of transition, alive with possibility, expectations and debate. In Chiapas, tensions rose on more than one occasion, in particular in October following the arrest of eleven members of the Agriculture and Forestry Union of Indigenous Peasants (UCIAF), a splinter group of Development, Peace and Justice, an alleged paramilitary group.

After President Fox took office in December, a significant change from the previous administration was observed - namely putting the issue of Chiapas high on the national agenda and ordering the closure of 53 military checkpoints.

After months of silence, and without having participated in the elections, the Zapatistas held a press conference acknowledging that the new government could represent a renewed opportunity for peace. They presented three requirements for the renewal of peace dialogues: the fulfillment of the San Andres Accords, the freeing of Zapatista prisoners, and the closing of seven military bases located in the area of major Zapatista influence. They also announced a march to Mexico City to defend the proposed constitutional reform written by the COCOPA based on the San Andres Accords.

Fox responded by presenting the COCOPA initiative to the Senate on December 5th and by gradually closing several military bases. There was a corresponding effort on the part of Pablo Salazar at the state level in Chiapas where he freed dozens of Zapatista prisoners.

In the first months of the year, the Fox government continued to fulfill certain of the indicators demanded by the Zapatistas as prerequisites to reopening the peace dialogue by liberating Zapatista prisoners and withdrawing from some military positions. In April, the army withdrew from the communities of Guadalupe Tepayac, La Garrucha, and Rio Euseba, thus fulfilling one of the three conditions.

At the end of February, the Zapatistas carried out their march to Mexico City in order to present to the Congress their arguments in favor of the indigenous rights reform written by the COCOPA in 1996. After receiving tremendous popular support in the twelve states through which the march passed on its way to the capital, the EZLN spoke in the House of Deputies in an inspirational moment for the peace process. However, in April, the Congress approved an indigenous rights and culture law which the EZLN viewed as a betrayal because it failed to include important parts of the San Andres Accords and the COCOPA version of the law.

Although the reform which was passed represented some progress, it significantly restricted the concept of indigenous autonomy. It failed to provide legal recognition of autonomous status, and it recognized neither indigenous rights to land and the use of its natural resources, nor rights of association within the communities and counties. Following this breach, the EZLN withdrew into the silence of the jungle.

The congresses of the states with the highest proportion of indigenous population in the country (Morelos, Chiapas, Guerrero, Hidalgo, San Luis Potosi, and Oaxaca) rejected the new law. Indigenous organizations and communities filed 329 constitutional challenges to the law in the Supreme Court. Several complaints were also filed by the International Labor Organization. Despite the controversy, the reform passed into law in August.

In a tour through Europe, President Fox declared that everything was now peaceful and tranquil in Chiapas, and he specifically mentioned the return of the displaced people within this context. Certainly, between August and December, the civil society organization, Las Abejas, carried out four such returns. However, Las Abejas made it clear that these returns were forced on them because their living conditions had become intolerable and their humanitarian aid had been cut. They denounced the fact that the paramilitary groups in the area are still armed and that several of those responsible for the Acteal massacre are still at liberty.

At the same time the EZLN continued in resistance, exercising their autonomy through their actions and their rejection of any assistance from the state or federal governments. This gave rise to ongoing conflicts between the Zapatista supporters and other previously allied indigenous organizations which did accept the social and economic programs of the government.

The end of the year was marked by the local elections in Chiapas in which the PRI returned to the majority in the state congress and in the county seats.

In March, the official plan for the Development of the Indigenous Peoples was presented, which tossed aside key aspects of the COCOPA law, and in their place, announced the implementation of governmental programs. The Zapatistas and the majority of indigenous organizations rejected these initiatives, instead wagering on the construction of autonomy through their own actions, from the base of their communities.

Until the end of 2002, the EZLN remained in silence, protesting the approval of the constitutional reform over indigenous rights. Three parallel processes could possibly modify this newly stagnant scenario.

• Around mid February of this year, 168 representatives presented the COCOPA law again in the federal Congress, “in order to correct the mistake of having approved a reform that does not respond to the demands of the indigenous people.” As it could have been foreseen, this initiative did not prosper because of the composition of the Legislature (that cannot change until mid 2003).
• In March, the International Labor Organization submitted the claims presented by unions and social organizations, and although a resolution against the reform would not have any coercive power, it would be a moral sanction that would question its legitimacy even further. This process remains pending.
• Finally, the highest expectation was directed to the Nation´s Supreme Court of Justice over the more than 300 constitutional controversies presented against the law. The Court finally presented itself in September, validating said law.

