Summary

On September 1, the Zapatista Army of National Liberation (EZLN) announced that it would not return to peace talks with the Mexican government until certain minimal conditions had been met:

• satisfactory compliance with the agreements reached in February on “Indigenous Rights and Culture;”
• release from prison of accused Zapatistas;
• establishment and operation of the Commission of Follow-up and Verification;
• a government delegation with decision-making power;
• demonstrated political will to negotiate, and respect for the Zapatista delegation;
• presentation of serious and concrete proposals on the negotiation topic “Democracy and Justice.” .

The Zapatista decision reflected another crisis point in the long and tortuous negotiation process that began shortly after the January 1, 1994 armed uprising. Since a February agreement on the issue area “Indigenous Rights and Culture,” the talks have focused on “Democracy and Justice.” However through the latest round of talks in August, progress was negligible. The EZLN did its best to include issues of national political reform, making substantive proposals, while the Mexican government attempted to limit the talks to local issues, insisting that national issues did not belong in the negotiations.

In May the sentencing of two accused Zapatistas to lengthy jail terms provoked an earlier suspension of the talks by the EZLN and a wave of protest at the national and international levels. In fact the government found it unviable to defend sentencing some accused Zapatistas to jail for “terrorism” while at the same time sitting at the negotiating table with the Zapatista leadership. The two were freed (although other accused Zapatistas remain in prison), and the talks were resumed after the mediators brokered an agreement that led to improvements in the negotiation process.

Complaining that since February, little or nothing has been done to actually implement the agreement that was reached, the Zapatistas insist that words must be turned into deeds. Meanwhile indigenous communities in the so-called conflict zone are living under the heavy-handed presence of the federal army. The military presence intimidates the communities, disrupts field work, and undermines social norms and cultural practices.

At the same time, communities in the northern part of Chiapas face increased violence at the hands of paramilitary groups, most of whom are affiliated with the ruling PRI party. Historically the PRI has maintained iron-clad control in this region. Those who line up with the PRI have privileged access to what little government resources, favors, and jobs are available. Those who don’t line up with the PRI risk repression. The growth of the political opposition over the last decade and the upsurge of protest and resistance actions by peasant groups since 1994 have led to violent reaction by those defending the status quo. Equally troubling is the fact that these groups operate with impunity and at times even with the collaboration of police officials and the army. The potential for continued escalation of the violence is apparent.

The fear and anxiety that result from both the heavy military presence and the paramilitary groups undermine public confidence in the peace process and call into question the government’s commitment to a nonviolent solution of the conflict.

The emergence of a new guerrilla force, the Popular Revolutionary Army (EPR), raises sensitive security issues for the government and further weakens hope that the government might take a more constructive role to move the peace process forward. On August 28- 29, coordinated actions in seven states, including Chiapas, left at least a eighteen dead and 20 wounded. To date there is much speculation but few answers regarding the political purpose of the EPR, who they are, and who is backing them. The Zapatistas noted their respect for the EPR, but disavowed any ties with them and criticized their decision to operate in Chiapas, pointing out that the indigenous communities must bear the brunt of the military’s response. The EPR replied that in Chiapas they would limit themselves to propaganda actions.

Both the National Mediation Commission (CONAI), presided by Bishop Samuel Ruiz, and the Commission for Agreement and Pacification (COCOPA), made up of representatives of the national Congress, have been committed and persistent in their efforts to keep the peace process on track. However, it is a great challenge in the current climate of social conflict, repression and violence.

As it has since the uprising began, the EZLN continues to find creative means to maintain the political and social initiative and demonstrate that it is a political force with which the government must reckon. Through a series of national and international gatherings, the Zapatistas brought together broad social sectors, refined their own proposals and gave them added momentum, and demonstrated a large base of support both within and beyond Mexico. While negligible as a military force, the Zapatista movement remains a powerful symbol, and the Zapatistas continue to demonstrate extraordinary ingenuity and persistence in exploiting its political potential.

The federal government faces local, national and international pressure to get rid of the Zapatista problem. If the Zapatistas are more a political force than a military force, the recourse to a military solution is less viable. Nonetheless, it becomes increasingly tempting to a government with a sense of shrinking options. International public opinion has been and continues to be a key restraint on the military option and a source of pressure to craft a political solution. Only when the government musters the political will to move forward will hope in the peace process be restored.

