During his fourth trip to Chiapas this year, President Zedillo stated,

“The government would never act with violence or repression against those who dissent. The government wants dialogue, it wants negotiation…Fortunately, there is no persecution of any kind in Mexico…That is why it makes us very unhappy, and should be of concern to everyone, that there are divisions and confrontations in some communities in Chiapas, especially indigenous communities. It is very sad that divisions and confrontations between brothers continue to occur because of political, ethnic or religious intolerance.”
(La Jornada, May 18).

These words were seconded by Emilio Rabasa, the government coordinator for Dialogue and Reconciliation (recently resigned), when he stressed that

“the [government] strategy after a year and five months [since the Acteal massacre] has resulted in a climate of détente, of stabilization [in Chiapas]…Social harmony and peaceful coexistence have been encouraged.”
(La Jornada, May 30)

At the end of May, Diodoro Carrasco Altamirano replaced Francisco Labastida Ochoa as Interior Minister when the latter resigned to devote himself completely to his campaign for the presidential nomination of the PRI (ruling Institutional Revolutionary Party). In early July, this change brought about a meeting between members of COCOPA (congressional Commission for Agreement and Pacification) and the Interior Ministry, after ten months without contact. Congressman Gilberto Lopez y Rivas, of the PRD (Democratic Revolutionary Party), asked the Minister if the federal government would be willing to present a new proposal on the indigenous rights and culture initiative or to withdraw theirs. Declining to make any commitments, the Minister responded that he “was going to consider it.”

While these gestures reaffirm the good will of the political leaders, the reality in Chiapas does not appear to coincide with the rhetoric. Days after the COCOPA meeting, during the first week of June, a significant increase in military and police incursions into Zapatista communities was initiated. There were arbitrary detentions of purported Zapatistas, harassment by the military at checkpoints, as well as the establishment of new military camps. Between one hundred and one thousand soldiers and police participated in each of the incursions. The reasons given by state and federal officials for the operations were the enforcement of the Firearms and Explosives Law, the fight against drug trafficking, to insure that government aid was delivered, the arrest of criminals, and the protection of residents who had requested it.

There were incursions in ten communities in the Cañadas of Ocosingo, such as La Trinidad and Nazareth. The incursions brought fear to the population of these communities, and, as a consequence, around 50 Zapatista sympathizer families from Nazareth fled their homes and took refuge in a nearby community, where they remain. At the end of June, during a visit by SIPAZ to the region, the displaced from Nazareth asserted: “Arrest warrants have been issued against us for fabricated crimes. That’s why we cannot return. Some of our children stayed, and the PRI supporters won’t let us go in to give them food.”

During the operations in El Censo and Pavorreal (also in Ocosingo), soldiers and police detained some alleged Zapatistas, accused of common crimes. The residents testified to the destruction of houses and of household goods and to physical mistreatment. According to authorities from Zapatista communities, at the time of this writing, army patrols are continuing and soldiers are aggressively interrogating the residents.

In recent months a more aggressive attitude has been noted at the military, police and immigration checkpoints. On several occasions, NGO (non-governmental organization) workers were intimidated or denied freedom of movement. Similarly, the military has been carrying out police duties (making arrests) and immigration duties (interrogating foreigners about their activities and immigration status), while immigration officials have been asking ‘military intelligence’ questions (asking about Zapatista contacts).

Economic Aid

During the months of April, May and June, government publicity campaigns continued concerning the turning in of arms by purported Zapatistas in exchange for government economic aid. The EZLN (Zapatista Army of National Liberation) and some local and regional social organizations have characterized these events as “a farce and theater.”

At the federal level, the government set in motion an unprecedented program that projects a wide government presence in 116 communities of the Cañadas of Ocosingo, Las Margaritas and Altamirano. It will have a budget of close to 109 million pesos (approximately 11 million dollars) that will theoretically benefit more than 3000 growers. Funds for the program include a loan from the World Bank. In view of implacable Zapatista opposition to allowing government programs in communities under their influence, Chiapas state Attorney General Eduardo Montoya Lievano recently declared, “The government will guarantee that aid will reach the communities, and, if it is necessary to use public force for that, then it will do so.” Thus it is feared that the new program will serve to intensify social conflict in the area. Such fears are heightened by the fact that the primary consultant is Alternative Advisory Consultants, an organization directed by Diana Orive. Her brother, Adolfo Orive, is a hard-liner who was a key architect of the Zedillo administration’s Chiapas policy.

Acteal

On May 20, Mario Perez Ruiz, a former soldier who had been accused of training the group that perpetrated the Acteal killings, was sentenced. However, he was only found guilty of carrying weapons restricted to use by the Army, and he received two years in prison with the possibility of release upon payment of a fine. When Perez Ruiz was detained, the Army admitted he was a soldier, but said he had been on leave during the period that the Acteal massacre took place. Perez Ruiz confirmed this account, but later he was quoted as saying that he had been told to do so.

Ten Public Security (state police) had previously been sentenced in the Acteal case. While they stood accused of having failed to stop the massacre, they too were only convicted of carrying weapons restricted to the use of the Army.