Meanwhile, the zapatista resistance continues amidst inevitable tensions with the local official authorities and with organizations once allied and now in dispute with it for territorial and political control. Between July and August of 2002, Chiapas recorded a worrisome escalation of violence and the murder of various civil leaders in autonomous municipalities located in the Jungle region. From mid-year on, another axis of tension was the threat of violent evictions of the communities settled in the Montes Azules Biosphere.

On January 1st, more than 20,000 indigenous people “took over” the city of San Cristóbal. The EZLN broke the silence, condemming the three main political parties for having betrayed the spirit of the San Andrés accords with the indigenous law that they approved. In the following months, the “Calender of Resistence,” twelve documents in which Sub Comandante Marcos x-rayed the movements taking place in the rest of México (taking the same route as the March of the Color of the Earth).

In May, after months of tension from threats of eviction, the state government of Chiapas and Lacondon leaders agreed to a respite, in which no communities would be evicted from the Montes Azules Biosphere. Although after this, no more violent acts took place, contradictory discourses on the part of the different governmental agencies helped maintain a high level of tension in the region.

In July, violent actions took place during the legislative elections in the indigenous regions of Chiapas, principally in San Juan Cancuc, Zinacantán and Chenalhó. At the federal level, there was the greatest level of absenteeism in the recent history of the country.

At the same time, the EZLN announced a series of changes in regards to their internal functions and relations with national and international civil society (seven documents which make up the "Thirteenth Stele"). In order to build the autonomy established in the San Andrés accords, on August 8-10th in Oventik, the command of the EZLN announced the disappearence of the Aguascalientes, and the creation of the Caracoles and the Good Government Committees (JBG). Each one of the five Good Government Committees is formed by one or two delegates of the Autonomous Councils in said region, covering the 30 Rebel Autonomous Zapatista Municipalities. The Zapatista project appears, more than ever, to be a form of resistance that is more than just military. It has adopted a proactive attidude of civil disobedience and has assumed ever more explicitly the functions of the government.

The EZLN also announced the retiring of its checkpoints as well as its tolls in the roads and highways as a gesture of good will towards the non Zapatista communities. Nonetheless, the EZLN will continue working in defense of the Autonomous Municipalities.

The creation of the JBG's opened a new phase in the recomposition of the relationships - as much within as outside of the Zapatista territories. Despite the conciliatory message towards the non-Zapatistas, this repositioning generates problems on the part of some social actors, in particular in aspects of territorial definition and the administration of justice, because of the plurality that exists in "Zapatista" territories.

At the national level, representatives of the National Indigenous Congress promised to continue the example of the Zapatistas, promoting indigenous autonomy in all of the country, and defending the rights of the indigenous communities.

Faced with this repositioning, the discourse of the official government seems to have been directed at understanding that the Good Government Committees could fit into the Constitution, thanks to the last constitutional reform that permitted indigenous autonomy.

Twenty years after the foundation of the EZLN and almost ten years after the armed uprising of '94 in Chiapas, the possibility of renewing the processes of negotiation appear more and more remote, as each of the parties move towards different strategies, times and interests.

Eleven years after the armed Zapatista uprising in Chiapas many think the conflict has been resolved or diminished at a national and international level. However, the root causes of conflict still exist, only now in a context of "corrosive" war in which there is no direct confrontations but rather military, economic and political strategy that attempts to reduce Zapatista resistance and that continues to generate conflicts at a community level.

The tenth anniversary of the Zapatista uprising marked the beginning of this year. The celebration yielded different analysis about the path of the Zapatistas during the decade. The importance of “neo-Zapatistas” in the ousting of the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) after 71 years in power and the strengthening of the indigenous movement on a national level was noted. Also the impact of the Zapatista struggle on the birth of the anti-globalization movement (against neoliberal economics and focused on the construction of new alternatives) was reaffirmed.

In the conflict zone, the Zapatista Councils Good Government Council have worked as autonomous governments, filling a missing link on the regional level. Their work in the mediation and resolution of community conflicts, not just between Zapatistas but also between non-Zapatistas, should be noted. The level of conflicts within and between communities was significantly reduced, even though tension remains in due to the constant presence of the military in the area. The Center for Political, Social and Economic Analysis (CAPISE), published the report "The military occupation in Chiapas: a prisoners dilemma" in which 91 military bases are pinpointed and the impact of the military presence with regards to the collective rights of indigenous peoples is analyzed.

The majority of community conflicts continue to be around public services like water, electricity and public works, as well as, the decision of the Zapatistas to have their own autonomous organization parallel to that of the government. Throughout the year, the resistance to the payment for electricity has generated some of the largest movements of civil disobedience (non-Zapatistas), in spite of the program "Better Life Tariff" through which the state government attempted to put an end to the resistance. On the contrary, it increased the number of conflicts between the population and the Federal Electricity Commission, which constantly cut electricity and continued to raise electricity prices.