Recommended Action:

1. Write the Mexican government, urging it to:

• Create the conditions necessary for revitalizing the peace talks by showing a genuine will to honor the San Andres accords and to respond to the EZLN’s concerns.
• Nurture reconciliation by taking immediate and effective measures to disarm and end the impunity of paramilitary groups in the northern region of Chiapas and to address complaints of abuse made by the local population.
• Stop the growing militarization in Chiapas and other parts of the country and seek a dialogue with the EPR in order to avoid further bloodshed and assaults on the civilian population caught between two armies.
• Recognize and respect the humanitarian efforts of international observers and human rights workers who provide factual information and analysis about the conflict and substantial support for the peace process.

2. Disseminate information –like this report– to mobilize international public opinion. Sign up to receive Urgent Action alerts regarding specific conflicts or cases of human rights violations monitored by the SIPAZ team..

Please write to:

Lic. Ernesto Zedillo Ponce de León
Presidente de la República
Palacio Nacional
06067 México, DF – México
Fax: (52 5) 271 1764 515 4783

Emilio Chuayffet Chemor
Secretario de Gobernación
Bucareli 99, 1o. piso
Col. Juárez
06699 México, DF – México
Fax: (52 5) 546 5350 546 7380

Lic. C. Ruíz Ferro
Gobernador del Estado de Chiapas
Palacio de Gobierno
Tuxtla Gutiérrez, Chiapas – México
Fax: (52 961) 20917

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Update

The long, hard road to peace . . .

Since the Zapatista uprising erupted in a brief armed conflict in January 1994, Mexico’s southernmost state of Chiapas has experienced a tense armed peace characterized by a great deal of social conflict. Despite sporadic peace talks, little has been accomplished to address the desperate poverty of the indigenous population that gave rise to the Zapatista movement. Widespread land takeovers by peasant groups, town hall occupations, and other threats to the status quo by opposition forces have been countered by increasing repression by armed bands tied to the ruling PRI (Institutional Revolutionary Party). While the federal army has thoroughly militarized the former Zapatista strongholds in the east of the state (the so-called conflict zone), paramilitary groups have been harassing, beating and even killing political opponents in the north.

Tensions were further heightened by the emergence of the guerrilla EPR (Popular Revolutionary Army). A series of actions on August 28-29 included the temporary blocking of key highways in Chiapas. This thrust the EPR into the complicated dynamics of the peace process there, a development that was publicly decried by the Zapatistas.

Considering the lack of tangible progress, the Zapatistas announced on September 1 that they would not participate in further talks until certain “minimal conditions” were met by the federal government.

It may well be that the peace talks would have failed long ago were it not for the significance that the Zapatista struggle has assumed at the national level within Mexico (and at the international level as well). In Chiapas, the need for real change, while widely acknowledged, has come up against the limits of the 67-year-old PRI system’s ability or willingness to accommodate it. Yet support for the Zapatistas remains broad and the government has not been able to dispose of this problem that continues to hound both Mexico’s domestic politics and its international relations.

Democracy and Justice

After signing the first agreements between the Mexican government and the Zapatista Army of National Liberation (EZLN) in February on the theme “Indigenous Culture and Rights,” the work relating to the second theme, “Democracy and Justice,” was initiated in March.

As mentioned in the first SIPAZ Report, from the moment the second round of talks began, there were obvious difficulties rooted in basic differences in each party’s understanding of democracy. At the same time, it was evident that the Mexican government resisted discussing a subject at the talks in San Andres that inevitably led to a debate over national reforms. According to the government, the proper context for such discussion is among the political parties in the national Congress. It should be noted that in that setting, the official party attained an agreement with the opposition for a limited electoral reform that was presented by the government as an important breakthrough.

While the EZLN summoned about 250 advisors and guests who made substantial contributions to the seven sub-themes of the negotiation topic, the government delegation appeared at the first phase without proposals or contributing guests. This attitude of the federal government was classified by a variety of analysts as being deaf and indifferent to the broad diversity of proposals that flowed from the guests of the EZLN, representatives of important social, political and intellectual sectors of the country.

Those profound differences blocked a genuine advance in the first two phases of the second theme. The EZLN argued that the government evaded substantial themes such as changing the regime (separate party and state), definition of a new social contract, and the dismantling of structures of official control, among others.

Even more serious than the lack of agreements at San Andres was the context in which this stage of the negotiation developed. Especially significant were increasing militarization in several parts of Chiapas and in the neighboring states of Guerrero, Oaxaca and Veracruz and increasing violence in municipalities dominated by paramilitary groups identified with the official party.

The May Crisis

In the beginning of May, the peace process was thrown into a crisis when the judiciary condemned the alleged Zapatistas Javier Elorriaga and Sebastian Entzin. The two had been detained since February 1995 in a process plagued with irregularities that were repeatedly criticized by prestigious national and international bodies. At a point when calls for their liberation were the strongest, Judge Alcantara condemned them to 13 and 6 years in prison respectively under charges of terrorism.