On July 19, 20 indigenous detainees were found guilty of murder, felony assault, and carrying weapons without a license and restricted to the use of the Army. They were sentenced to 35 years.

Other advances include the detention of Victorio Arias Perez, one of the alleged leaders of the paramilitaries involved in the Acteal killings, and the execution of three more arrest warrants.

In addition, Amnesty International asked the United States government to investigate Julio Cesar Ruiz Ferro (who was governor of Chiapas when the Acteal massacre took place, and who is now working at the Mexican Embassy in the US), in order to determine whether or not he had any responsibility for the massacre. The request was rejected by the Mexican Under-secretary for North America and Europe, Juan Rebolledo Gout, with the argument that: “There are no nations in the world who are exempt from human rights violations.”

The CNDH

The government National Human Rights Commission (CNDH) observed that the “degrading” practice of torture still continues in Mexico. According to its information, 21 cases were recorded in 1998. The Office of the Attorney General (PGR) and the Department of National Defense (SEDENA) were cited as the departments with the most public servants who were accused of responsibility for such incidents.

For the first time in its history, the Commission also gave figures on complaints made against SEDENA. It said it had received 1679 complaints against SEDENA, the majority from civilians, and less than 400 from military personnel in the exercise of their work or from deserters. The CNDH also proposed legislative reforms in order to resolve confusion regarding whether the military or the civilian courts are the most appropriate authority for dealing with abuses committed by military persons against civilians. The Miguel Agustin Pro Juarez Human Rights Center commented that under no circumstances can the Military Justice Code be considered above the Constitution (whose Article 13 notes that matters in which the rights of civilians are violated should be taken to the civil authorities). The Pro Juarez Center also maintained that the military is not above international human rights conventions signed by the Mexican government and ratified by the Senate of the Republic. For these reasons, it argued, legislative reform is unnecessary.

At the beginning of June, the CNDH itself experienced a legislative change with the approval of reforms to Article 102 of the Constitution, where it was granted full autonomy from the federal Executive. The Senate of the Republic will now name the president of the CNDH. What was not approved was the broadening of the CNDH’s powers in order to allow it to work with labor and electoral issues.

Other Developments

In April 1999, during his term as President of COCOPA, federal PRD Congressman Gilberto Lopez y Rivas announced that the PRD wing in the Chamber of Deputies had information to the effect that numerous training camps for paramilitaries were being established in Chiapas, financed by the federal and state governments. Two prominent Chiapas members of the PRI responded by calling for Lopez y Rivas’ resignation from COCOPA for distorting the Chiapas reality and the duties of COCOPA. In the face of such criticism, Lopez y Rivas presented the evidence he had collected on paramilitary groups to the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic (PGR) and demanded a thorough investigation.

During the second meeting between representatives of civil society and the EZLN (May 8 and 9), the EZLN invited the national, state, regional and county coordinating groups of the national Zapatista referendum (held last March) to become contact bodies between the EZLN and civil society. This resulted in a subsequent state forum of civil society (June 20), in which more than 70 Mexican social organizations participated in order to plan follow-up efforts on the Zapatista referendum.

In July, four opposition parties plus Senator Pablo Salazar, who recently resigned from the PRI, signed an agreement to field a single candidate in the 2000 elections for governor of Chiapas. The new coalition, called the Movement of Hope, includes the National Action Party (PAN), the Democratic Revolutionary Party (PRD), the Green Ecology Party of Mexico (PVEM) and the Labor Party (PT). While the agreement does not stipulate who would be the candidate, Salazar has expressed his desire to run. Even as a PRI senator, he has been highly critical of government policy regarding the Chiapas conflict. The new coalition represents a potentially formidable challenge to the historic domination of the PRI in Chiapas politics.

In the report it presented to a meeting of the Latin American Bishops Conference, the Mexican Bishops Conference said that the Mexican government has utilized two strategies in the Chiapas conflict: wearing down the EZLN and marginalizing the Diocese of San Cristobal and its Bishops, Samuel Ruiz and Raul Vera. They added that the stalemate in the negotiations is owing to intolerance on both sides and the failure to carry out the San Andres Accords.

International Concern

In its 1998 Annual Report, Amnesty International confirmed that it continues to receive denunciations on human rights violations committed by the Federal Army and paramilitary groups tied to the Mexican government. They added that some of the most frequent violations involve political prisoners, harassment of leaders of non-governmental organizations and the expulsion of foreign observers.

Asylum was granted in the United States to former Mexican Army Captain Jesus Valles who had fled to the US in 1994. Basing her decision on human rights reports and expert testimony, the judge wrote, “There is reason to believe the Mexican government has killed innocent civilians and engaged in repressive military action” in Chiapas, and that Valles has “a well-founded fear of persecution” because of his “refusal to obey orders to kill captured EZLN rebels and engage in such repressive action.”

On July 1, the US Senate approved a foreign aid bill that included language expressing strong concern about the unresolved conflict in Chiapas. “The militarization of the region, including the violence perpetrated by pro-government paramilitary groups, has resulted in civilian casualties and has forced thousands to flee their homes.” Noting the lack of progress toward a resolution, the Senate statement urges the Mexican government to fix a date for the visit of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights and “to take steps to create conditions conducive to a political dialogue.”