In April, in the municipality of Zinancantan (in the Highlands region) the Zapatistas suffered the worst violent aggression that area had seen since 1994. Members of the Democratic Revolutionary Party (PRD) cut off the water supply to the Zapatistas in the community of Jechvo, as retaliation for not contributing economically to traditional community “cargos” (community service responsibilities) in which autonomous Zapatistas no longer participate. The violence resulted in dozens of wounded and 125 displaced families, who after a few weeks returned to their homes despite the continuing division between the two groups.

The Montes Azules Bioreserve was a constant "hot spot" and a source of controversy. The conservation policies of the government were maintained along with the plan to displace communities whose presence in the Bioreserve is considered "irregular" (the majority are EZLN and ARIC-Independent and Democratic Union of Unions). NGOs like Maderas del Pueblo Sureste (Woods of the Southeastern Peoples) and Fray Bartolome de las Casas Human Rights Center have continually demanded an integral analysis of the environmental situation of the reserve without forgetting the socio-economic factors that drove people to inhabit it in the first place.

In October the EZLN announced the "reconcentration" of a few of their communities located in Montes Azules. This represents a repositioning of the Zapatista support bases given the dispersion and distance of these communities that form a part of the Zapatista Caracoles. It is hoped that the moves will benefit the Zapatiast organization as well as the defense of these communities.

The "Project for Integrated Social and Sustainable Development of the Lacandon Jungle” (PRODESIS) was begun, co-financed by the Chiapas state government (with 16 million Euros) and by the European Union (15 million). Intended for the micro-regions that border Montes Azules, this program is presented as an instrument to eradicate poverty through skill building of local peoples and the planning and implementation of development projects. PRODESIS has been strongly questioned by NGOs as it represents a conservation model implemented from above without the prior consent of those it will affect.

On a state level, there was backtracking with respect to individual rights and the fulfillment of human rights. In February, the so called "Gag Law" was approved that drastically increased penal sanctions with regards to crimes against honor (slander, libel, defamation) and limited freedom of expression and information. To this was also added other legislative reforms that allow more social control. This new legislation closed spaces for participation, channels for protest and reduced the ability to file complaints. These laws include, the anti-gang law, anti-bioterrorism law, supervision law, etc. In addition, the president of the State Commission on Human Rights, Pedro Raul Lopez Hernandez was dismissed from his post which endangered the autonomy of this organization in charge of verifying that authorities respect human rights.

Amnesty International in their 2004 report affirmed that the efforts by the federal government to guarantee the fulfillment of human rights were insufficient. In December, they published a special report "Disregarded Abuses in Guadalajara: resistance to shedding light on human rights violations only perpetuates impunity," denouncing the arbitrary detentions and torture suffered by protesters against the Latin American and European Union Summit held in May, in Guadalajara.

In September, President Vicente Fox presented his state of the union address in the midst of strong protests from opposition in Congress and mobilizations of a few social sectors in the streets. Similarly, motivated by the first anniversary of the Zapatista Councils of Good Government, the EZLN released a series of communiqués titled "Reading a Video." This report from the autonomous governments responded to criticisms and recognized two important failures: the shortage of participation of women in the Councils and the influence the Zapatista political-military structure continues to have over the organization of the civil autonomous governments. At the same time, they reported the advances in the areas of health, education, nutrition, land, housing and forms of self government.

In October, municipal elections took place in Chiapas. The Zapatista Councils of Good Government kept their promise to respect the work of electoral bodies. This decision was in line with the nonconfrontational stance of the Zapatista movement. Behind this electoral process the political map was redrawn in the sense that political parties were destabilized due to constantly changing candidates and disputed alliances. The weakening of party based democracy and the discrediting of authorities has been growing on a national level as well. The agenda of all political parties is now focused on the disputed contest of the next presidential elections (2006). In the face of these party struggles, in November social forces advanced the “First National Dialogue of the Project for a Nation with Liberty, Justice and Democracy,” with the objective of uniting resistances against the neoliberal economic project.

In January, during his visit to Chiapas, President Vicente Fox claimed that the EZLN is an issue that “now essentially remains in the past and everyone is looking forward.” The words of President Fox prove that the EZLN is not the biggest problem for the current government, which is more preoccupied with the premature struggle for the 2006 presidential elections, the growing power of drug trafficking, and by legislative bills still pending, all of which take greater priority for his administration.

On the eve of January 1, the date that the new municipal authorities took power, demonstrations were held, highways were blocked, and confrontations took place in various municipalities (Oxchuc, Tila and Sabanilla, for example). In Tila (the Northern Zone), both the PRI and the Alianza PRD-PT announced victory. The highest court, the Electoral Tribunal of Judicial Power of the Federation (TEPJF) finally declared the PRI victorious. On February 15th, there was a violent eviction, by a group of more than 800 police officers, of the sit-in in front of the municipal palace. 54 people were arrested. The parish priest of Tila noted that tension in the region had resurfaced due to the post-election conflicts and to the revival of the paramilitary group ‘Paz y Justicia’ (Peace and Justice).