This provoked a generalized reaction of dissent since the Dialogue and Reconciliation Law, under which the negotiation process is conducted, explicitly bars accusing or persecuting persons considered to be Zapatistas.

The EZLN interpreted the sentences as a sign of a break in the dialogue and a possible renewal of armed hostilities. They declared a “red alert” and announced that minimum security guarantees did not exist to return to San Andres. In a May 18 letter, Sub- Commander Marcos stated:

“The sentence against Elorriaga and Entzin represent a sentence against the EZLN. We were accused, judged and sentenced as terrorists. The problem is not the liberty of Elorriaga and Entzin… Whether the alleged Zapatistas are free or imprisoned, the dialogue of San Andres is not sustainable if the EZLN is defined as a terrorist organization by any federal, state or local power”.

Similarly, the government issued very harsh declarations, warning the EZLN that by not attending the scheduled meeting in San Andres on June 5, the law that protected the Zapatistas would be suspended and thus the arrest orders against them would again be in effect.

This tense atmosphere was further stressed by a particularly serious incident in Chiapas: the confrontation between residents and a paramilitary group in the town of Bachajon, municipality of Chilon, that left six dead, many families displaced, and thirteen houses burned.

The positive aspect of the so-called “May crisis” was to unleash a huge national and international response in defense of the peace process and against the possibility of a return to a dynamic of war in Chiapas. This obligated the Mexican government to reconfirm its will to seek a peaceful and negotiated solution to the conflicts in the state and to implement a judicial formula that enabled Elorriaga and Entzin to be freed on June 7. As a result the EZLN agreed to renew the talks with government representatives on June 9.

Overcoming that crisis led to establishing a new framework for the negotiation process of San Andres. Returning to an insistent EZLN demand, the parties agreed to modify some aspects of the dialogue procedure rules with an eye towards facilitating the process and preventing the possibility of a future break.

Another important development was an agreement reached July 12 on the composition of the Commission for Verification and Followup which is responsible for monitoring implementation of the agreements. However this commission has yet to become operational.

Paramilitaries and Guerrillas

During the month of June, two other phenomena negatively impacted the peace process. At the local level, violence escalated in the northern region of Chiapas due to the unchecked actions of the PRI- affiliated paramilitary group known as “Peace and Justice”. At the national level, the Popular Revolutionary Army (EPR) appeared on the scene on the first anniversary of the massacre of peasants in Aguas Blancas, Guerrero.

While a variety of hypotheses have been offered regarding the origin and the nature of this armed group, up till now it remains an unknown. What is surprising is its capacity of coordination, its efficiency of operation, and its powerful weapons. On August 28-29, coordinated actions by the EPR in seven states –including Chiapas– left at least eighteen dead and 20 wounded.

The EZLN immediately denied any links with the EPR, an organization in the tradition of other Latin American guerrilla movements that views armed struggle as a means to seize power. The absence of a connection between the EZLN and the EPR was noted by members of CONAI and COCOPA (the mediation bodies), the Mexican military, and even President Zedillo.

On August 29, the EZLN addressed a public message to the leaders of the EPR in which its independent position regarding the new guerrilla organization was made clear. Among other things, Sub- commander Marcos affirmed:

“We note the respectful tone used to refer to us. We respect those who respect us… I only want to tell you that we do not want your support. We do not need it nor do we seek it… The support that we want, that which we seek and need, is the support of national and international civil society. We hope for peaceful, civil mobilizations. It’s not weapons, combatants or military actions that we need… You follow your path and leave us to follow ours… You are not our enemy nor will we be yours. Neither will we view you as ‘rivals in the leadership of the struggle in Mexico,’ because, among other things, we are not trying to lead any struggle other than the struggle for our dignity.”

Stalemate

Despite the positive signs that emerged with the overcoming of the May crisis, the last stage of the San Andres dialogue ended August 11 without the parties reaching any agreement over their respective documents on “Democracy and Justice.” The EZLN blamed the government delegation for the failure of the negotiations, alleging that “the documents presented (by the government) do not contain serious and concrete proposals that permit an authentic, in-depth negotiation of the topics.” Similarly, the government delegation declared that the lack of agreements was due to an attitude that was “intransigent and outside the whole spirit of negotiation on the part of the EZLN who came seeking all or nothing, and the result was nothing.”