In February the Fray Bartolomé de Las Casas Human Rights Center made public a complaint about human rights violations in the Northern Region of Chiapas, which had been previously submitted to the Comisión Interamericana de Derechos Humanos (Interamerican Human Rights Commission) in October 2004. They denounced the persistent impunity, which contributes to the development of new conflicts: the paramilitary structures have not been disarmed nor dismantled, those responsible, intellectually or physically, have not been penalized, and there have been no reparations for the victims. In the days that preceded the forceful removal of the sit-in in Tila, the Fray Bartolomé Human Rights Center stated that the detention of Samuel Sánchez Sánchez, founder and leader of “Paz y Justicia”, was “overdue and inadequate.”

At the national level, on April 7th, the Chamber of Deputies decided to retract the immunity of the head of the government of the Federal District of Mexico, Andrés Manuel López Obrador, and remove him from his political post, so that he could be subjected to a legal process for his supposed contempt. This was perceived to be a political action to exclude López Obrador, the leader of the PRD and the favorite in the polls, from the upcoming presidential elections. It also brought into question were the roles of Vicente Fox, his party, the PAN, and the PRI in this process. At the end of April, amidst massive pressure from the civil society, the campaign against AMLO was dropped.

On June 20, the EZLN declared a Red Alert, which included the closing of the autonomous civil structures (Caracoles) and the retreat of the Zapatista insurgents. At the same time, they declared the breakdown of relations between the Zapatista civil structure and the institutions of the Chiapas state government.

Just before the Red Alert, unusual regroupings of some military and police bases occurred in Chiapas, an event without precedent since 2001. On the same day as the announcement of the Red Alert, the SEDENA stated that they had carried out an operation in which they found and destroyed 44 marijuana plants in Zapatista territory. It soon surfaced that the operation had taken place outside of the so-called “conflict zone,” in municipalities that have no Zapatista presence. As a result, the Ministry of the Interior had to deny the connection they claimed to the Zapatistas.

A number of communiqués followed the announcement of the Red Alert (which was lifted on July 11):

• Announcing the reorganization of the internal political and military structure of the EZLN;
• Explaining that the Red Alert was only a “preventative measure” to protect the internal consultation (referring to the military offensive that attempted to detain the Zapatista commanders during a previous consultation in February 2005);
• Informing that through the consultation the community assemblies of the EZLN had decided to launch “a new national and international political initiative” which would be explained in the Sixth Declaration of the Selva Lacandona (“La Sexta”).

The “Sexta” proposes the creation of a “new front” which will be promoted through a national tour seeking to forge alliances with political, social, indigenous, worker, campesino, student and popular groups. The idea is to create “a national plan of action, that is clearly leftist, which is to say, anticapitalist” and to move towards the creation of a new Constitution. It also proposes the organization of an intergalactic meeting, like the one held in La Realidad in 1996.

While the main parties were holding their internal elections to decide their presidential candidates, the EZLN launched the “Other Campaign.” They severed all ties to these political parties. After what the EZLN refers to as the legislative “betrayal” in 2001, when Congress approved a Constitutional reform on indigenous rights and culture that dramatically differed from the agreement reached in the San Andres Accords, the EZLN believes that there is nothing to debate with those from “above,” the institutions and the political parties. According to the EZLN, the position to vote for the “lesser of the evils” is not an option. Nevertheless, the Sexta is not a call for abstentionism.

Amidst the crisis in representative democracy and the rupture with the institutions, the Zapatistas proposes something more than a strategy, a methodology based on listening, constructed from the roots, for the roots: the Other Campaign. A series of meetings were organized, in August and September in Chiapas, between the EZLN and the civil society to prepare for the national tour of the Other Campaign. In the first plenary session, 2,069 people arrived at the Caracol of La Garrucha.

On July 2^nd, federal elections were held in Mexico. Due to the minimal margin between the two leading candidates, the announcement of the winner was not possible on the night of the elections. Finally, the Federal Electoral Institute (IFE) declared Felipe Calderón the winner, by a very slim margin against Andres Manuel López Obrador (Coalition for the Good of All). Legal challenges, which were ultimately rejected, were brought to the Electoral Tribunal of Judicial Power of the Federation (TEPJF).

López Obrador called for massive mobilizations that paralyzed Mexico City for months, culminating in the National Democratic Convention (CND), which appointed him “legitimate president” in September, in the presence of hundreds of thousands of people.

After a campaign marked by multiple irregularities, Juan Sabines Guerrero (who represented the Coalition for the Good of All even though he was the mayor of the capital of Chiapas for PRI a few weeks before the campaign started) won the state elections in Chiapas on the 20^th of August by a very slim margin.

On January 1^st, the national tour of the Other Campaign took off, led by the Delegate Zero (Subcomandante Marcos). In May, thousands of police officers tried to evict a group of street flower vendors in San Salvador Atenco (State of Mexico) that marched against the construction of a supermarket in the area they usually use for selling their products. A violent confrontation broke out, causing two deaths and the detention of hundreds of people. The police forces were accused of sexually abusing dozens of women, among other human rights violations. As a protest against these acts, Subcomandante Marcos declared a Red Alert in Chiapas and the national tour of the Other Campaign was suspended until October.

In March, the secretary of Interior declared that there is no longer a state of emergency in Chiapas caused by the armed conflict. He assured that the army's presence in Chiapas only responds to the needs of Chiapas being a border state. Local NGOs report the presence of 70 military camps, only in the indigenous territories of Chiapas.

Conflicts especially with a agrarian profile continue in Chiapas. 30 Zapatista families were evicted in the community of Choles de Tumbalá in August. In November, 17 families from Viejo Velasco (Lacandona Jungle) were attacked by hundreds of peasants from the Lacandona Community. 4 people were killed and 4 disappeared, apparently executed. Throughout 2006, human rights defenders and activists in Chiapas were also subjected to violence: there were at least 20 cases of threats and harassment.

In Oaxaca, the education workers' union called for a sit-in mobilizing more than 40,000 teachers. It started with the demand for better salaries, and was finally joined by numerous organizations and movements from Oaxaca and ended up prioritizing governor Ulises Ruiz's removal. The mobilization formed the APPO, the Popular Assembly of the Peoples of Oaxaca. Numerous human rights violations against the popular movement by federal and state police officers were reported, including homicides, disappearances and hundreds of illegal detentions.

In December, subcomandante Marcos Publisher a communiqué titled “Feeling Red: The Calendar and Geography of War” (“Sentir el rojo; el calendario y la geografía de la guerra”), in which he denounces the wave of aggression which the zapatista territories had been subject to in the previous months.  He underlined the fact that “this is the first time that these aggressions have, mockingly, come from supposed leftist governments or that have been perpetrated with aboveboard support from the institutional left and it is the first time since that early morning in January of 1994 that the social, national and international response has been insignificant or non-existent.”  In addition he warned that “We will try to continue consolidating the civil and pacific path we have taken through the Other Campaign, and, at the same time, we will be prepared to resist, alone, the reactivation of aggression towards us, be it via the army, the police or paramilitary groups. Those of us who have made war know how to recognize the paths through which it is prepared and when it is near at hand. The signs of war on the horizon are clear.”

Over the course of the year, the EZLN maintained various channels of communication with the national and international civil society.  Three delegations of commanders along with subcomandante Marcos toured the north of Mexico from January to early June.  In September, the EZLN announced the suspension of the of the Sixth Commission (Comisión Sexta) tour previously planned to take place between September and December in the central and southern regions of the country in order to concentrate on the defense of their own communities.  While most political actors and the front pages of local newspapers were focused on the municipal elections of October, a growing number of events including harassment, violence and forced evictions occurred apparently isolated and with hardly any public mention.
In addition to the Other Campaign, the EZLN carried out three Gatherings of the Zapatistas with the Peoples of the World: on New Year’s Day 2007 at the Caracol of Oventic; in July at three of the five Caracoles; and at the close of 2007 at the Caracol of La Garrucha (which also saw the First Gathering of Zapatista Women with the Women of the World).  Another noteworthy event held by the EZLN was the Gathering of the Indigenous Peoples of the Americas which took place in October at the Yaqui community of Vicam, Sonora.  Five hundred seventy indigenous delegates representing sixty-six indigenous groups from 12 countries were in attendance. A week before the Gathering, the Zapatista delegation was detained at a revision post maintained by the military and judicial officials in Mazatlán, Sinaloa.  After the incident, the zapatista commanders returned to Chiapas, leaving subcomandante Marcos to attend the Gathering as the sole representative of the EZLN.

Outside of the alternative media, there was a vacuum of information in terms of actions carried out by the zapatistas as well as the repression they were subject to. The Calderón administration appeared to continue in the same line as its predecessor in which it attempted to minimize or completely avoid acknowledging the existence of the conflict in Chiapas.  A telling example of this posture occurred in April when Luís H. Álvarez, head of the National Commission for the Development of Indigenous Peoples (Comisión Nacional para el Desarrollo de los Pueblos Indígenas) and ex Governmental Commissioner for Peace in Chiapas pointed out that the “EZLN is not a negotiator with Felipe Calderón’s government,” now that it neither represents nor is integrated into indigenous communities.