At the beginning of September, the last plenary session was scheduled on the second theme, “Democracy and Justice.” At that point, after carrying out consultations with their supporters in indigenous communities, the EZLN announced its decision not to return to the talks until certain conditions were met:

• satisfactory compliance with the agreements reached in February on “Indigenous Rights and Culture;”
• release from prison of accused Zapatistas;
• establishment and operation of the Commission of Follow-up and Verification;
• a government delegation with decision-making power, demonstrated political will to negotiate, and respect for the Zapatista delegation;
• presentation of serious and concrete proposals on the negotiation topic “Democracy and Justice.”

At that point, an interchange of messages began between the EZLN and the Ministry of the Interior whose harsh tone is reminiscent of the statements that accompanied the military offensive in February, 1995. In spite of the efforts of the mediating bodies, at the time of this writing communications are broken off between the parties. At the conclusion of a meeting with COCOPA (Commission for Agreement and Pacification) and the Minister of the Interior, Bishop Samuel Ruiz announced that CONAI (National Mediation Commission), of which he is president, is preparing a peace proposal not only for Chiapas but for all Mexico.

The EZLN brings together Civil Society and International Solidarity parallel to the tortuous dialogue process of San Andres. Important events happened in Chiapas that demonstrated an uncommon capacity on the part of the EZLN to bring social sectors together, both at the national and international levels.

In accord with the call in January of this year in their “Fourth Declaration of the Lacandon Jungle,” the EZLN organized a continental gathering in April and an intercontinental one in July under the slogan “For Humanity and Against Neoliberalism.” Important national and international personalities, representatives from the worlds of culture, art and science, and social and political activists from the five continents were invited to the “Aguascalientes” meeting centers constructed in five Zapatista communities.

The area was surrounded by a military cordon and the Immigration Department imposed strict controls apparently designed to intimidate and make more difficult the arrival of foreigners in the area. Nonetheless some four thousand people gathered in Chiapas to analyze together the consequences of the application of the neoliberal economic model in the world and to look for common strategies to confront it.

Another event unprecedented in Mexican history was the Special Forum on Government Reform organized by the EZLN with COCOPA backing that took place June 30 and July 6. The themes that seemed to be off-limits for the federal government at San Andres were broadly discussed in a true national dialogue by more than thirteen hundred people from all states of the country, called together by the indigenous of Chiapas as no political actor had ever done before. Intellectuals, artists, housewives, journalists, social organizations, political parties, and business people came together in San Cristobal de las Casas in a climate of dialogue, tolerance, and inclusivity.

Finally, the significance of the two meetings of the Permanent National Indigenous Forum that happened in April and July also bears mentioning. Based on the February agreements on “Indigenous Rights and Culture,” the Forum was created as a space where the EZLN could encourage encounter and exchange among different indigenous peoples of Mexico. It is intended that this process of the indigenous peoples would not be led by the EZLN. Instead, starting with their great diversity, it would unfold with its own rhythm as an inclusive and autonomous indigenous process.

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Analysis

It is difficult to appreciate the significance of the peace process which is underway in Chiapas without placing it in a national context characterized by increasing violence and instability.

Several prominent civic organizations underscored these troubling developments and criticized the government’s role:

” President Zedillo’s government has neither respected human rights, practiced social justice or enforced the law. Moreover, the recurring application of ‘measures of exception’ has incited ‘grave’ and ‘systematic’ violations of individual rights.”
— Report by the National Human Rights Network “All Rights for All People,” Civic Alliance, and the Workers’ Center for Reflection and Action

The report was presented to the Inter-American Human Rights Commission (IHRC) of the Organization of American States during its first-ever visit to Mexico in June. During a press conference at the end of their stay, the IHRC delegation shared a “preliminary and provisional appraisal.” They observed that, “On the basis of the information received, it can be perceived that impunity is still a critical problem.” The group also warned about “the consequences of using the armed forces in civil security functions since this could bring about serious human rights violations by virtue of the military nature and training of said forces.”

In the context of Chiapas, the negotiations between the EZLN and the Mexican government have been conducted in a climate heavily- marked by social conflict, political violence, militarization, and low-intensity warfare against indigenous communities.

It is alarming that in the northern region of Chiapas the violence is more intense and the human rights abuses more severe than in the so-called “conflict zone” where EZLN forces are concentrated. The paramilitary groups and “white guards” operate in various municipalities of the north, not only with total impunity but even in the presence of federal and state police. This situation weakens the peace process, and the EZLN has demanded that the government put an end to paramilitary operations.
Negotiations between the government and the EZLN were suspended following the EZLN’s decision not to return to the talks until the government showed greater political will to resolve the conflict. Further hindering potential progress in the peace process is the appearance of the EPR and the government’s response which has generated increasing militarization throughout the country.