Though the fundamental causes of the social dissatisfaction expressed in 2006 (particularly within the post-electoral context) had not been solved, the new government of Felipe Calderón has been able to present itself as if in there has been a return to “democratic normality.” The administration maintained an “iron fist” strategy, using the armed forces in its implementation.  Not withstanding, the massive operations against organized crime and drug trafficking did not appear to achieve their goals: not one day passed without an execution, ambush or shooting being reported.

The tendency towards militarization was intensified through various international agreements made in 2007: Mexico, the United States and Canada continued to advance talks on the Security and Prosperity Partnership of North America (SPP, also known as NAFTA plus as it includes proposals for the harmonization of economic and security strategies between the three nations).  Corollary to the SPP the Mexican and US governments began negotiating the implementation of another agreement created in response to the “war on drugs” and organized crime in Mexico. The idea was solidified in March of 2007 during a visit by US President George W. Bush to the Mexican city of Mérida.  As a result of the meeting held there between Bush and Calderón, the name “Mérida Initiative” was applied to the agreement.

2007 saw the reappearance of various other armed groups to the public arena. In early July, the Popular Revolutionary Army (EPR, Ejército Popular Revolucionario), with a recognized presence in Guerrero, Oaxaca and Chiapas, publicly claimed responsibility for eight explosive devices detonated in Pemex (Petróleos Mexicanos, the Mexican national petroleum company) pipelines located in the states of Guanajuato and Querétaro.  They made clear that the explosions were part of a larger campaign to pressure the Calderón administration to provide proof of life in the cases of two of their members who were disappeared in the state of Oaxaca in May.

Likewise, in July, the Lucio Cabañas Barrientos Revolutionary Movement (MRLCB, Movimiento Revolucionario Lucio Cabañas Barrientos, an armed group that claimed responsibility for the bombings at the Electoral Tribunal and the Institutional Revolutionary Party’s [PRI] headquarters in Mexico City in November of 2006) made a call to their militant members in which they stated that they should be ready “to act militarily.” Another armed group, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of the People (FARP, Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias del Pueblo) also warned that they were “in talks to decide that which no one wants to discuss, but which the vortex is drawing us towards.” Analysts reiterated the point that the closing of channels for dialogue and negotiation could make social movements feel cornered resulting in a radicalization of their methods of struggle.

At the national level, 2008 was marked by a general increase in the prices of basic goods, gasoline, and electricity.  These price-increases were exacerbated by the total opening of the agrofishery industry as stipulated by the North American Free-Trade Agreement (NAFTA), which was signed by México, the United States, and Canada in 1994.  This move nullified existing tariffs on the importation of basic foods such as beans and corn, as well as dairy products and oil crops, and as such was seen by Mexican campesinos, the political opposition, and various academics as the coup de grace of the Mexican countryside. It is estimated that the absolute number of Mexican living in extreme poverty increased by 7 million, to reach 20% of the total Mexican population.

As social discontent grew, the federal government maintained a tendency to resort to an “iron fist” through its increasing militarization of the country as related to the drug-trade and organized crime.  In any case, despite that 45,000 troops had been deployed on a daily basis, the violence attributed to criminal networks did not markedly decrease; some 5,400, indeed, were killed during this time.  Instead, an increased tendency to denounce human-rights violations by the military and to criminalize social protest was observed.

In this sense, in March, the approval of a penal reform, which included such improvements as oral trials and the presumption of innocence for the accused, was questioned for the doors it opened toward legalizing the said criminalization of protest—for example, with regard to pre-trial detentions.

Another reform that caused much controversy and that mobilized a number of social groups in 2008 were the energy reforms proposed by Felipe Calderón in April. This initiative sought to re-invigorate Mexico's oil sector, the primary source of income in the country, by providing the state-owned Pemex with greater funds.

The National Democratic Congress led by the Broad Progressive Front (FAP), which groups together the primary left-wing parties (the Party of Revolutionary Democracy, or PRD; the Labor Party, or PT; and Convergence) and former presidential candidate Andrés Manuel López Obrador (AMLO)engaged in non-violent actions intended to prevent what was seen as the intended privatization of Pemex both in Mexico city as in other states of the country.

Within this rather bleak context came as well the closing in April of the Coordination for Dialogue and Negotiation in Chiapas, putatively for “economic reasons” as well as a sense that its continued existence was “unnecessary.”  In February, nevertheless, the group Peace and Democracy (which counted in its membership several intellectuals and other public figures) spoke of a “new escalation of the war in Chiapas” and denounced “the instances of pillage, the burning of houses, murders, death-threats, and land-takeovers, which follow one other continuously.  These all constitute attempts to strip rebellious communities of their land and territory.”

Starting in the middle of May, the presence of police and military units in indigenous communities in Chiapas increased to levels unseen since the close of the 1990s.  The Fray Bartolomé Center for Human Rights denounced “a logic of counter-insurgency” that featured “tactical deployments in territories populated by peoples presenting just social demands” and that “allows the government as well to monitor the response of the populations to such operations.”

Jorge Lofredo, from the Center for the Documentation of Armed Movements, quoted a statement by Subcomandante Marcos in the book Corte de Caja: “It is as though we were in 1993, but differently.  Now it is the government that is preparing the assault.”  Lofredo later stressed that “although there have been reiterated warnings in regards to military incursions in the Zapatista zone that have not occurred, this could be considered the very execution of the military strategy. Through constant sieges or the threat thereof, they speculate that the continuous reactions of the EZLN and non-governmental organizations will cause them to be discredited or generate indifference, until finally the military incursions succeed.”

In more general terms, the social conflicts seen in the state had to do with resistance to high electricity prices as well as social and economic programs related to transport (e.g., the proposed highway from San Cristóbal de las Casas to Palenque), tourism (“theme parks” in Palenque and the Agua Azul waterfalls), and development (protected natural areas such as Huitepec and the Montes Azules Nature Reserve, as well as mining).  It is also worth mentioning that the Tenth Meeting of State Leaders and of the Tuxtla Governmental Mechanism for Dialogue and Agreement took place on 28 June in Villahermosa in the state of Tabasco.  The attendees reaffirmed the objectives sought by Plan Panamá, which was renamed “Project Mesoamérica.”

Another organization process, this one that originated in the prisons, began between March and April of this year, when 48 prisoners from 3 prisons in Chiapas engaged in a hunger strike in protest of their having been arbitrarily arrested under false charges in clear violation of their judiciary rights for their social-political activities.  Several of them founded the “Voice of Los Llanos” in San Cristóbal de las Casas, while others in the Cintalapa prisonorganized themselves into the “Voice of Amate.” Both were part of the Other Campaign established by the EZLN.The process led to the release of hundreds of prisoners.

Another development unconnected to oppositional groups or organizations occurred on 3 October: an operation taken up by federal and state police left 6 dead (4 of whom were said by locals to have been summarily executed), 17 injured, and 36 arrested in the Miguel Hidalgo ejido located in the municipality of La Trinitaria, Chiapas.  Since September, the ejidatarios had occupied the Chicultik ruins that are found near their community with the hopes that the ejido would itself be able to administer the archaeological site.  After the Secretary of Government of Chiapas recognized that there had not been an order authorizing eviction, the Chiapas Congress unanimously approved an eviction protocol that allows for the regular use of police forces in such cases.

The International Civil Observation Commission for Human Rights (CCIODH) found the case of Chincultik to have been an example of governmental policy that criminalizes social protest and seeks to cover-up its institutional responsibility by means of resorting to the granting of compensation payments.  The Fray Bartolomé Center for Human Rights, for its part, claimed that “There exists a significant risk that the massacre of Chinkultic, like others, go unpunished, and that responsibility for the crime will be found to rest solely with low-ranking public officials.”

In September, the EZLN announced the first Global Festival of Justified Rage, which took place during the final week of December and the first few days of January 2009 in Mexico City and Chiapas.  According to the festival's invitation, “The disappointment in face of the cynicism and incompetence of the traditional political classes has been transforming itself into rage.  At times this rage continues with hope for change by means of the usual paths and consequently comes into conflict with immobilizing despair or the tyranny of arbitrary power.  Other times, though—often, as often as we smile—rage seeks its own paths: different, other paths.  The ‘no’ advanced by such rage not only resists but also begins to propose.”

In 2009, Mexico came to occupy center-stage in international news due to the violence associated with organized crime as well as the H1N1 influenza epidemic.  Internally, however, media coverage on these issues could not ignore the worsening of poverty-rates in the country or the number of complaints directed at the military presence in the streets.

It  is noteworthy that so many Mexicans have come to doubt the very existence of the virus H1N1 due in large part to the lack of trust in dominant social institutions.  This distancing of the Mexican populace from its representatives could be seen in various phenomena, especially those related to voting.  On 5 July, elections for over 1,500 public offices took place.  Abstention rates reached 55.19%, with “blank-votes” reaching 5.4%.  The blank-vote movement had generated a significant following in the run-up to the elections.  Taking into account the low participation rate, the election results brought about changes compared with the previous decade: following 12 years of having lost control of the House of Deputies, the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI, the party that had held power for more than 70 years until 2000) carried the day.  Of a total of 500 deputy posts, the PRI won 237.