On September 12 in an analysis of the current crisis, CONAI pointed out that,

” The necessary political conditions for a more in-depth negotiation in Chiapas are effected by the grave risk inherent in expanding violence at the national level and the government’s use of repression as a response. The participation and strengthening of other local actors also becomes more difficult, while reconciliation and governability become increasingly distant.”

Regarding the talks themselves, Geronimo Hernandez , a Jesuit expert on indigenous issues and EZLN adviser, observed:

” The dialogue process is complicated by two contradictory theories or strategies: that of the federal government, which seeks to isolate and surround the EZLN and to force them to accept its conditions; and that of the Zapatistas who seek to permanently break the siege that the government wants to impose in order to involve the entire society in the negotiation process. This also relates to the confrontation between the two opposing concepts of peace. For the government, peace is reduced to the successful disarmament of the Zapatistas and a return to the starting point of 1993. For the EZLN, peace signifies a profound change in Chiapas and Mexico, embodied in the thirteen demands: liberty, justice, democracy, work, health care, education, housing, etc.”

According to this analysis, the attempt to isolate the EZLN may be seen in the different levels of the siege:

• Military: Defined by the geopolitical boundaries which designate the municipalities with Zapatista influence and also the area around the “Aguascalientes” communities.
• Political: Harassing EZLN sympathizers to create fear and undermine support and alliances with other groups. This also explains the policy of continual harassment of internationals in Chiapas by the Mexican government.
• Communication: Blocking EZLN access to the mass media and monopolizing control of information regarding Zapatista proposals.
• Social: Trying to strip away community support in the indigenous communities as well as among other sectors of national and international civil society.
• Economic: The government is investing large amounts of material resources in social programs for the communities in Zapatista- influenced zones. Support for the PRI is the basic criterion that determines who receives the aid. It is channeled principally through the pro-government faction of the peasant organization ARIC (Rural Association of Collective Interest). This in turn, generates enormous division and polarization within the communities.

Many agree that the federal government has successfully made the economic siege increasingly difficult to break since conditions of extreme poverty have sharpened in the past year due to the serious disruptions in the production cycles as a result of the military presence.

A regional leader of the independent ARIC faction described the situation in graphic terms: “There are problems in the communities. There are army troops handing out money and cultivating resentment among the people. Moreover, they bring women, increasing prostitution and disease. The local families are turning their sons over to the army, and young girls prostitute themselves with the soldiers. The men drink, and there is domestic violence. There is also considerable hunger, since the people no longer want to work their corn fields; some out of fear of the military that is everywhere; others because they have turned to selling goods to the soldiers or doing jobs for them and they no longer want to work the land. The military is installing camps on community lands without asking permission. They are cutting down trees of precious hardwood and taking them to sell. They are contaminating the rivers.. As a result of all these problems the community spirit plunges and the people no longer want to struggle.”

Despite this day-to-day reality of suffering throughout the indigenous communities, the EZLN has had substantial success in breaking through the different levels of siege by strengthening its ability to draw people together, making proposals and alliances, and establishing itself as a key political actor in Mexico in the building of a large, broad, inclusive opposition front.

Additionally, throughout the difficult negotiation process, both CONAI and COCOPA have demonstrated a firm disposition in contributing to the achievement of peace. CONAI has made important efforts to ensure the continuity of the dialogue. COCOPA deserves recognition for maintaining its independence vis a vis the executive and judicial branches of government, for acting effectively to resolve the May crisis, and for incorporating the EZLN as a significant player in the National Dialogue that proceeds parallel to and at the same time supersedes the context of the San Andres talks. COCOPA also has the responsibility of urging that agreements reached and the results of the various fora are taken seriously by the national Congress and formalized into legislative reforms.

However the determined efforts of the CONAI and the COCOPA face daunting challenges. Changing the age-old oppression and discrimination of which the Indians are victims requires enormous sustained effort. Yet, as we have noted, the political space necessary to marshall that effort is shrunk by the heavy military presence in the so-called conflict zone and by the repressive violence of paramilitary groups directed against political opponents. At the local, state and national levels, the formidable political machine of the PRI acts in more conventional heavy-handed ways to uphold the status quo.

The emergence of the EPR raises as yet unanswered questions about who they are and who is backing them. Regardless, their impact in Chiapas appears to be to provide an additional justification for further militarization and official caution in negotiations.

On the other hand, as the conflict nears its third anniversary, the Zapatistas display a remarkable resilience and ability to project themselves politically in the context of the major national problems facing Mexico. Needless to say, whether in Chiapas or elsewhere in Mexico, those problems will not simply go away. And the consequences – measured in economic statistics, political disaffection, repressive violence, or guerrilla movements – are only likely to grow.

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Paramilitaries – The other face of war

For more than a year, paramilitary groups and “white guards” (guardias blancas) with sinister roots and murky connections have sown fear and terror in different parts of Chiapas, particularly in the northern region. Operating with impunity, these groups have caused approximately 3000-4000 people to flee to the mountains and other places of Chiapas and Tabasco. They fled in fear of their lives, after seeing their houses burned and their goods stolen. It is estimated that over the last two years approximately 300 people have been murdered.

“In Chiapas, political and religious clashes proliferate, tearing apart the social fabric of many communities. Such conflicts even seem to have displaced the conflict stemming from the rebellion of January 1, 1994 as the main risk of violent confrontation.”
[La Jornada Editorial, July 7, 1996]

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“They persecute us…”

A meeting was called in Moyos on June 14. PRD (Democratic Revolutionary Party) members from different communities congregated in the town center of Moyos to demand liberation of two people being held. At the same time, PRI activists who were gathered in the ejido (communal lands) office started to shoot guns and throw home-made bombs. Seventeen-year-old, Arturo Hernandez Soto and nineteen-year-old Jose de Jesus, were killed. Feliz Martinez and Martin Perez, PRI members in their 60s, were injured. Shortly after these events, police forces from the municipal headquarters of Sabanilla arrived, but they made no arrests. They have remained in the community since then. That same day, June 14, many PRD families fled. In the following days, those who stayed were pressured by PRI members to leave town. A total of 67 families have been dispersed among nine communities, including: Union Hidalgo, Santa Catarina, Majastic, Esquipulas. In Providencia, a village adjoining Moyos, people are threatened by PRI activists for giving refuge to sixteen displaced families. The majority of the houses of the displaced have been ransacked and some burned.

“They blocked the highway, the roads, we can’t even go to get corn or wood, nothing. We’re living closed in; we can’t go out. We are under surveillance and they persecute us”
–women from Moyos who took refuge in Providencia

In order to hear the other version of events, the delegation went to Moyos to interview authorities and the commander of the police. However, the Ejidal Commissioner declined to make any statement, arguing that higher level authorities had already informed the press.
–SIPAZ Weekly Report – July 2, 1996

The authorities have let such actions go unpunished, thus favoring violence, a breakdown of law and order, and official complicity. At the same time, the government insists on classifying this wave of violence in the northern part of the state as “transitory“, and asserts that “they are not exactly paramilitary groups, but instead armed peasant groups.” However the authorities do recognize that these events affect the peace talks in San Andres.

“The problem in the northern region is not about political parties, nor religion, like some want to make it appear. These communities are political, but they are not ruled by the political party structures. Their expressions exceed institutional forms of political manifestation. A greater presence of social institutions is needed in the region and more resources going directly into the hands of the people. This region has been forgotten by both the federal and state governments.”
–Uriel Jarquin, Chiapas Undersecretary of Government

The regions where these groups operate are distinguished by being among the poorest and most marginalized. The majority of people affected are PRD activists and suspected EZLN sympathizers. Many of them are involved in longstanding land conflicts and are clearly opposed to the system of one-party rule.

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Background

Land disputes have been and continue to be the root of conflicts in Chiapas. Historically communal lands have not been legally recognized by the government and the hope of a fair land distribution through Article 27 of the national constitution ended during the administration of Carlos Salinas de Gortari. In 1991 Article 27 was modified to facilitate the sale of communal lands (ejidos).

It was in this conflictive context that the first white guards appeared four decades ago.

“The white guards were born during the administration of Governor Efrain Aranda Osorio (1952-1958). He created a ‘cattlemen’s auxiliary police guard’ with the purpose of protecting cattle and apprehending rustlers. Large landowners and cattle ranchers provided arms and wages to peasants for protecting their lands. In addition, acting within the law, they executed suspected rustlers and land invaders as part of the politics of terror to maintain control in the northern region of Chiapas. Governor Samuel Leon Brindis issued a decree in 1961, under which cattlemen were allowed to carry arms and hire private policemen.”
–[Expreso, May 16, 1996]

Today not only white guards but also paramilitary groups are normal in certain parts of Chiapas.