Chiapas, for its part, remained during this time far from a focus of concern for the national and international media.  In June, the First American Meeting Against Impunity took place in the Zapatista caracol in Morelia.  Impunity was there repeatedly denounced as a reality both past and present in Latin America.

In Chiapas, the most controversial—indeed, paradigmatic—event took place between August and November, when the Supreme Court of  Justice of the Nation(SCJN) mandated the release of 35 indigenous individuals who had been incarcerated for having participated in the murder of 45 indigenous members of the community of Acteal, a municipality of Chenalhó in the Highlands region of Chiapas, in 1997.  The SCJN argued in its finding that the previous sentence had been based on evidence that had been obtained illegally and on testimony fabricated by the PGR.  Importantly, however, the SCJN did not determine the imprisoned to have been innocent of these crimes.  For this reason, several observers noted the gap that could readily be seen between legitimate judicial findings and demands for justice.  The resolution was also criticized for not having taken into account either the context in which the Acteal massacre occurred or the ongoing war in Chiapas.

In confirmation of the claims that several human-rights had been making for more than a decade, a number of recently declassified U.S.-government documents from the National Security Archive were made public. They  detail the direct support given to paramilitary groups by the Mexican military in their counter-insurgency efforts against Zapatista support-bases in the 1990s.  Furthermore, the office of the Attorney General for State Justice announced in late October that it had in its possession evidence that implicated several high-ranking officials at both the state and federal levels for their omissions and negligence in the case of Acteal.

Another worrying aspect of the SCJN ruling is the impact it had in Chenalhó and various other regions in Chiapas, where the finding was widely seen as a confirmation of impunity that could perhaps allow for the return of paramilitary violence.  Demonstrating political realism, the government of Chiapas sought to prevent the formerly incarcerated from returning to Chenalhó so as to avoid conflict; it instead granted them land, housing, and work elsewhere.

Although little mention was made by relevant institutions regarding the ongoing armed conflict, several instances of military incursion and searches of communities (Zapatista and non-Zapatista alike) were seen in the Central zone (around Venustiano Carranza), in the Jungle Border region, as well as in the Highland zonethe HIghlands.

Beyond this, the harassment of Zapatista communities as carried out by indigenous and campesino groups associated with local power-groups or the government continued.  The aggression directed at such communities, it seems, seeks to wear down the resistance by means of acts of violence of both greater and lesser degrees designed to provoke counter-violence: occupation of “recovered lands,” theft or destruction of harvests, etc.  While the names and acronyms of the groups involved constantly change, the strategy of dividing indigenous groups within themselves has gone entirely unchanged.

In more general terms, a large majority of the social conflicts seen in 2009 had to do with questions of land and territory: resistance to mineral exploitation in 8 municipalities or the construction of the San Cristóbal-Palenque highway (as seen in Mitzitón, for example), the struggle for autonomous administration of the Agua Azul waterfalls (Bachajón), against high electricity prices , among others.  Several of these organizational processes are related to the Other Campaign established by the EZLN at the close of 2005.

Perhaps of most concern is the ongoing criminalization of organizations unrelated to the state government that engage in social protest, including independent organizations, human-rights defenders, and the local Catholic church, in a process reminiscent of that of the 1990s.

In November, the newspaper La Jornada made public parts of the Attorney General of State Justice's report, “Prevailing situation in the municipality of Venustiano Carranza,” which attempts to document the existence of a “subversive network” that was said to be planning destabilizing acts for 2010.  The network was claimed to be headed by the Catholic priest of Venustiano Carranza, Jesús Landín.  This report seems to justify both the harassment denounced by the Fray Bartolomé Center for Human Rights, the diocese, and other social actors, as well as the activities of police and military units in Venustiano Carranza and other nearby municipalities.

TAt the end of the year, the government seemed to change its strategy in light of rumors of potential social turmoil in 2010. At the close of November, representatives of the Chiapas Congress  attempted to approve an initiative that would grant legal recognition to the Good-Government Councils (JBGs). According to legislators, it was the Zapatistas who asked that the JBGs be recognized.”  The next day, the JBGs announced this claim to be a lie..  On 29 December, the local Congress approved a “Law on Indigenous Rights for the State of Chiapas,” a bill sent by the State Executive with the putative intent to “recognize the San Andrés Accords”.  Analysts and organizations challenged the discursive character of the bill, which was said to recognize indigenous rights “only when these do not contradict the precepts of the state and federal constitution or the rights of others.”

For the first time in 16 years, the EZLN did not publicly celebrate the anniversary of its armed uprising of 1 January 1994.  The Zapatista caracoles were closed on this first day of 2010, generating speculation and rumors with regard to the Zapatistas’ plans for the symbolic year of 2010, which marks the bicentennial of Mexican independence and the centennial of the Mexican Revolution.