“The existence of white guards or paramilitary groups is common in Chiapas, most of all in indigenous regions. Their belligerency has increased since the armed uprising of the Zapatista Army of National Liberation (EZLN) in January 1994.”
–[Proceso, May 13, 1996]

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Their support base and “borders”

Paramilitary groups have organized themselves to defend not only economic interests of those in power, as the white guards have done, but also to defend political interests in the region. These groups are made up in their majority of PRI members, some municipal authorities also from the PRI, communal land authorities (Comisariados Ejidales), and ex-military.

From their beginning until now, these armed groups have maintained official links. According to a report from CEDIAC (Center for Indigenous Rights) and the Fray Bartolome de las Casas Human Rights Center, white guards act as a clandestine force financed by groups loyal to the PRI along with officials who want to maintain political- social-economic control in regions of high poverty rates and marginalization.

An investigation carried out by a group of sociologists asserted,

“When they talk among themselves (members of these armed groups), they refer to how they are protected by Eraclio Zepeda (Chiapas Secretary of Government), and Mario Arturo Coutino Farrera (Director General of State Government). With their support they acquire production contracts, provisions, and sometimes uniforms and arms…”
–[Expreso, June 23, 1996]

In addition to the “Chinchulines” who operate in the Tzeltal regions of Chilon and Yajalon, other paramilitary groups and their areas of operation can be identified.

The 125 communities that form the municipality of Tila (Chol region) in the high jungle, live under the shadow, harassment and aggression of the armed group “Peace and Justice” (Paz y Justicia). According to complaints from inhabitants of the area, members of the Mexican Army train “Peace and Justice” members. They also assert that this group carries out armed actions in coordination with the government organization SOCAMA (Teacher and Peasant Solidarity, a group of teachers affiliated with the PRI.) The operations of “Peace and Justice” also extend through the municipalities of Sabanilla, Tumbala, and Salto de Agua.

The “San Bartolome de los Llanos Alliance” operates around Venustiano Carranza. Here the problems are a mix of old agrarian claims about communal lands monopolized by a few families and recent post-electoral problems. Since 1994, about 30 members of the community have been murdered in obscure circumstances.

In Simojovel, another municipality of the northern region with a long tradition of peasant and social struggle, there have been confrontations between members of the Work Party (PT) that governs the municipality and organized peasants.

Some Chamulans (from San Juan Chamula), in the Tzotzil area, are organized in a paramilitary group that residents call the “Cutthroats.” The group “Tomas Munzer” of the Ejido Tomas Munzer, supported by and composed of cattle ranchers, operates around the municipality of Ocosingo.

The Church is blamed

The PRI and the PT blame catechists and priests from the diocese of San Cristobal de las Casas and the Zapatistas for the crimes. Some government representatives in the north have characterized the parties in conflict as Catholics-Zapatistas and Protestants-PRI members. In all regions of Chiapas catechists, priests and nuns are blamed for the level of consciousness that the people have attained in seeking to obtain their rights. The situation has reached such a point that the National Executive Committee of the PRI issued a statement about the pastoral projects of the Bishop of San Cristobal de las Casas, Samuel Ruiz, accusing him of being responsible for promoting violence in Chiapas.

“In the northern region there is a lot of church influence and it is principally the catechists who are causing the conflicts. If we take a close look into the eyes of the indigenous where catechists are present, we’ll find hate and an attitude of vengeance towards others. But if we look into the eyes of indigenous in other areas, this doesn’t exist.”
–Rolando R. Villafuerte, PRI Municipal President of San Cristobal de las Casas

Facing the violence

This dynamic is not restricted only to the state of Chiapas. Civic organizations in other states have denounced the existence of paramilitary groups in Oaxaca, Guerrero, Puebla, Veracruz and Sinaloa.

In a declaration protesting paramilitary violence, Amnesty International condemned “a long-lasting pattern of human rights abuses committed by hired gunmen acting on behalf of local chiefs linked to the ruling PRI party.” Civil society, peasant and indigenous organizations, as well as human rights groups have demanded total disarmament on numerous occasions, but it has not yet been achieved.

Among the efforts to counter this violence are several initiatives on the part of the Diocese of San Cristobal to mediate between the parties in conflict. On July 8, 1996, a Commission of Support for Community Reconciliation and Unity was established by the Diocese of San Cristobal de las Casas, Civic Alliance, and the National Human Rights Network “All Rights for All People.”

“The sharpening of conflicts between communities and organizations makes it urgent to search for and strengthen bridges that foster communication among each of the actors involved.”
— Members of the Commission of Support for Community Reconciliation and Unity
[La Jornada, July 9, 1996]

By way of reflection

In Mexico, the PRI has been in power for over 60 years. Because of this, support for housing, nutrition, etc., from the government favors PRI members. It also results in repression and marginalization of communities that don’t join together with them, whether they are Zapatista sympathizers, PRD members or other independent peasant and indigenous organizations.

Paramilitary groups form an integral part of this strategy of marginalization and repression. It is disconcerting that paramilitary groups organize freely, the majority of them are PRI- affiliated, and they have economic, political and social power in their areas of influence. They act in the presence of and at times in collaboration with the police and Mexican military, and with open support from municipal authorities. They also enjoy the backing of several federal deputies and state officials. Based on this they sow intimidation and demand loyalty and support in several regions of Chiapas. In addition, they pressure communities to give their votes to the PRI, which may portend other not-so-clean elections in the future and, as a consequence, lead to more resistance and post- electoral disputes.

Contemporary history indicates another alarming concern. Many Latin American countries have recently emerged from the era of military dictatorships and death squads. First there were threats against priests, nuns, catechists and human rights activists. Later this gave way to killings of church workers and activists and widespread persecution in which the blood of the people was spilled. Mexico is in the period of threats, and there is great anxiety that this will lead to assassination of leaders of this type. In the language of national security, words such as “subversive”, “communist”, or “revolutionary” are used to stigmatize people who openly declare themselves in opposition to the party in power.

As if this were not bad enough, the actions of the paramilitary groups have impacted negatively the climate of the peace talks and the hope for their progress.

“These violent events are a constant danger to the negotiation process since they provoke military mobilization, the exodus of hundreds of indigenous, and leave people living with constant fear and anxiety.”
–Miguel Alvarez Gandara, CONAI technical secretary
[Expreso, August 7, 1996]

… … … … … …

Bachajon – The Cost of Impunity

On May 4, 1996, the PRI-affiliated paramilitary group the “Chinchulines” blocked the road into Bachajon (municipality of Chilon). They stopped hundreds of ejido (communal landholding) members returning from an election assembly. Angry over the defeat of their candidates, the Chinchulines shot off their weapons, threatened the ejido members, and beat a number of them. Unable to return home, some of the indigenous peasants traveled to Ocosingo to seek help. Instead, the response they received from police was,

“If this has to do with the people of Jeronimo (Gomez Guzman, leader of the Chinchulines), we won’t get involved.”

The next day, ejido members attacked the home of Jeronimo Gomez and killed him. Two of his relatives who pursued the attackers were also killed. In response, the Chinchulines went on a rampage in Bachajon. A day later the toll stood at six dead. A number of families fled their homes in fear. Thirteen houses and six vehicles were burned. Among the burned buildings were a Catholic school and the Jesuit mission and the Center for Indigenous Rights (CEDIAC) that they direct.. Fr. Jose Aviles and his companions received death threats, and some of them remained in hiding for several weeks.

Not until the next morning did state police arrive on the scene. The fact that some traveled in vehicles operated by the “Chinchulines” did not allay the anxiety of the terrorized populace.

The Chinchulines began as a PRI youth group, and ties with the ruling party have always been strong. According to several NGOs (non- governmental organizations), among the politicians who finance the Chinchulines are Rafael Ceballos Cancino, a PRI congressman, and Samuel Sanchez Sanchez, a member of the Chiapas state assembly.

“The deposed governor Elmar Setzer, a wealthy political boss from Yajalon, supported the formal integration of the Chinchulines in the PRI’s Regional Confederation of Workers and Peasants (CROC) during his administration (1993-94).”
–[Expreso, 16 de Mayo 1996]

Through the CROC, the Chinchulines enjoy public transport contracts and they have taken control of the ejido sand and gravel quarries in the area. For three years they did not permit the election of ejido officials in Bachajon. On May 4, they reacted violently against the election of PRD-affiliated leaders. The group is accused of responsibility for more than 50 killings, destruction of crops and houses, and the theft of cattle, corn and beans.

“At first (eight years ago), they were well regarded by the people…Many people supported them, because they said that they were fighting to ensure that the gravel quarry in the ejido would benefit the ejido members. Later it turned out to be just the opposite.”
–Manuel Gomez Moreno, PRD mayor of Chilon
[Proceso, May 13, 1996]

Mariclaire Acosta, President of the Mexican Commission for the Defense and Promotion of Human Rights, protested the violence in Bachajon in a May 6 letter to Chiapas Governor Cesar Ruiz Ferro:

“Given the lack of action by state authorities in this conflict, we can only conclude that the government permits violence as a legitimate means of resolving serious problems in Chiapas while at the same time renouncing its responsibility to administer justice in a prompt, expeditious and impartial manner.”